THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

LITTLE  ROUND  TOP 

G  ETT  YSBURG ,  JULY  2,156  3 


The  Attack  and  Defense 
of  Little  Round   Top, 

Gettysburg,  July  2,  1863 


N- 


Frontispiece 


The  Attack  and  Defense 
of  Little  Round  Top, 

Gettysburg,  July  2,  1863 


By 

Oliver  Willcox  Norton 

Private  Three  Months  Volunteers  April  21  to  July  24, 
1861.  Private  Eighty-third  Penn.  Vol.  Inf.  Aug.  28,  1861 
to  Nov.  10,  1863.  First  Lieutenant  8th  TJ.  S.  C.  Inf.  Nov. 
10,  1863,  to  Nov.  10,  1865.  Post  Q.  M.  Ringgold  Barracks, 
Texas,  June  to  Nov.,  1865.  Chief  Q.  M.  Jackson's  Div. 
25th  A.  C.  June  to  Nov.,  1865.  Member  Geo.  H.  Thomas 
Post  No.  5,  G.  A.  R.  Dept.  of  111.  Member  and  Ex-Com 
mander  of  Illinois  Commandery  and  Member  of  the  Com- 
mandery  in  Chief  of  the  Military  Order  of  the  Loyal 
Legion  of  the  United  States. 


New  York 

The   Neale   Publishing  Company 
1913 


v  53 


Copyright,  1913,  by 
Oliver  Willcox  Norton 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I    INTRODUCTION  .     „     .     „     .     .     »    *  .    n     .     .     n 
II    THE  HISTORIANS  .  15 

III  THE  OFFICIAL  REPORTS — 

CONFEDERATE 141 

UNION  ............   181 

IV  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF  LITTLE  ROUND  TOP     .  253 
V    BIOGRAPHICAL 276 

VI    LETTERS  AND  PAPERS 292 

VII  THE  WARREN  LETTERS    .      ........  307 

VIII    APPOMATTOX ,  333 

IX    INDEX 345 


M178840 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

PORTRAIT  OF  O.  W.  NORTON Frontispiece 

FACING  PAGE 

PORTRAIT  OF  CAPT.  PORTER  FARLEY 126 

BRIGADE  HEADQUARTERS  FLAG 262 

POSITION  OF  VINCENT'S  BRIGADE 274 

PORTRAIT  OF  GEN.  STRONG  VINCENT 282 

PORTRAIT  OF  COL.  PATRICK  H.  O'RORKE  ....  288 
PORTRAIT  OF  GEN.  GOUVERNEUR  K.  WARREN  .  .  .  308 
PORTRAIT  OF  GEN.  JOSHUA  L.  CHAMBERLAIN  .  .  .  332 


FOREWORD 

THE  author  and  compiler  of  this  book  has  been  blind 
for  many  years.  This  infirmity  has  obliged  him  to  depend 
very  much  upon  the  assistance  of  others  in  the  preparation 
of  the  volume.  It  doubtless  contains  many  faults,  for 
which  he  craves  the  reader's  indulgence. 

He  acknowledges  with  gratitude  his  indebtedness  to  Cap 
tain  Porter  Farley  for  the  loan  of  his  admirable  paper  on 
the  part  taken  by  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York 
Volunteers  on  Little  Round  Top,  the  loan  of  personal  let 
ters  to  him  from  General  Warren,  General  Sykes,  the 
Comte  de  Paris,  and  Lieutenant  Roebling,  with  permission 
to  publish  them,  and  for  many  other  courtesies. 

To  Captain  Simeon  H.  Crane,  for  much  valuable  assist 
ance  in  research  work  among  the  numerous  books  and 
documents  relating  to  this  battle. 

To  my  secretary,  Mr.  Otis  P.  Swift,  for  constant,  in 
telligent  assistance  to  me  during  all  the  time  which  I  have 
spent  in  writing  this  book. 

To  Miss  Henrietta  Hyde,  who  has  been  my  personal 
stenographer  for  more  than  twenty-five  years,  for  her  care 
ful  and  painstaking  work  in  taking  my  dictation  of  the 
book. 

To  Miss  May  Sturdevant,  typewriter,  for  preparing  the 
copy  for  the  publisher. 

To  The  Neale  Publishing  Company  and  Mr.  William  C. 


io  FOREWORD 

Oates,  Jr.,  for  permission  to  publish  that  part  of  General 
William  C.  Gates'  book,  "  The  War  Between  the  Union  and 
the  Confederacy,"  which  relates  to  the  attack  on  Little 
Round  Top. 

To  General  Joshua  L.  Chamberlain,  for  permission  to 
publish  his  address  on  "  The  Third  Brigade  at  Appomat- 
tox." 


CHICAGO,  September,  1912. 


INTRODUCTION 

THIS  is  not  a  history  of  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  but 
an  attempt  to  describe  more  fully  and  accurately  than  has 
heretofore  been  done  that  part  of  the  battle  which  was 
fought  on  one  corner  of  the  field,  where,  more  than  in  any 
other  place,  the  fate  of  the  contest  between  the  two  armies 
was  decided.  On  July  i,  1863,  the  battle  was  between 
portions  of  each  army  only.  On  July  2  both  armies  had 
arrived  on  the  field.  The  main  attack  of  the  Confederates 
was  directed  against  the  left  of  the  Union  line.  Much  has 
been  written  in  regard  to  the  battle  on  and  about  Little 
Round  Top,  with  more  contradictory  statements  by  both 
Union  and  Confederate  writers  than  about  almost  any  other 
part  of  the  battle. 

The  author,  who  was  an  eye-witness  of  the  attack  and 
took  part  in  the  defense  on  this  part  of  the  line,  believes 
that  it  will  serve  to  give  a  better  idea  of  the  fight  on  Lit 
tle  Round  Top  if  in  connection  with  what  he  saw  and 
heard  he  presents  the  official  reports  of  the  Union  and  Con 
federate  officers  and  extracts  from  the  accounts  of  the 
leading  historians  which  relate  to  this  part  of  the  battle, 
with  his  comparison  and  criticism  of  these  documents,  to 
gether  with  some  important  letters  and  papers  not  hereto 
fore  published. 

It  is  nearly  half  a  century  since  the  battle  was  fought. 
The  greater  part  of  the  armies  which  contended  in  this, 
the  greatest  battle  of  the  war,  have  passed  over  the  river. 
It  should  be  possible  for  those  who  remain,  and  to  whom 
this  battle  is  a  memory  only,  to  recognize  the  sincerity  and 
the  valor  of  their  foes,  to  put  aside  all  hatred  and  prej- 

ii 


T21          THE:  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

udice,  and,  recognizing  that  we  are  all  Americans,  proud 
of  our  country,  treat  all  with  fairness  and  impartiality. 
In  what  the  author  has  to  say  he  hopes  to  do  this. 

This  attitude  will  not  oblige  him,  in  cases  where  writers 
have  in  his  opinion  deliberately  misrepresented  the  facts 
to  cover  their  own  misconduct,  to  refrain  from  pointing 
this  out.  On  the  other  hand,  he  believes  that  where 
writers  make  statements  with  which  he  cannot  agree,  but 
which  have  no  relation  to  their  own  conduct,  these  state 
ments  have  been  made  in  good  faith  as  the  result  of  the 
best  information  obtainable  at  the  time  they  were  writ 
ten. 

One  reason  why  such  incorrect  accounts  appear  is  prob 
ably  that  the  commanders  of  the  two  brigades  and  the  bat 
tery  which  fought  the  battle  for  the  defense  of  Little 
Round  Top, — •  Vincent,  Weed  and  Hazlett, —  were  killed 
or  mortally  wounded;  O'Rorke,  who  commanded  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  was  killed,  and  Rice, 
who  succeeded  Vincent  in  his  command  of  the  brigade,  was 
killed  in  battle  a  few  months  later.  Had  any  of  these 
lived  until  they  had  time  to  write  their  reminiscences  after 
the  war  the  accounts  might  have  been  very  different. 

General  Warren  played  a  most  important  part  in  this 
battle.  The  historians  have  credited  to  him  much  that  he 
never  claimed  for  himself.  He  made  no  official  report, 
and  died  in  1882,  before  any  of  the  histories  referred  to  in 
this  book  were  published.  A  few  months  ago  the  author 
was  permitted  to  see  and  copy  a  number  of  personal  let 
ters  from  General  Warren  relating  mostly  to  the  battle  on 
Little  Round  Top,  which  the  officer  to  whom  they  were 
written  has  kindly  permitted  the  author  to  publish.  These 
letters  were  never  intended  for  publication,  but  it  is  from 
just  such  letters  that  true  history  is  written.  They  reveal 
so  much  of  the  character  of  General  Warren,  his  patriot 
ism  and  his  love  for  the  men  who  died  on  Little  Round 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         13 

Top,  that  as  a  contribution  to  the  history  of  that  day  they 
should  be  given  to  the  public. 

There  is  no  part  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  the  great 
est  battle  of  the  Civil  War,  the  facts  in  regard  to  which 
have  been  less  understood,  because  more  misrepresented, 
than  the  struggle  for  the  possession  of  Little  Round  Top. 
Its  capture  by  the  Confederates  during  the  battle  of  the 
second  day  would  have  forced  Meade  to  abandon  his 
strong  position  in  disorderly  retreat.  Its  retention  by  the 
Union  army  made  that  position  secure.  There  is  a  gen 
eral  agreement  among  historians  and  writers  that  this  state 
ment  is  true;  but  here  the  agreement  ends.  No  two 
"writers  agree  in  their  statements  of  what  actually  took 
place. 

In  order  to  give  the  reader  a  basis  for  a  better  under 
standing  of  the  facts,  I  purpose  to  give  all  the  official  re 
ports  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  officers  engaged  on 
this  part  of  the  field,  extracts  from  the  writings  of  leading 
historians  and  others,  with  my  own  account  and  some  hith 
erto  unpublished  letters  and  papers,  which  I  think  will 
convince  a  careful  reader  that  in  many  respects  the  gen 
erally  accepted  accounts  are  erroneous. 

I  have  no  doubt  that  it  will  seem  presumptuous  in  a 
private  soldier  to  come  forward  nearly  half  a  century  after 
the  battle  and  contradict  the  statements  of  so  many  writers 
much  abler  than  himself.  There  is  some  justification  for 
this  attempt  in  the  fact  that  these  writers  contradict  one  an 
other.  Although  a  private  soldier,  I  was  at  the  time  of 
the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  and  for  some  time  before  and 
after,  on  detached  service  at  the  Headquarters  of  the 
Third  Brigade,  First  Division,  Fifth  Army  Corps,  com 
manded  when  the  battle  began  by  Colonel  Strong  Vincent. 
I  was  brigade  bugler,  mounted,  and  bearer  of  the  brigade 
headquarters  flag.  As  such,  it  was  my  duty  to  keep 
near  the  brigade  commander,  following  him  closely  where- 


14     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

ever  he  went,  when  the  army  was  on  the  march  or  moving 
about  a  battlefield. 

Each  brigade  in  the  army  had  a  distinctive  headquar 
ters  flag,  bearing  the  corps  badge,  and  by  a  different  ar 
rangement  of  its  red,  white,  and  blue  colors  enabling  a 
staff  officer  or  any  other  person  familiar  with  the  system 
to  tell  from  any  distance  at  which  it  could  be  clearly  seen 
the  organization  to  which  it  belonged  and  where  he  could 
find  its  commander.  This  duty  gave  me  a  better  oppor 
tunity  than  even  the  officers  of  the  brigade  staff  enjoyed,  to 
see  what  occurred  and  hear  verbal  orders  given  or  re 
ceived.  The  officers  of  the  staff  were  frequently  absent 
at  intervals,  conveying  orders  or  seeking  information, 
while  I  remained  constantly  with  the  brigade  commander. 

My  recollection  of  what  I  saw  and  heard  that  day  is  as 
clear  and  distinct  as  that  of  any  event  in  my  life.  Since 
the  discovery  by  me,  about  a  year  since,  of  a  large  num 
ber  of  letters  from  General  Warren,  General  Sykes,  the 
Comte  de  Paris,  and  others  never  before  published,  throw 
ing  a  new  light  on  the  subject,  which  the  recipient  has 
kindly  given  me  permission  to  publish,  I  have  been  making 
a  careful  examination  of  all  the  literature  which  I  have 
been  able  to  find  relating  to  this  part  of  the  battle,  with  the 
purpose  of  collecting  and  presenting  these  various  accounts 
to  the  public  in  convenient  form  for  comparison  and  refer 
ence,  in  connection  with  my  own  recollections.  The  of 
ficial  reports  are  necessarily  fragmentary.  This  is  es 
pecially  true  of  the  Confederate  reports.  I  have  not  been 
able  to  find  any  reports  made  at  the  time  by  the  division 
commanders  of  either  Hood's  or  McLaws'  divisions.  In 
my  account  of  their  movements  it  is  necessary  to  depend 
on  the  few  brigade  and  regimental  reports  which  are  avail 
able. 


II 

THE  HISTORIANS 

IN  addition  to  my  own  account,  with  the  official  reports 
of  the  commanders  of  Union  and  Confederate  troops  which 
were  engaged  in  this  part  of  the  battle,  and  letters  and 
papers  not  heretofore  published,  I  have  made  extracts  from 
the  following  books: 

William  Swinton,  "  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  " ;  Abner  Doubleday,  "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettys 
burg  " ;  Comte  de  Paris,  "  The  Civil  War  in  America  " ; 
Francis  A.  Walker,  "  History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps  " ; 
Henry  J.  Hunt,  in  "  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil 
War  " ;  Regis  de  Trobriand,  "  Four  Years  with  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac";  William  H.  Powell,  "  The  Fifth  Army 
Corps  ";  J.  M.  Vanderslice,  "  Gettysburg  Then  and  Now  "; 
J.  H.  Stine,  "  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  ";  R. 
K.  Beecham,  "  Gettysburg,  the  Pivotal  Battle  of  the  Civil 
War  " ;  William  C.  Gates,  "  The  War  Between  the  Union 
and  the  Confederacy  " ;  Edward  M.  Law,  C.  S.  A.,  in  "  Bat 
tles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War." 

A  comparison  of  the  accounts  in  these  books  shows  that 
no  two  of  them  agree  in  their  description  of  what  took 
place  on  Little  Round  Top.  With  such  differences  they 
cannot  all  be  right.  With  due  deference  and  crediting 
the  authors  with  the  intention  to  state  the  facts,  I  think  that 
in  important  particulars  not  one  has  succeeded.  No  one 
can  deny  the  importance  of  the  part  which  General  War 
ren  performed  in  the  emergency,  but  nearly  all  the  writers, 
excluding,  of  course,  the  Confederates,  have  attributed  to 
him  things  which  he  did  not  do  and  which  he  never  claimed 
to  have  done,  as  I  will  show  later  by  direct  statements 

IS 


16     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

from  Warren  himself.  Not  one  of  them  credits  Colonel 
Vincent  with  his  action  in  taking  the  responsibility  — 
when  he  knew  that  General  Sykes  had  ordered  a  brigade  of 
Barnes'  division  to  be  sent  to  Little  Round  Top  —  of  tak 
ing  his  brigade  there  without  waiting  for  an  order  from 
his  division  commander,  who  was  not  present.  Had  Vin 
cent  waited  to  be  detached,  or  to  receive  his  order  through 
the  usual  channel,  he  would  have  arrived  at  his  position 
on  Little  Round  Top  too  late.  The  enemy  would  have 
been  in  possession  and  the  men  who  arrived  almost  as  soon 
as  Vincent  was  in  position  could  not  have  been  driven  off. 
However,  let  the  historians  speak  for  themselves. 

WILLIAM  SWINTON,  "  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 
POTOMAC,"  pp.  346-348 

"  Fortunately,  at  the  time  Hood  made  his  attack,  Gen 
eral  Warren,  chief  engineer,  happened  to  reach  Little 
Round  Top.  The  summit  of  this  hill  had  been  used  as  a 
signal  station,  and  at  the  moment  of  his  arrival  the  signal 
officers  suddenly  seeing  that  the  enemy  had  penetrated  be 
tween  Round  Top  and  the  left  of  Sickles'  line,  and  was 
approaching  their  position,  were  folding  up  their  flags  to 
leave;  but  Warren,  commanding  them  to  continue  waving 
them  so  as  to  make  at  least  a  show  on  the  hill,  hastened  to 
seek  some  force  wherewith  to  occupy  this  important  point. 
It  happened  at  this  pregnant  moment  that  the  head  of 
Sykes'  column,  which  had  been  ordered  over  to  the  left, 
reached  this  vicinity,  and  the  leading  division  of  this  corps 
under  General  Barnes  was  then  passing  out  to  reinforce 
Sickles.  General  Warren  assumed  the  responsibility  of  de 
taching  from  this  force  the  brigade  of  Vincent,  and  this 
he  hurried  up  to  hold  the  position,  while  Hazlett's  battery 
was  by  enormous  labor  dragged  and  lifted  by  hand  up  the 
rocky  brow  of  the  hill  and  planted  on  its  summit.  As 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         17 

these  events  followed  in  quick  succession,  it  resulted  that 
while  that  part  of  Hood's  force  that  had  penetrated  to  the 
left  of  the  line  was  approaching  the  front  slope  of  the  Lit 
tle  Round  Top,  which  in  a  few  moments  would  have  been 
seized  by  it,  other  claimants  were  hurrying  up  its  rear. 
Vincent's  men,  thrown  forward  at  the  pas  de  course,  and 
without  time  to  load,  reached  the  crest  just  as  Hood's 
Texans,  advancing  in  column  and  without  skirmishers, 
were  running  to  gain  it. 

"  Little  Round  Top  —  the  prize  so  eagerly  coveted  by 
both  combatants  —  is  a  bold  and  rocky  spur  of  the  lofty 
and  peaked  hill  Round  Top.  It  is  impossible  to  conceive 
a  scene  of  greater  wildness  and  desolation  than  is  presented 
by  its  bare  and  mottled  figure,  up-piled  with  granite  ledges 
and  masses  of  rock  and  strewn  with  mighty  boulders  that 
might  be  the  debris  of  some  antique  combat  of  the  Titans. 

"  Here  there  ensued  one  of  those  mortal  struggles  rare 
in  war,  when  the  hostile  forces,  clenching  in  close  contest, 
illustrate  whatever  there  is  of  savage  and  terrible  in  bat 
tle.  Vincent's  brigade,  composed  of  the  Sixteenth  Michi 
gan  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Welsh),  the  Forty- fourth  New 
York  (Colonel  Rice),  the  Eighty- third  Pennsylvania, 
(Captain  Woodward),  and  the  Twentieth  Maine  (Colonel 
Chamberlain),  coming  quickly  into  position,  engaged  Hood's 
troops  in  a  hand-to-hand  conflict,  in  which  bayonets  were 
crossed  and  muskets  clubbed ;  and  officers,  seizing  the  rifles 
dropped  from  dead  hands,  joined  in  the  fray.  After  half 
an  hour  of  this  desperate  work  the  position  was  secured. 
Meantime,  Weed's  brigade  of  Ayres'  division  of  the  Fifth 
corps  took  part  on  Vincent's  right  on  Little  Round  Top. 
The  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  of  this  brigade 
had  gone  up  simultaneously  with  Hazlett's  battery  and  par 
ticipated  in  the  engagement.  Hood's  men,  however,  clung 
fast  to  the  rocky  glen  at  the  base  of  the  hill,  and,  working 
their  way  up  the  ravine  between  the  Round  Tops,  sue- 


i8     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

ceeded  in  turning  the  left  flank.  The  ammunition  of  Vin 
cent's  troops  was  already  exhausted.  It  therefore  became 
necessary  to  use  the  steel,  and  the  enemy  was  driven  from 
this  point  by  a  charge  with  the  bayonet  by  Colonel  Cham 
berlain's  Maine  regiment.  Yet  this  rocky  bulwark  was 
not  secured  without  a  heavy  sacrifice.  Colonel  Vincent, 
who  had  so  heroically  met  the  first  shock,  laid  down  his 
life  in  defense  of  the  position;  O'Rorke  and  the  much-be 
loved  General  Weed  were  killed;  Hazlett,  who  commanded 
the  battery,  also  fell  at  his  perilous  post;  and  among  the 
ledges  of  rocks  lay  many  hundred  dead  soldiers  in  blue. 
:<  The  onset  of  Hood  and  McLaws  upon  Birney's  front 
was  made  with  great  vigor,  compelling  General  Sickles 
immediately  to  call  for  reinforcements;  and  it  was  in  re 
sponse  to  this  request  that  General  Barnes'  division  of  the 
Fifth  corps  had  been  thrown  out  in  support  at  the  time 
General  Warren  detached  from  this  division  the  brigade 
of  Vincent  to  hold  Little  Round  Top.  Its  other  two  bri 
gades,  under  Colonels  Tilton  and  Sweitzer,  hastened  to  the 
support  of  Birney's  hard-pressed  troops  on  the  advanced 
line;  and  General  Humphreys,  who  held  the  right  of  the 
Third  corps,  but  had  not  yet  been  attacked,  sent  one  of  his 
own  brigades  under  Colonel  Burling  to  still  further  help." 

Swinton  appears  to  have  obtained  his  account  of  this 
part  of  the  battle  from  various  sources.  He  has  con 
fused  the  time  and  order  of  events  and  the  movements  of 
troops,  so  much  as  to  give  a  wrong  impression.  He  at 
tributes  to  Vincent's  brigade  the  timely  arrival  on  the 
crest  of  the  hill  and  the  charge  down  the  western  slope 
which  drove  the  Confederates  from  this  part  of  the  line. 
This  was  the  work  of  Colonel  O'Rorke  and  his  regiment, 
the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York.  This  was  not 
the  first  attack  on  the  Union  position,  but  was  the  last. 
The  first  attack  was  made  by  the  Fourth  and  Forty-eighth 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         19 

Alabama  of  Law's  brigade  and  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas 
of  Robertson's  brigade,  which  came  up  the  swale  on  the 
north  side  of  Big  Round  Top  and  attacked  the  center  of 
Vincent's  brigade  posted  on  the  southern  slope  of  the  hill. 
A  desperate  fight  had  taken  place  there,  lasting  half  an 
hour.  During  this  time  the  other  brigades  of  Hood's  di 
vision  had  been  assaulting  Ward's  brigade  and  Smith's 
battery  at  the  Devil's  Den.  Ward  maintained  his  position 
for  some  time,  and  it  was  not  until  he  had  been  forced 
back  that  the  way  was  open  for  the  Confederates,  who  had 
been  driven  back  by  Vincent,  to  make  their  way  north 
ward  along  the  Plum  Run  valley  east  of  the  Devil's  Den 
to  a  point  from  which  they  could  ascend  the  west  front 
of  Little  Round  Top,  outflanking  the  Sixteenth  Michigan 
on  Vincent's  right  and  driving  it  in.  The  timely  arrival 
of  O'Rorke  and  his  men  repelled  this  attack  and  saved  the 
day  on  that  part  of  our  line.  Meantime  the  Fifteenth 
and  Forty-seventh  Alabama,  which  had  come  over  the  top 
of  Big  Round  Top,  attacked  Vincent's  left  flank,  held  by 
the  Twentieth  Maine  under  Chamberlain. 

Warren  did  not  arrive  on  Little  Round  Top  at  the  time 
Hood's  division  made  this  attack.  He  arrived  at  least  an 
hour  before  this.  When  he  arrived  the  enemy  was  not 
in  sight.  Warren,  having  been  informed  by  the  signal  of 
ficer  that  he  thought  he  had  seen  the  enemy  in  the  woods 
between  Plum  Run  and  the  Emmittsburg  road,  directed 
Smith's  battery  to  fire  a  shot  in  that  direction.  The  invol 
untary  movement  of  the  men  concealed  in  the  woods  as 
this  shot  whistled  over  them,  and  the  reflection  of  the  sun 
light  on  their  bright  bayonets  and  gun  barrels,  revealed  to 
Warren  a  long  line  of  the  enemy  in  position  far  outflank 
ing  Birney's  line.  Soon  after  this  the  batteries  of  Hood's 
and  McLaws'  divisions  opened  fire  on  Birney,  whose  bat 
teries  responded,  and  this  cannonade  continued,  according 
to  different  accounts,  for  from  fifteen  minutes  to  half  an 


20     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

hour  before  the  infantry  advanced.  Warren  did  not  leave 
the  hill,  but  sent  Lieutenant  Mackenzie,  one  of  the  three 
young  engineer  officers  on  his  staff,  asking  for  a  brigade 
to  occupy  Little  Round  Top.  Sickles  replied  that  he  could 
not  spare  any,  but  Sykes  promised  to  send  a  brigade.  A 
long  time  after  Barnes'  division  went  to  the  front  Weed's 
brigade  of  Ayres'  division  came  along.  Seeing  the  im 
minent  danger,  Warren  left  the  hill  and,  detaching  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  from  the  rear  of  this 
brigade,  sent  it  to  the  crest  of  Little  Round  Top  under  the 
guidance  of  Lieutenant  Roebling,  another  one  of  his  staff. 
Warren  did  not  return  to  the  hill,  but  rode  away  to  report 
to  General  Meade. 

The  reader  of  Swinton's  account  cannot  gather  from  it 
the  proper  sequence  of  events.  It  would  appear  that  Weed's 
brigade  took  part  in  this  engagement.  Except  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  it  did  not  get  into  posi 
tion  on  the  hill  until  all  the  close  fighting  was  done.  Weed 
and  Hazlett  were  killed  by  sharpshooters  firing  at  long 
range  after  the  Confederates  had  abandoned  the  hill,  to 
return  no  more.  For  confirmation  of  my  statements,  see 
letters  1  of  Warren,  Roebling,  and  Mackenzie,  and  Sykes' 
official  report. 

GENERAL  ABNER  DOUBLEDAY  :   "  CHANCELLORSVILLE 
AND  GETTYSBURG,"  p.  168 

"  General  Warren,  who  was  on  Meade's  staff  as  chief 
engineer,  had  ridden  ...  to  the  signal  station  on 
Little  Round  Top  to  get  a  better  view  of  the  field.  He 
saw  the  long  line  of  the  enemy  approaching  and  about  to 
overlap  Ward's  left,  and  perceived  that  unless  prompt  suc 
cor  arrived  Little  Round  Top  would  fall  into  their  hands. 

1  For  these  letters — to  which  frequent  mention  will  be  made  in  this 
work— see  pp.  292,  307-329,  330.  Sykes'  report  will  be  found  on  pp. 
j8i-i86T 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        21 

Once  in  their  possession  they  would  flank  our  whole  line 
and  post  guns  there  to  drive  our  troops  from  the  ridge; 
so  that  this  eminence  was  in  reality  the  key  of  the  battle 
field  and  must  be  held  at  all  hazards.  He  saw  Barnes'  di 
vision,  which  Sykes  had  ordered  forward,  formed  for  a 
charge  and  about  to  go  to  the  relief  of  De  Trobriand,  who 
held  the  center  of  Birney's  line  and  who  was  sorely  beset. 
Without  losing  a  moment  he  rode  down  the  slope,  over  to 
Barnes,  took  the  responsibility  of  detaching  Vincent's  bri 
gade,  and  hurried  it  back  to  take  post  on  Little  Round  Top. 
He  then  sent  a  staff  officer  to  inform  General  Meade  of 
what  he  had  done  and  to  represent  the  immense  importance 
of  holding  this  commanding  point. 

"  The  victorious  column  of  the  enemy  was  subjected  to 
the  fire  of  a  battery  on  Little  Round  Top  and  to  another 
farther  to  the  right,  but  it  kept  on,  went  around  Ward's 
brigade  and  rushed  eagerly  up  the  ravine  between  the  two 
Round  Tops  to  seize  Little  Round  Top,  which  seemed  to 
be  defenseless.  Vincent's  brigade  rapidly  formed  on  the 
crest  of  a  small  spur  which  juts  out  from  the  hill,  and,  not 
having  time  to  load,  advanced  with  the  bayonets  in  time 
to  save  the  height.  The  contest  soon  became  furious  and 
the  rocks  were  alive  with  musketry.  General  Vincent  sent 
word  to  Barnes  that  the  enemy  were  on  him  in  overwhelm 
ing  numbers,  and  Hazlett's  regular  battery,  supported  by 
the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  under  Colonel 
O'Rorke  of  Weed's  brigade,  was  sent  as  a  reinforcement. 
The  battery  was  dragged  with  great  labor  to  the  crest  of 
Little  Round  Top,  and  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  were 
posted  on  the  slope  on  Vincent's  right.  They  came  upon  the 
field  just  as  the  rebels,  after  failing  to  penetrate  the  center, 
had  driven  back  the  right.  In  advancing  to  this  exposed 
position  Colonel  O'Rorke,  a  brilliant  young  officer  who 
had  just  graduated  at  the  head  of  his  class  at  West 
Point,  was  killed  and  his  men  thrown  into  some  confusion ; 


22     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

but  Vincent  rallied  the  line  and  repulsed  the  assault.  In 
doing  so  he  exposed  himself  very  much,  and  was  soon 
killed  by  a  rebel  sharpshooter.  General  Weed,  who  was 
on  the  crest  with  the  battery,  was  mortally  wounded  in  the 
same  way,  and  as  Hazlett  leaned  over  to  hear  his  last 
message  a  fatal  bullet  struck  him  also,  and  he  dropped  dead 
on  the  body  of  his  chief.  Colonel  Rice,  of  the  Forty- 
fourth  New  York,  now  took  command  in  place  of  Vincent. 
The  enemy,  having  been  foiled  at  the  center  and  right, 
stole  around  through  the  woods  and  turned  the  left  of  the 
line,  but  Chamberlain's  regiment,  the  Twentieth  Maine, 
was  folded  back  by  him  around  the  rear  of  the  mountain 
to  resist  the  attack.  The  rebels  came  on  like  wolves,  with 
deafening  yells  and  forced  Chamberlain's  men  over  the 
crest,  but  they  rallied  and  drove  their  assailants  back  in 
their  turn.  This  was  twice  repeated,  and  then  a  brigade 
of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves  and  one  of  the  Fifth  corps 
dashed  over  the  hill.  The  Twentieth  Maine  made  a  grand 
final  charge  and  drove  the  rebels  from  the  valley  between 
the  Round  Tops,  capturing  a  large  number  of  prisoners. 
Not  a  moment  too  soon,  for  Chamberlain  had  lost  a  third 
of  his  command  and  was  entirely  out  of  ammunition. 
Vincent's  men  in  this  affair  took  two  colonels,  fifteen  of 
ficers,  and  five  hundred  men  prisoners,  and  a  thousand 
stand  of  arms.  Hill  in  his  official  report  says,  '  Hood's 
right  was  held  as  in  a  vise.' ' 

Doubleday's  account  is  more  nearly  correct  than  some  of 
the  others,  but  he  makes  one  error,  when  he  says  that  "  Gen 
eral  Warren,  who  was  on  Meade's  staff  as  chief  engineer, 
had  ridden  about  this  time  to  the  signal  station  on  Little 
Round  Top  to  get  a  better  view  of  the  field.  He  saw  the 
long  line  of  the  enemy  approaching  and  about  to  overlap 
Ward's  left,  and  perceived  that  unless  prompt  succor  ar 
rived  Little  Round  Top  would  fall  into  their  hands.  Once 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        23 

in  their  possession,  they  would  flank  our  whole  line  and 
post  guns  there  to  drive  our  troops  from  the  ridge;  so 
that  this  eminence  was  in  reality  the  key  of  the  battlefield 
and  must  be  held  at  all  hazards.  He  saw  Barnes'  division, 
which  Sykes  had  ordered  forward,  formed  for  a  charge 
and  about  to  go  to  the  relief  of  De  Trobriand,  who  held 
the  center  of  Birney's  line  and  who  was  sorely  beset. 
Without  losing  a  moment  he  rode  down  the  slope,  over  to 
Barnes,  took  the  responsibility  of  detaching  Vincent's  bri 
gade  and  hurried  it  back  to  take  post  on  Little  Round  Top. 
He  then  sent  a  staff  officer  to  inform  General  Meade  of 
what  he  had  done  and  to  represent  the  immense  importance 
of  holding  this  commanding  point." 

This  statement  about  his  taking  the  responsibility  of  de 
taching  Vincent's  brigade  and  hurrying  it  back  to  take  post 
on  Little  Round  Top  is  imaginary.  (See  Warren's  let 
ters  to  Captain  Farley,1  and  Lieutenant  Mackenzie's  letter 
to  General  Meade.2)  Doubleday  may  have  been  well  in 
formed  about  the  first  day's  battle,  but  he  makes  no  claim 
to  have  been  with  the  troops  on  the  left  during  the  second 
day,  and  apparently  got  his  information  of  what  took  place 
there,  at  least  to  some  extent,  from  rumors  sent  in  by  what 
was  called  in  the  war  time  "  the  grapevine  telegraph." 

COMTE  DE  PARIS  :  "  THE  CIVIL  WAR  IN  AMERICA," 
VOL.  in,  pp.  615-632 

"  About  a  quarter  to  four  o'clock  Warren,  following 
Meade's  instructions,  had  reached  this  hill  [Little  Round 
Top],  and  was  climbing  it  for  the  purpose  of  surveying 
the  country.  The  officers  of  the  signal  corps  stationed  on 
the  top  having  informed  him  that  they  thought  they  had 
seen  the  enemy's  lines  in  the  woods  between  Plum  Run 
and  the  Emmittsburg  road,  he  had  ordered  Smith's  bat 
tery  to  fire  a  shot  in  that  direction.  Just  as  the  projectile 
1  Pp.  307-329  infra.  *  P.  292  infra. 


24     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

passed  whistling  above  the  trees  all  the  Confederate  sol 
diers  had  instinctively  raised  their  heads,  and  this  simul 
taneous  movement  being  communicated  to  the  polished 
arms  they  held  in  their  hands,  Warren  had  caught  their 
reflection  like  a  streak  of  lightning,  winding  with  a  long 
trail  among  the  leaves.  This  momentary  apparition  had 
been  a  revelation  to  him;  he  had  divined  the  danger  which 
menaced  Little  Round  Top,  and  understood  by  the  same 
token  the  importance  of  this  position. 

"  It  was  necessary  to  hasten  in  order  to  find  defenders 
for  it.  Following  in  the  wake  of  Sykes,  who  had  just 
crossed  the  hill  on  foot  with  Barnes'  division,  he  had  found 
him  near  the  wheat-field  completing  the  reconnoissance  of 
which  we  have  spoken.  The  commander  of  the  Fifth  corps 
had  immediately  ordered  Colonel  Vincent,  who  was  in  com 
mand  of  Barnes'  Third  brigade,  to  proceed  to  occupy  the 
foot  of  Little  Round  Top;  Hazlett's  battery  was  to  co-op 
erate  with  him.  Warren,  going  in  advance  of  them,  had 
reached  his  post  of  observation  to  witness  the  first  attack 
of  Law  against  the  four  regiments  which  alone  are  defend 
ing  the  gorge  of  Plum  Run.  One  moment  later  the  bulk 
of  these  troops  was  falling  back  upon  the  flank  of  the 
Devil's  Den  hill,  while  a  party  of  sharpshooters  was  trying 
to  find  shelter  among  the  rocks  scattered  along  the  western 
flank  of  Little  Round  Top.  The  Confederates  were  has 
tening  in  pursuit  of  them;  their  projectiles  already  reached 
the  elevated  post  whence  Warren  was  watching  this  excit 
ing  scene.  He  could  not,  however,  see  Vincent's  brigade, 
which,  encompassing  the  hill  at  the  west,  had  disappeared 
in  the  woods. 

"  This  position,  easy  to  defend  and  impossible  to  recap 
ture,  whose  importance  Warren  alone  seems  to  have  then 
understood,  was  therefore  about  to  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy,  without  striking  a  blow.  The  young  general 
of  engineers  makes  a  last  effort  to  save  it.  He  directs  the 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        25 

officers  of  the  signal  corps,  who  are  preparing  to  abandon 
a  post  without  defenders,  to  continue  waving  their  flags, 
in  spite  of  the  enemy's  fire,  in  order  to  deceive  him  and  de 
tain  him  for  a  few  moments  while  he  is  going  to  ask  for 
assistance  from  a  body  of  troops  whose  column  he  sees 
moving  along  the  road  followed  a  short  time  since  by 
Barnes.  It  is  the  Third  brigade  of  Ayres'  division  of  the 
Fifth  corps,  under  command  of  General  Weed,  and  is  pre 
ceding  the  rest  of  the  division  at  a  considerable  distance. 
Weed  has  gone  forward  in  advance  to  ask  for  instructions 
from  Sickles;  but  the  first  regiment  that  Warren  en 
counters  is  commanded  by  Colonel  O'Rorke,  his  friend  and 
during  a  certain  period  of  time  his  subordinate,  who  does 
not  hesitate  to  respond  to  the  pressing  demands  of  his 
former  chief.  While  the  rest  of  the  brigade  is  continuing 
its  march,  O'Rorke  causes  the  column  of  the  One  Hundred 
and  Fortieth  New  York,  which,  fortunately,  is  of  consider 
able  strength,  to  scale  directly  the  acclivities  of  Little 
Round  Top. 

"  During  this  time  Vincent,  hastening  the  pace  of  his 
soldiers,  has  reached  the  southern  extremity  of  this  same 
hill.  On  this  side  it  is  not  so  steep  as  on  the  other  sides, 
being  prolonged  by  a  ridge  which  about  halfway  presents 
a  horizontal  stretch  of  nearly  one  hundred  yards  in  length, 
descending  thence  by  gentle  gradations  as  far  as  the  foot 
of  the  large  Round  Top.  This  ridge  affords  an  excellent 
position  to  Vincent  for  barring  the  passage  to  Law's  sol 
diers,  who  are  rapidly  advancing  in  his  direction.  He 
posts  himself  along  the  western  slope,  with  the  Sixteenth 
Michigan  on  the  right,  below  the  very  summit  of  the  hill, 
the  Forty-fourth  New  York  and  the  Eighty-third  Penn 
sylvania  in  the  center,  and  the  Twentieth  Maine,  under 
Colonel  Chamberlain,  on  the  left,  along  the  extremity  of 
the  ridge.  These  troops  could  not  have  arrived  more  op 
portunely. 


26     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

"  Hood,  after  being  for  some  time  held  stationary  by 
the  difficulty  of  keeping  his  soldiers  in  the  ranks  under  the 
fire  of  a  Federal  battery  posted  at  the  bottom  of  the  gorge, 
has  at  last  reached  the  foot  of  Little  Round  Top,  which  he 
points  out  to  them  as  a  prey  thenceforth  easily  captured. 
A  great  yell  goes  up  from  the  ranks  of  the  assailants,  who 
rush  with  impetuosity  upon  the  center  of  Vincent's  bri 
gade.  But  upon  this  ground  all  the  advantages  are  in 
favor  of  the  defense,  while  the  fire  of  the  Unionists,  shel 
tered  among  its  inaccessible  recesses,  stops  the  Confeder 
ates,  who  stumble  at  every  step  they  take  in  their  efforts 
to  reach  them.  They  do  not  turn  back  on  that  account, 
but,  posting  themselves  in  their  turn  behind  the  rocks,  en 
gage  in  a  murderous  encounter  with  Vincent's  brigade, 
which  defends  itself  almost  at  the  point  of  the  muzzle. 

"  Law,  seeing  the  resistance  which  this  small  band 
makes  in  front  of  him,  determines  to  turn  it.  He  extends 
his  left  for  the  purpose  of  outflanking  the  Sixteenth  Michi 
gan,  and  attacks  it  with  so  much  vigor  that  it  cannot  re 
sist  the  onslaught.  The  situation  is  becoming  serious  for 
the  Federals;  Vincent  is  entirely  isolated  from  the  rest  of 
the  army,  and  no  longer  protects  the  principal  point  of  the 
position,  the  summit  of  Little  Round  Top,  on  which  the 
officers  of  the  signal  corps  are  bravely  continuing  to  wave 
their  colors. 

"  At  the  very  moment  when  the  Sixteenth  Michigan  is 
succumbing,  O'Rorke's  soldiers,  by  a  really  providential 
coincidence,  reach  at  a  full  run  this  summit  which  Warren 
points  out  to  them  as  the  citadel  to  be  preserved  at  any 
cost. 

At  their  feet  lies  the  vast  battlefield,  whence  are 
heard  vague  noises  and  savage  cries,  the  rattling  of  mus 
ketry,  the  cannon's  roar,  and  where  all  the  incidents  of  the 
combat  are  seen  through  a  cloud  of  smoke;  but  they  have 
no  leisure  to  contemplate  this  spectacle,  for  they  find  them- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        27 

selves  face  to  face  with  Law's  soldiers,  who  are  climbing 
the  hill  on  the  opposite  side.  A  few  minutes'  delay  among 
the  Federals  would  have  sufficed  to  put  the  Confederates  in 
possession  of  the  summit.  Never  perhaps  was  seen  the 
winner  of  a  race  secure  such  a  prize  at  so  little  cost.  The 
Unionists,  although  surprised,  do  not,  however,  hesitate. 
They  have  time  neither  to  form  in  line  of  battle  nor  even 
to  load  their  guns  or  fix  bayonets.  O'Rorke  calls  them 
and  pushes  them  forward.  A  large  number  of  them  fall 
at  the  fire  of  the  enemy;  the  rest  rush  down  upon  the  lat 
ter  at  a  run,  brandishing  their  muskets  aloft;  and  this 
movement  suffices  to  stop  the  Confederates.  The  Federals 
take  prisoners  those  among  the  assailants  who  had  been 
foremost  in  the  race,  and  open  a  brisk  fire  of  musketry 
upon  the  others.  Vincent's  right,  having  recovered  from 
its  check,  comes  to  their  assistance.  Hazlett's  battery  has 
scaled  Little  Round  Top,  with  the  One  Hundred  and  For 
tieth  New  York;  the  most  extraordinary  efforts,  together 
with  the  co-operation  of  a  portion  of  the  regiment,  have 
been  required  to  haul  the  pieces  of  artillery  as  far  as  the 
summit. 

"  Although  the  position  is  very  dangerous,  for  showers 
of  bullets  are  falling  around  the  guns,  which  cannot  be  de 
pressed  enough  to  reach  the  enemy  along  the  slope  which 
he  is  scaling,  Hazlett  boldly  takes  his  position  and  directs 
his  fire  against  the  Confederate  reserve  in  the  valley;  he 
knows  that  the  presence  of  his  guns  encourages  the  Union 
infantry.  The  Federal  line,  thus  strengthened,  presents  an 
impregnable  front  to  Hood's  assaults;  the  position  of  Lit 
tle  Round  Top  is  safe  for  the  present.  But  this  advantage 
has  been  dearly  bought;  in  a  few  minutes  the  One  Hun 
dred  and  Fortieth  New  York  has  lost  more  than  one  hun 
dred  men,  a  large  number  of  officers  being  wounded.  The 
valiant  O'Rorke  has  paid  with  his  life  for  the  example  of 
bravery  which  he  set  to  his  soldiers.  Having  left  West 


28     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Point  two  years  previously  with  the  highest  honors,  he  had 
been  destined,  in  the  judgment  of  all  his  comrades,  for 
the  most  elevated  positions  in  the  army. 

"  A  personal  and  desperate  struggle  takes  place  along 
the  whole  front  of  the  two  bodies  of  troops.  They  watch 
each  other,  and  aim  from  behind  the  rocks  and  bushes; 
some  of  the  combatants  are  seen  here  and  there  climbing 
trees  in  order  to  secure  a  better  shot;  the  balls  whistle  in 
every  direction ;  two  pieces  of  Smith's  Federal  battery  take 
the  line  of  the  assailants  obliquely,  throwing  shells  into 
their  midst.  The  dead  and  wounded  disappear  among  the 
rocks.  On  both  sides  the  officers  perform  prodigies  of 
valor,  for  they  feel  the  importance  of  the  disputed  posi 
tion.  Law  is  not  satisfied  with  musketry-fire,  which  may 
be  prolonged  without  any  decisive  success;  he  wishes  to 
pierce  the  enemy's  line,  and  brings  back  against  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  the  soldiers  of  his  com 
mand  who  had  been  stopped  by  the  unexpected  arrival 
of  this  regiment;  but  Vincent,  who  had  assumed  com 
mand  of  the  whole  line,  hastens  with  a  few  reinforcements 
and  the  attack  is  repulsed. 

"  The  combatants  are  beginning  to  be  exhausted  on 
both  sides;  the  Federals  have  seen  Vincent  fall  gloriously 
with  a  large  number  of  his  men;  the  losses  of  the  Confed 
erates  are  also  heavy;  the  most  serious  one  is  that  of  Hood, 
who,  being  always  at  the  post  of  danger,  has  been  badly 
wounded  in  the  arm.  .  . 

"  Reinforcements,  equally  needful,  arrive  about  the  same 
time  on  the  extreme  Federal  left,  in  front  of  Little 
Round  Top.  Before  the  combat  had  begun  at  this  point 
Sykes  had  directed  Ayres'  division  toward  this  position; 
Weed's  brigade,  which  preceded  the  other  two  at  a  con 
siderable  distance,  had  been  turned  aside,  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  commander  of  the  Fifth  corps,  by  a 
pressing  call  from  Sickles,  and  it  was  going  to  the  assist 
ance  of  the  Third  corps  when  Warren  went  to  seek 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        29 

O'Rorke  and  his  regiment.  As  soon  as  Sykes  was  in 
formed  of  this  fact,  he  ordered  Weed,  who  had  not  yet 
fallen  into  line,  to  return  with  all  possible  haste  to  take 
the  position  already  occupied  by  the  One  Hundred  and 
Fortieth  New  York.  This  order  was  promptly  executed. 

"  Weed  reached  Little  Round  Top  at  the  moment  when 
Vincent  was  mortally  wounded  and  when  both  sides  were 
preparing  to  renew  the  struggle  which  had  been  tempo 
rarily  suspended.  He  takes  position  on  the  right  of  Vin 
cent's  brigade,  of  which  Colonel  Rice  has  assumed  the 
command,  thus  enabling  him  to  reinforce  his  left.  Cham 
berlain,  on  his  part,  in  order  to  keep  the  enemy  in  check, 
has  been  obliged  to  place  a  portion  of  the  Twentieth  Maine 
en  potence  above  the  defile  which  separates  the  two  sum 
mits.  It  is,  in  fact,  against  this  point  that  Law  directs  all 
his  efforts,  and  the  combat  is  resumed  with  fresh  vigor, 
without  allowing  Weed  time  to  deploy  his  battalions.  His 
soldiers,  having  speedily  recovered,  rush  to  the  assault  with 
the  earnestness  of  men  who  have  never  encountered  an  ob 
stacle  without  breaking  it  down.  He  strives  to  outflank 
the  Federal  line  in  order  to  reach  Little  Round  Top  by 
way  of  the  eastern  side  of  the  ridge;  his  troops  have  been 
under  less  fire  on  this  side,  but  they  have  to  do  with  the 
Twentieth  Maine,  which  defends  its  position  with  all  the 
vigor  of  the  strong  race  of  backwoodsmen  among  whom  it 
has  been  recruited;  again  they  fight  hand  to  hand,  the 
assailants  still  trying  to  turn  their  adversaries  during  the 
combat,  the  latter  prolonging  their  line  and  bringing  it  more 
and  more  to  the  rear,  in  order  to  frustrate  this  maneu 
ver.  .  .  . 

"  About  an  hour  since  we  left  the  two  parties  in  conflict 
along  the  flank  opposite  to  this  elevated  position,  and 
Law's  soldiers,  in  spite  of  their  reduced  number,  rushing 
against  the  Twentieth  Maine.  The  firing  of  musketry  is 
again  heard  along  the  whole  line.  Weed,  who  sets  an  ex 
ample  to  all  around  him,  is  mortally  wounded  near  Haz- 


30     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

lett's  battery,  whose  commander,  stooping  to  receive  his 
last  words,  is  struck  in  his  turn,  and  falls  lifeless  upon  the 
body  of  his  chief ;  nearly  all  the  superior  officers  are  either 
killed  or  wounded.  But  the  enemy  is  also  exhausted:  in 
order  to  surround  the  left  of  the  Federals  he  has  pro 
longed  his  line  to  too  great  an  extent.  Colonel  Chamber 
lain  takes  advantage  of  it  to  charge  the  enemy  in  his  turn. 
The  Confederates,  surprised  by  this  attack,  are  repulsed, 
leaving  behind  them  more  than  three  hundred  wounded 
and  prisoners. 

"  Chamberlain  has  scaled  the  slopes  of  the  Great  Round 
Top  \vith  a  few  soldiers  and  captured  a  squad  of  the  en 
emy  which  had  come  to  reconnoiter.  Fisher's  brigade 
joins  him  in  occupying  this  commanding  position,  thus 
closing  all  access  to  the  Confederates  at  this  point." 

1  The  Civil  War  in  America,"  by  the  Comte  de  Paris, 
is  generally  conceded  to  be  one  of  the  best,  if  not  the  best 
history  yet  written.  It  was  written  in  French,  apparently 
as  a  study  for  military  students.  It  has  the  merit  of  being 
impartial.  Other  histories,  whether  Union  or  Confeder 
ate,  almost  invariably  show  a  preference  for  one  side  or 
the  other  in  the  conflict.  The  Comte  de  Paris  and  two 
other  French  noblemen,  the  Prince  de  Joinville  and  the 
Due  de  Chartres,  came  to  the  United  States  and  tendered 
their  services  to  the  Government.  The  Due  de  Chartres 
was  a  younger  brother  of  the  Comte  de  Paris.  They  were 
grandsons  of  Louis  Philippe.  These  three  served  as  vol 
unteer  aides-de-camp  on  the  staff  of  General  McClellan  in 
1862.  The  Comte  de  Paris  was  the  legitimate  heir  to  the 
French  throne  as  next  in  succession  in  the  Bourbon  dy 
nasty.  He  was  a  trained  soldier,  and  gave  many  years 
of  careful  and  painstaking  work  to  this  history,  but  died 
before  he  had  finished  it.  While  he  was  writing  our  Gov 
ernment  gave  him  or  his  authorized  agent  every  facility 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         31 

for  inspecting  and  copying  official  records  and  documents. 
He  had  many  acquaintances  among  military  men,  especially 
Union  officers,  who  gladly  gave  him  all  the  assistance  in 
their  power.  (See  the  Warren  letters  and  the  letters  to 
Captain  Farley,1  which  will  give  an  idea  of  his  earnest  de 
sire  to  ascertain  the  facts  and  his  method  of  obtaining  in 
formation.)  The  work  in  French  was  published  in  six 
volumes,  which  are  consolidated  into  four  volumes  in  the 
English  translation.  The  work  ends  with  the  close  of  the 
campaigns  of  1863.  In  view  of  its  importance  and  gen 
eral  accuracy  I  have  quoted  at  greater  length  from  his  ac 
count  of  the  battle  at  Little  Round  Top  than  I  have  from 
some  other  writers.  With  some  hesitation  I  venture  to 
question  a  few  of  his  statements  which  I  think  are  not  quite 
in  accordance  with  the  facts.  They  are  very  few,  and  the 
wonder  is  that,  writing  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  he 
could  have  written  an  account  so  free  from  faults.  He 
has  done  better  than  some  of  our  own  historians  who  were 
officers  of  high  rank  and  present  in  the  battle. 

He  says  that  Warren,  following  Meade's  instructions, 
reached  Little  Round  Top  about  a  quarter  to  four  o'clock, 
and  by  a  shot  which  he  ordered  Smith's  battery  to  fire  into 
the  woods  between  Plum  Run  and  the  Emmittsburg  road, 
he  discovered  a  long  line  of  the  enemy  concealed  in  those 
woods.  I  think  the  time  of  Warren's  arrival  on  Little 
Round  Top  was  somewhat  earlier.  There  is  a  general 
agreement  among  the  Confederate  authorities  that  the  di 
visions  of  Hood  and  McLaws  were  in  position  by  3  p.  M., 
or  shortly  after,  each  with  four  batteries  of  artillery 
massed  on  its  left.  At  3 130  p.  M.  these  batteries  had 
opened  a  heavy  cannonade  on  the  Union  line,  which  was 
replied  to  by  the  Union  batteries  between  Little  Round  Top 
and  the  Peach  Orchard. 

The  Comte  de  Paris  says,  as  quoted  above :  "  Following 
in  the  wake  of  Sykes,  who  had  just  crossed  the  hill  on  foot 
ipp.  304-306;  307-329  infra. 


32     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

with  Barnes'  division,  he  [Warren]  had  found  him  near 
the  wheat-field  completing  the  reconnaissance  of  which  we 
have  spoken.  The  commander  of  the  Fifth  corps  had 
immediately  ordered  Colonel  Vincent,  who  was  in  com 
mand  of  Barnes'  Third  brigade,  to  proceed  to  occupy  the 
foot  of  Little  Round  Top." 

This  statement  is  incredible  in  some  respects;  part  of 
it  has  been  repeated  by  another  writer,  who  says  that  Sykes 
and  Barnes  preceded  on  foot  Barnes'  division.  No  pri 
vate  soldier  in  the  Fifth  corps,  knowing  the  distances  that 
Sykes  and  Barnes  had  to  traverse  that  day,  would  believe 
that  they  went  about  on  foot.  My  own  recollection  is 
that  both  were  well  mounted  and  accompanied  by  the 
mounted  officers  of  their  respective  staffs  and  a  number  of 
mounted  orderlies.  A  corps  or  division  commander  in  the 
immediate  presence  of  the  enemy,  wishing  to  get  a  better 
view,  might  temporarily  dismount  to  be  less  conspicuous; 
but  he  could  not  properly  handle  his  corps  or  division  by 
going  about  on  foot.  This  erroneous  statement  is  trace 
able  to  one  of  the  few  incorrect  translations  of  the  French 
edition  of  Comte  de  Paris'  book.  The  original  reads  that 
Sykes  had  just  crossed  "  au  pied  de  la  colline"  meaning 
the  foot  of  the  hill,  referring  to  the  ridge  extending  north 
from  Little  Round  Top. 

I  believe  that  Warren  did  not  leave  the  hill  after  he 
reached  the  signal  station  until  he  went  down  and  detached 
O'Rorke's  regiment.  (See  Warren's  letters  and  Sykes' 
letter  to  Captain  Farley.1)  Warren  had  with  him  that  day 
three  lieutenants  of  engineers  serving  on  his  staff,  Mac 
kenzie,  Reese,  and  Roebling,  also  some  mounted  orderlies. 
Meade  sent  Warren  to  Little  Round  Top  to  observe  the  battle 
from  that  elevation  and  keep  him,  Meade,  informed  of  its 
progress.  Warren  used  these  officers  of  his  staff  to  keep  in 
touch  with  Meade  and  take  such  measures  as  in  his  judg 
ment  seemed  necessary.  He  sent  Mackenzie  to  Sickles  and 
ipp.  300-306;  307-329- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        33 

Sykes  asking  for  troops  to  be  sent  to  Little  Round  Top,  ex 
plaining  the  necessity.  Sickles  refused,  but  Sykes  promised 
a  brigade.  (See  Mackenzie's  letter  to  Meade,  March,  1864, 
p.  292.) 

I  believe  that  neither  Sykes  nor  Barnes  detached  Vin 
cent's  brigade  and  directed  it  to  take  position  on  the  foot 
of  Little  Round  Top.  I  find  no  evidence  that  Sykes  saw 
the  position  where  Vincent's  brigade  fought,  at  any  time 
during  the  battle.  What  actually  happened  in  this  con 
nection  I  relate  in  my  own  statement. 

The  Comte  de  Paris'  narration  then  continues :  "  Warren, 
going  in  advance  of  them  [Vincent's  brigade],  had  reached 
his  post  of  observation  to  witness  the  first  attack  of  Law 
against  the  four  regiments  which  alone  are  defending 
the  gorge  of  Plum  Run.  One  moment  later  the  bulk  of 
these  troops  are  falling  back  upon  the  flank  of  the  Devil's 
Den  hill,  while  a  party  of  sharpshooters  was  trying  to 
find  shelter  among  the  rocks  scattered  along  the  western 
flank  of  Little  Round  Top.  The  Confederates  were  hasten 
ing  in  pursuit  of  them;  their  projectiles  already  reached 
the  elevated  post  whence  Warren  was  watching  this  ex 
citing  scene.  He  could  not,  however,  see  Vincent's  brigade, 
which,  encompassing  the  hill  at  the  west,  had  disappeared 
in  the  woods." 

This  implies  that  Warren  did  not  wait  to  conduct  Vin 
cent  to  his  position  on  the  south  foot  of  Little  Round  Top, 
but  returned  to  his  place  at  the  signal  station.  I  think,  as 
previously  stated,  that  Warren  had  not  left  the  hill.  If, 
by  the  first  attack  of  Law  on  the  four  regiments  (Ward's 
brigade)  defending  the  gorge  of  Plum  Run  is  meant  Law's 
brigade,  it  is  a  mistake.  The  Comte  de  Paris  seems  to 
have  thought,  as  appears  later  in  his  account,  that  Hood 
was  still  in  command  of  his  division;  but  Hood  was 
wounded  near  his  batteries  during  the  cannonading  which 
preceded  the  advance  of  the  infantry,  and  was  carried  off 


34     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  field,  leaving  Law,  the  senior  brigade  commander,  in 
command  of  the  four  brigades  of  Hood's  division.  No 
regiment  of  Law's  brigade,  with  the  possible  exception  of 
the  Forty-fourth  Alabama,  took  part  in  this  attack  on 
Ward.  Ward's  brigade  was  not  driven  back  in  a  moment, 
but  held  its  position  for  nearly  an  hour.  The  first  attack 
on  \Vard  was  made  by  the  First  Texas  and  Third  Ar 
kansas  of  Robertson's  brigade.  They  were  not  strong 
enough  to  drive  back  Ward's  men.  They  were  soon  joined 
by  Benning's  Georgia  brigade,  and  later  by  Anderson's 
Georgia  brigade,  on  the  left  of  Robertson  and  Benning. 
The  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas  of  Robertson's  brigade  went 
with  Law's  regiments  up  the  swale  on  the  north  side  of 
Big  Round  Top  to  attack  Vincent.  They  did  not  rejoin 
the  other  regiments  of  Robertson's  brigade  until  night, 
when  the  brigade  was  reassembled  near  the  western  foot 
of  Big  Round  Top.  (See  Confederate  official  reports.) 

The  statement  that  Warren  could  not  see  Vincent's  bri 
gade  "  which,  encompassing  the  hill  on  the  west,  disap 
peared  in  the  woods,"  is  a  surprising  error.  If  Vincent 
had  tried  to  reach  his  position  by  passing  along  the  west 
front  of  Little  Round  Top,  he  would  have  been  in  full 
view  from  Warren's  post  at  the  signal  station;  but  would 
have  been  stopped  by  the  Confederates  then  swarming 
around  Devil's  Den.  This  is  the  statement  of  the  English 
translation;  but  examining  the  original  French,  I  find  that 
it  reads  encompassing  the  hill  "  a  Vest,"  meaning  on  the 
east.  This  is  in  accordance  with  the  facts.  (See  War 
ren's  letters.1)  Vincent's  brigade  reached  its  position  with 
out  serious  interference  from  the  enemy.  A  few  shells  burst 
near  the  column  as  it  crossed  the  Plum  Run  valley.  It 
passed  the  northern  end  of  Little  Round  Top,  then,  turning 
to  the  right,  made  its  way  through  the  woods  along  the 
eastern  slope  until  it  passed  the  high  rock,  and  was  formed 
on  the  lower  ground  between  the  two  Round  Tops.  The 

1Pp-  307-329- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         35 

brigade  was  all  in  position  there  and  had  thrown  out 
skirmishers  toward  the  southeast  and  the  west  before  a 
single  Confederate  made  his  appearance. 

Comte  de  Paris  continues :  "  During  this  time,  Vincent, 
hastening  the  pace  of  his  soldiers,  has  reached  the  south 
ern  extremity  of  this  same  hill.  On  this  side  it  is  not  so 
steep  as  on  the  other  sides,  being  prolonged  by  a  ridge 
which  about  halfway  presents  a  horizontal  stretch  of  nearly 
one  hundred  yards  in  length,  descending  thence  by  gentle 
gradations  as  far  as  the  foot  of  the  large  Round  Top. 
This  ridge  affords  an  excellent  position  to  Vincent  for 
barring  the  passage  to  Law's  soldiers,  who  are  rapidly  ad 
vancing  in  his  direction." 

I  think  that  "  during  this  time  "  refers  to  the  time  in 
which  Warren  was  watching  the  fight  at  the  Devil's  Den 
and  not  to  the  time  which  Vincent  took  in  reaching  his 
position  after  leaving  Barnes'  division.  Some  have 
thought  that  Warren,  as  soon  as  he  returned  to  the  hill 
and  saw  the  probability  of  Confederate  success  in  driving 
Ward  back, —  thus  opening  a  way  for  the  enemy  to  reach 
the  summit  of  the  hill, —  also  saw  Weed's  brigade  ap 
proaching,  and  rode  to  meet  it  to  secure  reinforcements 
for  this  part  of  the  hill.  Vincent  had  been  fighting  in  his 
position  at  least  half  an  hour  before  the  Confederates 
drove  Ward  back  and  opened  the  way  for  their  advance 
to  the  summit.  After  Vincent  left  the  division,  Sykes 
spent  some  time  in  posting  the  other  two  brigades  in  the 
position  which  he  had  selected  for  them,  and  then  rode 
back  to  the  vicinity  of  Rock  Creek  to  bring  up  the  other 
two  divisions  of  the  corps.  On  the  way  he  met  Weed's 
brigade,  and  ordered  Weed  to  place  it  on  Little  Round  Top. 

It  must  have  been  at  least  half  an  hour  after  Vincent 
got  into  position  before  Weed's  brigade  arrived  where 
Warren  could  see  them.  During  this  half  hour  Vincent 
had  been  fighting  Law's  brigade  and  the  Fourth  and  Fifth 


36     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Texas  regiments.  These  troops  did  not  abandon  their  at 
tempt  to  break  the  center  of  Vincent's  brigade  without  a 
desperate  struggle.  They  did  not  make  the  movement  to 
turn  Vincent's  right  flank  until  their  assaults  on  the  center 
seemed  hopeless.  So  long  as  Ward  held  his  position  at 
the  Devil's  Den  they  could  not  have  made  this  flank  move 
ment  by  the  Plum  Run  valley;  but  when  Ward  was  driven 
back  the  way  was  open  and  they  took  advantage  of  it. 
Then,  Warren,  seeing  the  danger,  left  the  hill  for  the  first 
time  and,  detaching  O'Rorke's  regiment  from  Weed's  bri 
gade,  sent  his  aide  —  Lieutenant  Roebling  —  to  conduct  it 
to  the  crest  of  the  hill,  where  it  arrived  just  in  time  to  drive 
back  the  Confederates.  Warren  did  not  return  to  the  hill, 
but  rode  away  to  meet  General  Meade.  (For  Sykes' 
movement  see  his  official  report.) 

Narrative  continues :  "  Hood,  after  being  for  sometime 
held  stationary  by  the  difficulty  of  keeping  his  soldiers  in 
the  ranks  under  the  fire  of  a  Federal  battery  posted  at  the 
bottom  of  the  gorge,  has  at  last  reached  the  foot  of  Lit 
tle  Round  Top,  which  he  points  out  to  them  as  a  prey 
thenceforth  easily  captured."  Later,  in  speaking  of  the 
losses  at  this  point,  the  relation  says :  "  The  losses  of  the 
Confederates  are  also  heavy;  the  most  serious  one  is  that 
of  Hood,  who,  being  always  at  the  post  of  danger,  has 
been  badly  wounded  in  the  arm." 

Neither  Law  nor  Hood  made  any  official  report  of  his 
part  in  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  Several  years  after  the 
battle  Law  explains  why,  in  a  paper  contributed  to  the 
Century  Magazine,  and  published  in  "  Battles  and  Leaders 
'of  the  Civil  War."  There  is  no  evidence  that  Hood  was 
present  with  his  division  at  any  time  after  the  infantry  ad 
vanced  to  the  attack.  He  was  wounded  by  a  shell  while 
near  the  batteries  of  his  division  soon  after  the  artillery 
opened  fire,  and  was  carried  from  the  field.  Law,  as  senior 
brigade  commander,  assumed  command  of  the  division, 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        37 

leaving  the  command  of  the  brigade  to  Colonel  Sheffield,  of 
the  Forty-eighth  Alabama.  Sheffield's  official  report  men 
tions  the  fact,  but  has  nothing  to  say  of  what  he  did  as 
brigade  commander,  confining  his  statement  to  the  action 
of  his  own  regiment.  ( See  Law's  paper,  quoted  elsewhere,1 
and  Hood's  letter  to  Longstreet,  quoted  in  Oates'  book, 
"  The  War  Between  the  Union  and  the  Confederacy."  2) 

The  statement  that  Law  brought  back  his  soldiers  for  a 
second  assault  on  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New 
York,  and  that  Vincent  assumed  command  of  the  whole 
line,  is  incorrect.  The  Confederates  who  made  the  flank 
movement  against  the  right  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan,  and 
succeeded  in  driving  back  the  greater  part  of  three  com 
panies  on  the  right  of  this  regiment,  with  the  regimental 
colors,  were  right  among  the  Union  men.  Vincent  fell 
while  endeavoring  to  rally  the  men  of  the  Sixteenth.  Just 
at  this  moment  O'Rorke  with  his  men  came  over  the 
crest  of  the  hill  and,  charging  down  the  hill,  drove  back 
the  enemy,  capturing  some  and  killing  and  wounding  many 
others.  They  formed  on  the  right  of  the  remainder  of 
the  Michigan  regiment,  and  remained  there,  sheltering 
themselves  as  well  as  they  could  among  the  rocks  on  the 
western  slope,  and  no  further  advance  was  made  by  the 
Confederates  against  this  position.  Weed  did  not  arrive 
with  the  other  regiments  of  his  brigade  until  some  time 
after  Vincent  fell,  and  after  the  Confederate  assault  had 
been  repulsed. 

In  this  account  too  little  credit  is  given  to  O'Rorke  and 
his  regiment.  Vincent  had  fallen,  and  the  Confederates, 
who  had  been  baffled  in  all  their  previous  attempts  to 
break  his  line,  had  succeeded  at  last  in  driving  in  the  right 
flank.  Those  of  the  enemy  who  had  already  entered  our 
line  were  followed  closely  by  a  crowd  of  their  comrades 
swarming  up  the  hill.  Nothing  could  have  stopped  them 
from  doubling  up  our  broken  line  except  the  timely  ar- 
1  Pp.  114-123.  2  Pp.  77-110. 


38     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

rival  of  O'Rorke  and  his  men.  It  was  a  hand-to-hand  con 
flict,  but  the  Confederates  were  forced  to  yield.  It  lasted 
only  a  short  time,  but  in  that  time  more  than  a  hundred 
men  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  had  fallen.  This 
regiment  alone  bore  the  brunt  of  the  attack.  Their  gal 
lant  young  colonel  was  instantly  killed,  within  a  few  feet 
of  where  Vincent  lay.  The  other  regiments  of  Weed's 
brigade  did  not  arrive  until  the  close  fighting  at  that  point 
was  finished.  The  losses  of  these  three  regiments  com 
bined  were  much  less  than  those  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Fortieth  alone. 

GENERAL  FRANCIS  A.  WALKER:  "  HISTORY  OF  THE  SECOND 
ARMY  CORPS,"  pp.  277-278 

"  The  position  of  Little  Round  Top,  not  less  important 
upon  the  left  than  Cemetery  Hill  upon  the  center,  or  Culp's 
Hill  upon  the  right,  had  been  strangely  neglected  ever  since 
Geary,  sent  thither  by  Hancock  upon  his  first  arrival  on 
the  field,  had  been  withdrawn  to  join  the  Twelfth  corps 
at  Culp's.  The  vast  extension  involved  in  Sickles'  advance 
had  left  no  troops  available  to  occupy  the  hill,  and  thou 
sands  of  Confederates,  fierce  and  eager,  were  advancing 
to  seize  it  while  defended  solely  by  a  signal  officer  and  his 
two  assistants.  No,  not  by  these  alone.  One  other  was 
there  —  a  slender,  graceful  young  officer  of  engineers, 
Warren,  who  had  climbed  the  slope  to  scan  the  western 
horizon,  where  his  prescient  mind  had  descried  the  signs 
of  danger.  Perceiving  the  yet  distant  approach  of  Law's 
brigade,  Warren  commands  the  signal  officers  to  continue 
their  work  to  the  last  moment,  in  order  to  create  the  im 
pression  that  the  hill  is  occupied,  and  darting  northward 
seeks  some  casual  force  that  may  anticipate  the  fatal  occu 
pation  of  Little  Round  Top  by  the  enemy. 

"  It  is  the  head  of  the  column  of  the  Fifth  corps  which 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         39 

he  meets,  hastening  to  the  support  of  De  Trobriand.  He 
takes  the  responsibility  of  detaching  the  foremost  troops, 
and  hurries  them  forward  to  anticipate  the  arrival  of  the 
Confederate  line  of  battle.  There  is  not  a  minute  to  spare. 
The  opposing  forces  meet  on  the  crest;  the  contest  is  close, 
fierce,  and  deadly.  The  rocky  slopes  and  narrow  wooded 
passes  resound  with  infernal  clamor.  Vincent  falls  at  the 
head  of  his  men.  Weed  also  is  struck  down  with  a  mor 
tal  wound,  and  as  Hazlett  bends  over  him  to  catch  the  last 
message,  he,  too,  is  thrown  lifeless  upon  the  body  of  his 
friend.  But  our  line  is  now  complete,  and  the  valor  of  the 
men  of  Maine,  Michigan,  New  York,  and  Pennsylvania 
has  made  it  secure.  Well  did  General  Abbott  say  that  but 
for  the  wonderful  coup  d'oeil  of  Warren  and  his  prompt 
acceptance  of  responsibility  the  name  of  Gettysburg  might 
only  have  been  known  in  history  as  that  of  the  place  where 
the  Union  cause  made  its  grave." 

One  wonders  where  General  Walker  obtained  this  in 
formation  about  Warren  detaching  Vincent's  brigade.  He 
certainly  did  not  get  it  from  Warren.  His  opportunities 
for  learning  the  facts  about  the  Second  corps  were  ample, 
and  his  history  of  that  corps  is  an  admirable  book.  But 
Warren's  statements  in  his  own  letters  show  that  for 
once  Walker  was  mistaken. 

GENERAL  HENRY  J.  HUNT  :  "  BATTLES  AND  LEADERS 
OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR,"  VOL.  in,  pp.  307-309 

"  As  soon  as  Longstreet's  attack  commenced,  General 
Warren  was  sent  by  General  Meade  to  see  to  the  condition 
of  the  extreme  left.  The  duty  could  not  have  been  in 
trusted  to  better  hands.  Passing  along  the  lines,  he  found 
Little  Round  Top,  the  key  of  the  position,  unoccupied  ex 
cept  by  a  signal  station.  The  enemy  at  the  time  lay  con 
cealed,  awaiting  the  signal  for  assault,  when  a  shot  fired 


40     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

in  their  direction  caused  a  sudden  movement  on  their  part 
which,  by  the  gleam  of  reflected  sunlight  from  their  bay 
onets,  revealed  their  long  lines  outflanking  the  position. 
Fully  comprehending  the  imminent  danger,  Warren  sent  to 
General  Meade  for  a  division.  The  enemy  was  already 
advancing  when,  noticing  the  approach  of  the  Fifth  corps, 
Warren  rode  to  meet  it,  caused  Weed's  and  Vincent's  bri 
gades  and  Hazlett's  battery  to  be  detached  from  the  latter, 
and  hurried  them  to  the  summit.  The  passage  of  the  six 
guns  through  the  roadless  woods  and  amongst  the  rocks 
was  marvelous.  Under  ordinary  circumstances  it  would 
have  been  considered  an  impossible  feat,  but  the  eagerness 
of  the  men  to  get  into  action  with  their  comrades  of  the 
infantry,  and  the  skillful  driving,  brought  them  without 
delay  to  the  very  summit,  where  they  went  immediately 
into  battle.  They  were  barely  in  time,  for  the  enemy  were 
also  climbing  the  hill.  A  close  and  bloody  hand-to-hand 
struggle  ensued,  which  left  both  Round  Tops  in  our 
possession.  Weed  and  Hazlett  were  killed,  and  Vincent 
was  mortally  wounded  —  all  young  men  of  great  promise. 
Weed  had  served  with  much  distinction  as  an  artillerist  in 
the  Peninsular,  Second  Bull  Run,  and  Antietam  campaigns, 
had  become  chief  of  artillery  of  his  army  corps,  and  at 
Chancellorsville  showed  such  special  aptitude  and  fitness 
for  large  artillery  commands  that  he  was  immediately  pro 
moted  from  captain  to  brigadier-general  and  transferred  to 
the  infantry.  Hazlett  was  killed  whilst  bending  over  his 
former  *chief  to  receive  his  last  message.  Lieutenant  Rit- 
tenhouse  efficiently  commanded  the  battery  during  the  re 
mainder  of  the  battle." 

One  would  infer  from  the  order  of  the  names  that 
Weed's  brigade  came  first,  followed  by  Vincent,  and  that 
Warren  detached  or  caused  to  be  detached  both  brigades 
and  hurried  them  to  the  summit  of  Round  Top  with  Haz- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        41 

lett's  battery.  This  is  a  mistake.  Vincent's  brigade  did 
not  go  to  the  summit,  and  Weed's  brigade,  except  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  did  not  reach  there  until 
the  infantry  fighting  was  finished,  except  the  desultory, 
long-distance  firing  of  the  sharpshooters. 

General  Hunt  was  chief  of  artillery,  and  his  statements 
about  the  batteries  are  made  with  authority ;  but  he  had  no 
direct  connection  with  the  movements  of  the  infantry. 

GENERAL   REGIS   DE   TROBRIAND  :   "  FOUR   YEARS   WITH 
THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,"  pp.  501-502 

"  When  the  enemy  had  turned  Ward's  left,  that  was 
but  the  first  step  towards  getting  possession  of  Little  Round 
Top.  He  pushed  his  forces  on  rapidly  from  that  point, 
and  began  to  climb  the  steep  hill  with  so  much  the  greater 
impunity  that  the  summit  had  not  as  yet  been  occupied  by 
us  except  by  a  squad  of  the  signal  service.  Fortune  willed, 
at  that  moment,  that  Warren,  chief  engineer  on  the  staff, 
should  arrive  on  this  point,  whence  the  view  embraced  the 
attack  in  its  whole  extent.  A  glance  told  him  the  im 
minence  of  the  danger,  and  he  ran  to  Barnes'  division  of 
the  Fifth  corps,  on  its  way  to  reinforce  us.  He  took  upon 
himself  to  detach  from  it  a  brigade  commanded  by  Colonel 
Vincent,  and  to  hurry  it,  on  the  run,  to  the  summit  of  Lit 
tle  Round  Top,  which  Hood's  Texans  were  also  endeavor 
ing  to  reach  from  the  other  side. 

"  Both  of  the  parties  arrived  at  the  crest  at  nearly  the 
same  time.  They  both  understood  the  vital  importance  of 
the  position.  So,  without  stopping  to  fire,  they  rushed  upon 
each  other  with  the  bayonet.  In  that  hand-to-hand  con 
test,  with  equal  courage,  the  solid  muscles  of  the  North 
prevailed  over  the  hot  blood  of  the  South.  Our  men  were 
victorious,  and  the  position  was  saved;  not  without,  how 
ever,  a  continuation  of  a  deadly  fire  from  the  assailants 


42     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

against  General  Weed's  brigade,  which  had  joined  that  of 
Colonel  Vincent,  and  on  Hazlett's  battery,  which  the  men 
had  succeeded,  with  unheard-of  efforts,  in  dragging  up  to 
the  top,  through  woods  and  over  rocks.  Finally,  a  bay 
onet  charge  of  the  Twentieth  Maine,  under  the  lead  of 
Colonel  Chamberlain,  swept  the  ground  of  the  enemy. 
The  possession  of  Little  Round  Top  cost  us  dearly.  Weed, 
Vincent,  and  Hazlett  paid  their  lives  for  it.  And  how 
many  more !  " 

This  is  another  example  of  erroneous  statements  by  a 
writer  who  was  not  present.  Warren  arrived  at  the  sig 
nal  station  some  time  before  any  attack  was  made  on  Ward. 
The  first  attack  on  Little  Round  Top  was  made  on  Vin 
cent's  brigade,  which  was  not  on  the  summit,  but  was 
posted  on  the  southern  slope  in  front  of  Big  Round  Top. 
The  attack  from  the  Plum  Run  Valley  was  directed 
against  Vincent's  right  flank.  It  was  the  last  of  several 
assaults  on  Vincent,  and  was  repulsed  by  the  One  Hundred 
and  Fortieth  New  York.  Warren  did  not  detach  Vincent, 
and  Vincent  did  not  go  to  the  summit. 

LlEUTENANT-COLONEL  WlLLIAM  H.  POWELL  :  "  THE 

FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS,"  pp.  517-531 

"  Soon  after  6  A.  M.,  July  2,  General  Meade  directed 
his  son  and  aide,  Captain  George  Meade,  to  ride  down  to 
General  Sickles,  explain  where  headquarters  of  the  army 
were  located,  find  out  if  his  troops  were  in  position,  and 
ask  if  he  had  anything  to  report.  Captain  Meade,  return 
ing,  reported  that  his  mission  had  been  made  known  to 
General  Sickles,  who  was  resting  in  his  tent,  by  Captain 
Randolph,  chief  of  artillery,  Third  Army  Corps,  who  had 
brought  in  reply  the  statement  that  his  troops  were  not  yet 
in  position,  and  that  he  was  in  some  doubt  as  to  where  he 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         43 

was  to  go.  General  Meade  directed  his  son  to  ride  back 
to  General  Sickles  as  quickly  as  possible  and  urge  on  him 
the  necessity  of  getting  his  troops  in  position  immediately. 
Captain  Meade  returned  at  once  to  Third  corps  headquar 
ters,  where  he  found  the  tent  previously  occupied  by  Gen 
eral  Sickles  struck,  the  staff  mounted  and  on  duty,  and 
General  Sickles  himself  about  to  mount.  In  reply  to  Gen 
eral  Meade's  message,  General  Sickles  reported  that  his 
troops  were  then  moving  and  would  soon  be  in  position. 
General  Meade  sent  no  order  by  his  son  with  regard  to  the 
line  to  be  occupied.  It  could  not  have  been  far  from  7 
A.  M.  when  Captain  Meade  found  General  Sickles  prepar 
ing  to  mount. 

"  In  his  official  report  General  Geary  says : 

'  At  5  A.  M.  on  the  second,  having  been  relieved  by  the 
Third  Army  Corps,  in  obedience  to  orders  from  Major-Gen- 
eral  Slocum,  the  division  was  placed  on  the  right  of  the 
center  of  the  main  line  of  battle  east  of  the  turnpike/ 

"  General  Geary  afterward  explained  to  General  Meade 
that,  upon  receiving  notice  that  he  would  be  relieved  by 
General  Sickles,  he  sent  to  him  a  staff  officer  instructed  to 
explain  the  importance  of  the  position  he  held,  and  to  ask 
that,  if  troops  could  not  be  sent  at  once  to  relieve  him,  at 
least  a  staff  officer  might  be  sent  to  acquaint  himself  with 
the  position  and  be  ready  to  post  the  troops  when  they 
arrived.  He  received  for  answer  that  '  General  Sickles 
would  attend  to  it  in  due  time,'  and  after  waiting  some  time 
in  vain  for  either  troops  or  officers,  he  withdrew,  consider 
ing  himself  relieved. 

"  In  his  official  report  General  D.  B.  Birney  says : 

'  At  7  A.  M.,  under  orders  from  Major-General  Sickles, 
I  relieved  Geary's  division  and  formed  a  line,  resting  its 
left  on  the  Sugar-Loaf  Mountain  (Little  Round  Top), 
and  the  right  thrown  in  a  direct  line  toward  the  cemetery, 
connecting  on  the  right  with  the  Second  division  of  this 


44     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

corps.  My  picket  line  was  in  the  Emmittsburg  road,  with 
sharpshooters  some  three  hundred  yards  in  advance/ 

"  General  A.  A.  Humphreys,  in  his  report,  says : 

"  '  At  an  early  hour  of  the  morning  my  division  was 
massed  in  the  vicinity  of  its  bivouac,  facing  the  Emmitts 
burg  road,  near  the  crest  of  the  ridge  running  from  the 
cemetery  of  Gettysburg  in  a  southerly  direction  to  a  rug 
ged,  conical-shaped  hill,  which  I  find  goes  by  the  name  of 
Round  Top,  about  two  miles  from  Gettysburg.' 

"  Manifestly,  General  Sickles  at  or  about  7  A.  M.  formed 
his  line  where  General  Meade,  upon  reaching  the  field, 
had  instructed  him  to  post  it.  If  further  proof  could  be 
needed,  it  is  amply  furnished  by  General  Sickles'  criticisms 
of  the  line.  The  order,  however,  was  repeated  to  General 
Sickles  by  General  Meade  in  person,  just  before  noon  of 
July  2. 

"  General  Humphreys  reports : 

"  '  Shortly  after  midday  I  was  ordered  to  form  my  di 
vision  in  line  of  battle,  my  left  joining  the  right  of  the 
First  division  of  the  Third  corps,  Major-General  Birney 
commanding,  and  my  right  resting  opposite  the  left  of 
General  Caldwell's  division  of  the  Second  corps,  which  was 
massed  on  the  crest  near  my  place  of  bivouac.  The  line 
I  was  directed  to  occupy  was  near  the  foot  of  the  westerly 
slope  of  the  ridge  I  have  already  mentioned. 

" '  Shortly  after  midday '  was  shortly  after  General 
Meade  had  repeated  his  order  to  General  Sickles,  and  the 
line  occupied  in  disregard  of  that  order  was  that  styled  by 
General  Hunt  '  the  Plum  Run  line,'  and  declared  by  him 
'  not  an  eligible  line  to  occupy.'  It  was  some  five  hundred 
yards  in  front  of  the  position  assigned  to  the  Third  corps 
by  General  Meade. 

"  The  Sixth  Army  Corps  reached  Gettysburg  about  2  P.M.. 
July  2.  Upon  its  arrival  being  reported  to  him,  General 
Meade  directed  the  Fifth  corps  to  move  at  once  to  the  left 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        45 

of  his  line,  and  the  Sixth  to  occupy  the  position  vacated 
by  the  Fifth.  Shortly  after  2  p.  M.  he  rode  to  the  left 
to  await  the  arrival  of  the  troops.  He  then  found  that 
General  Sickles  had  advanced  his  line  still  farther,  taking 
a  position  with  his  First  division  in  front  of  Little  Round 
Top,  from  the  Devil's  Den  to  the  peach  orchard,  and  was 
about  advancing  his  Second  division  up  to  the  Emmitts- 
burg  road.  Up  to  this  time,  with  the  exception  of  a  recon 
naissance  sent  out  at  General  Hunt's  suggestion,  just  be 
fore  noon,  little  more  than  picket  firing  had  occurred  along 
the  Third  corps  front;  but  now  the  brief  discussion  of  the 
situation  by  the  army  and  corps  commanders  was  inter 
rupted  by  the  advance  of  the  Confederate  lines  in  force. 
To  General  Meade's  remark  that  he  had  moved  out  too 
far,  General  Sickles  had  just  rejoined:  'Very  well,  sir, 
I'll  withdraw  then,'  when  Longstreet's  artillery  opened. 
Saying,  '  I  wish  to  God  you  could,  sir,  but  you  see  those 
people  do  not  intend  to  let  you,'  General  Meade  left  him 
and  rode  out  upon  the  line. 

"  General  Sickles  then  ordered  his  Second  division,  Gen 
eral  A.  A.  Humphreys  commanding,  to  advance  to  the 
Emmittsburg  road.  As  this  movement  was  commencing, 
General  Humphreys  received  an  order  directly  from  Gen 
eral  Meade,  instructing  him  to  move  his  division  at  once 
to  Little  Round  Top.  The  division  was  immediately 
started  by  the  left  flank  toward  that  point,  but  had  only 
started  when  the  order  was  recalled  by  General  Meade; 
the  troops  retraced  the  steps  taken  and  moved  out  to  the 
Emmittsburg  road. 

"  At  General  Warren's  suggestion,  General  Meade  had 
previously  sent  that  officer  to  ascertain  the  exact  condi 
tion  of  affairs  upon  the  extreme  left,  and  beyond  doubt  it 
was  his  confidence  in  General  Warren,  and  his  knowledge 
that  the  Fifth  corps  must  soon  appear  upon  the  ground, 
and  would  be  aided  by  Caldwell's  division  of  the  Second 


46     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

corps,  which  he  had  ordered  to  report  to  General  Sykes  at 
Little  Round  Top,  that  induced  the  recall  of  his  order  to 
General  Humphreys,  which  would  have  left  the  right  of 
the  Third  corps  temporarily  unguarded,  while  securing  the 
far  more  important  and  more  imperiled  left. 

"  Attended  by  Lieutenants  W.  A.  Roebling  and  Ranald 
S.  Mackenzie,  General  Warren  reached  the  summit  of  Lit 
tle  Round  Top  and  found  it  held  only  by  a  signal  officer 
and  his  assistants.  It  is  an  injustice  to  General  Warren 
to  assert  that  he  discovered  Little  Round  Top  to  be  the 
key  to  the  Federal  position  when  he  reached  the  lookout  on 
its  summit  on  July  2.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the 
fact  escaped  his  quick  eye  on  July  i,  when  General  Han 
cock  noted  it  and  took  possession.  General  Geary  had 
not  failed  to  recognize  the  importance  of  the  position  as 
signed  to  him  that  night,  and  General  Meade,  in  ordering 
the  Third  corps  into  position,  relieving  Geary's  division  on 
July  2,  or  in  directing  the  movement  of  Humphreys'  di 
vision  from  the  right  of  the  Third  corps  line  to  the  un 
guarded  point,  had  not  acted  ignorantly.  General  Hum 
phreys  was  not  blind,  and  General  Sykes'  dispositions  as 
the  Fifth  corps  reached  the  field  evince  his  comprehension 
of  the  evident  facts,  and  even  General  Sickles  admits 
knowledge  of  the  importance  of  the  trust  he  disregarded. 
\Vhile  \Varren,  standing  upon  the  rocky  summit,  undoubt 
edly  realized  better  than  any  other  officer  on  the  field  the 
full  importance  of  the  position,  his  notable  service  lay  in 
his  instant  comprehension  of  how  utterly  it  had  been 
abandoned,  and  in  his  characteristic  promptness  in  secur 
ing  the  dispositions  that  held  it  safe.  He  was  the  savior, 
not  the  discoverer,  of  Little  Round  Top. 

"  General  Warren  at  once  sent  Lieutenant  Mackenzie 
to  General  Sickles  with  a  request  that  troops  should  be 
sent  to  occupy  it.  General  Sickles  refused,  saying  that  his 
whole  command  was  necessary  to  defend  his  front.  Gen- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         47 

eral  Warren  sent,  by  the  same  messenger,  a  note  to  Gen 
eral  Meade  requesting  him  to  send  at  least  a  division  to 
him.  But  the  emergency  grew  more  urgent  with  every 
moment.  The  whole  Confederate  line  was  sweeping  from 
out  the  woods  in  which  it  had  formed,  far  outflanking  the 
left  of  the  Third  corps  line  where  Smith's  battery,  in  air 
and  almost  unsupported  on  the  rocks  of  the  Devil's  Den, 
gallantly  waited  its  doom, —  and  between  that  left  and 
Round  Top  the  way  to  the  death  of  the  nation  lay  invit 
ingly  open  to  the  confidently  advancing  enemy.  To  War 
ren's  quick  eye  and  clear  mind  the  fate  of  the  Third  corps 
line  was  manifest,  and  at  that  moment  this  was  the  only 
eye  that  saw,  the  only  mind  that  comprehended,  the  full 
gravity  of  the  situation.  But  with  him  to  see  and  know 
was  to  act.  Noticing  troops  moving  out  the  Peach  Or 
chard  road  to  join  in  the  hopeless  struggle  in  front,  bid 
ding  the  signal  officer  to  continue  waving  his  flags  in  de 
fiance,  he  spurred  down  the  steep  hillside. 

"  In  the  meantime  General  Meade  had  sent  orders  to 
Sykes  to  send  a  brigade  to  report  to  Sickles.  The  corps 
was  then  waiting  orders  on  the  bank  of  Pipe  Creek.  Weed 
started  promptly,  and  after  going  a  little  distance,  he 
turned  to  Colonel  O'Rorke  and  said  that  he  would  go  on 
and  find  General  Sickles,  and  would  leave  O'Rorke  in  com 
mand  of  the  brigade.  He  left  all  the  brigade  staff  —  ex 
cept  Lieutenant  E.  N.  Warren  —  and  brigade  flag  with 
O'Rorke.  Weed  and  his  aide  rode  forward  at  a  rapid 
gait  and  found  General  Sickles,  and  then  sent  Lieutenant 
Warren  back  to  pilot  the  brigade  to  him.  The  lieutenant 
rode  back  rapidly,  and  when  he  got  to  Little  Round  Top 
found  the  brigade  going  up  the  slope.  He  told  O'Rorke 
that  the  brigade  was  expected  to  go  to  General  Sickles. 
General  Warren  was  there  also,  and  he  said  he  would  keep 
O'Rorke's  regiment. 

"  General    Warren,    in    descending    from   Little    Round 


48     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Top,  where  he  had  been  scanning  the  field,  having  observed 
the  approach  of  Weed's  brigade,  rode  straight  toward  the 
head  of  the  column.  He  called  out  to  O'Rorke,  beginning 
to  speak  while  some  eight  or  ten  rods  from  him,  that  he 
wanted  him  to  go  up  there;  that  the  enemy  was  advancing 
unopposed  up  the  opposite  side  of  the  hill  down  which  he 
had  come,  and  he  wanted  one  regiment  to  meet  him.  He 
was  apparently  greatly  excited,  and  spoke  in  his  usually 
impulsive  style.  O'Rorke  told  him  that  General  Weed 
was  ahead  and  expected  the  brigade  to  follow  him. 
'  Never  mind  that,'  said  General  Warren.  '  Bring  your 
regiment  up  here,  and  I  will  take  the  responsibility.'  It 
was  at  this  time  that  Lieutenant  Warren  put  in  an  appear 
ance. 

"  O'Rorke,  without  hesitation,  turned  to  the  left  and  fol 
lowed  the  officer  who  had  accompanied  General  Warren, 
while  Warren  himself  rode  rapidly  down  the  hillside.  The 
remainder  of  the  brigade  started  to  join  General  Weed, 
under  the  guidance  of  Lieutenant  Warren.  It  had  gone 
but  a  short  distance  before  General  Sykes  sent  a  staff  of 
ficer  to  know  where  the  brigade  was  going.  Being  told, 
'  To  report  to  General  Sickles,'  and  although  the  brigade 
was  not  stopped,  the  staff  officer  requested  Lieutenant 
Warren  to  go  with  him  to  General  Weed.  They  rode  as 
fast  as  they  could, —  the  distance  was  not  great, —  and  he 
told  General  Weed  that  he  would  have  to  return,  as  no 
troops  could  be  spared  by  General  Sykes,  and  that  he 
would  have  to  return  and  rejoin  his  brigade.  General 
Weed  informed  General  Sickles  of  the  message  and  hur 
ried  back  to  the  troops,  and  on  rejoining  was  ordered  to 
double-quick  them  and  hurry  to  Little  Round  Top,  where 
the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  was  hotly  engaged.  Gen 
eral  Warren  had  ridden  to  the  head  of  the  column  in  quest 
of  General  Weed,  and,  finding  that  he  was  still  absent, 
halted  the  brigade  to  await  his  return.  In  the  meantime 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        49 

he  had  met  Hazlett's  battery  and  started  it  after  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York.  Upon  Weed's  return, 
he  having  received  the  orders  from  General  Sykes,  the  bri 
gade  countermarched  and  followed  the  One  Hundred  and 
Fortieth  into  position. 

"  Guided  by  Lieutenant  Roebling,  O'Rorke  had  dashed 
up  the  eastern  slope  of  Little  Round  Top  to  gain  the  face 
beyond  the  summit;  some  of  the  guns  of  Hazlett's  battery 
plunging  through  his  line,  as,  with  horses  urged  to  frantic 
efforts  and  cannoneers  aiding  at  the  wheels,  it  made  for 
the  pinnacle  it  gained  —  and  holds  in  history.  As  they 
reached  the  crest  the  very  jaws  of  hell  yawned  before  them. 
Upon  their  right  the  Third  corps  line  was  completely  out 
flanked  by  Longstreet's  impetuous  advance,  and  up  the 
ravine  at  their  feet  in  front  Hood's  brigades  were  panting 
in  their  effort  to  gain  the  vantage  ground  that  would  en 
able  them  to  add  the  ignominy  of  a  rout  to  the  disaster  of 
the  day.  The  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  was  moving 
right  in  front,  and  not  a  musket  was  loaded  or  a  bayonet 
fixed.  The  emergency,  however,  called  for  action  far 
more  than  for  tactics  or  precaution.  Springing  from  his 
horse,  with  a  shout,  "  Down  this  way,  men !  "  O'Rorke, 
followed  by  his  command,  rushed  down  the  rocky  slope, 
with  at  least  the  impetus  of  a  charge.  It  took  such  order 
as  was  possible  and  opened  fire  upon  the  enemy.  The 
firing  for  a  few  moments  was  rapid  and  deadly  on  both 
sides,  and,  standing  erect  and  unsheltered  to  urge  on  and 
encourage  his  men,  O'Rorke,  shot  through  the  neck,  fell 
dead  without  a  word.  But  the  Confederate  rush  was 
checked,  and  before  it  could  be  urged  on  again  Weed  had 
closed  the  Ninety-first  Pennsylvania  upon  the  One  Hun 
dred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  while  the  One  Hundred  and 
Forty-sixth  New  York  and  the  One  Hundred  and  Fifty- 
fifth  Pennsylvania  had  formed  line  upon  the  right  of  Haz 
lett's  battery,  which  now  crowned  the  crest.  Then  Weed 


50     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

and  Hazlett  fell  upon  that  rocky  crest,  martyrs  to  the  cause 
of  the  Union. 

"  Immediately  after  starting  Weed's  brigade  from  where 
the  corps  was  lying  at  Pipe  Creek,  General  Sykes  received 
General  Meade's  order  to  take  position  upon  the  left. 
Sykes  started  his  corps  upon  the  road,  and,  accompanied 
by  General  Barnes,  commanding  the  First  division,  pre 
ceded  it  for  the  purpose  of  examining  the  position  he  was 
to  occupy.  Discovering  the  undefended  left  of  the  Third 
corps  line  and  the  inadequacy  of  the  support  given  to 
Smith's  battery,  he  suggested  to  General  Birney  to  close 
his  division  line  upon  the  battery,  while  he  (Sykes)  would 
fill  the  gap  which  would  be  made  by  the  movement  with 
troops  from  the  Fifth  corps.  Barnes  was  about  being 
placed  in  position  when  General  Warren  rode  rapidly  up  to 
General  Sykes,  with  whom  Barnes  was  riding,  and,  point 
ing  out  the  position  of  Round  Top,  urged  the  importance 
of  assistance  in  that  direction.  General  Sykes  yielded  to 
his  urgent  request,  and  General  Barnes  directed  Colonel 
Vincent,  commanding  the  Third  brigade,  to  proceed  to 
that  point  with  his  brigade,  consisting  of  the  Sixteenth 
Michigan,  Colonel  Vincent;  Forty-fourth  New  York,  Col 
onel  Rice;  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania,  Captain  Woodward; 
and  Twentieth  Maine,  Colonel  Chamberlain.  Vincent 
moved  with  great  promptness  to  the  post  assigned  him. 
Passing  an  open  field  in  the  hollow  ground,  in  which  some 
Union  batteries  were  going  into  position,  Vincent  reached 
the  skirt  of  a  piece  of  woods,  in  the  farther  edge  of  which 
there  was  a  heavy  musketry  fire  (O'Rorke's),  and  when 
about  to  go  forward  into  line  Colonel  Chamberlain  re 
ceived  from  Colonel  Vincent  orders  to  move  to  the  left 
at  the  double-quick,  taking  a  farm  road  crossing  Plum 
Run,  in  order  to  gain  a  rugged  mountain  spur,  called 
Granite  Spur,  or  Little  Round  Top. 

"  The  enemy's  artillery  got  range  of  the  column  as  it 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         51 

was  climbing  the  spur,  and  the  crashing  of  the  shells  among 
the  rocks  and  tree-tops  made  the  men  move  lively  along 
the  crest.  One  or  two  shells  burst  in  the  ranks.  Passing 
to  the  southern  slope  of  Little  Round  Top,  Colonel  Vin 
cent  indicated  to  Colonel  Chamberlain  the  ground  his  regi 
ment  was  to  occupy,  informing  him  that  this  was  the  ex 
treme  left  of  the  general  line,  which  he  was  to  hold  at  all 
hazards.  These  were  the  last  words  Chamberlain  ever 
heard  from  Vincent,  as  it  was  only  a  few  moments  after 
wards  the  latter  met  his  death. 

*  The  line  faced  generally  toward  a  more  conspicuous 
eminence  to  the  southwest,  which  is  known  as  Sugar  Loaf, 
or  Round  Top.  Between  this  and  Chamberlain's  position 
intervened  a  smooth  and  thinly  wooded  hollow.  His  line 
formed,  he  immediately  detached  Company  B,  Captain 
Morrill  commanding,  to  extend  from  the  left  flank  across 
this  hollow  as  a  line  of  skirmishers,  with  directions  to  act 
as  occasion  might  dictate,  to  prevent  a  surprise  in  the 
exposed  flank  and  rear. 

'  The  artillery  fire  on  the  position  had  meanwhile  been 
constant  and  heavy,  but  his  formation  was  scarcely  com 
plete  when  the  artillery  was  replaced  by  a  vigorous  in 
fantry  assault  upon  the  center  of  the  brigade  to  Chamber 
lain's  right.  This  very  soon  involved  the  right  of  the 
Twentieth  Maine,  and  gradually  extended  along  its  entire 
front.  The  action  was  quite  sharp  and  at  close  quarters. 
In  the  midst  of  this,  an  officer  from  the  center  informed 
Chamberlain  that  some  important  movement  of  the  enemy 
was  going  on  in  his  front,  beyond  that  of  the  line  with 
\vhich  they  were  engaged.  Mounting  a  large  rock,  Cham 
berlain  saw  a  considerable  body  of  the  enemy  moving  by  the 
flank  in  rear  of  their  engaged  line  and  passing  from  the  di 
rection  of  the  foot  of  Great  Round  Top  through  the  valley 
toward  the  front  of  his  left.  The  close  engagement  not  per 
mitting  any  change  of  front,  he  immediately  stretched  his 


52     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

regiment  to  the  left,  by  taking  intervals,  at  the  same  time 
refusing  his  left  wing,  so  that  it  was  nearly  at  right  angles 
with  his  right,  thus  occupying  about  twice  the  extent  of 
his  ordinary  front,  some  of  the  companies  being  brought 
into  single  rank  when  the  nature  of  the  ground  gave  suf 
ficient  strength  or  shelter.  The  officers  and  men  under 
stood  Chamberlain's  wishes  so  well  that  this  movement 
was  executed  under  fire,  the  right  wing  keeping  up  fire 
without  giving  the  enemy  any  occasion  to  seize  or  suspect 
their  advantage.  But  they  were  not  a  moment  too*  soon; 
the  enemy's  flanking  column,  having  gained  its  desired  di 
rection,  burst  upon  the  left  with  great  demonstration, 
where  they  evidently  had  expected  an  unguarded  flank. 

"  A  brisk  fire  was  opened  at  close  range,  which  was  so 
sudden  and  effective  that  the  Confederates  soon  fell  back 
among  the  rocks  and  low  trees  in  the  valley,  only  to  burst 
forth  again  with  a  shout,  and  rapidly  advanced,  firing  as 
they  came.  They  pushed  up  to  within  a  dozen  yards  of  the 
Union  line  before  the  terrible  effectiveness  of  its  fire  com 
pelled  them  to  break  and  take  shelter. 

"  They  renewed  the  assault  on  the  whole  front,  and  for 
an  hour  the  fighting  was  severe.  Squads  of  the  enemy 
broke  through  the  line  in  several  places,  and  the  fight  was 
literally  hand-to-hand.  The  edge  of  the  fight  rolled  back 
ward  and  forward  like  a  wave.  The  dead  and  wounded 
were  now  in  front  and  then  in  rear.  Forced  from  its  posi 
tion,  the  regiment  desperately  recovered  it  and  pushed  the 
enemy  down  to  the  foot  of  the  slope.  The  intervals  of 
the  struggle  were  seized  to  remove  the  wounded  of  both 
sides,  to  gather  ammunition  from  the  cartridge-boxes  of 
disabled  friend  or  foe  on  the  field,  and  even  to  secure  bet 
ter  muskets  than  the  Enfields,  which  were  found  not  to 
stand  service  so  well.  Rude  shelters  were  thrown  up  of 
the  loose  rocks  that  covered  the  ground. 

"  The  Confederates  gathered  all  their  energies  for  a  final 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         53 

assault.  Chamberlain  had  gotten  his  thin  line  into  as  good 
shape  as  possible,  when  a  strong  force  emerged  from  the 
scrub-wood  in  the  valley,  in  two  lines  in  echelon  by  the 
right,  and,  opening  a  heavy  fire,  the  first  line  pressed  for 
ward  as  if  it  meant  to  sweep  everything  before  it.  Fire 
was  opened  on  it  as  well  as  could  be  with  the  scant  am 
munition  snatched  from  the  fallen.  It  did  not  seem  pos 
sible  to  withstand  another  shock  like  the  one  coming  on. 
The  loss  had  been  severe.  One-half  of  Chamberlain's  left 
wing  had  fallen,  and  a  third  of  the  regiment  lay  just  be 
hind  it  dead  or  badly  wounded.  At  this  moment  the  anx 
iety  was  increased  by  a  great  roar  of  musketry  in  the  rear, 
on  the  farther  or  northerly  slope  of  Little  Round  Top,  ap 
parently  on  the  flank  of  Weed's  brigade,  then  on  the  crest, 
in  support  of  Hazlett's  battery.  The  bullets  from  this  at 
tack  struck  in  the  left  rear  of  the  Twentieth  Maine,  and 
it  was  feared  that  the  enemy  had  nearly  surrounded  Little 
Round  Top,  and  therefore  only  a  desperate  chance  was 
left  for  the  small  force  in  the  valley.  Chamberlain's  am 
munition  was  soon  exhausted.  His  men  were  firing  their 
last  shots,  and  getting  ready  to  club  their  muskets. 

"  Chamberlain  deemed  it  imperative  to  strike  before  he 
was  struck  by  the  overwhelming  force  in  a  hand-to-hand 
fight,  which  he  could  not  possibly  have  withstood  or  sur 
vived.  At  that  crisis  he  ordered  the  bayonet.  The  word 
was  enough.  It  ran  like  fire  along  the  line  from  man  to 
man,  and  rose  into  a  shout,  with  which  they  sprang  for 
ward  upon  the  enemy,  now  not  thirty  yards  distant.  Like 
greyhounds  they  bounded  over  shelter,  from  rock  to  rock, 
and  launched  their  fury  on  the  advancing  foe.  It  was 
veritably  'a  forlorn  hope.'  The  effect  was  surprising; 
many  of  the  enemy's  first  line  threw  down  their  arms  and 
surrendered.  An  officer  fired  his  pistol  at  Chamberlain's 
head  with  one  hand,  while  he  handed  him  his  sword  with 
the  other.  Holding  fast  by  the  right  and  swinging  toward 


54     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  left,  the  Twentieth  Maine  made  an  extended  right 
wheel  before  which  the  enemy's  second  line  broke  and  fell 
back,  fighting  from  tree  to  tree,  many  being  captured,  until 
the  devoted  little  Union  band  had  swept  the  valley  of  the 
enemy  and  cleared  the  front  of  nearly  the  entire  brigade. 
Four  hundred  prisoners,  including  two  field  and  several 
line  officers  from  the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  Ala 
bama,  with  some  of  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas,  were  sent 
to  the  rear,  while  one  hundred  and  fifty  Confederates  were 
found  killed  and  wounded  in  the  front.  These  troops 
could  not  be  reinforced  at  the  critical  period,  as  Ayres  had 
been  thrown  to  the  front  and  Crawford  was  only  arriving. 
"  Historians  have  exhausted  themselves  in  describing 
the  actions  of  the  '  Peach  Orchard '  and  the  events  of 
the  third  day  at  Gettysburg.  Great  stress  has  been  laid 
upon  the  results  of  Pickett's  charge,  while  famous  pictures 
have  presented  that  scene  to  the  gaze  of  the  American  pub 
lic;  but  the  truth  of  history  is,  that  the  little  brigade  of 
Vincent's,  with  the  self-sacrificing  valor  of  the  Twentieth 
Maine,  under  the  gallant  leadership  of  Joshua  L.  Cham 
berlain,  fighting  amidst  the  scrub-oak  and  rocks  in  that 
vale  between  the  Round  Tops  on  the  second  of  July,  1863, 
saved  to  the  Union  arms  the  historic  field  of  Gettysburg. 
Had  they  faltered  for  one  instant  —  had  they  not  ex 
ceeded  their  actual  duty  —  while  the  left  of  the  Third  corps 
was  swung  in  the  air  half  a  mile  to  the  right  and  front  of 
Little  Round  Top,  there  would  have  been  no  grand  charge 
of  Pickett,  and  '  Gettysburg '  would  have  been  the  mau 
soleum  of  departed  hopes  for  the  national  cause ;  for  Long- 
street  would  have  enveloped  Little  Round  Top,  captured 
all  on  its  crest  from  the  rear,  and  held  the  key  of  the  whole 
position.  In  view  of  such  possibilities,  it  is  no  wonder 
that  General  Meade  said  to  General  Sickles,  '  I  wish  to 
God  you  could,  sir,  but  you  see  those  people  do  not  intend 
to  let  you,'  when  that  officer  desired  to  withdraw  his  line." 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        55 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Powell  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg 
was  a  first  lieutenant  and  aide-de-camp  on  the  staff  of  Gen 
eral  Romeyn  B.  Ayres,  commanding  the  Second  division 
of  the  Fifth  corps.  His  duty  kept  him  near  his  chief  ex 
cept  for  short  absences  in  conveying  orders  or  reporting 
movements.  Ayres  makes  no  mention  in  his  official  re 
port  of  having  been  on  Little  Round  Top  at  any  time  dur 
ing  the  battle.  Sykes  had  commanded  this  division  pre 
vious  to  June  28,  when  Meade  was  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  army  and  Sykes  succeeded  him  in  the  com 
mand  of  the  corps.  Sykes  in  his  official  report  says  that 
after  posting  the  two  brigades  of  Barnes'  division  he  re 
turned  to  order  up  the  remainder  of  the  corps  from  the 
vicinity  of  the  Baltimore  Pike  near  the  Rock  Creek  bridge. 
On  the  way  he  met  Weed's  brigade,  and  ordered  it  to  take 
position  on  Little  Round  Top,  then  continued  on  his  way 
to  the  brigades  of  Ayres'  division.  Having  started  these, 
he  returned  to  the  front,  found  Weed's  brigade,  which  had 
not  stopped  at  Little  Round  Top,  moving  out  to  reinforce 
Sickles.  He  ordered  it  to  return  to  the  post  which  he  had 
previously  assigned  to  it.  Ayres  came  up  with  the  other 
brigades  and  took  position  on  the  ridge  north  of  Little 
Round  Top.  Later  these  brigades  under  Ayres  went  for 
ward  to  a  position  near  the  Devil's  Den.  In  all  probability 
Powell  accompanied  his  chief  and  had  no  personal  knowl 
edge  of  the  fight  on  Little  Round  Top.  His  book  was 
published  in  1896,  thirty-three  years  after  the  battle. 

One  would  think  that  an  officer  of  the  regular  army  who 
served  in  one  of  the  divisions  which  participated  in  the 
battle  on  and  near  Little  Round  Top,  to  whom  the  official 
records  were  open,  might  have  been  able,  in  the  lapse  of  a 
third  of  a  century,  to  get  nearer  the  facts.  He  states  that 
Weed's  brigade  was  the  first  organization  of  the  Fifth 
corps  to  leave  the  corps  near  Pipe  Creek  and  proceed  to 
the  left  under  an  order  to  reinforce  Sickles.  He  gets  first 


56     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

O'Rorke's  regiment,  then  the  remainder  of  Weed's  brigade 
under  Warren's  direction  posted  on  Little  Round  Top  and 
receiving  the  Confederate  assault  on  the  crest  of  the  hill, 
as  the  beginning  of  operations  on  that  part  of  the  field. 
When  this  is  well  started,  Warren  rides  down  the  hill 
again  and,  intercepting  Barnes'  division,  detaches  Vincent's 
brigade  and  hurries  it  off  to  the  south  slope  of  the  hill 
where  it  fought.  A  perusal  of  the  official  report  of  his 
corps  commander  would  have  shown  him  that  Barnes'  di 
vision  was  the  first  of  the  corps  to  arrive,  that  Vincent's 
brigade  had  gone  to  its  position  on  Little  Round  Top  be 
fore  Sykes  posted  the  First  and  Second  brigades  on 
Birney's  line;  that  Sykes  then  rode  to  the  rear  and,  meet 
ing  Weed's  brigade,  ordered  it  to  take  position  on  Little 
Round  Top,  and  continued  until  he  met  the  other  two  bri 
gades  of  Ayres'  division;  after  starting  them  to  the  front 
he  returned  and  found  Weed's  brigade,  except  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  moving  out  to  reinforce 
Sickles,  recalled  it,  and  finally  got  it  in  position  on  Little 
Round  Top  after  all  the  close  fighting  was  done.  (See 
Sykes'  official  report,  p.  293 ;  Captain  Farley's  "  Number 
Nine,"  p.  125;  and  the  Warren  letters,  p.  307.) 

Powell  says  that  Vincent,  while  en  route,  reached  the 
skirt  of  a  piece  of  woods,  in  the  farther  edge  of  which 
there  was  a  heavy  musketry  fire  (O'Rorke's).  This  in 
dicates  that  Powell  supposed  that  O'Rorke  was  already  en 
gaged  before  Vincent  reached  his  position.  The  fact  is, 
that  Vincent  had  been  engaged  for  half  an  hour  before 
Warren  left  the  hill  and  detached  O'Rorke.  Vincent, 
commanding  the  brigade,  was  colonel  of  the  Eighty-third 
Pennsylvania,  not  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan,  as  stated  by 
Powell.  Vincent's  brigade  did  not  move  along  the  crest 
of  the  hill,  but  through  the  woods  in  rear  of  it.  A  few 
shells  burst  in  the  midst  of  them  as  they  were  crossing  Plum 
Run  Valley,  but  once  behind  the  hill  they  were  screened 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         57 

from  observation  and  their  line  was  formed,  guns  loaded, 
and  everything  ready  before  they  were  discovered  by  the 
enemy. 

Powell  speaks  twice  of  Pipe  Creek,  meaning  Rock 
Creek;  but  this  is  evidently  a  slip  of  the  pen,  as  Pipe  Creek 
was  in  Maryland,  miles  away  from  Gettysburg. 

Notwithstanding  the  many  inaccuracies  in  this  account, 
I  can  forgive  him  in  consideration  of  his  splendid  tribute 
to  the  gallantry  of  Vincent's  brigade  and  its  decisive  effect 
on  the  result  of  the  battle.  I  would  have  made  the  praise 
include  O'Rorke  and  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New 
York. 

J.  M.  VANDERSLICE:  "GETTYSBURG  THEN  AND 
Now,"  pp.  147-156 

"...  In  the  meantime,  Law's  brigade, —  Fifteenth, 
Forty-seventh,  Fourth,  Forty-fourth,  and  Forty-eighth 
Alabama  Infantry, —  with  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas,  of 
Robertson's  brigade,  the  two  latter  regiments  following 
Law  by  a  misunderstanding  of  orders,  moved  forward  over 
as  rough  ground  as  was  ever  passed  over  by  troops,  to 
seize  Round  Top,  and  were,  after  skirmishing  with  the  Sec 
ond  United  States  Sharpshooters,  met  by  the  Fourth 
Maine,  Fortieth  New  York,  and  Sixth  New  Jersey  In 
fantry,  the  latter  being  of  Burling's  brigade,  which  had 
been  hurried  into  position  to  oppose  them.  Though  mak 
ing  brave  resistance,  these  regiments  were  forced  back,  and 
the  position  of  Round  Top  and  Ward's  left  endangered. 

"  During  this  time,  General  Warren,  chief  engineer  on 
Meade's  staff,  had  ascended  Little  Round  Top,  and  not 
only  saw  the  importance  of  holding  it,  but  saw  the  col 
umns  of  the  enemy  under  Law,  of  Hood's  division,  ad 
vancing  to  seize  it,  driving  before  them  the  regiments  at  its 
base.  He  hastened  to  the  road  where  Ayres'  division  of 


58     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  Fifth  corps  was  passing  to  the  front,  detached  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  Infantry  from  Weed's 
brigade  and  hurried  it  up  the  steep  hill. 

"  Before  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  reached  its 
position,  Vincent's  brigade  of  Barnes'  division,  which  had 
been  sent  to  hold  Round  Top,  arrived  upon  the  summit 
and  went  into  position  upon  a  ledge  just  below,  the  Six 
teenth  Michigan  Infantry  on  the  right,  the  Forty-fourth 
New  York  and  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania  in  the  center, 
and  the  Twentieth  Maine  on  the  left.  Hood's  troops  were 
already  charging  up  the  hill,  and  a  desperate  encounter 
ensued.  At  last  Law,  believing  he  could  not  force  the 
front,  attempted  a  flank  movement  upon  the  Sixteenth 
Michigan  with  the  Forty-eighth  and  the  Forty-fourth  Ala 
bama  Infantry,  while  the  Fourth  Alabama,  Fifth  and 
Fourth  Texas  attacked  the  Sixteenth  Michigan,  Forty- 
fourth  New  York,  and  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania  in  front. 
At  the  same  time  the  Forty-seventh  Alabama  engaged  the 
Twentieth  Maine  farther  to  the  left  in  front,  and  the  Fif 
teenth  Alabama  endeavored  to  turn  its  left.  The  move 
ment  upon  the  flank  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan  was  prov 
ing  successful  when  O'Rorke  reached  the  right  of  the  Six 
teenth  with  his  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York. 
The  enemy  were  within  a  few  feet  of  the  top,  and  O'Rorke 
had  no  time  to  form,  but  charged  his  regiment  down  the 
opposite  slope.  Hazlett's  Battery  D,  Fifth  United  States, 
had  by  great  effort  scaled  the  heights  and  opened  upon  the 
Confederates. 

"  The  youthful  O'Rorke,  who  had  but  two  years  before 
left  West  Point,  was  among  the  killed. 

"  For  nearly  an  hour  the  terrible  conflict  went  on  upon 
the  crest  of  Little  Round  Top,  the  fighting  continuing  des 
perate  (especially  on  the  front  of  the  Eighty-third  Penn 
sylvania  and  the  Twentieth  Maine),  where  at  times  the 
enemy  broke  through,  and  hand-to-hand  encounters  oo 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         59 

curred.  At  last  a  charge  of  the  Twentieth,  when  its  am 
munition  was  exhausted,  led  by  Colonel  Chamberlain, 
drove  the  enemy  from  the  hill  with  a  loss  of  many  pris 
oners.  The  balance  of  Weed's  brigade  —  Ninety-first 
and  One  Hundred  and  Fifty-fifth  Pennsylvania,  and  One 
Hundred  and  Forty-sixth  New  York  —  had  taken  position 
on  Vincent's  right,  and  the  rocky  summit  of  the  Federal 
left  was  secured,  but  at  the  cost  of  the  lives  of  Generals 
Vincent  and  Weed,  Colonel  O'Rorke,  Lieutenant  Hazlett, 
and  many  others.  General  Vincent  was  killed  while  urg 
ing  on  his  men.  He  had  just  been  promoted  from  the 
colonelcy  of  the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania,  by  which  regi 
ment,  and  by  his  whole  brigade,  he  was  greatly  beloved, 
being  a  cultured  and  gallant  young  officer. 

"  General  Weed  was  slain  at  his  former  battery,  Haz- 
lett's,  on  the  summit  of  Little  Round  Top.  Seeing  his 
commander  fall,  Lieutenant  Hazlett  hastened  to  his  side. 
The  general  seemed  desirous  of  telling  something,  and 
while  Hazlett  was  bending  over  him  the  bullet  of  a  sharp 
shooter  killed  the  lieutenant,  and  he  fell  upon  the  body  of 
his  dead  comrade.  The  Confederate  General  Hood  was 
also  wounded  here." 

The  statement  that  the  five  Alabama  regiments  of  Law's 
brigade  and  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas  of  Robertson's 
attacked  Ward's  brigade  at  the  Devil's  Den  is  not  corrob 
orated  by  any  evidence  that  I  have  been  able  to  find. 
The  Confederate  official  reports  show  that  all  these  regi 
ments,  with  the  exception  of  the  Forty-fourth  Alabama, 
went  up  the  swale  on  the  north  side  of  Big  Round  Top, 
two  of  them  going  over  the  top  of  the  mountain,  and  their 
attack  was  directed  against  Vincent's  brigade  and  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  on  Little  Round  Top. 
The  attack  on  the  Devil's  Den  was  made,  according  to  the 
official  reports,  by  the  Forty-fourth  Alabama,  the  other  two 


60     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

regiments  of  Robertson's  brigade,  Benning's  and  Ander 
son's  Georgia  brigades,  all  of  Hood's  division. 

Vincent's  brigade  did  not  go  to  the  summit  of  Little 
Round  Top,  but  passed  behind  the  ridge  its  whole  length 
and  to  a  position  on  the  slope  south  of  it.  (See  Union 
and  Confederate  official  reports,  pp.  141-252.) 

General  Hood  was  not  wounded  here.  According  to  his 
own  statement,  he  was  wounded  while  standing  near  the 
batteries  of  his  division  before  the  infantry  advanced. 
He  was  carried  off  the  field  and  General  Law  assumed 
command  of  Hood's  division,  and  retained  it  during  the 
battle  and  until  Hood's  recovery  and  return  to  duty,  some 
time  later.  (See  Law's  paper  on  the  "  Struggle  for 
Round  Top  "  and  Hood's  letter  to  Longstreet,  quoted  in 
Gates'  book,  "  The  War  Between  the  Union  and  the  Con 
federacy.") 

J.  H.  STINE:  "  HISTORY  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 
POTOMAC,"  pp.  500-5 12. 1 

"  But  another  reason  other  than  his  concealed  move 
ment  influenced  the  delay  of  the  attack  by  Longstreet, 
namely,  Law's  brigade  of  Hood's  division,  for  which  he 
was  waiting,  had  not  yet  arrived.  Law  arrived  a  little 
before  twelve  o'clock,  and  was  at  once  directed  to  move  to 
the  extreme  right  of  the  Confederate  line,  which  was  to 
sweep  up  Plum  Run.  When  Law  moved  to  the  place  as 
signed  him  his  right  rested  at  the  base  of  Big  Round  Top. 

1  The  reader  should  understand  that  in  this  paper  where  "  Law "  is 
mentioned  the  reference  is  to  Hood's  division,  after  Hood  was  wounded 
at  the  beginning  of  the  artillery  battle  and  before  the  infantry  was 
engaged.  When  Hood  was  disabled  Law  assumed  command  of  the 
division,  leaving  the  immediate  command  of  his  brigade  to  Colonel 
Sheffield,  of  the  Forty-eighth  Alabama  regiment.  Law  directed  the 
early  movements  of  his  brigade,  including  their  advance  up  the  valley 
to  attack  the  position  held  by  Vincent,  but  later  took  charge  of 
Robertson's,  Benning's,  and  Anderson's  brigades. — O.  W.  N. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         61 

Taking  a  hasty  survey  of  the  country  around  him,  he  saw 
no  cavalry  occupying  the  country  south  of  that  bold  moun 
tain  and  wondered  at  its  absence,  and  then  queried  if  the 
Union  soldiers  occupied  that  great  natural  fortification; 
but  as  none  were  visible  he  decided  to  send  a  scouting  party 
up  its  steep  side  to  discover,  if  possible,  the  location  and 
strength  of  the  Union  force  there,  if  any.  In  a  short  time 
one  of  them  returned  to  him  with  the  information  that 
they  had  ascended  to  the  summit  and  found  that  it  was  not 
held  by  the  Federals. 

"  Law  made  haste  to  communicate  this  important  in 
formation  to  Hood,  who  speedily  sent  it  to  Longstreet. 
As  no  attention  was  paid  to  it,  Law  again  called  Hood's 
attention  to  the  fact,  and  added  that  he  (Law)  had  cap 
tured  some  Union  soldiers,  who  claimed  to  be  going  to  the 
rear  in  the  direction  of  Emmittsburg  on  surgeon's  certifi 
cates.  Law  questioned  them  as  to  the  position  of  the  re 
serve  hospital  and  reserve  artillery,  which  they  located, 
and  said  a  road  east  of  Round  Top  led  there.  Again 
Longstreet  was  urged  to  move  farther  to  the  right  and  at 
least  occupy  Big  Round  Top,  but  he  sent  word  to  Hood 
that  Lee's  orders  were  positive  to  make  an  attack  where 
he  (Longstreet)  had  posted  the  two  divisions,  and  that 
they  must  be  obeyed. 

"  On  the  receipt  of  that  order  from  Longstreet,  Hood 
directed  his  division  to  prepare  for  action  and  directed 
his  artillery  to  open  on  the  Union  left  at  the  Devil's  Den 
and  to  the  right  of  it.  The  cannonading  did  not  continue 
long  before  Hood  was  wounded  in  the  arm,  when  Law  suc 
ceeded  to  the  command  of  the  division.  Law  commanded 
an  Alabama  brigade,  composed  of  the  Fourth,  Fifteenth, 
Forty- fourth,  Forty-seventh,  and  Forty-eighth  Alabama. 
Colonel  Sheffield,  of  the  latter  regiment,  assumed  command 
of  the  brigade  when  Law  was  assigned  to  the  division. 
On  the  left  of  the  Alabama  brigade  was  Robertson's  Texas 


62     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

brigade.  This  line  was  supported  by  the  Georgia  bri 
gades  commanded  by  Benning  and  G.  T.  Anderson. 
McLaws'  line  on  the  left  was  formed  with  Kershaw  on  the 
left  of  Robertson,  and  Barksdale  on  Kershaw's  left,  sup 
ported  by  Semmes  and  Wofford.  Thus  the  Confederate 
line  was  prepared  to  advance  on  Sickles,  who  was  await 
ing  the  assault.  Each  division  had  four  batteries.  Law 
says  he  had  twenty  guns  in  action.  If  this  is  true,  it  is 
fair  to  presume  that  McLaws  had  twenty,  and  thus  Long- 
street  opened  the  battle  on  the  afternoon  of  the  2d  with  at 
least  forty  guns. 

"  Law  advanced  up  the  Valley  of  Death,  through  which 
Plum  Run  flows,  with  his  brigade  on  the  right,  which,  in 
stead  of  following  in  the  valley,  veered  to  the  right  to  avoid 
the  heavy  and  well-aimed  fire  of  Smith's  battery,  stationed 
on  the  rocks  of  Devil's  Den.  An  interval  was  thus  left  be 
tween  that  brigade  and  the  right  of  Robertson's  Texas 
brigade.  Benning's  brigade  was  ordered  forward  to  fill 
the  interval.  At  the  same  time  Anderson's  brigade  was 
directed  to  move  to  the  left  of  Robertson,  and  Law  hurled 
his  whole  division  on  the  left  of  Birney's  division  with 
great  force. 

"  Captain  Smith^had  posted  four  of  his  guns  at  Devil's 
Den  while  he  left  the  other  section  150  yards  in  the  rear. 
The  Fourth  Maine  supported  his  battery.  General  Hunt, 
chief  of  artillery,  had  just  ridden  along  inspecting  es 
pecially  the  position  of  batteries.  As  he  passed  Smith, 
and  saw  his  cannon  on  that  advanced  position,  he  re 
marked  that  the  guns  were  well  posted,  but  would  be  dif 
ficult  to  remove  in  case  the  enemy  forced  back  our  in 
fantry.  Smith  knew  it  was  a  desperate  fight,  and  worked 
his  guns  with  great  effect. 

"  In  the  council  of  war,  held  about  three  o'clock,  Meade 
directed  Sykes  to  Little  Round  Top,  with  the  Fifth  corps. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         63 

Longstreet  began  his  attack  while  it  was  in  session,  and 
Sickles  merely  reported,  and  immediately  returned  to  the 
front.  When  Sykes  arrived  at  the  base  of  Little  Round 
Top  he  had  been  preceded  by  Warren,  for  the  council  had 
been  speedily  closed,  and  the  generals  prepared  for  action. 

"  When  Warren  arrived  on  the  summit  of  Little  Round 
Top  the  soldiers  of  the  signal  station  were  rolling  up  their 
flags  to  retire,  as  the  enemy  under  Law  were  pressing  so 
closely  that  their  lives  were  already  in  great  danger,  and 
it  was  always  understood  that  the  signal  stations  were  not 
to  be  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire.  Warren  directed  them 
to  unfurl  their  flags  and  continue  their  work  of  signaling 
with  Meade's  headquarters.  Seeing  Vincent's  brigade,  of 
Barnes'  division,  of  the  Fifth  corps,  approaching,  Warren 
rode  up  to  Sykes  and  Barnes  and  requested  that  Vincent 
be  moved  on  Little  Round  Top  and  hold  it,  as  the  Alabama 
brigade  was  hurrying  up  its  side  from  the  direction  of 
Plum  Run  to  take  possession  of  the  summit.  Vincent's 
men  seized  two  guns  of  Hazlett's  battery  and  dragged 
them  to  the  crest,  where  they  were  placed  in  position  to 
bear  on  Law  near  the  Devil's  Den. 

"  While  the  Union  forces  had  been  compelled  to  yield 
ground  under  Ayres  and  Caldwell,  yet  Law  saw  that  he 
could  not  get  possession  of  Little  Round  Top  by  following 
these  two  generals,  as  he  would  have  to  advance  over  an 
open  space  where  he  would  be  exposed  to  a  fire  that  would 
greatly  deplete  his  ranks  before  he  could  arrive  where 
Ayres  and  Caldwell  were  posted,  who  would  then  in  turn 
charge  him  back  over  the  wheat-field,  and  perhaps  break 
his  weakened  lines.  Before  the  action  began,  he  wanted 
to  take  possession  of  Big  Round  Top,  but  was  compelled 
to  follow  up  the  Valley  of  Death  according  to  Lee's  orders. 
He  then  thought  he  saw  a  chance  to  drive  our  troops  from 
Little  Round  Top  by  sending  a  force  up  the  secluded  de 
pression  between  the  Round  Tops,  which  was  only  a  few 


64     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

rods  wide  and  covered  with  woods,  which  would  shield  his 
movements;  but  again  his  efforts  were  foiled,  for  Vincent 
had  formed  his  brigade  in  a  semicircle,  with  the  right  of 
the  Sixteenth  Michigan  resting  not  far  from  Hazlett's 
battery;  the  Forty-fourth  New  York,  on  its  left,  tracing 
along  the  side  of  the  mountain;  the  Eighty-third  Penn 
sylvania,  on  its  left,  stretching  down  to  the  depression  be 
tween  the  two  mountains ;  and  the  Twentieth  Maine,  under 
Colonel  Chamberlain,  was  on  the  left  of  the  brigade,  and 
occupying  a  position  between  the  two  mountains.  Law  at 
tacked  vigorously  the  whole  front  of  Vincent.  The 
Forty-fourth  New  York  and  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania 
repulsed  several  assaults;  when  the  Sixteenth  Michigan 
on  the  right  was  attacked  a  part  of  that  regiment  gave 
way;  but  Patrick  H.  O'Rorke,  commanding  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  at  once  threw  his  regi 
ment  in  and  saved  that  point. 

"  General  Weed  had  been  mortally  wounded  and  Lieu 
tenant  Hazlett,  while  stooping  over  him  to  receive  what 
he  supposed  was  his  last  command,  was  shot  and  died  with 
his  arms  around  him.  As  O'Rorke  charged,  Vincent  was 
mortally  wounded,  and  soon  Patrick  O'Rorke  heroically 
surrendered  up  his  life.  Thus  Weed,  Vincent,  O'Rorke, 
and  Hazlett  lay  near  each  other,  silent  in  death,  on  Little 
Round  Top.  The  battle  still  waged  with  great  ferocity, 
for  as  yet  the  enemy  had  not  given  up  the  hope  of  carrying 
Little  Round  Top,  the  key  to  the  situation.  Failing  in  the 
effort  to  break  through  the  right  and  capture  Hazlett's 
guns,  and  possess  the  summit,  Law  moved  his  troops  back 
and  again  attacked  the  center  and  the  left.  While  the  as 
sault  on  Vincent's  center  was  made  with  great  determina 
tion,  the  left,  under  Chamberlain,  was  assailed  with  des 
peration. 

"  Vincent    having    fallen    mortally    wounded,    Colonel 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         65 

James  C.  Rice,  of  the  Forty-fourth  New  York,  assumed 
command  of  the  brigade.  Of  the  last  attack  he  says: 

"  '  Now  occurred  the  most  critical  time  of  the  action. 
For  above  half  an  hour  the  struggle  was  desperate.  At 
length  the  enemy  pressed  so  strongly  upon  the  left  flank  of 
Colonel  Chamberlain's  regiment  that  he  wisely  determined 
to  change  the  order  of  battle,  and  commanded  his  left 
wing  to  fall  back  at  right  angles  to  his  right.  He  then 
ordered  a  charge,  and  repulsed  the  enemy  at  every  point.' 

"  General  Crawford  having  arrived  with  two  brigades 
of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  Fisher's  brigade  was 
directed  to  support  Vincent's  brigade  on  Round  Top,  and 
was  posted  in  the  rear.  At  dusk  Colonels  Rice,  Chamber 
lain,  and  Fisher  held  a  consultation  and  decided  that  it 
would  be  unwise  to  permit  the  enemy  to  hold  the  crest 
of  Big  Round  Top,  as  it  would  be  fortified  during  the 
night  and  would  compel  Little  Round  Top  to  be  evacuated 
in  the  morning,  if  artillery  were  posted  on  it.  It  was 
therefore  decided  that  Fisher,  with  two  of  his  regiments, 
and  Chamberlain,  with  his  regiment,  should  charge  up  the 
mountain  at  once  and  dislodge  Law's  force  there.  Ac 
cordingly  these  two  officers,  with  the  Twentieth  Maine  and 
Fifth  and  Twelfth  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  ascended  the 
mountain  and  drove  the  enemy  before  them,  capturing 
some  thirty  prisoners,  including  one  of  General  Law's 
staff.  Chamberlain  in  the  darkness  was  unable  to  tell 
whether  he  was  near  a  heavy  body  of  the  enemy  or  not, 
and  sent  back  for  the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania  and 
Forty- fourth  New  York.  Fisher  had  moved  to  the  right 
of  Chamberlain  and  occupied  a  position  on  the  side  of  Big 
Round  Top,  but  in  the  night  sent  two  regiments  to  Cham 
berlain's  left.  Thus  ended  the  conflict  on  the  Round  Tops, 
leaving  both  in  possession  of  the  Union  troops,  but  which 
had  cost  so  many  precious  lives. " 


66     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

This  is  an  interesting  account,  but  differs  in  some  re 
spects  from  all  the  others.  There  are  some  statements 
not  corroborated  by  any  evidence  which  I  have  been  able 
to  find,  either  in  official  reports  or  elsewhere.  Stine  ig 
nores  the  fact  made  clear  by  Robertson's  report,  that  two 
of  his  regiments,  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas,  became 
separated  from  the  other  two  on  their  left  and  did  not  at 
tack  the  Devil's  Den,  but  went  up  the  swale  with  Law's 
brigade  to  attack  Vincent.  He  states  that  Warren  ar 
rived  on  Little  Round  Top  at  the  time  when  the  enemy's 
infantry  was  attacking  Ward's  brigade  at  the  Devil's  Den. 
Warren  arrived  before  any  advance  of  the  Confederate  in 
fantry  was  made.  He  directed  Smith's  battery  at  the 
Devil's  Den  to  fire  a  shot  into  the  woods  to  the  south,  be 
tween  Plum  Run  and  the  Emmittsburg  road,  and  dis 
covered  a  long  line  of  the  enemy's  infantry  there.  The 
Confederate  batteries  had  not  yet  opened  fire  on  Birney's 
line.  Warren  did  not  go  to  Sykes  and  Barnes  to  ask  for 
Vincent's  brigade.  Vincent  did  not  assist  in  getting  Haz- 
lett's  guns  up  the  hill.  Warren  says  that  he,  with  some 
stragglers  from  the  Third  corps,  assisted  in  getting  up  the 
first  two  of  Hazlett's  guns.  The  other  two  sections  came 
up  later,  breaking  through  the  column  of  the  One  Hun 
dred  and  Fortieth  New  York.  The  reader  should  bear  in 
mind  the  distinction  between  Law  as  brigade  commander 
and  division  commander.  Law  assumed  command  of  the 
division  before  the  infantry  became  engaged.  I  find  no 
record  that  he  gave  any  orders  to  his  own  brigade  after 
starting  it  up  the  swale  on  the  north  side  of  Big  Round 
Top.  He  was  fully  occupied  in  directing  the  attack 
against  Birney's  line.  The  reports  of  regimental  com 
manders  making  the  attack  on  Little  Round  Top  contain 
no  mention  of  receiving  any  orders  from  Law  or  Shef 
field.  The  statement  about  the  action  of  Fisher  and  his 
brigade  will  be  noticed  in  another  place. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        67 

CAPTAIN  R.  K.  BEECHAM  :  "  GETTYSBURG,  THE  PIVOTAL 
BATTLE  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR." 

"  The  Third  corps,  commanded  by  General  Sickles, 
12,000  strong,  also  arrived  on  the  field  at  an  early  hour  in 
the  morning.  This  gave  Meade  a  force  of  46,000  men  all 
told,  to  meet  Lee's  army,  very  early  on  the  morning  of 
July  2.  Thus  it  appeared  that  General  Meade  had  em 
ployed  the  night  to  great  advantage,  and  had  made  every 
effort  in  his  power  to  unite  his  army  so  that  he  might  in 
his  first  battle  meet  his  great  antagonist  on  somewhere  near 
equal  terms.  Still  the  Fifth  corps,  commanded  by  General 
Sykes,  12,500  strong,  and  the  Sixth  corps,  commanded  by 
General  Sedgwick,  15,500  (28,000  in  all,  or  more  than 
one-third  of  Meade's  whole  army),  were  many  weary  miles 
away."  (P.  137.) 

"  General  Meade  was  extremely  cautious,  too  cautious 
to  be  apt  to  win  a  great  victory  like  the  capture  or  an 
nihilation  of  the  army  opposed  to  him,  and  in  this  instance 
he  had  every  reason  to  be  cautious,  from  the  fact  that  a 
third  of  his  army  was  still  far  away  from  the  field. 
Meade  reasoned  that  as  Lee  had  marched  his  army  far 
from  his  base,  and  had  actually  carried  the  war  into  a  lo 
cality  unknown  to  him,  it  would  be  the  proper  thing  to  en 
courage  him  to  fight  a  truly  offensive  battle  on  grounds 
of  Meade's  own  choosing;  and  certainly  he  did  not  wish  to 
assume  a  position,  if  he  could  possibly  avoid  it,  that  would 
occasion  the  renewal  of  the  contest  before  the  arrival  of 
the  Fifth  and  Sixth  corps.  The  longer  Lee  delayed  his 
attack,  assuming  that  he  would  certainly  attack  Meade's 
chosen  position,  the  more  advantageous  the  situation  be 
came. 

"  By  extending  Hancock's  line  southward  along  Ceme 
tery  Ridge  to  Round  Top,  Meade  would  have  a  strong, 
compact  position,  with  his  left  absolutely  secure.  The 


68     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Fifth  corps  was  approaching  the  field  by  the  Taneytown 
Road,  and  would  arrive  in  the  exact  locality  to  reinforce 
readily  any  part  of  his  west  front,  as  the  Taneytown  Road 
runs  the  whole  length  of  Cemetery  Ridge  and  only  three 
or  four  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the  crest.  Sickles'  corps, 
nearly  12,000  strong,  was  ample  to  form  an  invincible  bat 
tle-line  from  Hancock's  left  to  that  impregnable  bastion  to 
the  southward. 

"  Because  of  the  absence  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  corps, 
but  for  no  other  reason,  was  Meade  justified  in  placing  his 
army  in  such  a  purely  defensive  position;  for,  to  abandon 
the  Emmittsburg  Road  to  Longstreet  was  in  itself  a  vic 
tory  for  Lee."  (P.  144.) 

"  But  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  corps  were  not  there,  and  the 
preparation  for  battle  was  obliged  to  go  on  without  them. 
Therefore,  in  the  absence  of  twenty-eight  thousand  in 
fantry  and  artillery,  and  until  they  should  arrive,  it  may 
have  been  good  generalship  on  Meade's  part  to  assume  the 
strongest  defensive  position  possible  and  maneuver  to  de 
lay  rather  than  facilitate  and  invite  attack.  Meade's  idea 
was  to  watch  the  enemy,  and  retreat  hastily  if  he  started 
to  move  away  from  his  front.  Sickles'  idea  was  to  shove 
his  lines  into  the  enemy's  teeth."  (P.  148.) 

"  At  twenty  minutes  past  six  o'clock  the  situation  of 
the  Union  army  was  desperate.  If  Lee  did  not  support 
Longstreet  with  reinforcements  from  his  center  and  left, 
as  Longstreet  complained  bitterly  that  he  did  not,  what 
can  be  said  of  Meade?  What  did  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  Union  army  do  to  relieve  the  tension?  If  it  is  true 
that  Lee  was  asleep,  or  had  forgotten  his  '  old  war  horse,' 
as  he  sometimes  called  Longstreet,  in  the  stress  of  the 
mightiest  effort  of  his  life,  is  it  not  also  true  that  Meade 
came  very  near  forgetting  Hancock  in  his  desperate  strug 
gle  to  maintain  his  position?  To  the  right  of  Hancock's 
line  many  batteries,  and  three  divisions,  or  seven  brigades 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         69 

of  Union  infantry  defended  the  west  front  of  Ceme 
tery  Hill;  and  two  of  those  brigades  had  hardly  pulled  a 
trigger  in  the  battle  of  the  previous  day.  They  were  not 
under  Hancock's  command,  and  Meade  did  not  feel  war 
ranted  in  weakening  the  line  by  a  single  regiment,  al 
though  the  position  was  naturally  so  rugged  and  strong 
that  a  skirmish  line  could  have  held  it  against  a  line  of 
battle.  At  least  he  did  not.  It  was  not  Longstreet 
against  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  but  up  to  that  moment 
and  until  half  an  hour  later,  it  was  Longstreet's  three  di 
visions,  comprising  thirteen  brigades,  against  Hancock's 
and  Birney's  three  divisions,  comprising  eleven  brigades, 
so  that  the  weight  of  the  battalia  was  with  Longstreet. 

"  But  now  the  time  had  arrived  when  it  became  neces 
sary  for  Meade,  the  commanding  general  of  the  Union 
army,  to  make  some  movement  on  the  chessboard  of  war; 
for  surely  and  certainly  it  was  the  danger  hour,  not  alone 
for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  for  the  American  Re 
public  as  well.  Since  the  birth  of  the  nation  there  was 
never  an  hour  fraught  with  danger  more  imminent.  The 
life  of  the  nation  was  in  the  balance.  Two  hours  before, 
Meade  had  received  a  despatch  from  Sedgwick  informing 
him  that  the  Sixth  corps  was  on  the  march  and  doing  its 
utmost  to  reach  the  field.  About  the  same  time  a  despatch 
from  Sykes  informed  him  that  the  Fifth  corps  was  nearer 
by  several  miles  than  the  Sixth ;  the  men  of  the  Fifth  corps 
were  not  made  of  asbestos,  but  what  humanity  could  they 
would  do.  It  is  not  recorded  of  Meade  that,  as  he 
watched  and  waited  during  those  anxious  hours,  he  was 
heard  to  murmur,  '  Sykes  or  night ! '  but  more  than  likely 
that  prayer  was  in  his  heart. 

"  At  twenty  minutes  past  six  o'clock  the  vanguard  of 
the  Fifth  corps  was  not  yet  in  sight,  and  Meade  could 
wait  no  longer  for  their  coming.  Then  he  sent  a  de 
spatch  to  Slocum  that  imperiled  the  right,  but  did  not  re- 


70     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

lieve  the  left.  It  showed  Meade's  good  intentions,  how 
ever,  which  were  worth  something,  and  if  he  did  more 
than  mean  well,  history  has  failed  to  make  a  record  of  it. 
The  despatch  to  Slocum  called  for  reinforcements.  Slo- 
cum  sent  him  Lockwood's  brigade  of  his  First  division, 
but  as  the  call  was  most  urgent,  Slocum  concluded  to  take 
some  chances;  so,  hastily  turning  his  whole  line  over  to 
the  care  of  General  Greene  and  his  Third  brigade  of  the 
Second  division,  with  instructions  to  extend  a  skirmish 
line  to  replace  his  line  of  battle  from  the  crest  of  Gulp's 
Hill  to  Rock  Creek,  and,  if  attacked,  to  hold  the  whole  line 
as  long  as  possible,  and  when  the  battle  became  too  heavy, 
to  retire  to  the  crest  and  hold  that  citadel  forever,  Slocum 
marched  away  to  the  left  with  the  balance  of  the  Twelfth 
corps,  leaving  one  brigade  —  a  mere  skirmish  line  —  to 
hold  Gulp's  Hill  and  its  important  slopes  against  Johnson's 
division  of  four  brigades.  It  was  a  daring  and  perilous 
movement,  one  of  the  mighty  risks  of  war  that  sometimes 
must  be  taken. 

"  General  G.  K.  Warren,  chief  of  engineers  on  General 
Meade's  staff,  may  truthfully  be  called  the  saviour  of  Lit 
tle  Round  Top;  and  for  his  work  that  day  he  earned  the 
everlasting  gratitude  of  his  country;  but  without  a  heroic 
effort  on  the  part  of  others,  no  man  could  have  saved  it; 
and  the  key  to  our  left,  as  Little  Round  Top  certainly 
was,  would  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Confederates. 

"  Along  in  the  afternoon,  when  the  battle  was  raging 
fiercely  to  the  westward,  General  Warren  rode  far  down 
Cemetery  Ridge  ascended  that  knob  of  boulders,  and  es 
tablished  on  the  summit  thereof  a  signal  station.  The 
eastern  and  northern  faces  of  Little  Round  Top,  though 
steep  and  rocky,  are  not  nearly  so  high  and  difficult  of 
ascent  as  the  western  face  from  Death  Valley.  Warren 
soon  made  the  discovery  that  the  bold  knob  on  which  he 
stood  was  a  most  important  position  —  not  for  the  Union 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         71 

army  while  it  remained  unoccupied  by  the  Confederates,  as 
it  then  was;  but  if  it  were  once  in  their  possession  and 
crowned  with  their  artillery,  they  could  enfilade  the  entire 
length  of  Cemetery  Ridge  and  take  Meade's  position  in  re 
verse  from  Cemetery  Hill  to  Rock  Creek.  Yet  there  was 
not  a  Union  soldier  there  to  defend  it,  except  Warren  and 
two  or  three  men  of  the  signal  corps.  Then,  as  the  after 
noon  wore  away  and  the  battle  drew  nearer,  increasing  in 
fury  around  the  wheat-field,  Warren  made  the  further 
discovery  that  Law  had  his  eye  on  Little  Round  Top; 
and  as  he  looked  he  saw  a  flanking  column  moving  out 
from  Devil's  Den  across  Plum  Run  valley,  headed  directly 
for  the  knob  of  boulders  on  which  he  stood.  A  message 
to  signal  headquarters  at  Cemetery  Hill  could  bring  no 
timely  relief,  even  if  a  regiment  could  be  spared  for  that 
purpose,  as  the  distance  was  more  than  two  miles,  and 
within  half  an  hour  the  advancing  Confederates  would  be 
in  possession  without  firing  a  gun.  But  there  were  de 
fenders  nearer;  at  that  moment  Warren's  ears  caught  the 
sound  of  marching  troops,  and  the  vanguard  of  the  Fifth 
corps,  so  anxiously  looked  for  by  Meade  and  Hancock, 
appeared  on  the  Taneytown  Road  not  four  hundred  yards 
in  rear  of  the  threatened  position. 

"  Never  in  the  history  of  war  was  arrival  more  timely. 
The  advent  of  Blucher's  army  on  the  field  of  Waterloo 
was  not  more  opportune  to  the  exhausted  English  than 
was  Sykes'  corps  to  Warren  and  the  exhausted  troops  of 
Hancock  and  Birney.  A  further  delay  of  half  an  hour 
for  any  cause  and  Sykes  would  have  found  Little  Round 
Top  in  Law's  possession  and  Cemetery  Ridge  occupied  by 
Longstreet  and  his  Confederates.  The  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  would  have  been  split  into  two  fragments,  the  Fifth 
and  Sixth  corps  out  of  the  battle,  and  Lee  master  of  the 
situation. 

"  Had  Longstreet  begun  his  battle  two  hours  earlier, — 


72     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

at  two  rather  than  at  four  o'clock, —  it  would  have  been 
over  before  Sykes'  arrival,  and  the  battle  of  Gettysburg 
would  have  been  counted  as  the  most  terrible  defeat  of  the 
Union  cause.  Lee's  unaccountable  hesitation  and  unread 
iness  in  the  morning;  Sickles'  daring  and  defiant  salient, 
that  puzzled  Longstreet  and  delayed  his  attack;  the  stub 
born  resistance  and  endurance  of  the  Third  corps  —  all 
combined  to  bring  a  far-reaching  victory  to  the  Union 
cause  at  the  bloody  sunset  hour.  Warren  hurried  down 
over  the  rocks  to  the  point  where  he  had  left  his  horse,  and 
rode  in  haste  to  the  marching  column,  detaching  Vincent's 
brigade  of  the  First  division,  which  he  hurried  to  the  sum 
mit  of  Little  Round  Top  just  in  time  to  meet  Law's  bri 
gade  of  Alabamans  climbing  its  western  face,  and  they 
drove  back  the  Southern  men  into  the  valley.  In  this 
struggle  the  valiant  Vincent  was  mortally  wounded.  Til- 
ton's  and  Sweitzer's  brigades  of  Sykes'  corps  were  hur 
ried  to  the  front  to  reinforce  the  Second  and  Third  corps. 
Then  out  of  the  former  chaos  the  battle  along  the  eastern 
verge  of  the  wheat-field  began  to  assume  form  and 
regularity.  The  First  and  Second  brigades  of  the  Sec 
ond  division,  and  also  the  Third  division  of  two  brigades 
of  the  Fifth  corps,  followed  in  support  of  the  main  battle, 
meeting  with  a  withering  fire  Longstreet's  temporarily  vic 
torious  brigades  that  had  won  the  wheat-field  and  were  ad 
vancing  toward  the  crest  of  Cemetery  Ridge. 

"  But  Law  had  not  yet  abandoned  his  design  on  Little 
Round  Top;  and  Benning's  brigade  of  Georgians  having 
reinforced  the  Alabamans,  they  tried  again  to  carry  the 
hill  of  boulders.  General  Weed,  with  the  Third  brigade 
of  the  Second  division  of  the  Fifth,  was  then  ordered  to 
reinforce  and  hold  Little  Round  Top.  Colonel  O'Rorke, 
with  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  Infantry, 
was  the  first  to  reach  the  firing  line  in  support  of  Vincent's 
brigade,  and  a  hand-to-hand  conflict  raged  again  on  the 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         73 

slippery  rocks  and  declivities.  By  order  of  Weed,  Haz- 
lett's  battery  (D  of  the  Fifth  United  States  Artillery)  was 
by  hand  and  with  ropes  dragged  to  the  summit;  but  the 
Confederate  sharpshooters,  located  behind  the  boulders  of 
Devil's  Den,  picked  off  the  Union  artillerymen  so  rapidly 
as  to  render  their  guns  of  little  or  no  service  for  a  time. 
General  Weed  was  mortally  wounded,  and  while  Hazlett 
was  leaning  over  him,  receiving  his  dying  message,  he  also 
was  hit,  and  fell  dead  across  Weed's  body. 

"  We  have  had  occasion  heretofore  to  speak  of  the  ex 
pert  marksmanship  of  the  Confederate  soldiers,  but  on  no 
field  of  the  war  did  they  exhibit  greater  skill  in  that  ca 
pacity  than  at  this  time  and  place.  The  rocks  of  Devil's 
Den  are  certainly  five  hundred  yards,  and  probably  more, 
from  the  summit  of  Little  Round  Top;  but  across  the 
yawning  chasm  of  Plum  Run  they  made  life  uncertain  for 
the  Union  soldiers  who  guarded  it.  The  Confederates, 
however,  had  one  great  advantage  over  their  opponents. 
They  were  shooting  upward,  and  the  boulders  of  Little 
Round  Top  were  aglow  with  the  rays  of  the  setting  sun. 
The  Union  soldiers  stood  out  against  the  sky  clear  and  dis 
tinct  to  their  eyes,  a  shining  mark  for  their  dexterity; 
while  the  superior  quality  of  their  powder  must  also  be 
taken  into  consideration. 

"  On  the  other  hand,  the  Union  soldiers  were  looking 
downward  into  an  abyss,  as  it  were,  with  the  dazzling  sun 
shine  in  their  eyes,  and  the  marks  at  which  they  directed 
their  shots  indistinct,  within  the  shadow  of  overhang 
ing  rocks.  Nevertheless,  a  company  or  two  of  Berdan's 
sharpshooters  were  hastily  distributed  among  the  rocks 
and  crevices,  and  they  soon  returned  the  Confederate  fire 
with  satisfactory  effect;  and  as  the  sun  went  down  be 
hind  the  South  mountain,  giving  to  each  party  of  distant 
combatants  a  fair  and  equal  chance,  the  Union  artillery 
was  brought  into  play  upon  their  rocky  stronghold,  with 


74     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  result  that,  when  the  battle  was  over,  many  a  Geor 
gian  and  many  an  Alabaman  was  found  among  the  rocks 
of  Devil's  Den  who  never  retreated,  not  a  few  bearing 
no  mark  of  ball  or  shell,  but  killed  by  the  concussion  of 
shell  or  solid-shot  against  the  rocks  upon  which  they  de 
pended  for  protection, 

"  So  Little  Round  Top  was  held  and  made  secure,  but 
the  battle  did  not  cease  with  the  going  down  of  the  sun; 
for  half  an  hour  later  it  was  raging  terrifically  in  Death 
Valley  and  along  the  wheat-field  plateau.  The  stone  walls 
and  rocky  defenses  on  the  east  side  of  the  wheat-field  were 
recaptured,  as  was  also  Devil's  Den,  and  held  by  the  Union 
forces.  At  eight  o'clock  the  battle  ceased.  Longstreet 
says :  '  While  Meade's  lines  were  growing,  my  men  were 
dropping;  we  had  no  others  to  call  to  their  aid,  and  the 
weight  against  us  was  too  heavy  to  carry.  The  sun  was 
down,  and  with  it  went  down  the  severe  battle.'  That 
statement  is  true.  During  the  sunset  hour  the  weight  of 
battalia  was  against  Longstreet. 

"  The  Fifth  corps  entered  the  arena  at  about  seven 
o'clock.  It  comprised  eight  brigades  and  numbered  twelve 
thousand  five  hundred  men;  but  as  the  afternoon  was  ter 
ribly  hot  and  the  corps  had  marched  steadily  and  rapidly, 
if  it  went  into  the  battle  with  twelve  thousand  men  it  made 
a  splendid  record.  A  reinforcement  of  twelve  thousand 
fresh  soldiers  (for  although  weary  enough  with  marching 
and  nearly  exhausted  with  excessive  heat,  they  were  fresh 
in  comparison  with  the  men  who  had  been  hours  in  battle) 
to  a  battle-line  originally  but  eighteen  thousand  strong,  and 
that  had  lost  thousands,  is  a  great  addition  to  its  battle 
strength.  Thus  the  Union  army,  starting  in  with  Sickles* 
corps  of  twelve  thousand,  was  reinforced  after  the  first 
hour  with  six  thousand,  and  again  at  seven  o'clock  with 
twelve  thousand,  making  its  battle  strength  at  the  finish 
nineteen  brigades  and  thirty  thousand  men,  less  the  loss 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        75 

of  the  day;  while  Longstreet  made  the  battle  without  re 
inforcements,  but  from  start  to  finish  with  thirteen  bri 
gades  and  twenty-six  thousand. 

"  On  the  whole  it  was  not  so  very  unequal.  Longstreet 
says :  '  My  loss  was  about  six  thousand ;  Meade's  between 
twelve  and  fourteen  thousand.'  It  is  useless  at  this  point 
to  discuss  the  Confederate  losses;  but  Longstreet's  esti 
mate  of  the  Union  losses  is  greatly  exaggerated.  As 
suming  that  the  Third  corps'  entire  loss  of  four  thousand 
one  hundred  and  ninety-eight  was  sustained  on  the  second 
of  July,  and  also  the  Fifth  corps'  entire  loss  of  two  thou 
sand  one  hundred  and  eighty-six,  to  the  sum  of  which  we 
add  half  the  entire  loss  of  the  Second  corps,  which  cannot 
be  far  from  a  correct  estimate,  and  it  brings  the  aggregate 
loss  of  the  Union  army  on  July  2  up  to  about  nine  thou 
sand,  which  is  more  than  forty  per  cent,  in  excess  of  Long- 
street's  loss  as  he  estimates  it. 

"  But  whatever  the  battle  losses  of  the  second  of  July 
may  have  been,  it  was  the  decisive  battle  of  the  series,  and 
bloody  enough  to  satisfy  any  votary  of  war  and  carnage. 

"  It  must  have  been  about  seven  o'clock  when  the  first 
shots  were  fired  by  Vincent's  brigade  of  the  Fifth  corps 
on  Little  Round  Top.  Within  a  few  minutes  thereafter 
every  brigade  and  every  regiment  of  that  twelve  thousand 
men  were  in  the  fire  and  fury  of  battle,  where  they  re 
mained  to  the  end  of  the  struggle.  One  hour  only,  one 
hour  at  the  going  down  of  the  sun,  and  until  darkness 
overshadowed  the  earth,  and  yet  in  that  short  space  of 
time  the  Fifth  corps  sustained  a  loss  of  more  than  two 
thousand  men.  Was  there  ever  a  bloodier  sunset  hour? 

"  After  dark  Meade  ordered  the  withdrawal  of  his  lines 
from  all  points  westward  to  the  ridge,  extending  an  un 
broken  line  from  Cemetery  Hill  to  Round  Top;  and 
Sickles  made  no  objection,  being  content  to  let  his  (  salient ' 
go  with  his  leg. 


;6     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

"  Before  seeking  his  couch  that  night,  it  is  said  that  Lee 
on  bended  knees  offered  up  thanks  to  God  on  high  for 
what  Longstreet  had  so  dearly  won;  and  Meade  returned 
thanks  to  the  same  wise  Providence  for  what  Longstreet 
had  failed  to  win;  while  the  whole  Army  of  the  Potomac 
thanked  God  indeed  for  the  timely  arrival  of  the  Fifth 
corps;  and  all  the  people  of  the  United  States  thanked 
Him,  and  the  boys  of  the  Third,  Second,  and  Fifth  corps 
for  their  heroic  fighting,  done  all  along  the  line."  (Pp. 
181-195.) 

Beecham's  "Gettysburg,"  etc.,  published  in  1911,  is  not 
worthy  of  serious  consideration.  My  reason  for  introduc 
ing  extracts  from  it  is,  that  as  the  latest  account  of  the  bat 
tle  of  Gettysburg,  it  will  be  read  by  many  readers  who 
have  never  seen  the  earlier  accounts,  who  may  accept  it 
as  a  truthful  history  of  the  battle.  It  is  no  more  history 
than  is  Victor  Hugo's  account  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo. 
It  may  be  poetry  or  romance,  but  cannot  have  any  stand 
ing  as  a  relation  of  facts,  especially  in  regard  to  the  bat 
tle  of  the  second  day.  It  is  amazing  that  a  writer  who  has 
access  to  the  official  records,  and  the  many  valuable  books 
which  have  been  published  on  the  subject,,  could  have 
invented  such  a  tale.  He  does  not  hesitate  to  reveal  the 
most  secret  thoughts  and  purposes  of  both  Meade  and 
Lee,  which  are  here  made  known  for  the  first  time.  He 
gives  no  heed  to  what  these  officers  have  said  for  them 
selves. 

The  Fifth  corps  came  from  Hanover.  By  midnight  of 
July  i  the  advance  of  the  corps  halted  within  two  or  three 
miles  of  the  battlefield.  At  daylight  it  was  again  on  the 
march,  and  by  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning  was  (with  the 
exception  of  two  brigades  of  Crawford's  division,  which 
arrived  a  little  later)  in  position  on  the  right  of  the 
Twelfth  corps.  By  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  Sixth 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         77 

corps  began  to  arrive  by  the  Baltimore  Pike.  By  Meade's 
order  it  relieved  the  Fifth  corps  on  the  right.  Sykes  then 
massed  his  corps  near  the  crossing  of  the  Baltimore  Pike 
over  Rock  Creek,  in  rear  of  the  center  of  the  Union  line 
of  battle,  where  it  was  in  good  position  to  move  to  any 
part  of  the  line  which  needed  reinforcements. 

What  shall  we  say  of  the  historian  who  says  that  at  6 120 
p.  M.  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  corps  were  many  weary  miles 
away,  and  that  at  7  p.  M.  the  head  of  the  Fifth  corps  began 
to  arrive  by  the  Taneytown  road,  and  who  makes  no  fur 
ther  mention  of  the  presence  of  the  Sixth  corps  on  the 
field  that  day?  Further  comment  is  unnecessary.  If  the 
reader  will  compare  the  extracts  which  I  have  quoted  with 
the  official  reports  and  the  accounts  of  other  writers,  it  will 
not  be  difficult  to  form  a  correct  opinion  of  the  value  of 
this  book  as  history. 

"  THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  UNION  AND  THE  CONFED 
ERACY,"  BY  WILLIAM  C.  OATES,  COLONEL  FIFTEENTH 
ALABAMA  INFANTRY. 

:<  When  we  arrived  Generals  Lee  and  Longstreet  were 
together  on  an  eminence  in  our  front,  on  Seminary  Ridge, 
and  appeared  to  be  inspecting  with  field-glasses  the  position 
of  the  Federals.  We  were  allowed  but  a  few  minutes' 
rest,  when  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Hood  were  moved 
in  line  by  the  right  flank  around  to  the  south  of  the  Fed 
eral  position.  There  was  a  good  deal  of  delay  on  the 
march,  which  was  quite  circuitous,  for  the  purpose  of 
covering  the  movement  from  the  enemy.  Finally  Hood 
marched  across  the  rear  of  McLaws  and  went  into  line  on 
the  crest  of  the  little  ridge  across  the  Emmittsburg  road, 
with  Benning's  brigade  in  rear  of  his  center,  constituting  a 
second  line,  his  battalion  of  artillery,  sixteen  pieces,  in 
position  on  his  left.  McLaws  then  formed  his  division  of 


78     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

four  brigades  in  two  lines  of  battle  on  Hood's  left,  with 
sixteen  pieces  of  artillery  in  position  on  McLaws'  left. 

''  This  line  crossed  the  Emmittsburg  road  and  was  par 
tially  parallel  with  it.  The  extreme  right  of  Hood's  line 
was  considerably  in  advance  and  north  of  that  road,  and 
its  right  directly  opposite  to  the  center  of  the  Great  Round 
Top  Mountain.  Law's  brigade  constituted  the  right  of 
Hood's  line,  and  was  formed  at  first  in  single  line,  as  fol 
lows: 

"  My  regiment,  the  Fifteenth  Alabama,  in  the  center,  the 
Forty-fourth  and  Forty-eighth  Alabama  regiments  to  my 
right,  and  the  Forty-seventh  and  Fourth  Alabama  regi 
ments  to  my  left.  Thus  formed,  about  j:jo  o'clock  P.  M.1 
both  battalions  of  artillery  opened  fire.  The  Federals 
replied  from  their  guns  on  and  near  Little  Round  Top, 
and  within  a  few  minutes  our  line  advanced  in  quick 
time  under  the  fire  of  our  guns,  through  an  open  field 
about  three  or  four  hundred  yards  and  then  down  a  gentle 
slope  for  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  through  the  open  valley  of 
Plum  Run,  a  small,  muddy,  meandering  stream  running 
through  it  near  the  base  of  the  mountains.2 

1  Italics  are  mine.— O.  W.  N. 

2  The  advance  was  not  skillfully  made  in  all  respects.     Five  compa 
nies   from  two   of  the   regiments   of  the  brigade  covered   its   front  as 
skirmishers.     The  two  from  the  Forty-eighth  on  the  right  were  under 
the  command  of  a  captain,  the  three  from  the  Forty-seventh  likewise 
commanded  by  a  captain,  and  in  the  advance  were  soon  disconnected 
from  each  other,  but  all  moved  directly  toward  the  center,  and  bore 
to  the  right  of  the  southern  front  of  Great  Round  Top,  and  passed 
around  it  to   the   right  on   the  eastern  side.     Captain   A.    O.   Dickson, 
then   first  lieutenant   of    Company   A,    one   of   the   skirmish   companies 
of  the  Forty-eighth  regiment,  now  lives  in  Brooksville,  Blount  County, 
Alabama,  and  is  an  intelligent,  reliable  man.     He  says  that  these  com 
panies  passed  entirely  around  to   the  northern  side  of  the  mountain 
without   encountering  any  Union  troops,  and  in   this  way  these   com 
panies  were  not  in  the  battle  of  July  2.     Captain  J.  Q.  Burton,  of  the 
Forty-seventh,  who  lives  at  Opelika,  and  is  a  reliable  gentleman,  says 
that  three  companies  from  that   regiment  went  the  same  way,  never 
encountered  the  enemy,  and  were  not  ill  the  battle.    Had  these  five 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        79 

"  Law's  brigade  was  the  first  to  move,  but  the  two  regi 
ments  to  my  right  were  dropped  back  a  short  distance, 
and  as  we  entered  the  valley  the  Forty-fourth  Alabama 
was  directed  to  the  left  to  attack  the  Devil's  Den,  and  the 
Forty-eighth  continued  as  a  reserve  or  second  line,  which 
made  the  Fifteenth  a  little  in  advance  and  on  the  extreme 
right  of  Longstreet's  column  of  attack.  Benning's  —  the 
Texas  —  and  Anderson's  brigades  moved  in  echelon  into 
the  action,  so  that  our  division  was  spread  out  like  the 
outer  edge  of  a  half -open  fan,  and  as  the  right  drove  the 
enemy  from  the  base  of  the  mountain  each  brigade  in  suc 
cession  would  strike  the  enemy's  line  on  the  flank  or  quar 
tering,  so  that  as  we  drove  them  our  line  would  shorten 
and  hence  strengthen;  but  General  Sickles  had  changed  his 
line  after  the  first  formation,  so  that  Birney's  division,  with 
Ward's  brigade  on  its  left  at  the  Devil's  Den  and  extend 
ing  along  a  ridge  to  the  Emmittsburg  road,  was  facing  us, 
instead  of  the  other  way,  as  General  Lee  thought.  Sickles 
thus  gave  us  an  unexpected  and  very  warm  reception.  He 

companies  gone  farther  and  joined  my  column  on  the  north  side  of 
Great  Round  Top,  I  could  have  captured  the  ordnance  train,  and  it 
would  have  enabled  me,  in  all  probability,  to  have  captured  Little 
Round  Top.  The  Forty-eighth  regiment  was  ordered  across  the  rear 
to  the  left  early  in  the  advance.  The  attack,  instead  of  being  straight 
forward,  as  the  skirmishers  doubtless  believed  it  would  be,  was  a 
left  half-wheel,  but  of  which  the  skirmishers  were  not  informed,  so 
they  went  to  the  right  and  the  line  of  battle  to  the  left.  On  such  an 
occasion  a  competent  field  officer  should  have  been  in  command  of 
the  skirmish  line  of  the  brigade  and  before  he  begun  the  advance 
have  received  definite  instructions  from  the  brigade  commander. 
There  was  no  such  arrangement  on  this  occasion,  and  as  a  consequence 
five  companies  of  the  brigade  were  not  in  the  battle. 

"No  communication  as  to  what  was  intended  to  be  done  was  made 
to  the  regimental  commanders  until  after  the  advance  began.  This 
was  a  common  practice  in  those  days ;  but  it  was  wrong.  The  colonels 
of  the  regiments  about  to  engage  in  battle  should  always  be  informed 
of  what  is  to  be  done  before  the  advance  begins,  and  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  staff  officers  to  see  the  orders  carried  out. — Footnote  to  Gates' 
work.  p.  207. 


8o     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

constantly  received   reinforcements,    which   made   his   line 
hard  to  drive. 

"  Sickles'  apprehension  of  another  flank  movement 
on  Lee's  part,  as  at  Chancellorsville,  was  well  founded; 
but  the  same  man  was  not  there  to  conduct  it  as 
at  that  place  two  months  before.  To  guard  against  a 
similar  surprise,  Sickles  changed  his  first  formation  and 
placed  Birney's  fine  division,  well  supported,  on  his  flank 
and  facing  to  the  rear,  which  thwarted  Lee's  plan  of  attack 
made  t\vo  hours  before,  which  was  a  masterly  piece  of 
strategy  when  made.  Rapid  change  of  conditions  in  all 
human  affairs  bring  unexpected  results.  As  the  most 
authentic  account  of  Longstreet's  attack  and  the  spirit  in 
which  he  made  it,  I  quote  from  Major-General  Hood's 
report  to  him  long  after  the  battle,  as  follows : 

'  General  Lee  was,  seemingly,  anxious  you  should  at 
tack  that  morning.  He  remarked  to  me,  "  The  enemy  is 
here,  and  if  we  do  not  whip  him,  he  will  whip  us."  You 
thought  it  better  to  await  the  arrival  of  Pickett's  division, 
at  that  time  still  in  the  rear,  in  order  to  make  the  attack; 
and  you  said  to  me,  subsequently,  whilst  we  were  seated 
together  near  the  trunk  of  a  tree:  "  The  General  is  a  lit 
tle  nervous  this  morning ;  he  wishes  me  to  attack ;  I  do  not 
wish  to  do  so  without  Pickett.  I  never  like  to  go  into 
battle  with  one  boot  off."  ' 

"  '  Thus  passed  the  forenoon  of  that  eventful  day,  when 
in  the  afternoon,  about  three  o'clock,  it  was  decided  to 
await  no  longer  Pickett's  division,  but  to  proceed  to  our 
extreme  right  and  attack  up  the  Emmittsburg  road. 
McLaws  moved  off,  and  I  followed  with  my  division.  In 
a  short  time  I  was  ordered  to  quicken  the  march  of  my 
troops  and  to  pass  to  the  front  of  McLaws. 

"  '  This  movement  was  accomplished  by  throwing  out 
an  advanced  force  to  tear  down  fences  and  clear  the  way. 
The  instructions  I  received  were  to  place  my  division  across 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         81 

the  Emmittsburg  road,  form  line  of  battle,  and  attack. 
Before  reaching  this  road,  however,  I  had  sent  forward 
some  of  my  picked  Texas  scouts  to  ascertain  the  position 
of  the  enemy's  extreme  left  flank.  They  soon  reported  to 
me  that  it  rested  upon  Round  Top  Mountain  [meaning 
Little  Round  Top]  ;  that  the  country  was  open,  and  that 
I  could  march  through  an  open  woodland  pasture  around 
Round  Top  [meaning  Great  Round  Top],  and  assault  the 
enemy  in  flank  and  rear;  that  their  wagon  trains  were 
parked  in  rear  of  their  lines  and  were  badly  exposed  to 
our  attack  in  that  direction.  As  soon  as  I  arrived  upon 
the  Emmittsburg  road  I  placed  one  or  two  batteries  in 
position  and  opened  fire.  A  reply  from  the  enemy's  guns 
soon  developed  his  lines.  His  left  rested  on  or  near  Round 
Top  [meaning  Little  Round  Top]  with  line  bending  back 
and  again  forward,  forming,  as  it  were,  a  concave  line,  as 
approached  by  the  Emmittsburg  road.  A  considerable 
body  of  troops  was  posted  in  front  of  their  main  line,  be 
tween  the  Emmittsburg  Road  and  Round  Top  Mountain. 
This  force  was  in  line  of  battle  upon  an  eminence  near  a 
peach  orchard.  [This  was  Birney's  division  of  Sickles' 
corps.] 

"  '  I  found  that  in  making  the  attack  according  to  or 
ders,  viz.,  up  the  Emmittsburg  road,  I  should  have  first  to 
encounter  and  drive  off  this  advanced  line  of  battle;  sec 
ondly,  at  the  base  and  along  the  slope  of  the  mountain,  to 
confront  immense  boulders  of  stone  so  massed  together  as 
to  form  narrow  openings,  which  would  break  our  ranks 
and  cause  the  men  to  scatter  whilst  climbing  up  the  rocky 
precipice. 

'  I  found,  moreover,  that  my  division  would  be  ex 
posed  to  a  heavy  fire  from  the  main  line  of  the  enemy 
in  position  on  the  crest  of  the  high  range,  of  which  Round 
Top  was  the  extreme  left;  and,  by  reason  of  the  concavity 
of  the  enemy's  line,  that  we  would  be  subject  to  a  de- 


82     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

structive  fire  in  flank  and  rear,  as  well  as  in  front;  and 
deemed  it  almost  an  impossibility  to  clamber  along  the 
boulders  up  this  steep  and  rugged  mountain,  and,  under 
this  number  of  crossfires,  put  the  enemy  to  flight.  I  knew 
that  if  the  feat  was  accomplished,  it  must  be  at  a  fearful 
sacrifice  of  as  brave  and  gallant  soldiers  as  ever  engaged 
in  battle. 

"  '  The  reconnaissance  of  my  Texas  scouts  and  the  de 
velopment  of  the  Federal  lines  were  effected  in  a  very 
short  space  of  time;  in  truth,  shorter  than  I  have  taken  to 
recall  and  jot  down  these  facts,  although  the  scenes  and 
events  of  that  day  are  as  clear  to  my  mind  as  if  the  great 
battle  had  been  fought  yesterday.  I  was  in  possession  of 
these  important  facts  so  shortly  after  reaching  the  Em- 
mittsburg  road,  as  ordered,  and  to  urge  that  you  allow  me 
to  turn  Round  Top,  and  attack  the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear. 
Accordingly  I  despatched  a  staff  officer,  bearing  to  you  my 
request  to  be  allowed  to  make  the  proposed  movement  on 
account  of  the  above-stated  reasons.  Your  reply  was 
quickly  received :  "  General  Lee's  orders  are  to  attack  up 
the  Emmittsburg  road."  I  sent  another  officer,  saying  I 
feared  nothing  could  be  accomplished  by  such  an  attack, 
and  renewed  my  request  to  turn  Round  Top.  Again  your 
answer  was,  "  General  Lee's  orders  are  to  attack  up  the 
Emmittsburg  road."  During  this  interim  I  had  continued 
the  use  of  the  batteries  upon  the  enemy,  and  had  become 
more  and  more  convinced  that  the  Federal  line  extended  to 
Round  Top,  and  that  I  could  not  reasonably  hope  to  ac 
complish  much  by  the  attack  as  ordered.  In  fact,  it 
seemed  to  me  that  the  enemy  occupied  a  position  by  na 
ture  so  strong, —  I  may  say  impregnable, —  that,  inde 
pendently  of  their  flank  fire,  they  could  easily  repel  our  attack 
by  merely  throwing  and  rolling  stones  down  the  mountain 
side  as  we  approached. 

"  '  A  third  time  I  despatched  one  of  my  staff  to  explain 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         83 

fully  in  regard  to  the  situation  and  suggest  that  you  had 
better  come  and  look  for  yourself.  I  selected,  in  this  in 
stance,  my  adjutant-general,  Colonel  Harry  Sellers,  whom 
you  know  to  be  not  only  an  officer  of  great  courage,  but 
also  of  marked  ability.  Colonel  Sellers  returned  with  the 
same  message :  "  General  Lee's  orders  are  to  attack  up 
the  Emmittsburg  road."  Almost  simultaneously,  Colonel 
Fairfax,  of  your  staff,  rode  up  and  repeated  the  above  or 
ders. 

1  After  this  urgent  protest  against  entering  the  battle 
at  Gettysburg  according  to  instructions,  which  protest  is 
the  first  and  only  one  I  ever  made  during  my  entire  mili 
tary  career,  I  ordered  my  line  to  advance  and  make  the  as 
sault. 

'  As  my  troops  were  moving  forward  you  rode  up  in 
person;  a  brief  conversation  passed  between  us,  during 
which  I  again  expressed  the  fears  above  mentioned,  and  re 
gret  at  not  being  allowed  to  attack  in  flank  around  Round 
Top.  You  answered  to  this  effect :  "  We  must  obey  the 
orders  of  General  Lee."  I  then  rode  forward  with  my  line 
under  a  heavy  fire.  In  about  twenty  minutes,  after  reach 
ing  the  peach  orchard,  I  was  severely  wounded  in  the  arm, 
and  borne  from  the  field. 

'  With  this  wound  terminated  my  participation  in  this 
great  battle.  As  I  was  borne  off  on  a  litter  to  the  rear  I 
could  but  experience  deep  distress  of  mind  and  heart  at  the 
thought  of  the  inevitable  fate  of  my  brave  fellow-soldiers, 
who  formed  one  of  the  grandest  divisions  of  that  world- 
renowned  army;  and  I  shall  ever  believe  had  I  been  per 
mitted  to  turn  Round  Top  Mountain,  we  would  not  only 
have  gained  that  position,  but  have  been  able  finally  to  rout 
the  enemy.' 

"  Skirmishers  from  Law's  brigade,  who  passed  around 
Great  Round  Top  on  its  east  side,  confirm  the  statement 
of  Hood's  scouts,  that  no  Union  troops  were  there. 


84     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

"  General  Law  rode  up  to  me  as  we  were  advancing, 
and  informed  me  that  I  was  then  on  the  extreme  right  of 
our  line  and  for  me  to  hug  the  base  of  Great  Round  Top 
and  go  up  the  valley  between  the  two  mountains,*  until  I 
found  the  left  of  the  Union  line,  to  turn  it  and  do  all 
the  damage  I  could,  and  that  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bulger 
would  be  instructed  to  keep  the  Forty-seventh  closed  to  my 
regiment,  and  if  separated  from  the  brigade  he  would  act 
under  my  orders.  Just  after  we  crossed  Plum  Run  we 
received  the  first  fire  from  the  enemy's  infantry.  It  was 
Stoughton's  Second  Regiment  United  States  Sharpshooters, 
posted  behind  a  fence  at  or  near  the  southern  foot  of  Great 
Round  Top.  They  reached  that  position  as  we  advanced 
through  the  old  field.  No  other  troops  were  there,  nor 
on  that  mountain  at  that  time.  I  did  not  halt  at  the  first 
fire,  but  looked  to  the  rear  for  the  Forty-eighth  Alabama, 
and  saw  it  going,  under  General  Law's  order,  across  the 
rear  of  our  line  to  the  left,  it  was  said,  to  reinforce  the 
Texas  brigade,  which  was  hotly  engaged.  That  left  no 
one  in  my  rear  or  on  my  right  to  meet  this  foe.  They 
were  in  the  woods,  and  I  did  not  know  the  number  of 
them.  I  received  the  second  fire.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Feagin  and  one  or  two  of  the  men  fell.  I  knew  it  would 
not  do  to  go  on  and  leave  that  force,  I  knew  not  how 
strong,  in  our  rear  with  no  troops  of  ours  to  take  care  of 
them;  so  I  gave  the  command  to  change  direction  to  the 
right.  The  seven  companies  of  the  Forty-seventh  swung 
around  with  the  Fifteenth  and  kept  in  line  with  it.  The 
other  three  companies  of  that  regiment  were  sent  forward 
as  skirmishers  before  the  advance  began.  The  sharp 
shooters  retreated  up  the  south  front  of  the  mountain,  pur 
sued  by  my  command. 

"  In  places  the  men  had  to  climb  up,  catching  to  the  rocks 
and  bushes  and  crawling  over  the  boulders  in  the  face  of 
the  fire  of  the  enemy,  who  kept  retreating,  taking  shelter 
1  Italics  are  mine.— O.  W.  N. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        85 

and  firing  down  on  us  from  behind  the  rocks  and  crags 
which  covered  the  side  of  the  mountain  thicker  than  grave 
stones  in  a  city  cemetery.  Fortunately  they  usually  over 
shot  us.  We  could  see  our  foe  only  as  they  dodged  back 
from  one  boulder  to  another,  hence  our  fire  was  scattering. 
As  we  advanced  up  the  mountain  they  ceased  firing  about 
halfway  up,  divided,  and  a  battalion  went  around  the 
mountain  on  each  side.  Those  who  went  up  to  the  right 
fired  a  few  shots  at  my  flank.  To  meet  this  I  deployed 
Company  A,  and  moved  it  by  the  left  flank  to  protect  my 
right,  and  continued  my  rugged  ascent  until  we  reached 
the  top.  Some  of  my  men  fainted  from  heat,  exhaustion, 
and  thirst.  I  halted  and  let  them  lie  down  and  rest  a  few 
minutes.  My  right  lay  exactly  where  the  observatory  now 
stands,  and  the  line  extended  down  the  slope  westward.  I 
saw  Gettysburg  through  the  foliage  of  the  trees.  Saw  the 
smoke  and  heard  the  roar  of  battle  which  was  then  raging 
at  the  Devil's  Den,  in  the  peach  orchard,  up  the  Emmitts- 
burg  road,  and  on  the  west  and  south  of  the  Little  Round 
Top.  I  saw  from  the  highest  point  of  rocks  that  we  were 
then  on  the  most  commanding  elevation  in  that  neighbor 
hood.  I  knew  that  my  men  were  too  much  exhausted  to 
make  a  good  fight  without  a  few  minutes'  rest. 

"  To  show  their  condition,  I  quote  from  General  Long- 
street,  who  says  in  his  book  (page  365)  : 

"  '  Law  completed  his  march  of  twenty-eight  miles  in 
eleven  hours,  the  best  marching  in  either  army,  to  reach 
the  field  of  Gettysburg.' 

"  In  addition  to  this,  we  had  ascended  that  mountain  in 
pursuit  of  the  sharpshooters,  which  but  few  men  at  this 
day  are  able  to  climb  without  the  accouterments,  rifles,  and 
knapsacks  carried  by  those  heroic  men.  Greater  heroes 
never  shouldered  muskets  than  those  Alabamans. 

"  When  we  formed  line  of  battle  before  the  advance  be 
gan,  a  detail  was  made  of  two  men  from  each  of  the  eleven 


86     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

companies  of  my  regiment  to  take  all  the  canteens  to  a  well 
about  one  hundred  yards  in  our  rear  and  fill  them  with 
cool  water  before  we  went  into  the  fight.  Before  this  de 
tail  could  fill  the  canteens  the  advance  was  ordered.  It 
would  have  been  infinitely  better  to  have  waited  five  min 
utes  for  those  twenty-two  men  and  the  canteens  of  wrater, 
but  generals  never  ask  a  colonel  if  his  regiment  is  ready 
to  move.  The  order  was  given  and  away  we  went.  The 
water  detail  followed  with  the  canteens  of  water,  but  when 
they  got  into  the  woods  they  missed  us,  walked  right  into 
the  Yankee  lines,  and  were  captured,  canteens  and  all.  My 
men  in  the  ranks,  in  the  intense  heat,  suffered  greatly  for 
water.  The  loss  of  those  twenty-two  men  and  lack  of 
water  contributed  largely  to  our  failure  to  take  Little 
Round  Top  a  few  minutes  later.  About  five  minutes  after 
I  halted,  Captain  Terrell,  assistant  adjutant-general  to  Gen 
eral  Law,  rode  up  by  the  only  pathway  on  the  southeast 
side  of  the  mountain,  and  inquired  why  I  had  halted.  I 
told  him.  He  then  informed  me  that  General  Hood  was 
wounded,  Law  was  in  command  of  the  division,  and  sent 
me  his  compliments,  said  for  me  to  press  on,  turn  the 
Union  left,  and  capture  Little  Round  Top,  if  possible,  and 
to  lose  no  time. 

"  I  then  called  his  attention  to  my  position.  A  precipice 
on  the  east  and  north,  right  at  my  feet ;  a  very  steep,  stony, 
and  wooded  mountain-side  on  the  west.  The  only  ap 
proach  to  it  by  our  enemy,  a  long  wooded  slope  on  the 
northwest,  where  the  pathway  to  the  observatory  now  is. 
Within  half  an  hour  I  could  convert  it  into  a  Gibraltar  that 
I  could  hold  against  ten  times  the  number  of  men  that  I 
had,  hence  in  my  judgment  it  should  be  held  and  occupied 
by  artillery  as  soon  as  possible,  as  it  was  higher  than  the 
other  mountain  and  would  command  the  entire  field.  Ter 
rell  replied  that  probably  I  was  right,  but  that  he  had  no 
authority  to  change  or  originate  orders,  which  I  very  well 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         87 

knew;  but  with  his  sanction  I  would  have  remained  at  that 
point  until  I  could  have  heard  from  Law  or  some  superior 
in  rank.  I  inquired  for  Law.  Terrell  said  that  as  senior 
brigadier  he  was  commanding  the  division,  and  along  the 
line  to  the  left.  He  then  repeated  that  General  Law  had 
sent  him  to  tell  me  to  lose  no  time,  but  to  press  forward 
and  drive  everything  before  me  as  far  as  possible.  Gen 
eral  Meade  did  not  then  know  the  importance  of  the  Round 
Tops.  He  admitted  before  the  Committee  of  Congress  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War  that  it  was  the  key-point  to  his 
position.  He  soon  discovered  its  importance,  and  at  the 
very  moment  we  occupied  it  he  sent  couriers  to  General 
Sykes  to  occupy  it  with  his  division  as  speedily  as  possible. 
I  felt  confident  that  Law  did  not  know  my  position,  or  he 
would  not  order  me  from  it.  I  had  not  seen  him  or  any 
other  general  officer  after  I  received  Stoughton's  fire,  and 
did  not  see  any  general  or  staff  officer,  other  than  Terrell, 
until  the  morning  of  July  3 ;  and  I  am  confident  that  no 
general  and  but  the  one  staff  officer  ascended  Great  Round 
Top. 

"  From  an  examination  of  the  reports  of  the  generals  on 
each  side  and  the  testimony  taken  by  the  joint  committee 
of  Congress,  there  appears  to  have  been  confusion  and  in 
accuracy  of  statement  about  Round  Top  Mountain,  and  a 
failure  to  discriminate  between  them.  There  are  two 
mountains,  Great,  or  Big  Round  Top,  and  Little  Round 
Top.  They  are  from  apex  to  apex  1,000  yards  apart,  and 
Big  Round  Top  is  southeast  of  Little  Round  Top  and  120 
feet  higher.  Many  of  the  generals  in  their  reports  speak 
of  '  Round  Top,'  without  indicating  which.  A  reader 
who  is  familiar  with  the  field  or  was  in  the  fight  can  under 
stand  pretty  well  which  is  referred  to,  but  one  unac 
quainted  with  the  topography  of  the  field  will  find  some 
difficulty  in  understanding  which  of  these  twin  mountains 
is  meant.  For  the  benefit  of  such,  I  will  say  from  my 


88     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

knowledge  of  it  that  Little  Round  Top  is  in  most  cases  the 
one  referred  to  in  reports.  Notwithstanding  my  convic 
tion  of  the  importance  of  holding  and  occupying  Big 
Round  Top  with  artillery,  which  I  endeavored  to  communi 
cate  to  Law  through  Terrell  (he  never  reached  General 
Law  until  near  the  close  of  the  battle),  I  considered  it  my 
duty  to  obey  the  order  communicated  to  me  by  Terrell, 
whom  I  knew  to  be  a  trustworthy  and  gallant  officer,  but 
it  was  against  my  judgment  to  leave  that  strong  position. 
It  looked  to  me  to  be  the  key-point  of  the  field,  as  artillery 
on  it  would  have  commanded  the  other  Round  Top  and 
the  Federal  line  toward  Gettysburg  as  far  as  it  extended 
along  Cemetery  Ridge ;  but  the  order  was  to  find  and  turn 
the  left  of  the  Union  line,  and  that  was  on  Little  Round 
Top;  the  battle  was  raging  below.  I  therefore  caused  both 
regiments  to  face  to  the  left  and  moved  to  the  left,  so  as  to 
avoid  the  precipice  in  our  front,  and  then  ordered  the  line 
by  the  right  flank  forward  and  passed  to  the  left-oblique 
entirely  down  the  northern  side  of  the  mountain  without 
encountering  any  opposition  whatever. 

"  While  descending  in  rear  of  Vincent's  Spur,  in  plain 
view  was  the  Federal  wagon-trains,  and  less  than  three 
hundred  yards  distant  was  an  extensive  park  of  Federal 
ordnance  wagons,  which  satisfied  me  that  we  were  then  in 
their  rear.  I  ordered  Captain  Shaaf  to  deploy  his  Com 
pany  A,  surround  and  capture  the  ordnance  wagons,  have 
them  driven  in  under  a  spur  of  the  mountain,  and  de 
tached  his  company  for  the  purpose.  Advancing  rapidly, 
without  any  skirmishers  in  front,  the  woods  being  open 
without  undergrowth,  I  saw  no  enemy  until  within  forty 
or  fifty  steps  of  an  irregular  ledge  of  rocks,  a  splendid  line 
of  natural  breastworks  running  about  parallel  with  the 
front  of  the  Forty-seventh  regiment  and  my  four  left  com 
panies,  and  then  sloping  back  in  front  of  my  center  and 
right  at  an  angle  of  about  thirty-five  or  forty  degrees. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        89 

Vincent's  brigade,  consisting  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan  on 
the  right,  Forty-fourth  New  York,  Eighty-third  Pennsyl 
vania,  and  Twentieth  Maine  regiments,  reached  this  posi 
tion  ten  minutes  before  my  arrival,  and  they  piled  a  few 
rocks  from  boulder  to  boulder,  making  the  zigzag  line 
more  complete,  and  were  concealed  behind  it  ready  to  re 
ceive  us.  From  behind  this  ledge,  unexpectedly  to  us, 
because  concealed,  they  poured  into  us  the  most  destruc 
tive  fire  I  ever  saw.  Our  line  halted,  but  did  not  break. 
The  enemy  were  formed  in  line  as  named  from  their  right 
to  left.  We  received  the  fire  of  the  three  left  regiments. 
As  men  fell  their  comrades  closed  the  gap,  returning  the 
fire  most  spiritedly.  I  could  see  through  the  smoke  men 
of  the  Twentieth  Maine  in  front  of  my  right  wing  run 
ning  from  tree  to  tree  back  westward  toward  the  main 
body,  and  I  advanced  my  right,  swinging  it  around,  over 
lapping  and  turning  their  left. 

"  At  the  dedication  of  the  monument  on  Little  Round 
Top  to  the  Forty- fourth  New  York  regiment  on  July  3, 
1893,  m  delivering  the  oration,  Captain  Nash,  describing 
the  assaults  made  upon  Vincent's  brigade,  which  held  that 
spur  of  the  mountain  during  the  battle  of  the  afternoon  of 
July  2,  1863,  among  other  things  said: 

"  '  In  the  meantime  the  enemy  sent  a  strong  flanking 
column  to  envelop  and  turn  the  left  of  the  brigade  held  by 
the  Twentieth  Maine.  Success  there  opened  to  him  van 
tage  ground  from  which  to  operate  on  the  flank  and  rear 
of  our  entire  army.  While  his  regiment  was  under  a 
heavy  fire,  with  great  presence  of  mind  Colonel  Chamber 
lain  changed  direction  of  his  left  wing  and  took  intervals 
to  the  left  to  meet  the  new  emergency.  For  an  hour  the 
terrible  contest  at  this  point  ensued,  the  edge  of  the  fight 
rolling  backward  and  forward  like  a  wave.' 

"  The  flanking  column  referred  to  by  Captain  Nash  was 
mine. 


90     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

"  At  the  erection  of  monuments  to  the  Twentieth  Maine 
regiment  on  Little  Round  Top,  October  3,  1889,  Captain 
Howard  L.  Prince,  the  historian  of  that  regiment,  said  in 
his  oration,  among  other  things,  that : 

"  '  Again  and  again  was  this  mad  rush  repeated,  each 
time  to  be  beaten  off  by  the  ever-thinning  line  that  desper 
ately  clung  to  its  ledge  of  rock,  refusing  to  yield  except 
as  it  involuntarily  shrunk  for  a  pace  or  two  at  a  time  from 
the  storm  of  lead  which  swept  its  front.  Colonel  Oates 
himself  advanced  close  to  our  line  at  the  head  of  his  men, 
and  at  times  the  hostile  forces  were  actually  at  hand-to- 
hand  distance.  Twice  the  rebels  were  followed  down  the 
slope  so  sharply  that  they  were  obliged  to  use  the  bayonet, 
and  in  places  small  squads  of  their  men  in  their  charges 
reached  our  actual  front.  The  reports  of  both  com 
manders  are  authority  for  these  statements.  The  front 
surged  backward  and  forward  like  a  wave.  At  times  our 
dead  and  wounded  were  in  front  of  our  line,  and  then  by 
a  superhuman  effort  our  gallant  lads  would  carry  the  com 
bat  forward  beyond  their  prostrate  forms.  Continually 
the  gray  lines  crept  up  by  squads  under  protecting  trees 
and  boulders,  and  the  firing  became  at  closer  and  closer 
range.  And  even  the  enemy's  line  essayed  to  reach  around 
the  then  front  of  blue  that  stretched  out  in  places  in  single 
rank  and  could  not  go  much  farther  without  breaking.  So 
far  had  they  extended,  that  their  bullets  passed  beyond  and 
into  the  ranks  of  the  other  regiments  farther  up  the  hill, 
and  Captain  Woodward,  commanding  the  Eighty-third, 
sent  his  adjutant  to  ask  if  the  Twentieth  had  been  turned. 
Colonel  Chamberlain  assured  him  that  he  was  holding  his 
ground,  but  would  like  a  company,  if  possible,  to  extend 
his  line.  Captain  Woodward  was  unable  to  do  this,  but 
by  shortening  his  line  somewhat  he  was  able  to  cover  the 
right  of  the  Twentieth  and  enable  it  to  take  a  little  more 
ground  to  the  left.  Meanwhile  the  brigade  in  front  of  the 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        91 

hill  was  hard  pushed  to  hold  its  own,  and  the  heavy  roar 
of  musketry  in  the  fitful  lulls  of  our  guns  came  to  the  anx 
ious  ears  of  our  commander  and  told  too  plainly  what 
would  be  the  result  if  our  line  gave  way.  Not  a  man  in 
that  devoted  band  but  knew  that  the  safety  of  the  bri 
gade,  and  perhaps  of  the  army,  depended  on  the  steadfast 
ness  with  which  that  point  was  held,  and  so  fought  on 
and  on,  with  no  hope  of  assistance,  but  not  a  thought  of 
giving  up.  Already  nearly  half  of  the  little  force  is  pros 
trate.  The  dead  and  the  wounded  clog  the  footsteps  of  the 
living.' 

"  General  Chamberlain,  who  was  colonel  of  the  Twentieth 
Maine,  afterwards  made  general  for  his  conduct  on  that 
occasion,  and  after  the  war  Governor  of  Maine,  in  his  ad 
dress,  delivered  on  the  same  occasion,  said: 

"  '  All  can  see  what  would  have  become  of  our  brigade 
swallowed  up;  of  Weed's  struck  in  the  rear;  of  Hazlett's 
guns  taken  in  the  flank  and  turned  to  launch  their  thunder 
bolts  upon  our  troops,  already  sore  pressed  in  the  gorge  at 
our  feet,  and  the  fields  upon  the  great  front  and  right. 
Round  Top  lost,  the  day  lost,  Gettysburg  lost,  who  can  tell 
what  for  loss  thence  would  follow ! ' 

"  Captain  Prince  of  the  Twentieth  Maine,  in  his  ora 
tion  above  referred  to,  claims  that  '  fifty  dead  bodies  of  the 
Fifteenth  Alabama  men  were  buried  in  the  front  of  his 
regiment  and  about  one  hundred  of  the  badly  wounded 
were  left  behind  to  become  prisoners.'  His  is  an  over 
estimate  of  the  number  of  the  dead  from  the  Fifteenth 
Alabama.  There  were  present  in  the  seven  companies  of 
the  Forty-seventh,  as  shown  by  the  muster  roll,  an  aggre 
gate  of  but  154  men.  Only  four  or  five  of  these  were 
killed  and  about  twenty  wounded.  If  they  buried  fifty 
dead,  that  included  those  from  the  Forty-seventh  com 
panies  with  the  Fifteenth  dead.  He  was  certainly  mis 
taken  as  to  the  number  badly  wounded,  including  both  regi- 


92    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

ments,  for  several  of  these,  fully  one-half,  went  to  the 
Confederate  rear. 

"  Prince  also  said :  *  Four  hundred  prisoners,  mostly 
from  the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  Alabama,  were  sent 
to  the  rear/  This  is  an  egregiously  mistaken  statement.  I 
have  examined  the  muster  rolls  of  the  companies  of  the 
Fifteenth,  made  soon  after  the  battle,  in  which  the  names 
were  given  of  the  captured  without  wounds,  and  there  was 
a  total  of  but  84,  most  of  them  being  with  Adjutant  Wad- 
dell  when  the  retreat  was  ordered,  which  they  did  not 
hear.  If  every  man  in  the  seven  companies  of  the  Forty- 
seventh  which  went  into  the  action  (only  154)  were  in 
cluded,  it  would  make  but  238,  and  we  know  that  at  least 
one  hundred  and  twenty-odd  of  the  Forty-seventh  es 
caped  and  were  afterwards  in  line  all  night.  Deduct  the 
killed  and  wounded  from  those  companies,  and  Captain 
Prince  has  but  little  over  half  the  number  of  prisoners 
which  he  says  were  taken  from  those  regiments  and  sent 
to  the  rear.  General  Chamberlain  fell  into  the  same  error. 
All  of  us,  on  both  sides,  who  were  in  such  hot  places  as 
that  were  made  to  see  double,  and  are  disposed  to  exag 
gerate  in  favor  of  our  respective  sides,  and  do  it  honestly 
in  most  cases. 

"  If  I  had  had  one  more  regiment  we  would  have  com 
pletely  turned  the  flank  and  have  won  Little  Round  Top, 
which  would  have  forced  Meade's  whole  left  wing  to  re 
tire.  Had  the  Forty-eighth  Alabama  not  been  transferred 
to  the  left  it  would  have  driven  the  sharpshooters,  and  then 
following  my  advance  we  would  have  gotten  in  the  rear 
of  the  Federal  line  and  have  completely  turned  the  tide 
of  battle  in  favor  of  the  Confederates.  With  the  five 
companies  of  skirmishers  which  had  gone  to  the  east  of 
the  mountain,  they  might  have  made  my  assault  success 
ful.  Another  lost  opportunity. 

"  I  knew  that  the  left  of  the  Forty-seventh  was  discon 
nected,  I  knew  not  how  far  from  the  right  of  the  Fourth 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        93 

Alabama,  and  consequently  was  outflanked  on  its  left  and 
without  support.  The  seven  companies  of  that  regiment 
present  confronted  the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania  and  was 
enfiladed  by  the  left-oblique  fire  of  the  left  wing  of  the 
Forty-fourth  New  York,  which  was  very  destructive,  and 
drove  the  men  from  the  obstructions  behind  which  they 
were  sheltering.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bulger,  in  command 
of  the  Forty-seventh  Alabama  companies,  a  most  gallant 
old  gentleman  over  sixty  years  of  age,  fell  severely 
wounded,  and  soon  afterward  his  seven  companies,  after 
behaving  most  gallantly,  broke,  and  in  confusion  retreated 
southward  toward  the  position  of  the  other  regiments  of 
the  brigade  and  reached  their  right. 

"  I  aided  their  gallant  Major  Campbell  in  his  efforts  to 
hold  them,  but,  having  no  support  on  the  left,  they  could 
not  be  rallied  and  held  to  the  position.  When  the  Fif 
teenth  was  driven  back,  Colonel  Bulger  was  left  sitting  by 
a  tree,  sword  in  hand,  shot  through  one  lung  and  bleeding 
profusely.  A  captain  in  the  Forty-fourth  New  York  ap 
proached  and  demanded  his  sword.  The  old  Colonel  said, 
*  What  is  your  rank? '  The  reply  was,  '  I  am  a  captain/ 
Bulger  said,  '  Well,  I  am  a  lieutenant-colonel,  and  I  will 
not  surrender  my  sword  except  to  an  officer  of  equal  rank/ 
The  captain  then  said,  '  Surrender  your  sword,  or  I  will 
kill  you.'  Colonel  Bulger  promptly  replied,  *  You  may 

kill  and  be  d d!     I  shall  never  surrender  my  sword  to 

an  officer  of  lower  rank.'  The  captain  was  so  amused  at 
the  old  colonel's  high  notions  of  military  etiquette  that  he 
went  for  his  colonel,  Rice,  to  whom  the  sword  was  grace 
fully  surrendered.  Rice's  statement  of  the  circumstance 
caused  Colonel  Bulger  to  be  better  cared  for  than  he  would 
otherwise  have  been,  which  probably  saved  his  life.1 

1  General  Chamberlain  denies  this  statement,  and  says  that  Bulger 
surrendered  to  him.  Rice  and  Bulger  are  both  dead  and  there  is  now 
no  living  witness  to  verify  the  statement,  The  writer  derived  his 
information  from  Colonel  Bulger. — Footnote  to  Gates'  work,  p.  217. 


94     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

[<  When  exchanged  in  the  summer  of  1864  he  was  pro 
moted  to  the  colonelcy  of  his  regiment,  went  to  the  front, 
and  served  with  it  for  a  short  time,  and  was  then  honor 
ably  retired.  He  was  not  made  a  brigadier-general,  as  re 
ported  in  vol.  vii  of  '  Confederate  Military  History,'  but 
returned  to  his  home  in  Dadeville,  Alabama,  and  was 
elected  to  the  State  Senate  in  August,  1864,  where  he 
served  until  the  surrender.  He  was  in  the  Secession  Con 
vention  in  1861,  voted  against  secession,  and  refused  to 
sign  the  ordinance.  But  when  the  war  came  as  a  conse 
quence,  he  raised  a  company  and  fought  heroically  through 
the  struggle.  He  was  unskilled  in  tactics  and  lacking  in 
disciplinary  power,  but  he  possessed  such  a  high  order  of 
courage  that  he  was  greatly  respected  by  his  men,  who 
stood  bravely  with  him  until  he  fell.  He  died  in  1900, 
about  ninety-five  years  of  age. 

'  Just  as  the  Forty-seventh  companies  were  being  driven 
back,  I  ordered  my  regiment  to  change  direction  to  the 
left,  swing  around,  and  drive  the  Federals  from  the  ledge 
of  rocks,  for  the  purpose  of  enfilading  their  line,  relieving 
the  Forty-seventh,  gain  the  enemy's  rear,  and  drive  him 
from  the  hill.  My  men  obeyed  and  advanced  about  half 
way  to  the  enemy's  position,  but  the  fire  was  so  destructive 
that  my  line  wavered  like  a  man  trying  to  walk  against  a 
strong  wind,  and  then  slowly,  doggedly,  gave  back  a  little ; 
then  with  no  one  upon  the  left  or  right  of  me,  my  regi 
ment  exposed,  while  the  enemy  was  still  under  cover,  to 
stand  there  and  die  was  sheer  folly;  either  to  retreat  or 
advance  became  a  necessity.  The  Lieutenant-Colonel,  I. 
B.  Feagin,  had  lost  his  leg  at  Plum  Run;  the  heroic  Cap 
tain  Ellison  had  fallen;  while  Captain  Brainard,  one  of  the 
bravest  and  best  officers  in  the  regiment,  in  leading  his 
company  forward,  fell,  exclaiming,  '  Oh,  God !  that  I  could 
see  my  mother !  '  and  instantly  expired.  Lieutenant  John 
A.  Oates,  my  dear  brother,  succeeded  to  the  command  of 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG        95 

the  company,  but  was  pierced  through  by  a  number  of 
bullets,  and  fell  mortally  wounded.  Lieutenant  Cody  fell 
mortally  wounded,  Captain  Bethune  and  several  other  of 
ficers  were  seriously  wounded,  while  the  carnage  in  the 
ranks  was  appalling. 

"  I  again  ordered  the  advance,  and,  knowing  the  officers 
and  men  of  that  gallant  old  regiment,  I  felt  sure  that  they 
would  follow  their  commander  anywhere  in  the  line  of 
duty.  I  passed  through  the  line  waving  my  sword,  shout 
ing,  *  Forward,  men,  to  the  ledge !  '  and  was  promptly  fol 
lowed  by  the  command  in  splendid  style.  We  drove  the 
Federals  from  their  strong  defensive  position;  five  times 
they  rallied  and  charged  us,  twice  coming  so  near  that  some 
of  my  men  had  to  use  the  bayonet,  but  in  vain  was  their 
effort.  It  was  our  time  now  to  deal  death  and  destruction 
to  a  gallant  foe,  and  the  account  was  speedily  settled.  I 
led  this  charge  and  sprang  upon  the  ledge  of  rock,  using 
my  pistol  within  musket  length,  when  the  rush  of  my  men 
drove  the  Maine  men  from  the  ledge  along  the  line  now 
indicated  by  stone  markers  on  the  east  end  of  Vincent's 
Spur. 

"  I  have  seen  a  statement  from  General  Chamberlain 
that  his  right  was  not  forced  back  beyond  the  point  or  angle 
of  the  rocky  ledge  where  the  right  marker  of  his  regiment 
stands.  My  recollection  is  quite  different.  At  this  angle 
and  to  the  southwest  of  it  is  where  I  lost  the  greatest 
number  of  my  men.  The  Twentieth  Maine  was  driven 
back  from  this  ledge,  but  not  farther  than  to  the  next 
ledge  on  the  mountain-side.  I  recall  a  circumstance  which 
I  recollect.  I,  with  my  regiment,  made  a  rush  forward 
from  the  ledge.  About  forty  steps  up  the  slope  there  is  a 
large  boulder  about  midway  the  Spur.  The  Maine  regi 
ment  charged  my  line,  coming  right  up  in  a  hand-to-hand 
encounter.  My  regimental  colors  were  just  a  step  or  two 
to  the  right  of  that  boulder,  and  I  was  within  ten  feet.  A 


96     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Maine  man  reached  to  grasp  the  staff  of  the  colors  when 
Ensign  Archibald  stepped  back  and  Sergeant  Pat  O'Con 
nor  stove  his  bayonet  through  the  head  of  the  Yankee, 
who  fell  dead.  I  witnessed  that  incident,  which  impressed 
me  beyond  the  point  of  being  forgotten.  There  never 
were  harder  fighters  than  the  Twentieth  Maine  men  and 
their  gallant  colonel.  His  skill  and  persistency  and  the 
great  bravery  of  his  men  saved  Little  Round  Top  and 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  defeat. 

"  Great  events  sometimes  turn  on  comparatively  small 
affairs.  My  position  rapidly  became  untenable.  The  Fed 
eral  infantry  were  reported  to  be  coming  down  on  my 
right,  and  certainly  were  closing  in  on  my  rear,  while  some 
dismounted  cavalry  were  closing  the  only  avenue  of  es 
cape  on  my  left  rear.  I  sent  my  sergeant-major  with  a 
request  to  Colonel  Bowles,  of  the  Fourth  Alabama,  the 
next  in  line  to  the  left,  to  come  to  my  relief.  He  re 
turned  within  a  minute  and  reported  that  none  of  our 
troops  were  in  sight,  the  enemy  to  be  between  us  and  the 
Fourth  Alabama,  and  swarming  in  the  woods  south  of 
Little  Round  Top.  The  lamented  Captain  Park,  who  was 
afterwards  killed  at  Knoxville,  and  Captain  Hill,  killed 
near  Richmond  in  1864,  came  and  informed  me  that  the 
enemy  were  closing  in  on  our  rear. 

"  I  sent  Park  to  ascertain  their  number.  He  soon  re 
turned  and  reported  that  two  regiments  were  coming  up 
behind  us,  and  just  then  I  saw  them  halt  behind  a  fence, 
some  two  hundred  yards  distant,  from  which  they  opened 
fire  on  us.  These,  I  have  since  learned  from  him,  were 
the  battalions  of  Stoughton's  sharpshooters,  each  of  which 
carried  a  flag,  hence  the  impression  that  there  were  two 
regiments.  They  had  been  lost  in  the  woods,  but,  guided 
by  the  firing,  came  up  in  our  rear.  At  Balaklava  Captain 
Nolan's  six  hundred  had  cannon  to  the  right  of  them, 
cannon  to  the  left  of  them,  cannon  in  front  of  them,  which 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         97 

volleyed  and  thundered.  But  at  this  moment  the  Fif 
teenth  Alabama  had  infantry  in  front  of  them,  to  the  right 
of  them,  dismounted  cavalry  to  the  left  of  them,  and  in 
fantry  in  the  rear  of  them.  With  a  withering  and  deadly 
fire  pouring  in  upon  us  from  every  direction,  it  seemed 
that  the  regiment  was  doomed  to  destruction.  While  one 
man  was  shot  in  the  face,  his  right-hand  or  left-hand  com 
rade  was  shot  in  the  side  or  back.  Some  were  struck 
simultaneously  with  two  or  three  balls  from  different  di 
rections. 

"  Captains  Hill  and  Park  suggested  that  I  should  order 
a  retreat;  but  this  seemed  impracticable.  My  dead  and 
wounded  were  then  nearly  as  great  in  number  as  those  still 
on  duty.  They  literally  covered  the  ground.  The  blood 
stood  in  puddles  in  some  places  on  the  rocks;  the  ground 
was  soaked  with  the  blood  of  as  brave  men  as  ever  fell  on 
the  red  field  of  battle.  I  still  hoped  for  reinforcements  or 
for  the  tide  of  success  to  turn  my  way.  It  seemed  impos 
sible  to  retreat,  and  I  therefore  replied  to  my  captains,  '  Re 
turn  to  your  companies;  we  will  sell  out  as  dearly  as  pos 
sible.'  Hill  made  no  reply,  but  Park  smiled  pleasantly, 
gave  me  the  military  salute,  and  said,  '  All  right,  sir.'  On 
reflection  a  few  moments  later  I  saw  no  hope  of  success, 
and  did  order  a  retreat,  but  did  not  undertake  to  retire  in 
order.  I  sent  Sergeant-Ma j or  Norris  (who  is  now  a  phy 
sician  residing  in  Brazil)  and  had  the  officers  and  men  ad 
vised  the  best  I  could  that  when  the  signal  was  given  that 
we  would  not  try  to  retreat  in  order,  but  every  one  should 
run  in  the  direction  from  whence  we  came,  and  halt  on 
the  top  of  the  Big  Round  Top  Mountain.  I  found  the 
undertaking  to  capture  Little  Round  Top  too  great  for  my 
regiment  unsupported.  I  waited  until  the  next  charge  of 
the  Twentieth  Maine  was  repulsed,  as  it  would  give  my 
men  a  better  chance  to  get  out  unhurt,  and  then  ordered 
the  retreat.  The  historian  of  that  regiment  claims  that 


98     THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

its  charge  drove  us  from  the  field.  This  is  not  true;  / 
ordered  the  retreat?  He  was,  I  believe,  the  chaplain,  and 
not  present  to  see  it.  Doubtless  he  was  at  prayer  a  safe  dis 
tance  in  the  rear.  Colonel  Chamberlain  also  reported  it, 
and  doubtless  believed  it;  but  it  was  just  as  I  state,  I  or 
dered  the  retreat. 

"  When  the  signal  was  given  we  ran  like  a  herd  of  wild 
cattle,  right  through  the  line  of  dismounted  cavalrymen. 
Some  of  the  men  as  they  ran  through  seized  three  of  the 
cavalrymen  by  the  collars  and  carried  them  out  prisoners. 
As  we  ran,  a  man  named  Keils,  of  Company  H,  from 
Henry  County,  who  was  to  my  right  and  rear,  had  his 
throat  cut  by  a  bullet,  and  he  ran  past  me  breathing  at  his 
throat  and  the  blood  spattering.  His  windpipe  was  en 
tirely  severed,  but  notwithstanding  he  crossed  the  mountain 
and  died  in  the  field  hospital  that  night  or  the  next  morn 
ing. 

"  Captain  De  B.  Waddell,  who  was  then  adjutant  of  the 
regiment,  when  we  had  reached  our  most  advanced  posi 
tion,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  the  top  of 
Little  Round  Top,  where  the  New  York  monument  now 
stands,  came  and  asked  me  to  let  him  take  forty  or  fifty 
men  from  the  right  wing  of  the  regiment  and  advance  to 
some  rocks  from  which  to  enfilade  the  Union  line,  the 
Twentieth  Maine  and  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania.  I  au 
thorized  it,  and  he  had  about  fifty  men  behind  a  ledge  of 
rocks  or  ridge  of  ground,  and  doing  effective  work  when 
I  ordered  the  retreat.  The  firing  was  so  heavy  that  he  did 
not  hear  the  order,  but  said  he  saw  me  and  the  men  near 
me  start,  and  knew  that  it  was  a  retreat.  Sergeant- 
Major  Norris,  when  communicating  to  commanders  of 
companies  that  I  would  order  a  retreat,  did  not  so  inform 
Waddell.  He  gave  the  order  and  broke  to  run.  He  saw 
two  of  his  men  fall.  He  escaped,  but  his  men  were  cap 
tured. 

i  Italics  are  Gates'.— O.  W.  N. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG         99 

"  When  he  reached  the  foot  of  the  mountain  he  there 
met  Company  A  coming  out  of  the  woods  to  the  east  of 
the  position  from  which  we  had  just  retreated.  This  was 
the  company  whose  captain  I  had  ordered,  as  we  advanced 
down  the  north  side  of  Great  Round  Top,  to  deploy  his 
company  in  open  order  to  surround  and  capture  the  train 
of  ordnance  wagons.  Captain  Shaaf  claimed  that  there 
were  Union  troops  in  the  woods  east  of  the  wagons  and 
he  feared  capture  of  his  company  if  he  attempted  to  cap 
ture  the  wagons,  and  desisted  in  consequence.  He  should 
then  have  rejoined  the  regiment  at  once,  but  did  not.  The 
troops  in  the  woods  were  Stoughton's  sharpshooters,  and 
perhaps  Morrell's  company  of  the  Twentieth  Maine. 
Waddell  caused  the  company  to  take  a  stand  a  short  dis 
tance  up  the  mountain-side,  where  by  their  fire  they  checked 
and  turned  back  the  Maine  men  who  were  pursuing  my 
regiment.  When  I  visited  the  battlefield  after  the  war,  I 
could  not  understand  how  the  trees  on  that  side  of  Round 
Top  near  its  base  were  scarred  on  each  side  by  bullets,  and 
why  monuments  or  markers  were  set  up  there,  as  I  thought 
no  battle  occurred  there.  Afterwards  Captain  Waddell 
(now  an  Episcopal  clergyman  at  Meridian,  Mississippi) 
explained  it. 

"  The  absence  of  Company  A  from  the  assault  on  Lit 
tle  Round  Top,  the  capture  of  the  water  detail,  and  the 
number  overcome  by  heat  who  had  fallen  out  on  scaling 
the  rugged  mountain,  reduced  my  regiment  to  less  than 
four  hundred  officers  and  men  who  made  that  assault. 
All  these  facts  I  did  not  know  when  I  made  my  report, 
nor  when  I  wrote  the  article  for  the  Southern  Historical 
Society  papers  in  1878,  but  close  investigation  since  the 
war  revealed  them  to  me.  In  the  hasty  manner  of  writ 
ing  my  report,  I  took  as  a  basis  of  the  strength  of  my  regi 
ment  its  last  muster  before  we  began  the  march  to  Penn 
sylvania.  I  also  wrote  the  article  after  the  war  on  the 


ioo    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

same  basis,  which  was  a  mistake.  When  approaching  the 
top  of  the  mountain  in  retreat,  I  made  an  attempt  to  halt 
and  re-form  the  regiment;  but  the  men  were  helping 
wounded  and  disabled  comrades,  and  scattered  in  the  woods 
and  among  the  rocks,  so  that  it  could  not  then  be  done.  I 
was  so  overcome  by  heat  and  exertion  that  I  fainted  and 
fell,  and  would  have  been  captured  but  for  two  stalwart, 
powerful  men  of  the  regiment,  who  carried  me  to  the  top 
of  the  mountain,  where  Dr.  Reeves,  the  assistant  surgeon, 
poured  water  on  my  head  from  a  canteen,  until  it  revived 
me.  I  never  can  forget  those  two  men,  for  I  dreaded  a 
prison  more  than  death.  When  I  revived  I  turned  over 
the  command  of  the  regiment  to  Captain  Hill  temporarily, 
writh  directions  to  retire  to  the  open  field  at  the  foot  of 
the  mountain  on  the  line  of  our  advance.  This  was  be 
tween  sunset  and  dark;  the  fighting  along  our  line  had 
pretty  well  ceased.  It  had  been  terrific  all  along  Long- 
street's  front.  His  seventeen  thousand  men  had  done  the 
best  fighting  of  any  equal  number  of  troops  during  the 
war,  but  had  not  accomplished  anything  in  the  way  of 
substantial  results. 

"  Lee's  plan  for  Longstreet's  attack  was  up  the  Em- 
mittsburg  road,  beginning  with  the  right  brigade,  which 
was  Law's,  where  I  was.  Had  General  Longstreet  been 
where  the  attack  began,  he  would  have  seen  the  necessity 
of  protecting  my  flank  from  the  assault  of  United  States 
sharpshooters.  Had  that  been  done,  I  would,  with  the  six 
hundred  veterans  I  had,  have  reached  Little  Round  Top 
before  Vincent's  brigade  did,  and  would  easily  have  cap 
tured  that  place,  which  would  have  won  the  battle.  Or 
had  he  seen  the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  regiments 
when  they  reached  the  top  of  Great  Round  Top,  and  or 
dered  a  battery  and  another  regiment  to  aid  me  in  holding 
that  mountain,  it  would  have  been  held  —  which  Meade 
admitted,  in  his  testimony  on  the  conduct  of  the  war,  was 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG: 

the  key  to  his  position.  With  that  in  our  possession  he 
could  not  have  held  any  of  the  ground  which  he  subse 
quently  held  to  the  last,  for  it  was  the  key-point  of  his 
position.  Instead  of  this,  General  Longstreet  was  near  the 
other  end  of  his  line,  more  than  a  mile  away  from  his 
right,  and  never  knew  that  those  regiments  passed  over 
the  top  of  Big  Round  Top  until  years  after  the  battle, 
when  he  saw  it  in  print. 

"  Though  he  may  not  have  approved  Lee's  plan,  it  was 
his  duty  to  have  loyally  and  to  the  best  of  his  ability  exe 
cuted  that  plan.  Had  he  done  so,  I  have  no  doubt  of  the 
success  of  the  attack.  General  Lee  was  at  fault  for  fail 
ing  to  have  Longstreet's  two  divisions,  then  on  the  field 
(except  Law's  brigade),  seize  the  Round  Tops  in  the  fore 
noon,  when  there  were  no  Union  troops  on  them.  When 
the  assault  was  made  at  3  130  P.  M.  neither  of  these  moun 
tains  was  occupied  in  force,  but  Sickles'  corps  was  ad 
vanced  beyond  and  obstructed  a  direct  attack  on  Little 
Round  Top.  Longstreet  was  responsible  and  at  fault  for 
the  negligent  and  bungling  manner  in  which  it  was  done. 
The  change  made  in  his  line  by  General  Sickles,  which 
was  unknown  to  General  Lee,  greatly  impaired  his  plan; 
but  notwithstanding  his  shrewd  change  and  its  tendency  to 
thwart  the  plan,  yet  had  Longstreet  skillfully  and  loyally, 
instead  of  sullenly  and  disapprovingly,  executed  it,  he 
would  have  won  the  battle.  When  he  found  the  change 
in  Sickles'  lines  —  of  which  he  knew  that  General  Lee  was 
not  aware  —  he  should  have  adopted  General  Hood's  sug 
gestion  to  turn  the  flank  and  attack  in  the  rear;  but  be 
cause  Lee  had  ordered  him  to  attack  in  a  particular  way, 
he  would  not  change,  though  he  knew  that  if  Lee  himself 
had  been  present  he  would  have  changed  the  order  of  at 
tack  when  he  discovered  the  change  in  Sickles'  line  which 
made  it  necessary. 

"  General  Longstreet  in  his  book  (p.  408)  throws  all  the 


*  ,   TtfE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 


blame  on  Lee  for  not  riding  with  him  and  personally  di 
recting  his  attack,  as  follows: 

"  '  We  were  left  to  our  own  resources  in  finding  ground 
upon  which  to  organize  for  battle.  The  enemy  had 
changed  position  somewhat  after  the  march  was  ordered, 
but,  as  we  were  not  informed  of  his  position  before  the 
march,  we  could  not  know  of  the  change.  The  Confeder 
ate  commander  did  not  care  to  ride  near  us,  to  give  in 
formation  of  a  change  to  assist  in  preparing  for  attack, 
nor  to  inquire  if  new  and  better  combinations  might  be 
made.' 

"  General  Lee  mistakenly  supposed  that  Longstreet  un 
derstood  the  situation,  position  of  the  enemy,  etc.,  and 
possessed  the  ability  and  patriotism  sufficient  to  make  that 
attack  wisely  without  his  presence. 

"  General  Longstreet  disapproved  the  plan  of  attack  be 
cause  Lee  was  departing  from  the  policy,  declared  by  him 
before  he  moved  from  Virginia,  of  an  aggressive  defen 
sive  campaign,  which  Longstreet  approved.  He  may  have 
been  right;  it  may  have  been  best  for  Lee  to  have  flanked 
Meade  out  of  his  strong  position  and  have  forced  him  to 
attack  and  thus  to  have  acted  on  the  defensive.  Lee  gave 
his  reasons  why  he  did  not  pursue  that  course,  which  were 
well-nigh  conclusive.  Longstreet  had  no  right  to  sulk  be 
cause  of  this  change  of  policy.  Sulking  was  disloyalty  to 
his  chief.  If  his  conduct  was  not  half-hearted  and  will 
ful,  then  the  only  explanation  of  it  is  that  he  was  a  failure 
as  a  general,  and  no  one  believes  that.  Hood  saw  the 
necessity,  and  insisted  on  a  change  of  the  plan  of  attack, 
but  because  Lee  had  ordered  it,  without  a  knowledge  of 
Sickles'  change  of  lines,  Longstreet  obeyed  Lee's  order 
literally,  although  Hood  showed  him  the  necessity  of  a 
change,  and  by  his  mulishness  lost  the  greatest  battle  of 
the  war.  General  Law  fully  concurred  in  Hood's  views. 
A  supposition  that  Hood's  request  would  be  granted  may 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       103 

account  for  Law's  skirmishers  passing  around  Big  Round 
Top  to  the  east  and  thus  missing  the  battle. 

"  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  General  Meade  ex 
pected  Lee  to  attack  him  on  his  right,  and  determined  to 
attack  Lee  before  the  latter  moved  against  him.  At  9:30 
A.  M.  he  ordered  Slocum,  who  commanded  the  Twelfth 
and  Fifth  corps,  constituting  the  right  wing  of  the  Union 
army,  to  get  ready  to  attack,  and  that  he  would  give  the 
signal  as  soon  as  the  Sixth  corps  arrived  within  supporting 
distance.  Slocum,  whom  General  Sherman  afterwards 
said  was  as  capable  of  commanding  80,000  men  as  he  was, 
carefully  examined  the  ground  in  his  front,  with  its  un 
even  surface,  woods,  hills,  and  streams,  and  reported  to 
Meade  adversely  and  advised  against  making  the  attack. 
General  Meade  then  surveyed  the  field  with  the  view  of  at 
tacking  by  his  front,  or  left,  and  then  summoned  his  corps 
commanders  to  a  conference.  Sickles  did  not  come,  but 
sent  word  that  his  corps,  on  the  extreme  left,  was  threat 
ened  with  an  attack  and  that  he  could  not  leave.  There 
upon  Meade  sent  him  a  peremptory  order  to  attend  the 
conference  at  once.  Sickles  then  went,  and  as  he  rode  up 
Longstreet's  guns  opened  upon  his  line.  Meade  told  him 
not  to  dismount,  but  return  to  his  command.  Meade  re 
inforced  him  heavily  and  saved  him  from  utter  rout. 

"  The  assault  of  Longstreet  was  the  opening  of  the  bat 
tle  of  that  day.  Slocum's  decision  and  advice  were  wise. 
Had  Slocum  made  that  attack  it  would  have  been  on 
Ewell's  corps,  which  would  have  allowed  Longstreet's  and 
Hill's  corps  to  advance  against  the  Third  and  Second, 
Sickles'  and  Hancock's  corps,  which  were  inferior  numeri 
cally,  and  they  would  have  been  driven  back  against 
Meade's  attacking  column,  which  Ewell  could  have  held  at 
bay  for  a  time.  Lee  would  have  thus  gained  the  advan 
tage  of  position  and  Meade  would  inevitably  have  lost  the 
battle.  Slocum's  advice  and  Sickles'  wise  disposition  of 


104    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

his  corps  saved  Meade  from  dishonor  and  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  from  defeat  —  two  New  York  Union  Democrats. 

"  Inasmuch  as  General  Lee  did  not  have  Longstreet 
seize  the  Round  Tops  in  the  forenoon,  he  had  better  have 
awaited  the  results  of  that  conference;  and  had  it  been  to 
attack  him  it  would  have  been  to  his  advantage,  for,  as 
Stonewall  Jackson  said  on  his  deathbed,  '  My  troops  some 
times  fail  to  drive  the  enemy  from  their  position,  but  theirs 
always  fail  to  drive  my  men  from  their  position.'  But  of. 
course  Lee  was  not  aware  of  that  conference. 

"  The  Yankees  did  not  occupy  the  top  of  Big  Round 
Top  until  after  dark.  It  was  dark  when  my  regiment 
reached  the  valley,  and  here  we  bivouacked  for  the  night. 
After  all  had  gotten  up,  I  ordered  the  roll  of  the  companies 
to  be  called.  When  the  battle  commenced,  four  hours 
previously,  mine  was  the  strongest  and  finest  regiment  in 
Hood's  division.  Its  effectives  numbered  about  five  hun 
dred  officers  and  men.  Now  two  hundred  and  twenty- 
three  enlisted  men  answered  at  roll-call,  and  more  than 
one-half  of  the  officers  had  been  left  on  the  field,  only 
nineteen  answering  to  their  names;  but  some  of  the  of 
ficers  and  men  came  up  in  the  course  of  the  night  and  next 
morning,  who  had  been  overcome  by  the  heat  during  the 
advance  the  previous  evening. 

"  Some  of  the  men  that  night  voluntarily  went  back 
across  the  mountain,  and  in  the  darkness  penetrated  the 
Federal  lines  for  the  purpose  of  removing  some  of  our 
wounded.  They  reached  the  scene  and  started  out  with 
some  of  the  wounded  officers,  but  were  discovered  and  shot 
at  by  the  Federal  pickets,  and  had  in  consequence  to  leave 
the  wounded,  but  succeeded  in  getting  back  to  the  regi 
ment,  and  brought  to  me  Lieutenant  Cody's  knife  and 
pocketbook.  These  men  reported  to  me  that  Big  Round 
Top  was,  even  at  that  late  hour,  occupied  by  only  a  thin 
skirmish  line.  I  am  sorry  that  I  do  not  remember  the 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       105 

names  of  those  brave  men  who  voluntarily  went  within 
the  enemy's  lines  to  relieve  and  save  from  capture  wounded 
comrades. 

"  Soon  after  the  advance  began  the  gallant  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Isaac  B.  Feagin  was  shot  through  the  knee,  which 
necessitated  amputation  of  the  limb.  The  major  was  vol 
untarily  with  the  wagon-train,  and  consequently  I  had  no 
field  officer  to  assist  me.  I  discovered  some  time  before 
we  reached  Gettysburg  that  my  brother,  Lieutenant  John 
A.  Oates,  had  fallen  behind  some  distance,  and  was  re 
ported  sick.  I  sent  back  a  horse  for  him  and  he  came  up. 
Just  before  we  advanced  I  went  to  him  where  he  was  ly 
ing  on  the  ground  in  rear  of  his  company,  and  saw  at 
once  that  he  was  sick.  I  thereupon  told  him  not  to  go 
into  the  action,  but  when  we  advanced  to  remain  where  he 
was,  because  he  was  unable  to  bear  the  fatigue.  He  re 
plied,  with  the  most  dogged  and  fiery  determination, 
'  Brother,  I  will  not  do  it.  If  I  were  to  remain  here  peo 
ple  would  say  that  I  did  it  through  cowardice.  No,  sir,  I 
am  an  officer,  and  will  never  disgrace  the  uniform  I  wear; 
I  shall  go  through,  unless  I  am  killed,  which  I  think  is 
quite  likely.'  These  were  the  last  words  ever  passed  be 
tween  us.  When  he  fell,  struck  by  several  balls,  Lieu 
tenant  Isaac  H.  Parks,  who  had  been  his  schoolfellow,  ran 
to  him  and  dragged  him  behind  a  large  stone,  and  just  as 
Parks  let  him  down  another  ball  struck  one  of  his  hands 
and  carried  away  his  little  finger.  Parks  was  for  many 
years  after  the  war  a  prominent  lawyer  at  Rutledge,  Cren- 
shaw  County,  Alabama,  and  represented  his  county  in  both 
branches  of  the  legislature,  and  in  the  Constitutional  Con 
vention  of  1875,  and  died  in  1900.  Lieutenant  Cody,  a 
boy  about  eighteen  years  old,  the  best  officer  I  ever  saw  of 
his  age,  except  Major  Latimer  of  the  artillery,  fell  near 
my  brother,  mortally  wounded. 

"  When  we  retreated,  they,  with  most  of  our  wounded 


106    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

and  eighty- four  men  who  were  not,  were  taken  prisoners, 
and  the  wounded  were  removed  to  the  Federal  field  hos 
pital,  where  they  were  as  well  cared  for  as  wounded  sol 
diers  in  the  hands  of  an  enemy  ever  are.  Cody  lived 
twenty-one  and  my  brother  twenty-three  days.  A  Miss 
Lightner,  a  Virginia  lady  and  Southern  sympathizer, 
nursed  them  to  the  last,  and  Doctor  Reid,  of  the  One  Hun 
dred  and  Fifty-fifth  Pennsylvania  Regiment,  did  all  that 
he  could  for  them  and  had  them  decently  buried  when  they 
died.  He  sent  to  me  by  flag  of  truce  my  brother's  old 
gold  watch,  his  pocketbook  and  money.  I  endeavored  for 
years  after  the  war  to  find  Doctor  Reid,  without  success, 
but  finally  obtained  his  address,  Lancaster,  Pennsylvania, 
and  had  a  very  pleasant  and  satisfactory  correspondence 
with  him.  I  had  theretofore  never  had  an  opportunity  of 
expressing  to  him  the  full  measure  of  my  gratitude  for  his 
attention  to  my  brother  and  Lieutenant  Cody.  The  dear, 
good  ministering  angel,  Miss  Lightner,  has  long  since 
passed  beyond  the  arena  of  bloody  battles  and  grim  death, 
to  reap  that  priceless  reward  which  is  promised  to  the 
charitable  and  the  good.  Some  of  our  wounded  were  not 
treated  so  well.  Some  were  not  removed  from  the  places 
where  they  fell  for  two  or  three  days.  Sergeant  Johns, 
of  Company  B,  had  one  of  his  thighs  broken,  and  lay 
where  he  fell,  in  all  the  hard  rain  of  the  third  and  fourth 
days  of  July,  and  was  not  removed  until  the  battle  was 
over  and  Lee  on  his  way  back  to  Virginia.  He  lay  on  his 
back,  could  not  turn,  and  kept  from  drowning  by  putting 
his  hat  over  his  face.  He  recovered,  and  was  alive  sev 
eral  years  after  the  war,  and  living  in  Texas. 

"  Captain  J.  Henry  Ellison  was  a  son  of  the  Rev.  Dr. 
Ellison,  a  distinguished  Methodist  divine.  When  I  gave 
the  order  to  change  direction  to  the  left  to  drive  the 
Twentieth  Maine  Regiment,  he  did  not  hear  it  with  dis 
tinctness.  He  stepped  toward  me,  and  placing  his  hand 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       107 

behind  his  ear  inquired,  *  What  is  the  order,  Colonel?  '  I 
repeated  it.  He  turned  to  his  company  and  cried  out, 
'  Forward,  my  men,  forward ! '  and  fell  shot  through  the 
head.  I  saw  the  ball  strike  him;  that  is,  I  was  looking  at 
him  when  it  did.  He  fell  upon  his  left  shoulder,  turned 
upon  his  back,  raised  his  arms,  clenched  his  fists,  gave  one 
shudder,  his  arms  fell,  and  he  was  dead.  He  wore  that 
day  a  very  fine  captain's  uniform  which  I  had  presented  to 
him  after  my  promotion,  and  I  thought  at  the  moment  of 
his  death  that  he  was  the  handsomest  and  finest  specimen 
of  manhood  that  ever  went  down  upon  a  field  of  carnage. 

"  There  was  no  better  regiment  in  the  Confederate 
Army  than  the  Fifteenth  Alabama,  and  when  properly 
commanded,  if  it  failed  to  carry  any  point  against  which 
it  was  thrown,  no  other  single  regiment  need  try  it.  The 
long  and  rapid  march,  the  climb  of  Great  Round  Top's 
rugged  front  without  water,  impaired  its  power  of  endur 
ance,  but  it  fought  hard  and  persistently  until  ordered  to 
retreat.  The  other  regiments  of  the  brigade  did  their 
duty  at  Gettysburg,  but  the  Fifteenth  struck  the  hardest 
knot. 

"  The  following  from  the  pen  of  Colonel  W.  F.  Perry 
describes  '  The  Devil's  Den  '  and  the  assault  of  his  regi 
ment,  the  Forty-fourth  Alabama,  upon  it: 

"  '  Large  rocks,  from  six  to  fifteen  feet  high,  are  thrown 
together  in  confusion  over  a  considerable  area,  and  yet  so 
disposed  as  to  leave  everywhere  among  them  winding  pas 
sages  carpeted  with  moss.  Many  of  its  recesses  are  never 
visited  by  the  sunshine,  and  a  cavernous  coolness  pervades 
the  air  within  it. 

" '  A  short  distance  to  the  east  the  frowning  bastions  of 
Little  Round  Top  rise  two  hundred  feet  above  the  level 
of  the  plain.  An  abrupt  elevation,  thirty  or  forty  feet 
high,  itself  buttressed  with  rocks,  constitutes  the  western 
boundary  of  this  strange  formation. 


io8    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

'  The  view  was  imposing.  Little  Round  Top,  crowned 
with  artillery,  resembled  a  volcano  in  eruption;  while 
the  hillock  near  the  Devil's  Den  resembled  a  small  one. 
The  distance  between  them,  diminished  by  the  view  in 
perspective,  appeared  as  a  secondary  crater  near  its  base. 
It  was  evident  that  a  formidable  task  was  before  us. 

'  The  enemy  was  as  invisible  to  us  as  we  were  to  them. 
The  presence  of  a  battery  of  artillery  of  course  implied 
the  presence  of  a  strong  supporting  force  of  infantry. 
Of  its  strength,  its  position,  and  the  nature  of  its  defenses 
we  were  in  total  ignorance.  We  were  soon  to  learn.  As 
the  line  emerged  from  the  woods  into  the  open  space  men 
tioned  above,  a  sheet  of  flame  burst  from  the  rocks  less 
than  fifty  yards  away.  A  few  scattering  shots  in  the  be 
ginning  gave  warning  in  time  for  my  men  to  fall  down, 
and  thus  largely  to  escape  the  effect  of  the  main  volley. 
They  doubtless  seemed  to  the  enemy  to  be  all  dead,  but 
the  volley  of  the  fire  which  they  immediately  returned 
proved  that  they  were  very  much  alive. 

"  '  No  language  can  express  the  intensity  of  the  solici 
tude  with  which  I  surveyed  the  strange,  wild  situation 
which  had  suddenly  burst  upon  my  view.  Upon  the  de 
cision  of  a  moment  depended  the  honor  of  my  command, 
and  perhaps  the  lives  of  many  brave  men.  I  knew  that,  if 
called  upon,  they  would  follow  me,  and  felt  confident  that 
the  place  could  be  carried  by  an  impetuous  charge.  But 
then  what?  There  were  no  supporting  troops  in  sight. 
A  heavy  force  of  the  enemy  might  envelop  and  overpower 
us.  It  was  certain  that  we  should  be  exposed  to  a  plung 
ing,  enfilading  fire  from  Little  Round  Top.  And  yet  the 
demoralization  and  shame  of  a  retreat,  and  an  exposure 
to  be  shot  in  the  back,  were  not  to  be  thought  of. 

"  '  Before  the  enemy  had  time  to  load  their  guns  a  de 
cision  was  made.  Leaping  over  the  prostrate  line  before 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       109 

me,  I  shouted  the  order,  "  Forward !  "  and  started  for  the 
rocks.  The  response  was  a  bound,  a  yell,  and  a  rush,  and 
in  ten  seconds  my  men  were  pouring  into  the  Den,  and 
the  enemy  were  escaping  from  the  opposite  side.  A  few 
prisoners  were  taken.  Two  soldiers  of  the  Fourth  Maine 
regiment  surrendered  to  me  in  person  at  the  edge  of  the 
rocks  as  my  line  overtook  and  passed  me. 

"  '  In  the  charge  the  left  wing  of  the  regiment  struck 
the  hill  on  which  the  artillery  were  stationed,  and  the  center 
and  the  right  swept  into  the  rocks  east  of  it.  Maj.  George 
W.  Carey  led  the  left  wing  up  the  hill  and,  bounding  over 
the  rocks  on  its  crest,  landed  among  the  artillerymen  ahead 
of  the  line,  and  received  their  surrender.  One  of  the  of 
ficers  of  the  battery  whom  I  met  soon  after  complimented 
his  gallantry  and  that  of  his  men  in  the  highest  terms.  The 
major  a  few  moments  later  found  me  near  the  foot  of  the 
hill,  completely  prostrated  by  heat  and  excessive  exertion. 
He  exhibited  several  swords  as  an  evidence  that  the  artil 
lery  had  surrendered,  and  complained  that  guns  from  both 
sides  were  playing  upon  the  position.  This  I  knew  to  be 
true  as  to  the  Federal  side.  At  the  very  entrance  of  the 
labyrinth  a  spherical  case-shot  from  Round  Top  had  ex 
ploded  very  near  my  head  and  thrown  its  deadly  contents 
against  a  rock  almost  within  my  reach.  He  was  ordered 
to  hurry  back  and  withdraw  the  men  from  the  crest  so  that 
they  could  find  shelter  on  the  side  of  the  hill. 

"  '  In  a  very  short  time  he  came  back  in  great  haste  and 
informed  me  that  a  force  of  the  enemy  large  enough  to  en 
velop  our  position  was  moving  down  upon  us.  I  sprang  to 
my  feet  with  the  intention  of  climbing  the  hill  to  see  the  sit 
uation  and  determine  what  to  do;  but  found  myself  un 
able  to  stand  without  support.  While  we  were  anxiously 
discussing  the  situation,  a  line  of  battle,  moving  in  splen 
did  style,  swept  in  from  Seminary  Ridge  upon  the  left,  and 


no    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

met  the  threatening  force.  One  of  us  remarked,  "  There  is 
Benning;  we  are  all  right  now."  Benning's  march  was  so 
directed  that  his  right  lapped  upon  my  left,  and  poured  over 
the  hill  upon  which  were  the  abandoned  guns. 

'  A  furious  battle  now  began  along  his  entire  line,  as 
well  as  my  own,  which  had  pressed  through  to  the  north 
side  of  the  rocks.  It  has  always  been  to  me  a  source  of 
sincere  regret  that  my  disability,  which  continued  until  after 
nightfall,  prevented  me  from  seeing  anything  that  occurred 
after  the  arrival  of  Benning's  line. 

"  '  My  loss  was  comparatively  light,  considering  the  des 
perate  character  of  the  fighting.  This  was  due  to  three 
causes:  The  happy  dodge  given  the  first  volley  of  the 
enemy,  the  rush  made  upon  them  before  they  had  time  to 
reload,  and  the  protection  afterwards  afforded  by  the  rocks. 
The  killed  and  wounded  numbered  ninety-two,  a  little  over 
one-fourth  of  those  who  went  into  action.' 

"  Thus  ended  the  second  day's  fighting." 

Many  books  about  the  Civil  War  have  been  published, 
histories  of  the  armies,  of  corps,  divisions,  brigades,  and 
regiments,  enough  to  make  a  large  library.  Compara 
tively  few  are  from  the  Confederate  side.  "  The  War 
Between  the  Union  and  the  Confederacy,"  by  General 
Oates,  is  the  only  one  which  I  have  found  which  treats  of 
the  battle  for  the  possession  of  Little  Round  Top ;  for  this 
reason  I  have  quoted  from  it  at  greater  length  than  I  have 
from  any  other  publication.  Its  author  was  a  gallant  Con 
federate  soldier,  who  fought  through  the  war,  and  after 
ward  was  prominent  in  his  State  in  politics,  having  re 
ceived  the  highest  honors  at  the  disposal  of  its  grateful 
people.  At  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  he  was  the  colonel  of 
the  Fifteenth  Alabama  regiment  in  Law's  brigade.  He 
says  that  at  this  time  his  regiment  was  the  largest  and  best 
in  Hood's  division.  His  book  was  published  in  1905, 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       in 

forty-two  years  after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  He  seems 
to  have  been  well  acquainted  with  all  the  officers  and  en 
listed  men  of  his  regiment,  and  throughout  the  book  says 
more  about  its  individual  members  than  I  have  seen  in  any 
other  regimental  history,  for  while  he  criticises  freely  the 
conduct  of  the  Confederate  generals  and  their  campaigns, 
it  is  essentially  the  history  of  Colonel  Oates  and  his  men. 
There  are  many  statements  in  his  account  of  their  part  in 
the  attack  on  Little  Round  Top  which  do  not  agree  with 
statements  of  others,  both  Union  and  Confederate  officers, 
which  I  do  not  feel  competent  to  criticise,  but  I  must  men 
tion  a  few  of  a  different  character. 

Military  etiquette  requires  that  official  reports  shall  be 
confined  to  the  part  taken  by  the  organization  under  the 
command  of  the  officer  reporting,  without  alluding  to  the 
other  organizations  unless  the  action  of  the  latter  modifies 
that  of  his  own.  Colonel  Oates'  report  of  the  Fifteenth 
Alabama,  dated  August  8,  1863,  complies  with  this  require 
ment  ;  but  it  differs  materially  from  the  account  in  his  book. 
He  and  his  regiment,  with  the  Forty-seventh  Alabama, 
which,  according  to  his  account,  was  temporarily  under  his 
command,  did  as  much  to  break  up  Vincent's  brigade  as 
any  equal  number  of  well  trained  and  disciplined  soldiers 
either  Union  or  Confederate  could  have  done  under  the 
circumstances.  It  seems  ungenerous,  to  say  the  least,  that 
he  should  claim  that  parts  of  these  two  regiments  alone 
comprised  all  of  the  Confederates  engaged  on  this  part  of 
the  field.  He  ignores  the  presence  of  the  Fourth  and  Fifth 
Texas  of  Robertson's  brigade,  and  the  remaining  regiments 
of  Law's  brigade.  If,  as  he  states,  the  force  which  at 
tacked  Vincent  consisted  of  154  men  of  the  Forty-seventh 
Alabama,  and  less  than  400  of  the  Fifteenth  Alabama, 
it  reflects  very  little  credit  on  Vincent's  brigade,  which  en 
tered  the  fight  with  about  1,100  men,  that  any  of  the  Con 
federates  escaped  death  or  capture. 


H2    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

I  have  found  no  evidence  anywhere  confirming  his  state 
ment  that  just  before  his  retreat  there  were  two  battalions 
of  sharpshooters  on  his  right,  dismounted  cavalry  on  his 
left,  and  infantry  in  his  rear.  Stoughton's  battalion  of  the 
Second  United  States  Sharpshooters  consisted  of  eight 
small  companies.  The  First  battalion,  under  Colonel  Ber- 
dan,  which  also  belonged  to  Ward's  brigade,  was  sent  out 
to  the  west  of  the  Peach  Orchard  early  in  the  day  and 
did  not  return  to  Ward's  brigade  that  day.  The  Second 
battalion  was  sent  out  by  Ward  as  a  skirmish  line  to  cover 
his  front.  Stoughton  says  that  the  five  companies  on  his 
right  were  outflanked  and,  being  forced  to  retire,  fell  back 
to  the  main  line  of  the  brigade.  The  other  three  com 
panies  retreated  before  the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh 
Alabama,  going  up  the  western  slope  of  Big  Round  Top 
before  these  regiments,  and  divided  before  reaching  the 
summit.  The  greater  part  of  them  went  around  the  left 
of  the  Forty-seventh,  and  after  they  passed  made  their  way 
down  the  slope  to  the  northwest  and  rejoined  their  bri 
gade.  The  remainder  of  this  line,  about  a  dozen  men, 
kept  to  the  right  of  the  Fifteenth  Alabama.  Oates  de 
ployed  his  Company  A,  and  they  followed  these  few  sharp 
shooters  until  they  drove  them  off  the  hill  at  the  eastern 
end;  there  they  joined  with  Captain  Merrill's  company 
of  the  Twentieth  Maine,  which  Chamberlain  had  sent  out 
as  skirmishers  in  that  direction.  When  Chamberlain  made 
his  final  charge,  Merrill's  company,  with  this  dozen  sharp 
shooters,  came  up  and  joined  in  the  charge.  If  there 
were  any  dismounted  cavalry  in  that  vicinity  it  is  a  mys 
tery  where  they  came  from.  All  accounts  except  this 
agree  that  there  were  no  Union  cavalry  on  the  left  dur 
ing  the  engagement  on  July  2.  Law  says  that  he  sent  out 
scouts  in  every  direction  and  failed  to  discover  even  a 
cavalry  picket.  It  seems  incredible  that  there  could  have 
been  any  Union  infantry  in  the  rear  of  Oates'  line  while 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       113 

his  attack  on  the  Twentieth  Maine  and  Eighty-third  Penn 
sylvania  was  in  progress. 

The  incident  of  the  surrender  of  the  punctilious  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Bulger  is  not  of  great  importance.  I  no 
tice  it  only  because  of  Oates'  discredit  of  Chamberlain's 
account.  It  seems  to  have  taken  place  while  Chamber 
lain  was  conducting  the  charge  of  the  Twentieth  Maine, 
which  cleared  the  valley  of  the  Confederates.  Colonel 
Rice  did  not  go  forward  with  this  charge.  The  other 
regiments  of  the  brigade  remained  in  position  and  Rice 
properly  remained  with  them.  Chamberlain's  report  is 
dated  July  6,  and  was  in  the  hands  of  Rice  within  a  day 
or  two.  If  Rice  had  received  this  surrender  he  would 
naturally  have  asked  Chamberlain  to  modify  his  report.  I 
was  at  brigade  headquarters  until  some  time  after  Colonel 
Rice  received  his  commission  as  brigadier-general,  and  was 
transferred  to  the  command  of  a  brigade  in  another  corps. 
The  incidents  of  the  battle  were  the  subject  of  frequent 
conversation  among  the  men  and  officers  at  brigade  head 
quarters,  and  if  Bulger's  surrender  had  been  made  as 
Oates  describes  it  I  am  sure  I  should  have  heard  of  it. 

In  questioning  the  accuracy  of  the  statement  of  Captain 
Prince  about  the  number  of  prisoners  taken,  he  is  not  quite 
fair. 

Captain  Prince  says  the  prisoners  were  mostly  from 
the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  Alabama.  As  these  regi 
ments  made  the  fight  against  the  Twentieth  Maine,  and  the 
fighting  there  was  long  continued  and  very  desperate, 
Prince's  attention  was  naturally  directed  there.  He  says 
that  the  four  hundred  prisoners  were  "  mostly  "  from  the 
Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  Alabama;  but  many  prisoners 
belonging  to  the  Fourth  and  Forty-eighth  Alabama  and 
the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas  were  also  taken.  Vincent's 
other  regiments  took  their  full  share,  and  a  total  of  four 
hundred  for  the  brigade  does  not  seem  excessive. 


H4    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

GENERAL  E.  M.  LAW,  C  S.  A.:  "THE  STRUGGLE  FOR 
ROUND  TOP/'  "  BATTLES  AND  LEADERS  OF  THE  CIVIL 
WAR,"  VOL.  in,  p.  318. 

"  More  has  been  written  concerning  the  battle  of  Gettys 
burg  than  any  other  '  passage  of  arms  '  between  the  Fed 
eral  and  Confederate  troops  during  the  Civil  War.  The 
engagement  of  the  first  of  July,  brought  on  by  accident, 
on  the  part  of  the  Confederates  at  least,  in  which  two  corps 
of  the  Federal  army  under  General  Reynolds  were  de 
feated  and  driven  through  Gettysburg  by  portions  of  Hill's 
and  Ewell's  corps,  has  been  often  and  fully  described  by 
the  officers  on  both  sides.  Ewell's  attack  on  the  Federal 
right  in  the  vicinity  of  Gulp's  Hill  on  the  second  of  July, 
and  Longstreet's  advance  upon  the  Federal  left  on  the 
same  day,  so  far  as  relates  to  one  division  of  the  latter's 
command  (McLaws'),  have  been  detailed  with  equal  mi 
nuteness  by  those  engaged.  The  magnificent  charge  of 
Pickett's  division  on  the  third  day  has  been  the  theme  of 
a  host  of  writers  who  deemed  it  an  honor  to  have  stood 
in  the  lines  of  blue  by  which  that  charge  was  repelled,  and 
those  who,  on  the  other  hand,  thought  it  no  less  an  honor 
to  have  shared  the  fortunes  of  the  torn  and  shattered  col 
umns  of  gray  which  only  failed  to  accomplish  impossi 
bilities. 

"  But  concerning  the  operations  of  Lee's  extreme  right 
wing,  extending  to  the  foot  of  Round  Top,  little  or  noth 
ing  has  been  written  on  the  Confederate  side.  This  part 
of  the  line  was  held  by  Hood's  division  of  Longstreet's 
corps,  and  was  really  the  key  to  the  whole  position  of 
Gettysburg.  Here  some  of  the  most  stubborn  fighting  of 
that  desperate  battle  was  done,  and  here  a  determined  ef 
fort  of  the  Federal  cavalry  to  reach  the  right  rear  of  the 
Confederate  army  on  the  third  of  July  was  frustrated  — 
an  attempt  which,  if  successful,  must  have  resulted  dis 
astrously  to  that  army. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       115 

1  The  meagerness  of  the  details  of  the  operations  re 
ferred  to  may  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  General 
Longstreet  personally  superintended  the  left  of  his  line, 
consisting  of  McLaws'  division  of  his  own  corps,  supported 
by  B.  H.  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  corps,  and  hence 
knew  comparatively  little  from  personal  observation  of  the 
movements  of  Hood's  division;  and,  also,  that  Genera! 
Hood  was  wounded  early  in  the  engagement  on  the  second 
of  July,  and,  relinquishing  the  command  of  the  division, 
could  not  report  its  subsequent  operations.  As  senior  brig 
adier,  I  succeeded  to  the  command  of  Hood's  division, 
and  directed  its  movements  during  the  engagements  of 
the  second  and  third  of  July.  But  owing  to  the  active  and 
constant  movements  of  our  army  for  some  weeks  after 
the  battle,  I  was  able  to  obtain  the  reports  of  brigade  com 
manders  only  a  very  short  time  previous  to  being  ordered 
to  the  army  of  General  Bragg  at  Chickamauga.  This 
prevented  me  from  making  a  report  at  the  time,  and  it  was 
afterward  neglected. 

'  The  facts  stated  in  this  paper  are  therefore  many  of 
them  published  for  the  first  time.  It  remains  for  the  im 
partial  reader  to  decide  whether  they  do  not  constitute  an 
important  part  of  the  history  of  the  most  memorable  bat 
tle  of  the  war ;  for  Gettysburg  was  the  turning-point  in  the 
great  struggle.  Together  with  the  fall  of  Vicksburg, 
which  occurred  simultaneously  with  the  retreat  of  Lee's 
army  toward  the  Potomac,  it  inspired  the  armies  and  peo 
ple  of  the  North  with  fresh  courage  and  stimulated  anew 
the  hopes  of  ultimate  success,  which  were  visibly  flagging 
under  an  almost  uninterrupted  series  of  reverses  to  the 
Federal  armies  in  Virginia,  extending  over  a  period  of 
nearly  two  years.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  at  Gettys 
burg  that  the  right  arm  of  the  South  was  broken,  and  it 
must  always  stand  out  in  Confederate  annals  as  in  the 
history  of  a  brave  and  kindred  people  stands 


n6    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

"'Flodden's    fatal   field, 

,t  Where  shivered  was  fair  Scotland's  spear, 

And  broken  was  her  shield.' 


"  It  was  now  past  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  our 
troops  were  in  position  for  the  attack.  The  flank  move 
ment  by  which  they  came  into  position  is  referred  to  in  the 
following  dispatch  from  the  Federal  signal  station  on  Lit 
tle  Round  Top :  '  To  General  Meade  —  four  o'clock  p.  M. 
The  only  infantry  of  the  enemy  visible  is  on  the  extreme 
(Federal)  left;  it  has  been  moving  toward  Emmittsburg.' 
It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  movement,  in  spite  of  our  pre 
cautions,  was  not  unobserved. 

"  The  Confederate  line  of  battle  occupied  a  ridge,  partly 
wooded,  with  a  valley  intervening  between  it  and  the 
heights  held  by  the  Federal  troops  in  front.  The  position 
occupied  by  the  Federal  left  wing  in  front  of  us  was  now 
fully  disclosed  to  view,  and  it  was  certainly  one  of  the 
most  formidable  it  had  ever  been  the  fortune  of  any  troops 
to  confront.  Round  Top  rose  like  a  huge  sentinel  guard 
ing  the  Federal  left  flank,  while  the  spurs  and  ridges  trend 
ing  off  to  the  north  of  it  afforded  unrivaled  positions  for 
the  use  of  artillery.  The  puffs  of  smoke  rising  at  intervals 
along  the  line  of  hills,  as  the  Federal  batteries  fired  upon 
such  portions  of  our  line  as  became  exposed  to  view,  clearly 
showed  that  these  advantages  had  not  been  neglected. 
The  thick  woods  that  in  great  part  covered  the  sides  of 
Round  Top  and  the  adjacent  hills  concealed  from  view  the 
rugged  nature  of  the  ground,  which  increased  fourfold  the 
difficulties  of  the  attack. 

"  How  far  up  the  slope  of  Round  Top  the  Federal  left 
extended  we  could  not  tell,  as  the  woods  effectually  con 
cealed  from  view  everything  in  that  quarter. 

"  In  order  to  gain  information  upon  this  important  point, 
I  sent  out  a  detail  of  six  picked  men  as  scouts,  with  instruc- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       117 

tions  to  move  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the  summit  of 
Round  Top,  making  a  detour  to  their  right,  and  '  feeling ' 
down  from  that  point,  to  locate  the  left  of  the  Federal 
line.  The  entire  absence  of  Federal  cavalry  on  our  right, 
as  well  as  other  indications  leading  to  the  same  conclusion, 
convinced  me  that  the  Federals,  relying  upon  the  protec 
tion  of  the  mountain,  considered  their  flank  secure;  and  it 
was  therefore  their  most  vulnerable  point.  Impressed  with 
this  view,  I  further  instructed  the  scouts  when  they  reached 
the  summit  to  observe  carefully  the  state  of  affairs  on  the 
other  side,  and  to  send  a  '  runner '  back  to  me  with  such 
intelligence  as  they  might  be  able  to  gain.  They  moved 
off  at  a  trot. 

"  A  few  moments  after  they  had  started  I  saw  in  the 
valley,  some  distance  to  our  right,  several  dark  figures 
moving  across  the  fields  from  the  rear  of  Round  Top  in 
the  direction  of  the  Emmittsburg  road.  These,  on  being 
captured,  proved  to  be  Federal  -soldiers,  who  seemed  sur 
prised  at  our  sudden  appearance  in  that  quarter,  and  who, 
on  being  questioned,  stated  that  they  had  surgeon's  certifi 
cates  and  were  going  '  to  the  rear.'  They  indicated  '  the 
rear '  by  pointing  toward  Emmittsburg,  and  in  reply  to  the 
question  where  they  came  from,  they  said  from  the  '  medi 
cal  train  behind  the  mountain  ' —  referring  to  Round  Top. 
They  also  stated  that  the  medical  and  ordnance  trains 
'  around  the  mountain '  were  insecurely  guarded,  no  at 
tack  being  expected  at  that  point;  and  that  the  other  side 
of  the  mountain  could  be  easily  reached  by  a  good  farm 
road,  along  which  they  had  just  traveled,  the  distance  being 
little  more  than  a  mile.  On  my  way  to  convey  this  infor 
mation  to  General  Hood,  I  met  a  messenger  from  my 
scouts,  who  had  reached  the  crest  of  Round  Top.  He  re 
ported  that  there  was  no  Federal  force  on  the  summit,  and 
confirmed  in  every  particular  the  statements  of  the  pris 
oners  I  had  just  captured.  If  there  had  previously  been 


ii8    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

any  question  in  regard  to  the  policy  of  a  front  attack, 
there  now  remained  not  a  shadow  of  a  doubt  that  our  true 
point  d'appui  was  Round  Top,  from  which  the  Confeder 
ate  right  wing  could  be  extended  toward  the  Taneytown 
and  Baltimore  roads  on  the  Federal  left  and  rear. 

"  I  found  General  Hood  on  the  ridge  where  his  line  had 
been  formed,  communicated  to  him  the  information  I  had 
obtained,  and  pointed  out  the  ease  with  which  a  movement 
by  the  right  flank  might  be  made.  He  coincided  fully  with 
my  views,  but  said  that  his  orders  were  positive  to  attack 
in  front,  as  soon  as  the  left  of  the  corps  should  get  into 
position.  I  therefore  entered  a  formal  protest  against  a 
direct  attack,  on  the  grounds:  i.  That  the  great  natural 
strength  of  the  enemy's  position  in  our  front  rendered  the 
result  of  a  direct  assault  extremely  uncertain.  2.  That, 
even  if  successful,  the  victory  would  be  purchased  at  too 
great  a  sacrifice  of  life,  and  our  troops  would  be  in  no  con 
dition  to  improve  it.  3.  That  a  front  attack  was  unneces 
sary —  the  occupation  of  Round  Top  during  the  night  by 
moving  upon  it  from  the  south,  and  the  extension  of  our 
right  wing  from  that  point  across  the  enemy's  left  and 
rear,  being  not  only  practicable,  but  easy.  4.  That  such 
a  movement  would  compel  a  change  of  front  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy,  the  abandonment  of  his  strong  position  on 
the  heights,  and  force  him  to  attack  us  in  position. 

"  General  Hood  called  up  Captain  Hamilton,  of  his  staff, 
and  requested  me  to  repeat  the  protest  to  him,  and  the 
grounds  on  which  it  was  made.  He  then  directed  Cap 
tain  Hamilton  to  find  General  Longstreet  as  quickly  as  pos 
sible  and  deliver  the  protest,  and  to  say  to  him  that  he 
(Hood)  indorsed  it  fully.  Hamilton  rode  off  at  once, 
but  in  about  ten  minutes  returned,  accompanied  by  a  staff 
officer  of  General  Longstreet,  who  said  to  General  Hood, 
in  my  hearing,  '  General  Longstreet  orders  that  you  begin 
the  attack  at  once.'  Hood  turned  to  me  and  merely  said, 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       119 

*  You  hear  the  order  ? '  I  at  once  moved  my  brigade  to 
the  assault. 

"  Our  order  of  attack  —  issued  as  soon  as  the  two  di 
visions  of  Longstreet's  corps  came  into  position  on  the  line 
already  described  —  was,  that  the  movement  should  begin 
on  the  right,  my  brigade  on  that  flank  leading,  the  other 
commands  taking  it  up  successively  toward  the  left.  It 
was  near  5  o'clock  p.  M.  when  we  advanced  to  the  attack. 
The  artillery  on  both  sides  had  been  warmly  engaged  for 
about  fifteen  minutes,  and  continued  to  fire  heavily  until 
we  became  engaged  with  the  Federal  infantry,  when  the 
Confederate  batteries  ceased  firing  to  avoid  injury  to  our 
own  troops,  who  were  then,  for  the  most  part,  concealed 
by  the  woods  about  the  base  of  Round  Top  and  the  spurs 
to  the  north  of  it.  General  Hood  was  severely  wounded 
in  the  arm  by  a  shot  from  the  Federal  artillery  as  we 
moved  into  action. 

"  Advancing  rapidly  across  the  valley  which  separated 
the  opposing  lines, —  all  the  time  under  a  heavy  fire  from 
the  batteries, —  our  front  line  struck  the  enemy's  skir 
mishers  posted  along  the  farther  edge  of  the  valley.  Brush 
ing  these  quickly  away,  we  soon  came  upon  their  first  line 
of  battle,  running  along  the  lower  slopes  of  the  hills  known 
as  Devil's  Den,  to  our  left  of  Round  Top,  and  separated 
from  the  latter  by  Plum  Run  valley.  The  fighting  soon 
became  close  and  severe.  Exposed  to  the  artillery  fire 
from  the  heights  in  front  and  on  our  left,  as  well  as  to 
the  musketry  of  the  infantry,  it  required  all  the  courage 
and  steadiness  of  the  veterans  who  composed  the  army  of 
Northern  Virginia  —  whose  spirit  was  never  higher  than 
then  —  to  face  the  storm.  Not  one  moment  was  lost. 
With  rapidly  thinning  ranks  the  gray  line  swept  on,  until 
the  blue  line  in  front  wavered,  broke,  and  seemed  to  dis 
solve  in  the  woods  and  rocks  on  the  mountain-side.  The 
advance  continued  steadily,  the  center  of  the  division  mov- 


120    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

ing  directly  upon  the  guns  on  the  hill  adjoining  Devil's 
Den  on  the  north,  from  which  we  had  been  suffering  so 
severely.  In  order  to  secure  my  right  flank,  I  extended  it 
well  up  on  the  side  of  Round  Top,  and  my  brigade,  in 
closing  to  the  right,  left  a  considerable  interval  between 
its  left  and  the  right  of  the  Texas  brigade  of  Robertson. 
Into  this  interval  I  threw  Benning's  Georgia  brigade, 
which  had  up  to  that  time  occupied  the  second  line.  At 
the  same  time,  seeing  a  heavy  Federal  force  on  Robertson's 
left,  and  no  Confederate  troops  having  come  up  to  extend 
our  line  in  that  direction,  Anderson's  Georgia  brigade, 
till  then  also  in  the  second  line,  was  thrown  out  on  that 
flank. 

''  Thus  disposed,  the  division  continued  to  move  for 
ward,  encountering,  as  it  ascended  the  heights  around  the 
battery  on  the  spur  and  to  the  right  and  left  of  it,  a  most 
determined  resistance  from  the  Federal  troops,  who 
seemed  to  be  continually  reinforced.  The  ground  was 
rough  and  difficult,  broken  by  rocks  and  boulders,  which 
rendered  an  orderly  advance  impossible.  Sometimes  the 
Federals  would  hold  one  side  of  the  huge  boulders  on  the 
slope  until  the  Confederates  occupied  the  other.  In  some 
cases  my  men  with  reckless  daring  mounted  to  the  top  of 
the  large  rocks  in  order  to  get  a  better  view  and  to  deliver 
their  fire  with  greater  effect.  One  of  these,  Sergeant  Bar 
ber  of  the  Texas  brigade,  having  reached  a  rock  a  little  in 
advance  of  the  line,  stood  erect  on  the  top  of  it,  loading 
and  firing  as  coolly  as  if  unconscious  of  danger,  while  the 
air  around  him  was  fairly  swarming  with  bullets.  He 
soon  fell  helpless  from  several  wounds;  but  he  held  his 
rock,  lying  upon  the  top  of  it  until  the  litter-bearers  car 
ried  him  off. 

"  In  less  than  an  hour  from  the  time  we  advanced  to 
the  attack  the  hill  by  Devil's  Den  opposite  our  center  was 
taken,  with  three  pieces  of  the  artillery  that  had  occupied 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       121 

it.  The  remaining  piece  was  run  down  the  opposite  slope 
by  the  gunners,  and  escaped  capture. 

"  In  the  meantime  my  brigade,  on  the  right,  had  swept 
over  the  northern  slope  of  Round  Top,  cleared  it  of  the 
enemy,  and  then,  making  a  partial  change  of  front  to  the 
left,  advanced  upon  Little  Round  Top,  which  lay  in  rear 
of  the  spur  on  which  the  battery  had  been  taken.  This 
change  of  direction  soon  exposed  it  to  a  flank  attack  on 
the  right  by  fresh  troops  (Vincent's  brigade),  rendering 
it  necessary  to  retire  it  to  the  general  line. 

"  While  our  center  and  right  wing  were  engaged  as  I 
have  described,  Anderson's  brigade,  on  the  left,  was  sub 
jected  to  great  annoyance  and  loss  by  movements  of  the 
enemy  upon  its  left  flank,  being  frequently  compelled  to 
change  the  front  of  the  regiments  on  that  flank  to  repel 
attacks  from  that  direction. 

"  Up  to  this  time  I  had  seen  nothing  of  McLaws'  di 
vision,  which  was  to  have  extended  our  left  and  to  have 
moved  to  the  attack  at  the  same  time.  I  therefore  halted 
my  line,  which  had  become  broken  and  disorganized  by 
the  roughness  of  the  ground  over  which  it  had  been  fight 
ing,  and,  placing  it  in  as  advantageous  a  position  as  pos 
sible  for  receiving  any  attack  that  the  Federals  might  be 
disposed  to  make,  I  hurried  back  to  the  ridge  from  which 
we  had  originally  advanced.  I  found  McLaws  still  in  posi 
tion  there,  his  troops  suffering  considerably  from  a  severe 
fire  of  artillery  from  the  opposite  hills.  I  was  informed 
by  General  Kershaw,  who  held  the  right  of  this  division, 
that  although  he  understood  the  general  instructions  that 
the  forward  movement  was  to  be  taken  up  from  the  right, 
he  had  not  yet  received  the  order  to  move,  from  his  di 
vision  commander.  I  pointed  out  the  position  of  Hood's 
division,  and  urged  the  necessity  of  immediate  support  on 
its  left.  General  Kershaw  requested  me  to  designate  the 
point  on  which  his  right  flank  should  be  directed,  and 


122    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

promptly  moved  to  the  attack,  the  movement  being  taken 
up  by  the  whole  division. 

"  When  Hood's  division  first  attacked,  General  Meade, 
alarmed  for  the  safety  of  his  left  wing,  and  doubtless  fully 
alive  to  the  importance  of  holding  so  vital  a  point  as 
Round  Top  and  its  adjacent  spurs,  commenced  sending 
reinforcements  to  the  threatened  points.  We  encountered 
some  of  these  in  our  first  advance,  and  others  were  arriv 
ing  as  McLaws  came  up  on  our  left.  In  its  advance  this 
division  extended  from  the  '  Peach  Orchard  '  near  the  Em- 
mittsburg  road,  on  its  left,  to  the  '  wheat-field  '  north  of 
the  hill  on  which  we  had  captured  the  Federal  battery, 
where  its  right  wing  connected  with  my  left.  As  McLaws 
advanced,  we  again  moved  forward  on  his  right,  and  the 
fighting  continued  in  *  see-saw  '  style  —  first  one  side  and 
then  the  other  gaining  ground  or  losing  it,  with  small  ad 
vantage  to  either,  until  dark. 

"  At  the  close  of  the  engagement  Hood's  division  held 
the  hill  where  the  battery  had  been  taken  and  the  ridge 
to  its  left  —  our  right  extending  across  Devil's  Den  and 
well  up  on  the  northwestern  slope  of  Round  Top.  During 
the  night  this  line  was  strengthened  by  the  construction 
of  a  breastwork  of  the  loose  stones  that  abounded  all  along 
the  positions  occupied  by  the  troops,  and  the  light  of  the 
next  morning  disclosed  the  fact  that  the  Federal  troops 
in  front  of  us  had  improved  their  time  in  the  same  way. 
In  fact,  all  through  the  night  we  could  hear  them  at  work 
as  the  rocks  were  dropped  in  place  on  the  works,  and  no 
doubt  they  heard  us  just  as  distinctly  while  we  were  en 
gaged  in  the  same  life-preserving  operation. 

"  Though  the  losses  had  been  severe  on  both  sides,  com 
paratively  few  prisoners  had  been  taken.  But  early  in  the 
night,  in  the  confusion  resulting  from  the  fight  over  such 
rugged  ground,  and  the  darkness  of  the  wooded  mountain 
side,  men  of  both  armies,  in  search  of  their  commands,  oc- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       123 

casionally  wandered  into  the  opposing  picket-lines  and 
were  captured.  Many  of  the  Federal  wounded  were  left 
in  our  lines,  on  the  ground  from  which  their  troops  had 
been  forced  back,  and  some  of  ours  remained  in  their 
hands  in  the  most  advanced  positions  which  we  had 
reached  and  had  been  compelled  to  abandon.  Among  these 
latter  was  Colonel  Powell  of  the  Fifth  Texas  regiment, 
who  was  shot  through  the  body  and  afterward  died. 
Powell  was  a  stout,  portly  man,  with  a  full  beard,  resem 
bling,  in  many  respects,  General  Longstreet,  and  the  first 
impression  of  his  captors  was  that  they  had  taken  that 
officer.  Indeed,  it  was  asserted  positively  by  some  of  the 
prisoners  we  picked  up  during  the  night  that  Longstreet 
was  badly  wounded  and  a  prisoner  in  their  hands,  and  they 
obstinately  refused  to  credit  our  statements  to  the  con 
trary.  .  .  ." 

This  paper  by  General  Law,  written  for  the  Century 
Magazine  many  years  after  the  battle,  is  an  able  discus 
sion  of  the  strategy  of  Meade  and  Lee,  and  is  well  worth 
reading  whether  or  not  one  agrees  with  his  opinion  of  the 
reasons  for  the  defeat  of  the  Confederates.  I  have  made 
extracts  of  the  portions  which  relate  to  the  fight  for  the 
possession  of  Little  Round  Top.  As  Hood  was  wounded 
before  the  Confederate  infantry  reached  the  Union  lines, 
and  Law  succeeded  him  in  the  command  of  the  division, 
it  appears  that,  after  starting  his  brigade  on  its  way  to 
attack  Vincent,  he  devoted  his  time  to  the  direction  of  the 
other  brigades  of  the  division  in  their  attack  on  Birney's 
line.  We  are  obliged  to  depend  for  information  from 
Confederate  sources  on  the  reports  of  their  regimental  com 
manders,  with  an  explanation  in  Robertson's  report  of  his 
brigade,  of  the  reason  for  the  participation  by  two  of  his 
regiments  —  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas  —  in  the  attack 
on  Little  Round  Top.  These  Alabama  and  Texas  men 


124    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

were  magnificent  soldiers,  and  they  made  desperate  at 
tempts  to  gain  the  coveted  position.  Whether  they  would 
have  succeeded  had  Hood  or  Law  been  present  to  direct 
them  is  a  question  which  we  need  not  raise,  since  they 
have  not.  The  regimental  commanders,  according  to  their 
reports,  acted  generally  on  their  own  initiative.  Colonel 
Sheffield,  who  assumed  command  of  Law's  brigade  when 
Law  took  the  division,  merely  mentions  the  fact  in  his  re 
port,  but  says  nothing  of  any  orders  given  by  him  to  any 
regiments  except  his  own. 

The  scouts  which  Law  sent  to  the  top  of  Round  Top 
evidently  examined  the  ground  to  the  north  of  it,  and  saw 
no  Union  troops  in  position.  They  must  have  seen  the 
narrow  valley  leading  up  from  Plum  Run  along  the  north 
side  of  Round  Top,  and  reported  that.  Law  was  prepared 
by  this  information  to  start  his  brigade  up  this  valley  as 
soon  as  he  had  cleared  the  western  slope  of  Round  Top. 
Whether  he  had  reported  this  to  Hood  and  was  directed 
by  him  to  send  a  part  of  his  forces  in  that  direction,  is  not 
stated ;  but  believing  the  way  was  clear  to  reach  and  occupy 
or  turn  little  Round  Top,  we  must  suppose  that  experi 
enced  officers  like  Hood  or  Law  would  not  neglect  to  take 
advantage  of  it.  If  Vincent  had  not  reached  that  point 
and  prepared  to  receive  them,  the  attempt  would  have  suc 
ceeded;  but  Vincent  was  there  first,  and  it  failed. 

It  is  evident  from  this  statement  by  Law,  and  Hood's 
letter  to  Longstreet  written  some  time  after  the  war 
(quoted  in  Gates'  book),  that  both  of  these  officers  pro 
tested  against  making  a  direct  attack  on  the  front  of  Bir- 
ney's  line.  Longstreet  also  had  pleaded  with  Lee  to  be 
allowed  to  move  around  the  east  end  of  Big  Round  Top  to 
get  in  the  rear  of  Meade's  left,  threatening  his  communi 
cations  and  forcing  him  to  abandon  his  strong  position  on 
the  right.  It  may  be  that  the  hope  that  Longstreet  would 
yield  to  their  repeated  importunities  caused  Hood's  di- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       125 

vision  to  go  so  far  to  the  east  that  when  it  faced  to  the 
front  Law's  brigade  so  far  over-lapped  Big  Round  Top 
that  it  was  necessary  to  move  the  two  regiments  on  its 
right  to  its  left,  and  even  to  the  left  of  the  Fourth  and 
Fifth  Texas,  which  under  orders  had  kept  closed  on  the 
Fourth  Alabama,  the  left  of  Law's  brigade.  For  some 
reason  not  explained  by  Law,  his  brigade  in  advancing 
obliqued  to  the  right.  After  moving  two  regiments  to 
the  left,  the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  Alabama  were 
still  so  far  to  the  east  that  they  struck  the  south  side  of 
the  western  slope  and,  following  the  sharpshooters  of 
Stoughton's  skirmish  line,  wheeled  to  the  right  and  went 
up  over  the  top  of  the  mountain.  (See  Oates'  account  in 
his  book,  Robertson's  official  report,  and  reports  of  regi 
mental  commanders  in  Law's  and  Robertson's  brigades.) 

CAPTAIN  FARLEY'S  "  NUMBER  NINE  " l 
REMINISCENCES  BY  PORTER  FARLEY. 

"  On  Wednesday  July  i,  1863,  the  Fifth  corps,  of  which 
our  regiment  formed  a  part,  having  that  morning  crossed 
the  line  dividing  the  States  of  Maryland  and  Pennsyl- 

1  This  paper,  although  not  published  in  book  form,  belongs  with  the 
accounts  by  other  historians.  It  is  one  of  a  series  of  papers  written 
by  Captain  Farley  describing  the  history  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Fortieth  New  York  Volunteers,  published  at  intervals  in  a  Rochester 
newspaper,  and  is  Number  Nine  of  that  series.  This  regiment  was 
raised  in  Rochester,  New  York,  and  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Pat 
rick  H.  O'Rorke  from  its  organization  until  his  death  in  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg.  As  shown  by  the  Warren  letters,  Captain  Farley's  Num 
ber  Nine  had  been  submitted  to  General  Warren  and,  after  some 
suggestions  made  by  him,  the  final  revised  draft  met  Warren's  ap 
proval.  Warren  was  so  impressed  with  its  value  that  he  requested 
that  a  copy  of  it  should  be  sent  to  the  Comte  de  Paris,  who  was  then 
writing  his  "  History  of  the  Civil  War  in  America."  This  request 
was  complied  with,  and  the  information  obtained  from  this  paper  may 
be  plainly  seen  in  the  chapter  on  Gettysburg  in  the  Comte  de  Paris' 
work.  Captain  Farley  has  kindly  permitted  me  to  publish  the  paper 
in  this  book. 


126    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

vania,    halted   about  the  middle  of   the   afternoon   within 
sight  of  the  town  of  Hanover. 

"  All  the  country  through  which  we  that  day  passed  had 
been  overrun  by  the  rebel  cavalry.  The  inhabitants  hailed 
the  army  of  the  Potomac  as  their  deliverers  from  a  threat 
ened  wholesale  desolation.  The  day  before  our  arrival 
there  had  been  quite  a  lively  cavalry  fight  at  Hanover.  We 
came  in  sight  of  the  town  at  about  3  P.  M.  and  halted  in 
an  open  field  just  beyond  its  suburbs.  Our  rest,  however, 
was  but  short.  News  soon  reached  us  of  heavy  fighting 
which  had  that  day  taken  place  some  fourteen  miles  to  the 
westward,  at  the  town  then  insignificant,  but  now  known 
to  fame  as  Gettysburg.  The  only  particulars  of  the  action 
which  we  could  learn  were  that  the  First  corps  had  been 
engaged  and  that  General  Reynolds,  its  commander,  had 
been  killed. 

"  At  six  o'clock  that  evening  we  were  in  motion  again, 
making  all  possible  speed  toward  Gettysburg,  the  point 
upon  which  the  entire  army  was  then  concentrating. 

'  This  was  campaigning  under  circumstances  entirely 
different  from  any  of  our  former  experiences.  We  wrere 
on  the  soil  of  a  loyal  State  and  were  hastening  to  meet  a 
presumptuous  foe  who  had  audaciously  invaded  it.  The 
kindly  anxious  interest  with  which  the  country  women  and 
children  gazed  upon  us  as  they  stood  at  their  gates  \vhile 
we  marched  by,  and  the  alacrity  with  which  they  furnished 
water  and  food  to  those  who  needed  it,  were  incentives  to 
better  feelings  than  those  engendered  by  the  sulky  faces 
and  contemptuous  treatment  with  which  we  had  been  so 
familiar  in  our  Virginia  marches.  I  have  heard  and  read 
many  stories  of  the  meanness  with  which  the  Pennsylva- 
nians  treated  the  Union  soldiers  during  the  Gettysburg  cam 
paign,  of  the  parsimony  which  prompted  them  to  charge 
and  take  money  for  water  and  outrageous  prices  for  food 
furnished  to  men  whose  wants  were  extreme,  but  justice 


CAPTAIN    PORTER    FARLKY 


Facing    Page   126 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       127 

compels  me  to  say  that  I  never  saw  anything  of  it.  On 
the  contrary,  I  witnessed  the  exhibition  of  a  great  deal  of 
liberality  and  wras  the  recipient  of  it  in  my  own  person. 
Doubtless  some  of  the  shameful  stories  we  have  heard  were 
true,  but  I  feel  very  certain  that  the  miscreants  who  were 
guilty  of  such  meanness  were  exceptions  among  the  many, 
and  that  a  few  poor,  shriveled  souls  were  able  by  thus 
abusing  common  decency  to  bring  a  reproach  upon  a  kind- 
hearted  and  grateful  community. 

"  We  pushed  on  till  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  Thurs 
day,  July  2,  and  then  halted  and  lay  down  to  rest  in  the 
road.  Overcome  by  fatigue,  the  men  were  asleep  almost 
as  soon  as  they  touched  the  ground.  To  how  many  of  the 
poor  fellows  did  this  prove  the  last  sleep  from  which  they 
were  ever  to  arise ! 

"  At  about  four  o'clock  we  were  roused  again,  and  shak 
ing  off  as  best  we  could  the  terrible  drowsiness  which  op 
pressed  us,  moved  still  further  westward.  After  march 
ing  about  two  hours  we  halted  and  the  regiments  of  our 
brigade  formed  in  column  by  divisions  in  the  rear  of 
other  troops  that  were  deployed  in  lines  of  battle,  with  all 
dispositions  made  as  if  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy. 

"  It  was  while  waiting  here  that  an  orderly  brought  to 
Colonel  O'Rorke  a  circular  addressed  by  General  Meade  to 
the  army.  O'Rorke  and  I  were  both  mounted  and  stand 
ing  in  front  of  the  column.  He  glanced  over  the  paper, 
handed  it  to  me  and  told  me  to  read  it  to  the  regiment. 
It  was  as  follows : 

"  CIRCULAR. 
"  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"  June  30,  1863. 

"  The  commanding  general  requests  that  previous  to  the  engagement 
soon  expected  with  the  enemy,  corps  and  all  other  commanding  offi 
cers  will  address  their  troops,  explaining  to  them  briefly  the  immense 
issues  involved  in  this  struggle.  The  enemy  are  on  our  soil.  The 
whole  country  now  looks  anxiously  to  this  army  to  deliver  it  from 
the  presence  of  the  foe.  Our  failure  to  do  so  will  leave  us  no  such 


128    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

welcome  as  the  swelling  of  millions  of  hearts  with  pride  and  joy 
at  our  success  would  give  to  every  soldier  in  the  army.  Homes,  fire 
sides,  and  domestic  altars  are  involved.  The  army  has  fought  well 
heretofore.  It  is  believed  that  it  will  fight  more  desperately  and  bravely 
than  ever  if  it  is  addressed  in  fitting  terms. 

"  Corps  and  other  commanders  are  authorized  to  order  the  instant 
death  of  any  soldier  who  fails  in  his  duty  at  this  hour. 

"  By  command  of  MAJOR-GENERAL  MEADE. 

"  S.  WILLIAMS,  Ass't  Adj't  Geril. 

"  West  Pointers  are  not  habitual  speechmakers,  and  our 
colonel  was  no  exception  to  the  rule;  but  the  order  just 
read  explicitly  directed  all  commanding  officers  to  '  address 
their  troops,  explaining  to  them  briefly  the  immense  issues 
involved  in  this  struggle/  and  in  obedience  to  it,  then  and 
there,  sitting  on  his  little  brown  horse  in  front  of  the  regi 
mental  colors,  dressed  as  we  all  so  well  remember  him  in 
his  soft  felt  hat,  long  white  leather  gloves,  and  military 
cape,  Pat  O'Rorke  made  the  first  and  only  speech  which  he 
ever  addressed  to  his  regiment.  It  was  short  and  to  the 
point,  and  I  regret  that  I  cannot  repeat  the  whole  of  it, 
but  his  closing  words  I  remember  very  well,  when  he  said, 
'  I  call  on  the  file-closers  to  do  their  duty,  and  if  there  is  a 
man  this  day  base  enough  to  leave  his  company,  let  him 
die  in  his  tracks — shoot  him  down  like  a  dog.'  Those 
were  the  words  of  a  man  who  meant  to  do  his  duty,  and 
was  resolved  that  everyone  under  his  command  should  do 
the  same.  The  episode  was  dramatic  to  the  highest  de 
gree.  The  sentiment  and  the  occasion  were  not  such  as  to 
elicit  boisterous  applause;  but  a  low  murmur  of  approval 
throughout  his  audience  showed  that  as  a  body  they  were 
ready  to  follow  wherever  a  brave  man  would  lead. 

"  The  whole  army,  with  the  exception  of  the  Sixth  corps, 
had  by  this  time  arrived  upon  the  field.  In  the  disposi 
tion  of  the  troops  our  corps  was  held  as  a  reserve  within 
the  curved  range  of  hills  whose  crests  formed  our  chosen 
line  of  battle.  During  the  day  we  were  moved  from  place 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       129 

to  place,  according  as  different  parts  of  the  grand  line 
seemed  more  exposed  or  threatened.  Thus  early  in  the 
morning  we  were  behind  the  extreme  right;  later  in  the 
day  we  were  massed  on  Rock  Creek,  near  the  point  where 
it  is  crossed  by  the  Baltimore  pike.  This  position  was  in 
rear  of  our  main  line,  which  has  generally  been  described  as 
shaped  like -a  horseshoe,  with  its  convexity  turned  toward 
the  enemy,  but  \vhich  may  more  properly  be  compared  to 
a  fish-hook,  its  shank  beginning  on  the  northern  slope  of 
Round  Top  and  running  almost  due  north  along  the  crests 
of  Little  Round  Top  and  Cemetery  Ridge,  its  curve  begin 
ning  at  the  cemetery  and  its  barb  and  point  represented  by 
Culp's  Hill. 

"  Late  in  the  afternoon  we  were  ordered  to  move  to  the 
left  of  the  line  where  the  booming  of  artillery  admonished 
us  that  the  bloody  work  of  the  day  had  begun  in  right 
earnest. 

'  We  soon  reached  the  sloping  ground  where  the  ascent 
began  on  our  side  up  the  ridge,  beyond  which  the  battle  at 
that  time  was  raging.  I  have  said  that  we  could  hear  the 
artillery,  though  it  still  had  a  distant  sound;  but  now  the 
rifle  balls  coming  over  the  hill  began  to  whistle  through  the 
air  high  above  us,  and  in  the  woods  to  our  left  on  the  hill 
side  we  saw  the  surgeons  at  work  over  the  wounded;  and 
yet,  strange  to  say,  we  could  but  very  indistinctly  hear  the 
sound  of  musketry.  It  must  have  been  owing  to  the  in 
tervening  hill  or  the  direction  of  the  wind,  or  both  causes 
combined,  for  we  were  even  then  upon  the  very  verge  of 
the  battle,  and  when  we  mounted  the  ridge  two  or  three 
minutes  later  its  full  fury  burst  upon  us. 

'  The  First  division  of  our  corps,  commanded  by  Brig 
adier-General  Barnes,  had  preceded  us.  Our  division, 
the  Second,  under  Brigadier-General  R.  B.  Ayres,  followed 
it.  Our  brigade,  under  Brigadier-General  Stephen  H. 
Weed,  led  the  division,  and  though  my  recollection  of  the 


130    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

order  in  which  the  regiments  were  marching  does  not  agree 
with  that  of  other  officers  present,  I  think  that  our  regi 
ment  was  the  rear  one  of  the  brigade,  and  that  the  leading 
regiments  of  our  brigade  were  just  passing  over  that 
slightly  elevated  ground  north  of  Little  Round  Top  when 
down  its  slope  on  our  left,  accompanied  by  a  single  mounted 
officer  and  an  orderly,  rode  General  G.  K.  Warren,  our 
former  brigade  commander,  then  acting  as  General  Meade's 
chief  engineer.  Warren  came  straight  toward  the  head 
of  the  regiment,  where  I  was  riding  with  the  colonel.  He 
called  out  to  O'Rorke,  beginning  to  speak  while  still  some 
eight  or  ten  rods  from  us,  that  he  wanted  us  to  come  up 
there;  that  the  enemy  were  advancing  unopposed  up  the 
opposite  side  of  the  hill,  down  which  he  had  just  come, 
and  he  wanted  our  regiment  to  meet  them.  He  was  evi 
dently  greatly  excited  and  spoke  in  his  usual  impulsive 
style.  O'Rorke  answered,  '  General  Weed  is  ahead  and 
expects  me  to  follow  him.'  '  Never  mind  that,'  said  War 
ren,  '  bring  your  regiment  up  here  and  I  will  take  the  re 
sponsibility.'  It  was  a  perplexing  situation,  but  without 
hesitating  O'Rorke  turned  to  the  left  and  followed  the  of 
ficer  who  had  been  riding  with  Warren,  while  Warren 
himself  rode  rapidly  down  the  stony  hill,  whether  in  the 
direction  from  which  we  had  just  come  or  to  overtake  the 
rest  of  our  brigade,  I  cannot  say,  but  evidently  to  find  and 
order  up  more  troops.  The  cause  for  this  haste  is  graph 
ically  described  by  General  Warren  himself  in  a  letter  which 
he  kindly  wrote  me  under  date  of  July  13,  1872,  from 
which  I  here  take  the  liberty  to  quote.  He  says : 

"  '  Just  before  the  action  began  in  earnest  on  July  21,  I 
was  with  General  Meade  near  General  Sickles,  whose 
troops  seemed  very  badly  disposed  on  that  part  of  the  field. 
At  my  suggestion,  General  Meade  sent  me  to  the  left  to 
examine  the  condition  of  affairs,  and  I  continued  on  till  1 
reached  Little  Round  Top.  There  were  no  troops  on  it, 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       131 

and  it  was  used  as  a  signal  station.  I  saw  that  this  was 
the  key  of  the  whole  position,  and  that  our  troops  in  the 
woods  in  front  of  it  could  not  see  the  ground  in  front  of 
them,  so  that  the  enemy  would  come  upon  them  before 
they  would  be  aware  of  it.  The  long  line  of  woods  on 
the  west  side  of  the  Eminittsburg  road  (which  road  was 
along  a  ridge)  furnished  an  excellent  place  for  the  enemy 
to  form  out  of  sight,  so  I  requested  the  captain  of  a  rifle 
battery  just  in  front  of  Little  Round  Top  to  fire  a  shot  into 
these  woods.  He  did  so,  and  as  the  shot  went  whistling 
through  the  air  the  sound  of  it  reached  the  enemy's  troops 
and  caused  everyone  to  look  in  the  direction  of  it.  This 
motion  revealed  to  me  the  glistening  of  gun  barrels  and 
bayonets  of  the  enemy's  line  of  battle,  already  formed  and 
far  outflanking  the  position  of  any  of  our  troops,  so  that 
the  line  of  his  advance  from  his  right  to  Little  Round  Top 
was  unopposed. 

"  '  I  have  been  particular  in  telling  this,  as  the  discovery 
was  intensely  thrilling  to  my  feelings  and  almost  appalling. 
I  immediately  sent  a  hastily  written  dispatch  to  General 
Meade,  to  send  a  division  at  least  to  me,  and  General 
Meacle  directed  the  Fifth  Army  Corps  to  take  position 
there.  The  battle  was  already  beginning  to  rage  at  the 
peach  orchard,  and  before  a  single  man  reached  Round 
Top  the  whole  line  of  the  enemy  moved  on  us  in  splendid 
array,  shouting  in  the  most  confident  tones.  While  I  was 
still  all  alone  with  the  signal  officer,  the  musket  balls  began 
to  fly  around  us,  and  he  was  about  to  fold  up  his  flags 
and  withdraw,  but  remained  at  my  request  and  kept  wav 
ing  them  in  defiance.  Seeing  troops  going  out  on  the 
peach  orchard  road,  I  rode  down  the  hill  and  fortunately 
met  my  old  brigade.  General  Weed,  commanding  it,  had 
already  passed  the  point,  and  I  took  the  responsibility  to 
detach  Colonel  O'Rorke,  the  head  of  whose  regiment  I 
struck,  who  on  hearing  my  few  words  of  explanation  about 


132    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  position  moved  at  once  to  the  hilltop.  About  this  time 
First-Lieutenant  Charles  E.  Hazlett,  of  the  Fifth  Artillery, 
with  his  battery  of  rifled  cannon  arrived.  He  compre 
hended  the  situation  instantly,  and  planted  a  gun  on  the 
summit  of  the  hill.  He  spoke  to  the  effect  that  though  he 
could  do  little  execution  on  the  enemy  with  his  guns,  he 
could  aid  in  giving  confidence  to  the  infantry,  and  that  his 
battery  was  of  no  consequence  whatever  compared  with 
holding  the  position.  He  stayed  there  till  he  was  killed. 

"  '  I  did  not  see  Vincent's  brigade  come  up,  but  I  sup 
pose  it  was  about  this  time  they  did,  and,  coming  up  be 
hind  me  through  the  woods  and  taking  post  to  the  left, 
their  proper  place,  I  did  not  see  them.  The  full  force  of 
the  enemy  was  now  sweeping  the  Third  Army  Corps  from 
its  untenable  position,  and  no  troops  nor  any  reinforce 
ments  could  maintain  it.  It  was  the  dreadful  misfortune 
of  the  day  that  any  reinforcements  went  to  that  line,  for 
all  alike,  Third  corps,  Second  corps,  and  Fifth  corps,  were 
driven  from  it  with  great  loss.  The  earnest  appeals  for 
support  drew,  I  suppose,  the  troops  of  the  Fifth  corps 
away  from  their  intended  position,  that  is,  Little  Round 
Top,  out  on  the  road  to  the  peach  orchard,  and  so  it  was 
that  the  Fifth  corps  reached  this  vital  point  in  such  small 
detachments. 

"  '  I  was  wounded  with  a  musket  ball  while  talking  with 
Lieutenant  Hazlett  on  the  hill,  but  not  seriously,  and  seeing 
the  position  saved,  while  the  whole  line  to  the  right  and 
front  of  us  was  yielding  and  melting  away  under  the 
enemy's  fire  and  advance,  I  left  the  hill  to  rejoin  General 
Meade,  near  the  center  of  the  field,  where  a  new  crisis 
was  at  hand.' 

"  So  much  as  explaining  what  Warren  had  seen  when  he 
came  riding  down  on  the  head  of  our  regiment  and  de 
tached  us  so  unexpectedly  from  the  rest  of  our  brigade, 
and  now  to  resume  the  narrative  of  the  part  we  took  in 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       133 

the  struggle  which  ensued  for  the  possession  of  Little 
Round  Top. 

"  We  turned  off  the  road  to  our  left  and  rushed  along 
the  wooded,  rocky  eastern  slope  of  Little  Round  Top,  as 
cending  it  while  at  the  same  time  moving  toward  its 
southern  extremity.  It  was  just  here  that  some  of  the 
guns  of  Hazlett's  battery  came  rapidly  up  and  plunged  di 
rectly  through  our  ranks,  the  horses  being  urged  to  frantic 
efforts  by  the  whips  of  their  drivers  and  the  cannoneers  as 
sisting  at  the  wheels,  so  great  was  the  effort  necessary  to 
drag  the  guns  and  caissons  up  the  ragged  hillside. 

"  As  we  reached  the  crest  a  never  to  be  forgotten  scene 
burst  upon  us.  A  great  basin  lay  before  us  full  of  smoke 
and  fire,  and  literally  swarming  with  riderless  horses  and 
fighting,  fleeing,  and  pursuing  men.  The  air  was  saturated 
with  the  sulphurous  fumes  of  battle  and  was  ringing  with 
the  shouts  and  groans  of  the  combatants.  The  wild  cries 
of  charging  lines,  the  rattle  of  musketry,  the  booming  of 
artillery,  and  the  shrieks  of  the  wounded  were  the  orches 
tral  accompaniments  of  a  scene  like  very  hell  itself  —  as 
terrific  as  the  warring  of  Milton's  fiends  in  Pande 
monium.  The  whole  of  Sickles'  corps,  and  many  other 
troops  which  had  been  sent  to  its  support  in  that  ill-chosen 
hollow,  were  being  slaughtered  and  driven  before  the  im 
petuous  advance  of  Longstreet.  But  fascinating  as  was 
this  terrible  scene,  we  had  no  time  to  spend  upon  it. 
Bloody  work  was  ready  for  us  at  our  very  feet. 

"  Round  Top,  a  conical  hill  several  hundred  feet  in  height, 
lay  just  to  the  south  of  us,  and  was  separated  from  Little 
Round  Top,  on  whose  crest  we  were  now  moving,  by  a 
broad  ravine  leading  down  into  the  basin  where  the  great 
fight  was  raging.  Right  up  this  ravine,  which  offered  the 
easiest  place  of  ascent,  a  rebel  force,  outflanking  all  our 
troops  in  the  plain  below,  was  advancing  at  the  very  mo 
ment  when  we  reached  the  crest  of  the  hill.  Vincent's 


134    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

brigade  of  the  First  division  of  our  corps  had  come  up 
through  the  woods  on  the  eastern  slope  of  the  hill,  had  de 
ployed  and  taken  position  on  its  southern  slope,  and  were 
at  the  moment  of  our  arrival  hotly  engaged  with  a  superior 
and  aggressive  force  of  the  enemy.  As  soon  as  we  reached 
the  crest  bullets  came  flying  in  among  us.  We  were  mov 
ing  with  the  right  in  front  and  not  a  musket  was  loaded, 
a  fact  which  Warren  of  course  knew  nothing  about  when 
he  rushed  us  up  there. 

'  The  enemy  were  coming  from  our  right,  and  to  face 
them  would  bring  our  file-closers  in  front.  The  order, 
'  On  the  right,  by  file  into  line,'  would  have  brought  us 
into  proper  position;  but  there  was  no  time  to  execute  it, 
not  even  time  to  allow  the  natural  impulse  which  mani 
fested  itself  on  the  part  of  the  men  to  halt  and  load  the  in 
stant  we  received  the  enemy's  fire.  O'Rorke  did  not  hesi 
tate  a  moment.  '  Dismount,'  said  he  to  me,  for  the  ground 
before  us  was  too  rough  to  ride  over.  We  sprang  from 
our  horses  and  gave  them  to  the  sergeant-major.  O'Rorke 
shouted,  '  Down  this  way,  boys ! '  and  following  him  we 
rushed  down  the  rocky  slope  with  all  the  same  moral  ef 
fect  upon  the  rebels,  who  saw  us  coming,  as  if  our  bay 
onets  had  been  fixed  and  we  ready  to  charge  upon  them. 
Coming  abreast  of  Vincent's  brigade,  and  taking  advantage 
of  such  shelter  as  the  huge  rocks  lying  about  there  af 
forded,  the  men  loaded  and  fired,  and  in  less  time  than  it 
takes  to  write  it  the  onslaught  of  the  rebels  was  fairly 
checked,  and  in  a  few  minutes  the  woods  in  front  of  us 
were  cleared  except  of  the  dead  and  wounded.  Such  of 
the  rebels  as  had  approached  so  near  as  to  make  escape 
almost  impossible  dropped  their  guns,  threw  up  their 
hands,  and  upon  a  slight  slackening  of  our  fire  rushed  in 
upon  us  and  gave  themselves  up  as  prisoners,  while  those 
not  so  near  took  advantage  of  the  chance  left  them  and  re 
treated  in  disorder. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       135 

"  The  firing  for  a  few  minutes  was  very  rapid,  and  the 
execution  on  both  sides  was  fearful.  Captain  Starks,  of 
the  leading  company,  received  four  wounds,  but  with 
splendid  pluck  stayed  by  his  men  till  the  affair  was  over. 
Captain  Sibley,  of  the  second  company,  was  shot  through 
both  legs  and  lay  perfectly  helpless  till  carried  off. 
O'Rorke  exposed  himself  with  the  greatest  gallantry,  not 
taking  the  least  advantage  of  the  partial  shelter  which  the 
rocks  afforded.  He  was  shot  in  the  neck  and  dropped  in 
stantly  dead  without  a  word.  Captain  Spies,  of  Company 
B,  was  shot  through  the  body  and  desperately  hurt.  Lieu 
tenant  Charles  Klein,  of  the  same  company,  and  Lieutenant 
Hugh  McGraw,  of  Company  K,  were  both  wounded  in 
the  leg,  and  both  died  in  consequence.  Of  the  enlisted 
men  there  were  twenty-five  killed  and  about  eighty-four 
wounded.  Klein  and  McGraw  died,  Spies  and  Sibley  were 
so  badly  hurt  that  they  never  could  rejoin  us,  and  Starks 
with  his  four  wounds,  all  of  which  were  slight,  fully  re 
covered,  and  after  a  few  weeks  rejoined  us,  to  meet  a  sol 
dier's  death  the  following  spring  in  the  fight  near  Spott- 
sylvania  Court-House. 

"  Our  losses  were  much  more  severe  than  they  would 
have  been  if  our  muskets  had  been  loaded  and  if  the  regi 
ment  had  been  formed  in  proper  line  of  battle  before  it 
rushed  over  the  crest  of  the  hill.  This  remark  must  not 
be  construed  as  reflecting  on  any  one.  Warren  did  not 
know  that  our  guns  were  empty,  and  if  he  had  known  it,  or 
if  he  or  O'Rorke  had  halted  the  column  for  the  purpose 
of  loading,  it  would  have  caused  a  delay  which  might,  and 
probably  would,  have  been  disastrous  beyond  all  calcula 
tion. 

"  In  a  word,  Gettysburg  might  have  been  the  greatest 
disaster  of  the  war,  and  might  have  turned  the  scales  in 
favor  of  the  rebellion.  This  may  seem  an  extravagant 
statement;  but  everyone  who  was  there  will  corroborate 


136    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  assertion  that  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  regiment 
reached  the  crest  of  Little  Round  Top  in  the  very  nick 
of  time,  and  before  any  other  troops  were  there  except  a 
part  of  Hazlett's  rifled  battery,  and  that  if  we  had  not 
reached  it  first,  thirty  or  sixty  seconds  later  Hood's  Texas 
brigade,  which  was  the  force  we  met,  would  have  seized 
the  hill  which  was  the  key  to  the  whole  Union  line.  The 
disorganized  remnant  of  Sickles'  routed  corps  would  have 
been  surrounded  on  three  sides.  Hazlett's  battery  would 
have  been  taken  and  its  guns  turned  upon  the  Union  troops 
in  the  field  below.  The  principal  ammunition  train,  which 
was  parked  about  half  a  mile  in  the  rear,  would  have  been 
lost,  the  general  line  of  battle  would  have  been  doubled  up, 
and  a  disastrous  defeat  would  have  been  almost  inevitable. 
Vincent's  brigade  of  the  First  division  of  our  corps  might 
have  done  something  to  avert  this  disaster;  but  to  do  it 
they  would  have  had  to  change  their  front  under  fire  and 
on  ground  the  most  unsuitable  for  such  an  evolution.  We 
of  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  regiment  are  so  self- 
gratulatory  as  to  think  that  the  arrival  of  the  Monitor  in 
Hampton  Roads  just  when  and  as  she  did,  was  a  circum 
stance  no  more  fortunate  for  the  Union  cause  than  was  our 
timely  arrival  to  fill  the  gap  just  when  and  as  we  did  on 
Little  Round  Top  at  Gettysburg. 

"  That  was  our  first  really  bloody  engagement,  and  in 
all  the  subsequent  experiences  of  the  regiment  upon  many 
other  desperate  fields,  the  service  there  rendered  upon  Lit 
tle  Round  Top  must  be  regarded  as  the  supreme  event 
in  its  existence. 

"  Vincent's  brigade  on  our  left  fought  splendidly  and 
lost  heavily.  Vincent  himself  was  killed.  Hazlett's  bat 
tery,  which  was  stationed  on  the  crest  above  and  behind 
us,  had  not  been  able  to  do  any  execution  upon  the  force 
which  actually  assailed  us,  but  it  played  upon  the  rebel 
masses  who  were  driving  Sickles'  corps  in  the  plain  below, 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       137 

and  after  our  engagement  was  over  it  still  kept  firing  upon 
any  considerable  body  of  rebels  that  remained  in  sight. 
What  their  losses  had  been  during  the  heat  of  the  engage 
ment  I  cannot  say,  but  after  our  fight  was  over  and  we 
had  secured  pretty  good  shelter  behind  the  rocks  on  the 
western  slope,  their  cannoneers  were  much  exposed,  and 
many  fell  by  the  bullets  of  the  sharpshooters,  who  seemed 
swarming  in  the  tree-tops  and  behind  the  rocks  over  in  the 
direction  of  the  peach  orchard.  Man  after  man  fell  under 
this  murderous  sharpshooting  while  those  thus  exposed 
were  serving  their  guns  directed  upon  an  enemy  not  en 
gaged  in  an  attack  upon  our  immediate  front.  For  the 
better  understanding  of  the  part  which  this  battery  took 
in  the  action  of  that  afternoon,  it  may  be  remarked  that 
they  did  little  or  nothing  in  repelling  the  assault  of  the 
Texan  brigade  which  fell  upon  us.  Our  men  and  the 
enemy  were  at  too  close  quarters  for  that,  and  the  nature 
of  the  ground  did  not  permit  the  artillery  to  be  of  any  im 
mediate  service  to  us.  But  Hazlett  got  his  guns  into  posi 
tion  just  at  the  time  when  Sickles'  corps  was  falling  back 
in  great  disorder  before  an  overwhelming  force,  and  it  was 
against  these  advancing  and  for  the  moment  victorious 
lines  that  he  poured  in  an  effective  fire.  Here,  too,  he  met 
his  death  in  a  manner  dramatic  to  the  last  degree,  and  yet 
to  be  described. 

"  When  Warren  detached  and  sent  us  up  the  hill,  word 
was  sent  to  our  brigade  commander,  General  Stephen  H. 
Weed,  notifying  him  of  the  fact,  he  having  gone  at  the 
head  of  the  brigade  directly  to  the  front  to  the  support  of 
Sickles'  corps.  Upon  receiving  this  word,  Weed  brought 
back  the  regiments  with  him  as  hastily  as  possible  and 
put  them  in  position  to  our  right  along  the  crest  of  Little 
Round  Top,  not,  however,  arriving  till  our  bloody  affair 
was  over.  But  the  sharpshooters  were  still  doing  their 
best  against  Hazlett's  gunners,  and  it  was  while  standing 


I38    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

among  them  that  Weed  received  a  mortal  wound.  Be 
lieving  that  he  was  about  to  die,  he  was  in  the  very  act  of 
committing  his  last  messages  to  his  friend  Hazlett,  who 
stooped  over  him,  when  there  came  the  whiz  and  thud  of 
another  bullet  as  it  sunk  into  Hazlett's  brain,  and  that 
brave  artilleryman  fell  a  corpse  across  the  body  of  his  dy 
ing  friend. 

"  Thus  had  fallen  our  brigadier,  the  commander  of  the 
battery  which  we  supported,  and  our  gallant  young  col 
onel. 

!<  The  general  was  carried  at  once  behind  the  shelter 
of  a  rock,  and  was  soon  taken  in  an  ambulance  to  the  farm 
house  of  Louis  A.  Bushman,  which,  as  well  as  his  barns 
and  outhouses,  had  been  taken  possession  of  and  was  being 
used  as  our  division  hospital.  Weed  suffered  intensely, 
but  for  some  time  after  he  was  hurt  was  entirely  conscious 
and  able  to  communicate  the  messages  which  he  had  begun 
to  give  to  Hazlett.  This  he  did  to  Lieutenant  William  H. 
Crennell,  quartermaster  of  our  regiment,  who,  with  the 
other  quartermasters  of  our  brigade,  had  served  during1 
this  campaign  as  Weed's  aides.  Among  other  things, 
Weed  asked  that  when  he  was  dead  the  ring  which  he  wore 
might  be  taken  from  his  finger  and,  with  the  pocketbook 
containing  his  private  letters,  be  carried  to  the  young  lady 
to  whom  he  was  engaged  to  be  married.  As  the  father  of 
that  young  lady  has  for  many  years  been  a  public  char 
acter,  it  may  not  be  inappropriate  to  state  that  she  was  the 
daughter  of  Simon  Cameron  of  Pennsylvania. 

"  Weed's  bravery  even  unto  death,  and  his  bluff,  out 
spoken  manner,  were  well  exemplified  by  the  clearness 
with  which  he  made  his  dying  requests,  well  knowing  they 
were  such,  and  by  the  emphasis  with  which  he  spoke,  par 
ticularly  in  a  reply  which  almost  epitomizes  the  character 
of  the  man,  made  to  Crennell  when  he  said  to  him,  '  Gen 
eral,  I  hope  you  are  not  so  very  badly  hurt.'  Said  Weed, 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       139 

'I'm  as  dead  a  man  as  Julius  Caesar.'  He  soon  became  de 
lirious,  and  died  at  about  nine  o'clock  that  evening. 

"  During  the  fight  our  surgeons,  Drs.  Dean  and  Lord, 
had  been  stationed  but  a  few  rods  in  rear  of  the  regiment, 
just  over  the  crest  of  the  hill.  Here  they  gave  the 
wounded  such  immediate  attention  as  they  needed  before 
being  sent  to  the  division  hospital  at  Bushman's  farm.  To 
this  place,  when  the  fight  was  over,  Sergeant  Wright  and 
three  other  men  of  Company  A  carried  our  young  colonel, 
and  there  laid  him  on  the  ground.  I  went  with  them. 
He  had  fallen  instantly  dead.  A  bloody  froth  on  each 
side  of  his  neck  showed  the  fatal  track  of  the  bullet. 

"  Up  to  that  time  in  my  life  I  had  never  felt  a  grief  so 
sharply,  nor  realized  the  significance  of  death  so  well,  as 
then,  when  the  wild  excitement  of  our  fight  was  over  and 
I  saw  O'Rorke  lying  there  so  pale  and  peaceful.  To  me 
and  all  of  us  he  had  seemed  so  near  the  beau  ideal  of  a 
soldier  and  a  gentleman,  all  that  he  had  been  and  the 
bright  promise  of  what  he  was  to  be,  was  so  fresh  in  our 
minds,  and  now,  in  an  instant,  the  fatal  bullet  had  cut 
short  the  chapter  of  that  fair  life.  I  choked  with  grief  as 
I  stood  beside  his  lifeless  form.  I  had  known  and  loved 
him  well,  and  in  these  last  few  weeks  better  than  ever,  my 
position  as  his  adjutant  naturally  leading  to  intercourse  of 
the  most  familiar  kind,  as  day  by  day  we  ate  our  soldier's 
fare  together  and  often  at  night  slept  with  the  same  blanket 
covering  us.  For  him  to  die  was  to  me  like  losing  a 
brother,  and  that  brother  almost  the  perfection  of  the 
manly  graces.  What  a  blow  was  such  a  death  to  the 
young  wife  and  loving  family  who  far  away  waited  for 
the  news  from  Gettysburg;  what  was  it  to  us  of  that  regi 
ment  whose  fortunes  he  had  shared,  whose  wants  and  wel 
fare  he  had  watched  over,  and  who  had  been  the  witnesses 
of  the  last  gallant  effort  of  his  life  when  inspiring  every 
one  who  heard  him  with  an  enthusiasm  which  only  master 


140    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

minds  can  impart,  he  started  his  men  with  their  empty 
muskets  full  in  the  face  of  a  withering  fire  and  springing 
to  their  front  in  the  wild  '  rapture  of  the  strife  '  fell  dead 
among  them. 

"  It  was  only  natural  that  his  so  sudden  death  should 
most  deeply  affect  us.  But  time  and  place  alike  forbade 
the  comfort  which  comes  to  the  heart  when  it  yields  to  its 
grief. 

"  I  took  from  his  pockets  his  watch  and  some  trifles, 
pulled  from  his  hands  the  long  gloves  which  he  had  worn 
and  slipped  them  in  his  belt,  helped  compose  his  supple 
form  in  fitting  way,  collected  the  men  who  had  brought 
him  and  others  to  the  surgeon's  station,  and  taking  a  last 
look  at  poor  O'Rorke  went  back  to  the  regiment." 

At  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  Captain  Farley  was  a  first 
lieutenant  and  acting  as  the  adjutant  of  the  regiment.  I 
see  nothing  to  criticise  in  his  account.  It  was  written  be 
fore  any  of  the  histories  from  which  I  have  quoted  were 
published,  and  was  not  influenced  by  any  of  the  statements 
contained  in  them.  It  is  the  simple  story  of  an  intelligent 
soldier  who  was  present  in  the  battle,  and  related  what  he 
saw  and  heard.  There  is  no  attempt  at  fine  writing;  there 
was  no  need  for  that.  I  have  read  it  many  times,  and 
never  without  emotion.  His  grief  at  O'Rorke's  death  was 
like  mine  for  Vincent's.  Many  other  heroes  in  blue  and 
gray  died  on  Little  Round  Top  that  day,  and  the  grief 
over  their  loss  was  felt  in  many  homes  from  Maine  to 
Texas.  Let  us  believe  that  the  men  on  both  sides  who  died 
there  did  not  die  in  vain. 


Ill 

THE  OFFICIAL  REPORTS— CONFEDERATE  1 
LAW'S  BRIGADE 

Report  of  Col.  James  L.  Sheffield,  Forty-eighth  "Alabama 
Infantry.  (Commanding  Law's  Alabama  Brigade  after 
Gen.  Hood  was  wounded.) 

"  AUGUST  7,  1863. 

"  I  have  the  honor  herewith  to  give  a  statement  of  the 
part  taken  by  the  Forty-eighth  Alabama  in  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg,  on  July  2  and  3. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  2d  ultimo  this  regiment,  with 
the  brigade,  marched  from  New  Guilford  to  the  field,  a 
distance  of  20  miles,  where  we  were  placed  in  line  of  bat 
tle  in  the  open  field,  where  Companies  A  and  H  were  or 
dered  on  picket.  After  lying  in  line  of  battle  a  half  hour 
we  were  ordered  forward,  and  advanced  a  distance  of  i 
mile  over  a  very  rough  and  rugged  road,  the  worst  cliffs 
of  rocks  there  could  have  been  traveled  over. 

"  On  reaching  the  enemy's  lines,  where  they  were  well 
and  strongly  situated,  I  ordered  my  regiment  forward, 
which  was  gallantly  obeyed  until  within  about  20  paces 
of  their  line.  Here  the  fire  of  the  enemy  was  severe. 
Here  the  men  opened  fire  on  the  enemy,  and  for  some  time 
continued,  until  the  left,  from  the  loss  of  men  and  their 
exposed  position  to  a  fire  from  the  front  and  from  the 
mountain  on  the  right,  were  forced  to  fall  back.  The 
right  steadily  maintained  its  position  for  some  time,  forc 
ing  the  enemy  to  withdraw  from  their  first  line  and  estab 
lish  their  line  a  short  distance  to  their  rear,  where  they 

1M  Rebellion  Records,"  Series  i,  Vol.  xxvii,     part  2,   pp.   391-416. 

141 


142    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

continued  their  fire.  After  the  contest  had  continued  for 
an  hour  and  a  half,  and  my  whole  regiment  had  been 
brought  to  the  front  the  third  time,  only  to  be  driven  back, 
I  ordered  them  to  re-form  in  the  rear  of  their  advanced 
position.  While  doing  this,  I  was  ordered  to  take  com 
mand  of  the  brigade.  After  this,  the  regiment  was  com 
manded  by  Capt.  T.  J.  Eubanks,  who  re-formed  and  car 
ried  it  to  the  front,  where  the  battleground  was  held  during 
the  night,  bringing  off  our  wounded. 

"  In  this  battle  the  regiment  had  275  men  engaged. 
There  were  102  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 

"  On  the  3d  ultimo  the  regiment  was  withdrawn  a  short 
distance,  where  we  remained  during  the  day,  excepting 
while  engaged  in  a  short  fight  with  cavalry. 

"  At  night  we  were  still  farther  withdrawn  to  the  rear. 
The  men  and  officers  acted  very  well. 

"  I  cannot  close  without  speaking  of  those  who  acted 
most  conspicuously  during  the  hottest  of  the  conflict. 
Lieutenants  [F.  M.]  Burk  and  [R.  T.]  Ewing  and  Cap 
tains  Eubanks  and  [Jeremiah]  Edwards  are  especially  no 
ticed  for  their  gallantry  in  leading  their  men  forward  and 
remaining  in  front  of  their  commands,  encouraging  their 
men. 

"  Lieutenant-Colonel  [W.  M,]  Hard  wick  and  Major 
[C.  B.]  St.  John  were  very  efficient  in  performing  their 
part  until  wounded. 

"  It  is  proper  to  state  that  in  the  account  of  missing,  24 
men  were  taken  prisoners,  with  Captain  Edwards  and 
Lieutenant  [T.  L.]  Christian  (of  General  Law's  staff), 
while  posting  pickets  after  night  on  the  2d  ultimo." 

Report  of  Lieut.-Col.  L,  H.  Scruggs,  Fourth  Alabama 
Infantry. 

"AUGUST  8,  1863. 
"  In  accordance  with  orders  of  the  6th  instant,  I  have 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       143 

the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report  of  the  opera 
tions  of  the  regiment  during  the  engagement  of  July  2  and 
3,  at  Gettysburg,  Pa. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  2d  we  took  up  the  line  of 
march  from  New  Guilford  in  the  direction  of  Gettysburg. 
After  a  rapid  and  fatiguing  march  of  about  24  miles,  ar 
rived  at  the  scene  of  action  at  3 130  p.  M.,  immediately 
taking  our  assigned  position  on  the  left  of  the  brigade. 

"  The  order  was  then  given  to  move  forward,  which  we 
did  at  a  double-quick  across  a  plowed  field  for  half  a  mile, 
the  enemy's  batteries  playing  upon  us  with  great  effect  un 
til  we  arrived  at  a  stone  fence,  behind  which  the  enemy's 
first  line  of  infantry  was  posted,  which  position  we  soon 
succeeded  in  carrying  with  the  bayonet.  Then,  having 
reached  the  foot  of  the  mountain,  the  command  halted  a 
few  minutes  to  re-form  the  line.  We  advanced  up  the 
mountain  under  a  galling  fire,  driving  the  enemy  before  us 
until  we  arrived  at  a  second  line,  where  a  strong  force  was 
posted  behind  another  stone  fence.  Owing  to  the  ex 
hausted  condition  of  the  men  and  the  roughness  of  the 
mountain-side,  we  found  it  impossible  to  carry  this  posi 
tion.  We  retired  in  good  order,  though  not  until  we  had 
expended  our  ammunition.  Having  received  a  fresh  sup 
ply  of  cartridges  about  dark,  we  remained  in  the  enemy's 
front,  some  200  yards  distant,  during  the  night. 

"  Early  on  the  next  morning  we  threw  up  a  line  of 
breastworks  composed  of  rock,  and  assumed  the  defen 
sive,  which  position  we  held  during  the  day  until  late  in  the 
afternoon,  when  the  regiment  was  ordered  some  distance 
to  the  right,  to  meet  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which  we  soon 
dispersed.  Then  we  remained  in  position  until  dark,  when 
the  remainder  of  the  brigade  moved  to  our  rear,  and  were 
ordered  to  connect  with  it  on  the  right,  where  we  remained 
until  the  morning  of  the  4th. 

"  Both  officers  and  men  behaved  with  much  coolness  and 


144    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

gallantry,  and  many  brave  and  good  soldiers  fell,  a  noble 
sacrifice  to  their  country's  cause.  The  official  list  of  cas 
ualties  handed  in  will  show  the  total  of  our  casualties 
to  be  87." 

Report  of  Col.  William  C.  Oates,  Fifteenth  Alabama  In 
fantry. 

"  AUGUST  8,  1863. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  report,  in  obedience  to  orders  from 
brigade  headquarters,  the  participation  of  my  regiment  in 
the  battle  near  Gettysburg  on  the  2d  ultimo. 

"  My  regiment  occupied  the  center  of  the  brigade  when 
the  line  of  battle  was  formed.  During  the  advance,  the 
two  regiments  on  my  right  [Forty-eighth  and  Forty-fourth 
Alabama.  — O.  W.  N.]  were  moved  by  the  left  flank  across 
my  rear,  which  threw  me  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  whole 
line.  I  encountered  the  enemy's  sharpshooters  posted  be 
hind  a  stone  fence,  and  sustained  some  loss  thereby.  It  was 
here  that  Lieut.-Col.  Isaac  B.  Feagin,  a  most  excellent  and 
gallant  officer,  received  a  severe  wound  in  the  right  knee, 
which  caused  him  to  lose  his  leg.  Privates  [A.]  Kennedy, 
of  Company  B,  and  [William]  Trimmer,  of  Company  G, 
were  killed  at  this  point  and  Private  [G.  E.]  Spencer, 
Company  D,  severely  wounded. 

"  After  crossing  the  fence  I  received  an  order  from  Brig 
adier-General  Law  to  left-wheel  my  regiment  and  move 
in  the  direction  of  the  heights  upon  my  left,  which  order 
I  failed  to  obey,  for  the  reason  that  when  I  received  it  I 
was  rapidly  advancing  up  the  mountain,  and  in  my  front 
I  discovered  a  heavy  force  of  the  enemy.  Besides  this, 
there  was  great  difficulty  in  accomplishing  the  maneuver 
at  that  moment,  as  the  regiment  on  my  left  (Forty-seventh 
Alabama)  was  crowding  me  on  the  left  and  running  into 
my  regiment,  which  had  already  created  considerable  con 
fusion.  In  the  event  that  I  had  obeyed  the  order  I  should 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       145 

have  come  in  contact  with  the  regiment  on  my  left,  and 
also  have  exposed  my  right  flank  to  an  enfilading  fire  from 
the  enemy.  I  therefore  continued  to  press  forward,  my 
right  passing  over  the  top  of  the  mountain,  on  the  right 
of  the  line. 

"  On  reaching  the  foot  of  the  mountain  below  I  found 
the  enemy  in  heavy  force,  posted  in  rear  of  large  rocks 
upon  a  slight  elevation  beyond  a  depression  of  some  300 
yards  in  width  between  the  base  of  the  mountain  and  the 
open  plain  beyond.  I  engaged  them,  my  right  meeting 
the  left  of  their  line  exactly.  Here  I  lost  several  gallant 
officers  and  men. 

"  After  firing  two  or  three  rounds,  I  discovered  that  the 
enemy  were  giving  way  in  my  front.  I  ordered  a  charge, 
and  the  enemy  in  my  front  fled ;  but  that  portion  of  his  line 
confronting  the  two  companies  on  my  left  held  their 
ground,  and  continued  a  most  galling  fire  upon  my  left. 

"  Just  at  this  moment  I  discovered  the  regiment  on  my 
left  (Forty-seventh  Alabama)  retiring.  I  halted  my  regi 
ment  as  its  left  reached  a  very  large  rock,  and  ordered  a 
left- wheel  of  the  regiment,  which  was  executed  in  good 
order  under  fire,  thus  taking  advantage  of  a  ledge  of  rocks 
running  off  in  a  line  perpendicular  to  the  one  I  had  just 
abandoned,  and  affording  very  good  protection  to  my  men. 
This  position  enabled  me  to  keep  up  a  constant  flank  and 
cross  fire  upon  the  enemy,  which  in  less  than  five  minutes 
caused  him  to  change  front.  Receiving  reinforcements,  he 
charged  me  five  times,  and  was  as  often  repulsed  with 
heavy  loss.  Finally  I  discovered  that  the  enemy  had 
flanked  me  on  the  right,  and  two  regiments  were  moving 
rapidly  upon  my  rear  and  not  200  yards  distant,  when,  to 
save  my  regiment  from  capture  or  destruction,  I  ordered  a 
retreat. 

"  Having  become  exhausted  from  fatigue  and  the  ex 
cessive  heat  of  the  day,  I  turned  the  command  of  the  regi- 


146    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

ment  over  to  Capt.  B.  A.  Hill,  and  instructed  him  to  take 
the  men  off  the  field  and  re-form  the  regiment  and  report 
to  the  brigade. 

"  My  loss  was,  as  near  as  can  now  be  ascertained,  as 
follows,  to- wit:  17  killed  upon  the  field,  54  wounded  and 
brought  off  the  field,  and  90  missing,  most  of  whom  are 
either  killed  or  wounded.  Among  the  killed  and  wounded 
are  8  officers,  most  of  whom  were  very  gallant  and  ef 
ficient  men. 

"Recapitulation:  Killed,  17;  wounded,  54;  missing,  90; 
total,  161." 

Report  of  Col.  William  F.  Perry,  Forty-fourth  Alabama 
Infantry. 

"  NEAR  FREDERICKSBURG,  VA., 

"August  8,   1863. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report  of 
the  part  taken  by  the  regiment  under  my  command  in  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  Pa.,  on  July  2 : 

"  It  occupied  the  place  of  the  second  battalion  in  the 
line  formed  by  the  brigade  on  the  heights,  which  ran  paral 
lel  with  and  fronting  the  enemy's  position.  Having  ad 
vanced  with  the  brigade  down  the  long  slope  and  through 
the  intervening  meadow,  it  was  detached  from  its  place  in 
the  line  by  order  of  General  Law,  and  by  a  flank  move 
ment  was  brought  to  the  extreme  left  of  the  brigade. 

"  When  at  a  short  distance  from  the  stone  fence  near 
the  base  of  the  mountain,  General  Law  informed  me  that 
he  expected  my  regiment  to  take  a  battery  which  had  been 
playing  on  our  line  from  the  moment  the  advance  began. 
This  battery  was  situated,  not  on  the  mountain  itself,  but 
on  a  rugged  cliff  which  formed  the  abrupt  termination  of  a 
ridge  that  proceeded  from  the  mountain,  and  ran  in  a  di 
rection  somewhat  parallel  with  it,  leaving  a  valley  desti 
tute  of  trees  and  filled  with  immense  boulders  between 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       147 

them.  This  valley,  not  more  than  300  paces  in  breadth, 
and  the  cliff  on  which  their  artillery  was  stationed  were  oc 
cupied  by  two  regiments  of  the  enemy's  infantry. 

"  The  direction  of  the  regiment  after  crossing  the  stone 
fence  was  such  that  a  march  to  the  front  would  have  car 
ried  it  to  the  right  of  the  enemy's  position.  It  was  there 
fore  wheeled  to  the  left,  so  as  to  confront  that  position, 
its  left  opposite  the  battery,  and  its  right  extending  toward 
the  base  of  the  mountain.  This  movement  was  executed 
under  fire,  and  within  200  yards  of  the  enemy.  The  for 
ward  movement  was  immediately  ordered,  and  was  re 
sponded  to  with  an  alacrity  and  courage  seldom,  if  ever, 
excelled  on  the  battlefield.  As  the  men  emerged  from  the 
forest  into  the  valley  before  mentioned,  they  received  a 
deadly  volley  at  short  range,  which  in  a  few  seconds  killed 
or  disabled  one-fourth  their  number.  Halting  without  an 
order  from  me,  and  availing  themselves  of  the  shelter  which 
the  rocks  afforded,  they  returned  the  fire.  Such  was  their 
extreme  exhaustion,  having  marched  without  interruption 
24  miles  to  reach  the  battlefield,  and  advanced  at  a  double- 
quick  step  fully  a  mile  to  engage  the  enemy,  that  I  hesi 
tated  for  an  instant  to  order  them  immediately  forward. 
Perceiving  very  soon,  however,  that  the  enemy  were  giving 
way,  I  rushed  forward,  shouting  to  them  to  advance.  It 
was  with  the  greatest  difficulty  that  I  could  make  myself 
heard  or  understood  above  the  din  of  battle.  The  order 
was,  however,  extended  along  the  line,  and  was  promptly 
obeyed.  The  men  sprang  forward  over  the  rocks,  swept 
the  position,  and  took  possession  of  the  heights,  capturing 
40  or  50  prisoners  around  the  battery  and  among  the  cliffs. 

"  Meanwhile  the  enemy  had  put  a  battery  in  position 
on  a  terrace  of  the  mountain  to  our  right,  which  opened 
upon  us  an  enfilading  fire  of  grape  and  spherical  case-shot. 
A  sharp  fire  of  small-arms  was  also  opened  from  the  same 
direction.  This  was  not  destructive,  however,  owing  to 


148    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  protection  afforded  by  the  rocks.  Soon  the  enemy  ap 
peared  moving  down  upon  our  front  in  heavy  force.  At 
this  critical  moment  General  Benning's  brigade  of  Geor 
gians  advanced  gallantly  into  action.  His  extreme  right, 
lapping  upon  my  left,  swarmed  over  the  cliffs  and  mingled 
with  my  men.  It  was  now  past  5  p.  M.  The  conflict  con 
tinued  to  rage  with  great  fury  until  dark.  Again  and 
again  the  enemy  in  great  force  attempted  to  dislodge  us 
from  the  position  and  retake  the  battery,  in  each  case  with 
signal  failure  and  heavy  loss. 

"  Lieutenant-Colonel  [John  A.]  Jones,  Major  [George 
W.]  Cary,  and  Lieutenant  [W.  P.]  Becker,  acting  adju 
tant,  behaved  with  great  coolness  and  courage.  I  abstain 
from  mentioning  by  name  others  who  deserve  special 
commendation,  because  the  list  would  be  so  long  as  to 
confer  little  distinction  on  any  single  individual,  and  be 
cause  injustice  might  be  done  to  others  whose  good  con 
duct  escaped  my  observation. 

:c  The  regiment  lost:  Killed,  24;  wounded,  66;  miss 
ing,  4-" 

Report  of  Maj.  James  M.  Campbell,  Forty-seventh  Ala 
bama  Infantry. 

"  AUGUST  7,  1863. 

"  A  report  of  the  part  my  regiment  took  in  the  fight 
at  Gettysburg: 

"  Before  our  line  was  formed  three  companies  were  de 
tached  from  my  regiment  and  placed  in  rear  of  our  right, 
to  guard  a  road.  These  companies  remained  on  this  part 
of  the  field,  almost  constantly  skirmishing  with  the  enemy, 
until  we  fell  back  on  the  morning  of  the  4th,  when  they 
rejoined  their  command.  The  other  seven  companies 
went  into  the  fight  in  line  with  the  brigade.  There  was 
some  confusion  in  these  companies,  owing  to  the  fact  that 
in  the  charge  the  lieutenant-colonel  expected  the  colonel 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       149 

to  give  all  the  necessary  commands,  and  the  colonel  re 
mained  so  far  behind  that  his  presence  on  the  field  was  but 
a  trammel  on  the  lieutenant-colonel. 

"  The  colonel  having  been  left  behind,  and  the  lieutenant- 
colonel  (righting  most  nobly)  killed,1  I  took  command  of 
the  regiment,  and,  after  the  first  repulse  of  the  brigade, 
in  obedience  to  orders  I  deployed  a  part  of  my  men  on  the 
right  of  the  brigade,  where  they  remained  until  the  close 
of  the  fight. 

"  After  the  firing  ceased,  in  obedience  to  orders  from 
Colonel  [James  L.]  Sheffield,  commanding  brigade,  I 
threw  my  regiment  out  as  skirmishers  on  our  right,  where 
they  remained  until  morning. 

"  Out  of  the  21  officers,  4  were  killed  on  the  field.  All 
of  these  (the  21)  acted  well.  The  colonel  and  adjutant 
are  not  included  in  this  number. 

"  About  one-third  of  the  whole  number  of  men  were 
killed  and  wounded." 

ROBERTSON'S  BRIGADE 

Report  of  Brig.-Gen.  J.  B.  Robertson,  C.  S.  Army,  Com 
manding  Brigade. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  TEXAS  BRIGADE, 
"  NEAR  BUNKER  HILL,  VA.,  July  17,  1863. 
"  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  through  you  my  report  of 
the  action  of  my  brigade  in  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  on 
July  2  and  3.     I  have  been  too  much  occupied  with  the 
duties  imposed  by  the  marches  and  maneuvers   we  have 
gone  through  to  allow  me  to  make  this  report  at  an  earlier 
time. 

'  The  division  arrived  on  the  ground  in  front  of  the  po- 

1  Lieut.  Col.  M.  J.  Bulger  was  not  killed.  On  July  16,  1863,  he 
became  colonel,  vice  James  W.  Jackson  resigned. — Footnote  in  "Re 
bellion  Records." 


150    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

sition  of  the  enemy  that  we  were  to  attack  but  a  few  min 
utes  before  we  were  ordered  to  advance.  I  therefore  got 
but  a  glance  at  the  field  on  which  we  had  to  operate  before 
we  entered  upon  it.  I  was  ordered  to  keep  my  right  well 
closed  on  Brigadier-General  Law's  left,  and  to  let  my  left 
rest  on  the  Emmittsburg  pike.  I  had  advanced  but  a  short 
distance  when  I  discovered  that  my  brigade  would  not  fill  the 
space  between  General  Law's  left  and  the  pike  named,  and 
that  I  must  leave  the  pike,  or  disconnect  myself  from  Gen 
eral  Law,  on  my  right.  Understanding  before  the  action 
commenced  that  the  attack  on  our  part  was  to  be  general, 
and  that  the  force  of  General  McLaws  was  to  advance 
simultaneously  with  us  on  my  immediate  left,  and  seeing 
at  once  that  a  mountain  held  by  the  enemy  in  heavy  force 
with  artillery  to  the  right  of  General  Law's  center  was  the 
key  to  the  enemy's  left,  I  abandoned  the  pike  and  closed  on 
General  Law's  left.  This  caused  some  separation  of  my 
regiments,  which  was  remedied  as  promptly  as  the  numerous 
stone  and  rail  fences  that  intersected  the  field  through  which 
we  were  advancing  would  allow. 

"  As  we  advanced  through  this  field,  for  half  a  mile  we 
were  exposed  to  a  heavy  and  destructive  fire  of  canister, 
grape,  and  shell  from  six  pieces  of  their  artillery  on  the 
mountain  alluded  to,  and  the  same  number  on  a  command 
ing  hill  but  a  short  distance  to  the  left  of  the  mountain, 
and  from  the  enemy's  sharpshooters  from  behind  the  nu 
merous  rocks,  fences,  and  houses  in  the  field. 

"  As  we  approached  the  base  of  the  mountain  General 
Law  moved  to  the  right,  and  I  was  moving  obliquely  to 
the  right  to  close  on  him  when  my  whole  line  encountered 
the  fire  of  the  enemy's  main  line,  posted  behind  rocks  and 
a  stone  fence.  The  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas  regiments, 
under  the  direction  of  their  gallant  commanders  (Col 
onels  Powell  and  Key),  while  returning  the  fire  and  driving 
the  enemy  before  them,  continued  to  close  on  General  Law, 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       151 

to  their  right.  At  the  same  time  the  First  Texas  and 
Third  Arkansas,  under  their  gallant  commanders  (Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  [P.  A.]  Work  and  Colonel  Manning)  were 
hotly  engaged  with  a  greatly  superior  force,  while  at  the 
same  time  a  heavy  force  appeared  and  opened  fire  on  Col 
onel  Manning's  left,  seriously  threatening  his  left  flank, 
to  meet  which  he  threw  two  or  three  companies  with  their 
front  to  his  left  flank,  and  protected  his  left. 

"  On  discovering  this  heavy  force  on  my  left  flank,  and 
seeing  that  no  attack  was  being  made  by  any  of  our  forces 
on  my  left,  I  at  once  sent  a  courier  to  Major-General 
Hood,  stating  that  I  was  hard  pressed  on  my  left;  that 
General  McLaws'  forces  were  not  engaging  the  enemy  to 
my  left  (which  enabled  him  to  move  fresh  troops  from 
that  part  of  his  line  down  on  me),  and  that  I  must  have  re 
inforcements. 

"  Lieutenant-Colonel  Work,  with  the  First  Texas  regi 
ment,  having  pressed  forward  to  the  crest  of  the  hill  and 
driven  the  enemy  from  his  battery,  I  ordered  him  to  the 
left,  to  the  relief  and  support  of  Colonel  Manning,  di 
recting  Major  [F.  S.]  Bass  with  two  companies  to  hold 
the  hill,  while  Colonel  Work  with  the  rest  of  the  regiment 
went  to  Colonel  Manning's  relief.  With  this  assistance 
Colonel  Manning  drove  the  enemy  back  and  entered  the 
woods  after  him,  when  the  enemy  reoccupied  the  hill  and 
his  batteries  in  Colonel  Work's  front,  from  which  Colonel 
Work  again  drove  him. 

"  For  an  hour  and  upward  these  two  regiments  main 
tained  one  of  the  hottest  contests,  against  five  or  six  times 
their  number,  that  I  have  witnessed.  The  moving  of  Col 
onel  Work  to  the  left,  to  relieve  Colonel  Manning  while 
the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas  were  closing  to  the  right  on 
General  Law's  brigade,  separated  these  two  regiments  from 
the  others.  They  were  steadily  moving  to  the  right  and 
front,  driving  the  enemy  before  them,  when  they  passed 


152    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  woods  or  ravine  to  my  right.  After  finding  that  I 
could  not  move  the  First  and  Third  to  the  right  to  join 
them,  I  sent  to  recall  them,  ordering  them  to  move  to  the 
left  until  the  left  of  the  Fourth  should  rest  on  the  right  of 
the  First;  but  my  messenger  found  two  of  General  Law's 
regiments  on  the  left  of  my  two  (the  Fourth  and  Fifth 
Texas),  and  did  not  find  these  regiments  at  all. 

"  About  this  time  my  aide,  Lieutenant  Scott,  reported 
my  two  regiments  (the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas)  in  the 
center  of  General  Law's  brigade,  and  that  they  could  not 
be  moved  without  greatly  injuring  his  line.  I  sent  a  re 
quest  to  General  Law  to  look  to  them. 

"  At  this  point  my  assistant  adjutant  and  inspector-gen 
eral  reported  from  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  that  they  were 
hotly  engaged,  and  wanted  reinforcements.  My  courier, 
sent  to  General  Hood,  returned,  and  reported  him  wounded 
and  carried  from  the  field.  I  sent  a  messenger  to  Lieu 
tenant-General  Longstreet  for  reinforcements,  and  at  the 
same  time  sent  to  Generals  [George  T.]  Anderson  and 
Benning,  urging  them  to  hurry  up  to  my  support.  They 
came  up,  joined  us,  and  fought  gallantly;  but  as  fast  as 
we  would  break  one  line  of  the  enemy  another  fresh  one 
would  present  itself,  the  enemy  reinforcing  his  lines  in 
our  front  from  his  reserves  at  the  base  of  the  mountain 
to  our  right  and  front,  and  from  his  lines  to  our  left. 
Having  no  attack  from  us  in  his  front,  he  threw  his  forces 
from  there,  on  us. 

"  Before  the  arrival  of  Generals  Anderson  and  Benning, 
Col.  J.  C.  G.  Key,  who  gallantly  led  the  Fourth  Texas  regi 
ment  in,  up  to  the  time  of  receiving  a  severe  wound, 
passed  me,  being  led  to  the  rear.  About  the  same  time  I 
learned  of  the  fall  and  dangerous  wounding  of  Col.  R. 
M.  Powell,  of  the  Fifth,  who  fell  while  gallantly  leading 
his  regiment  in  one  of  the  impetuous  charges  of  the  Fourth 
and  Fifth  Texas  on  the  strongly  fortified  mountain. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       153 

"  Just  after  the  arrival  of  General  Anderson  on  my  left 
I  learned  that  the  gallant  Col.  Van.  H.  Manning,  of  the 
Third  Arkansas,  had  been  wounded  and  carried  from  the 
field,  and  about  the  same  time  I  received  intelligence  of 
the  wounding  and  being  carried  from  the  field  of  those  two 
able  and  efficient  officers,  Lieut.  Cols.  K.  Bryan,  of  the 
Fifth,  and  B.  F.  Carter,  of  the  Fourth,  both  of  whom  were 
wounded  while  bravely  discharging  their  duty.  Captain 
[J.  R.]  Woodward,  acting  major  of  the  First  Texas,  was 
wounded  near  me,  while  gallantly  discharging  his  duty. 

'  The  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas,  under  the  command  of 
Majors  [J.  P.]  Bane  and  [J.  C.]  Rogers,  continued  to 
hold  the  ground  of  their  original  line,  leaving  the  space 
over  which  they  had  made  their  successive  charges  strewn 
with  their  wounded  and  dead  comrades,  many  of  whom 
could  not  be  removed,  and  were  left  upon  the  field.  The 
First  Texas,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Work,  with  a  por 
tion  of  Benning's  brigade,  held  the  field  and  the  batteries 
taken  by  the  First  Texas.  Three  of  the  guns  were  brought 
off  the  field  and  secured;  the  other  three,  from  the  nature 
of  the  ground  and  their  proximity  to  the  enemy,  were  left. 
The  Third  Arkansas,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  [R.  S.]  Taylor,  ably  assisted  by  Major  [J.  W.] 
Reedy,  after  Colonel  Manning  was  borne  from  the  field, 
sustained  well  the  high  character  it  made  in  the  earlier 
part  of  the  action. 

"  When  night  closed  the  conflict,  late  in  the  evening,  I 
was  struck  above  the  knee,  which  deprived  me  of  the  use 
of  my  leg,  and  prevented  me  from  getting  about  the  field. 
I  retired  some  200  yards  to  the  rear,  leaving  the  immediate 
command  with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Work,  the  senior  of 
ficer  present,  under  whose  supervision  our  wounded  were 
brought  out  and  guns  secured,  and  our  dead  on  that  part 
of  the  field  were  buried  the  next  day. 

"  About   two   o'clock   that   night  the   First   Texas   and 


154    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Third  Arkansas  were  moved  by  the  right  to  the  position 
occupied  by  the  Fourth  and  Fifth,  and  formed  on  their 
left,  where  the  brigade  remained  during  the  day  of  the  3d, 
keeping  up  a  continuous  skirmishing  with  the  enemy's 
sharpshooters,  in  which  we  had  a  number  of  our  men  se 
verely  wounded.  I  sent  my  assistant  adjutant-general, 
Capt.  F.  L.  Price,  at  daybreak  to  examine  the  position 
of  the  brigade  and  report  to  me  as  soon  as  he  could,  and, 
while  in  the  discharge  of  that  duty,  was  either  killed  or  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  as  he  has  not  been  seen  or 
heard  of  since. 

"  About  dark  on  the  evening  of  the  3d  the  brigade,  with 
the  division,  fell  back  to  the  hill  and  formed  in  line,  where 
it  remained  during  the  4th. 

"Lieutenant  [J.  R.]  Loughridge,  commanding  Com 
pany  I,  Fourth  Texas,  who  commanded  the  skirmishers 
in  front  of  the  Fourth,  and  who  was  left  when  that  regi 
ment  moved  to  the  right,  joined  the  First  Texas,  and  did 
gallant  service  during  the  engagement. 

"  In  this,  the  hardest  fought  battle  of  the  war  in  which 
I  have  been  engaged,  all,  both  officers  and  men,  as  far  as 
my  observation  extended,  fully  sustained  the  high  char 
acter  they  have  heretofore  made.  Where  all  behaved  so 
nobly  individual  distinction  cannot  with  propriety  be  made. 

"  I  cannot  close  this  report  without  expressing  my 
thanks  to  my  personal  staff  for  the  able  and  satisfactory 
manner  in  which  they  discharged  their  duties.  The 
wounding  of  so  many  commanding  officers,  among  them 
the  division  commander,  rendered  their  duties  peculiarly 
arduous.  They  were  discharged  with  zeal  and  prompt 
ness.  Capt.  F.  L.  Price,  my  assistant  adjutant-general, 
whose  loss  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  I  have  to  deplore,  was 
an  active,  efficient  officer,  and  did  his  duty  nobly.  My 
aide-de-camp,  Lieut.  John  G.  Scott,  my  assistant  ad 
jutant  and  inspector  general,  Lieut.  John  W.  Kerr,  and 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG      155 

Lieut.  John  Grace,  volunteer  aide,  discharged  their  duties 
with  a  promptness  and  ability  that  merit  special  notice. 

"  A  list  of  the  casualties  in  the  several  regiments,  to 
gether  with  the  reports  from  each  of  the  regimental  com 
manders  is  herewith  submitted." 

Report  of  Col.   Van  H.  Manning,  Third  Arkansas  In- 

fantry-  "NEAR  HAGERSTOWN,  MD., 

"  JULY  8,  1863. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  report  the  part  taken  by  this  com 
mand  in  the  recent  battle  near  Gettysburg,  Pa. 

"  About  four  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  July  2  I  was  or 
dered  to  move  against  the  enemy,  keeping  my  right  well 
connected  with  the  left  of  the  First  Texas  regiment,  and 
hold  my  left  on  the  Emmittsburg  road,  then  some  200 
yards  in  my  front  and  out  of  view. 

"  Upon  reaching  this  road  I  discovered,  from  the  di 
rection  the  directing  regiment  was  taking,  that  I  could  not 
with  the  length  of  my  line  carry  out  the  latter  order;  hence 
I  decided  to  keep  my  command  on  a  prolongation  of  the 
line  formed  by  the  troops  on  my  right.  After  marching 
in  line  of  battle  at  a  brisk  gait  (part  of  the  way  at  a  double- 
quick)  for  about  1,000  yards,  all  the  time  exposed  to  a 
destructive  fire  from  artillery,  we  engaged  the  enemy  at 
short  range,  strongly  posted  behind  a  rock  fence  at  the 
edge  of  woods.  We  drove  him  back  with  but  little  loss 
for  a  distance  of  150  yards,  when  I  ascertained  that  I  was 
suffering  from  a  fire  to  my  left  and  rear.  Thereupon  I 
ordered  a  change  of  front  to  the  rear  on  first  company, 
but  the  noise  consequent  upon  the  heavy  firing  then  going 
on  swallowed  up  my  command,  and  I  contented  myself  with 
the  irregular  drawing  back  of  the  left  wing,  giving  it  an 
excellent  fire,  which  pressed  the  enemy  back  in  a  very 
short  while,  whereupon  the  whole  line  advanced,  the 
enemy  fighting  stubbornly,  but  retiring. 


156    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

"  Soon  I  was  again  admonished  that  my  left  was  seri 
ously  threatened,  when  I  ordered  the  command  back  50  or 
75  yards  to  meet  this  contingency.  He  was  again  driven 
back,  and  I  stretched  out  my  front  twice  its  legitimate 
length,  guarding  well  my  left,  and  advanced  to  the  ledge 
of  rocks  from  which  we  had  previously  been  dislodged  by 
the  enemy's  movement  upon  my  flank.  I  experienced 
some  annoyance  from  the  exposure  of  this  flank  up  to  this 
moment,  when  Colonel  [F.  H.]  Little,  of  the  Eleventh 
Georgia  regiment,  joined  to  my  left.  The  Fifty-ninth 
Georgia  regiment,  coming  also  at  this  time,  occupied  the 
line  with  my  command.  Some  little  time  after  this  I  was 
disabled  by  concussion  and  wound  on  my  nose  and  fore 
head.  The  command  then  devolved  upon  Lieutenant-Col 
onel  Taylor,  who  will  report  its  operations  subsequent  to 
this  time. 

"  It  would  be  invidious  to  make  special  mention  of  gal 
lantry  with  either  officers  or  men  when  all  did  so  well, 
righting  greatly  superior  numbers  and  at  great  disadvan 
tage.  I  might  safely  assume  that  the  bearing  of  the  entire 
command  was  of  the  highest  creditable  character. 

"  No  guns  or  colors  were  captured,  and  but  few  (some 
25)  prisoners,  a  number  of  whom  were  sent  to  the  rear 
with  wounded  men. 

"  Below  I  submit  a  list  of  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 
The  wounded  include  only  those  disabled  indefinitely. 
Quite  a  number  were  temporarily  disabled  by  slight 
wounds,  but  resumed  their  duties  in  a  few  days;  hence  I 
make  no  mention  of  them  in  this  report." 

Report  of  Lieut.   Col.   P.   A.    Work,  First   Texas  In- 

f™try-  "JULY  9,  1863.  " 

"  The  following  is  submitted  as  a  report  of  the  part  sus 
tained  by  the  First  Texas  regiment  in  the  engagement  of 
Thursday,  July  2,  near  Gettysburg,  Pa.,  to-wit: 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       157 

"  The  regiment,  together  with  the  brigade,  having  been 
ordered  forward  to  the  attack  about  4  P.  M.,  continued  to 
advance  by  the  front  for  a  distance  exceeding  half  a  mile, 
the  Fourth  Texas  upon  the  right  and  the  Third  Arkansas 
upon  the  left,  when  Company  I,  commanded  by  Lieut.  J. 
H.  Wooters,  and  thrown  out  as  skirmishers,  engaged  the 
skirmishers  of  the  enemy,  driving  them  back  upon  a  regi 
ment  supporting  the  enemy's  battery,  and  then,  aided  by 
volunteers  from  this  (First  Texas)  regiment,  engaging  the 
regiment  and  artillery,  succeeded  in  driving  back  the  regi 
ment  and  silencing  the  enemy's  guns,  taking  and  holding 
possession  of  the  latter. 

"  While  this  regiment  was  closely  following  our  skir 
mishers,  and  had  reached  to  within  about  125  yards  of  the 
enemy's  artillery,  the  Third  Arkansas  regiment,  upon  my 
left,  became  hotly  engaged  with  a  strong  force  of  the 
enemy  upon  its  front  and  left,  and,  to  preserve  and  pro 
tect  its  left  flank,  was  forced  to  retire  to  a  point  some  75 
or  100  yards  to  my  rear  and  left,  thus  leaving  my  left 
flank  uncovered  and  exposed,  to  protect  which  I  halted  and 
threw  out  upon  my  left  and  rear  Company  G,  commanded 
by  Lieut.  B.  A.  Campbell  (some  40  men),  which  soon  en 
gaged  the  enemy  and  drove  them  from  their  threatening 
position  to  my  left  and  the  front  of  the  Third  Arkansas. 
It  was  while  in  the  execution  of  this  order  that  Lieutenant 
Campbell,  a  brave  and  gallant  officer,  fell,  pierced  through 
the  heart. 

"  Owing  to  the  failure  (as  informed  by  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  Robertson)  of  the  troops  that  were  assigned  to  the 
position  on  the  left  of  this  (Robertson's)  brigade  to  ar 
rive  promptly,  neither  this  nor  the  Third  Arkansas  regi 
ment  was  able  to  advance,  without  advancing  against  a 
vastly  superior  force  and  with  the  left  flank  of  the  Third 
Arkansas  (protecting  my  left)  exposed  to  attack. 

"  After  the  lapse  of  several  minutes  Benning's  brigade 


158    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

made  its  appearance,  but  instead  of  occupying  the  ground 
to  the  left  of  Robertson's  brigade  so  as  to  enable  the  lat 
ter  to  move  forward  with  its  left  flank  secured  from  at 
tack,  it  occupied  the  ground  still  occupied  by  a  portion, 
at  least,  of  this  brigade,  the  Fifteenth  Georgia  regiment 
falling  in  and  remaining  with  the  First  Texas  regiment. 
After  several  ineffectual  efforts  upon  the  part  of  both  the 
commanders  of  the  Fifteenth  Georgia  and  myself  to  sepa 
rate  the  men  of  the  two  regiments,  we  gave  the  order  to 
move  forward,  when  both  regiments,  thus  commingled, 
moved  forward  and  occupied  the  crest  of  the  hill,  some  100 
yards  or  more  to  the  front,  and  where  the  enemy's  artil 
lery  was  stationed,  where  we  remained  until  the  close  of 
the  day  and  until  two  o'clock  on  Friday  morning. 

"  During  the  evening  of  the  2d  an  incessant  fire  was  kept 
up  by  this  regiment,  and  the  enemy  was  several  times  re 
pulsed  in  their  efforts  to  retake  the  hill.  My  position  was 
such  that  I  was  enabled  to  pour  a  deadly  enfilading  fire 
into  the  enemy  as  they  advanced  through  a  wheat-field  to 
attack  the  troops  in  position  on  my  left,  and  I  have  not  a 
doubt  that  this  fire  contributed  greatly  to  the  repulse  of 
the  forces  of  the  enemy  attacking  our  forces  some  300 
to  500  yards  on  my  left. 

"  Once  during  the  evening  the  troops  upon  my  left 
were  driven  back,  and  my  left  was  exposed,  when,  direct 
ing  Capt.  H.  E.  Moss,  Company  D,  to  take  charge  of  the 
colors,  and  retaining  them  there  with  a  few  men  to  hold 
the  hill  until  the  regiment  could  safely  retire,  I  ordered  the 
regiment  to  fall  back  to  a  stone  fence  about  100  yards  in 
rear.  The  major  portion  of  the  regiment  and  the  Fif 
teenth  Georgia  fell  back  as  ordered ;  but  quite  a  large  num 
ber,  having  noticed  that  the  colors  were  not  moving  to  the 
rear,  refused  to  withdraw,  and,  remaining  upon  the  crest 
of  the  hill,  succeeded  in  holding  the  enemy  in  check  in 
their  immediate  front,  and  obliquely  upon  their  front  and 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       159 

left,  until  the  troops  upon  my  left  had  been  re-formed  and 
were  again  advanced,  when  I  directed  Maj.  F.  S.  Bass  to 
return  to  the  crest  of  the  hill  with  the  body  of  the  regi 
ment,  and,  with  Capt.  D.  K.  Rice,  of  Company  C,  pro 
ceeded  myself  to  collect  together  all  fugitives,  slightly 
wounded,  and  exhausted  men,  and  placed  them  so  as  to 
protect  my  right  and  rear  from  an  attack  from  that  quarter, 
one  of  my  advanced  scouts  in  that  direction  having  re 
ported  to  me  that  a  column  of  the  enemy  was  moving  down 
a  ravine  or  hollow  and  threatening  me  in  that  quarter. 

"  Having  made  every  disposition  to  guard  my  right  and 
rear,  I  placed  Capt.  D.  K.  Rice  in  charge  of  such  defense, 
and  proceeded  to  the  Third  Arkansas  regiment,  of  which 
General  Robertson  had  ordered  me  to  take  charge.  After 
the  loss  of  some  half  hour  in  searching  for  the  Third  Ar 
kansas.  I  found  Lieut.-Col.  Taylor  and  Major  Reedy,  of 
that  regiment,  both  alive  and  uninjured,  and  in  charge  of  the 
regiment,  which  was  doing  its  duty  nobly  and  well. 

"  Late  in  the  evening  a  terrific  fire  of  artillery  was  con 
centrated  against  the  hill  occupied  by  this  (the  First)  regi 
ment,  and  many  were  killed  and  wounded,  some  losing 
their  heads  and  others  so  horribly  mutilated  and  mangled 
that  their  identity  could  scarcely  be  established;  but,  not 
withstanding  this,  all  the  men  continued  heroically  and  un 
flinchingly  to  maintain  their  position. 

"  Immediately  after  dark,  having  detailed  Companies 
E  and  I  for  the  purpose,  I  sent  three  pieces  of  the  artillery 
captured  to  the  rear.  There  were  three  other  pieces,  two 
at  one  point  and  one  at  another,  that  I  was  unable  to  re 
move,  for  the  reason  that  they  were  located  between  the 
lines  of  the  enemy  and  our  own,  and  were  so  much  ex 
posed  that  they  could  not  be  approached  excepting  under 
a  murderous  fire.  While  they  could  not  be  removed  by 
me,  neither  could  they  be  approached  by  the  enemy,  for 
the  same  fire  that  drove  the  artillerists  from  their  guns  and 


160    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  infantry  from  their  support  was  ever  in  readiness  to 
keep  them  in  check  and  drive  them  back. 

"  With  but  two  exceptions,  to- wit,  Private  [Richard] 
Childers,  of  Company  E,  and  Private  [W.  F.]  Brooks, 
Company  K,  each  and  every  man  of  the  regiment  proved 
himself  a  hero.  Hundreds  might  be  mentioned,  each  of 
whom  with  reason  and  propriety  might  point  to  his  gal 
lant  acts  and  daring  deeds,  and  the  lieutenant-colonel  com 
manding  feels  that  he  cannot  call  attention  to  the  bearing 
of  a  few  only  of  these  without  doing  some  share  of  in 
justice  to  those  not  mentioned;  and  though  he  is  urged  to 
mention  the  names  of  Privates  [W.  Y.]  Salter,  Company 
I,  [J.  N.]  Kirksey  and  [G.]  Barfield,  Company  B,  and 
[W.  J.]  Barbee,  Company  L,  for  great  and  striking  gal 
lantry,  and  does  mention  them,  he  feels  that  he  is  neglect 
ing  others  of  equal  merit.  Private  Barbee,  though  a 
mounted  courier,  acting  for  Major-General  Hood,  entered 
the  ranks  of  his  Company  (L),  and  fought  through  the  en 
gagement.  At  one  time  he  mounted  a  rock  upon  the  high 
est  pinnacle  of  the  hill,  and  there,  exposed  to  a  raking, 
deadly  fire  from  artillery  and  musketry,  stood  until  he  had 
fired  twenty-five  shots,  when  he  received  a  minie  ball 
wound  in  the  right  thigh,  and  fell. 

"  Having  exhausted  their  original  supply  of  ammuni 
tion,  the  men  supplied  themselves  from  the  cartridge-boxes 
of  their  dead  and  disabled  comrades  and  from  the  dead 
and  wounded  of  the  enemy,  frequently  going  in  front  of 
the  hill  to  secure  a  cartridge-box.  Many  of  the  officers 
threw  aside  their  swords,  seized  a  rifle,  and,  going  into 
the  ranks,  fought  bravely  and  nobly. 

"The  regiment  lost  in  killed,  25;  in  wounded,  48;  and 
missing,  20;  a  list  of  the  names  of  whom,  giving  the  com 
pany  and  character  of  wound  of  those  wounded,  is  hereto 
annexed  as  part  of  this  report. 

"  I    would    state    that    Capt.    John    R.    Woodward,    of 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       161 

Company  G,  entered  the  engagement  as  acting  major  in 
charge  of  the  left  wing  early  in  the  engagement.  He  was 
wounded  in  the  head  by  the  fragment  of  a  shell,  and  was 
borne  from  the  field. 

"  In  addition  to  the  above  report  I  have  the  following  to 
submit:  During  the  evening  of  Friday,  July  2,  Company  I, 
commanded  by  Lieutenant  [J.  R.]  Loughridge,  having  be 
come  separated  from  the  Fourth  Texas  regiment,  of  which 
it  was  a  part,  attached  itself  to  the  First  Texas  regiment, 
and  remained  with  it  throughout  the  evening  and  night, 
until  the  latter  was  moved  to  the  position  occupied  by  the 
brigade  on  July  3,  doing  its  full  duty  and  battling  bravely." 

Report  of  Major  John  P.  Bane,  Fourth  Texas  Infantry. 

"JULY  9,  1863. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report  of  the 
part  taken  by  my  regiment  in  the  action  near  Gettysburg, 
Pa.,  July  2  and  3  : 

"  About  4 130  p.  M.  the  2d  instant  we  were  ordered  to 
advance  on  the  enemy,  who  occupied  the  heights  about  11-4 
miles  distant,  the  Fifth  Texas,  the  directing  battalion,  on 
my  right,  and  the  First  Texas  on  my  left.  Advancing 
at  double-quick,  we  soon  met  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  who 
occupied  a  skirt  of  thick  undergrowth  about  one-quarter 
of  a  mile  from  the  base  of  the  cliffs,  upon  which  the  enemy 
had  a  battery  playing  upon  us  with  the  most  deadly  effect. 

"  After  a  short  pause  while  repelling  his  skirmishers,  I 
was  ordered  by  General  Robertson  to  move  by  the  right 
flank,  so  as  to  cover  all  the  ground  between  us  and  the  di 
recting  battalion.  Moving  about  200  yards,  I  met  the 
enemy  in  full  force  in  a  heavy,  wooded  ground,  sheltering 
themselves  behind  rocks,  from  which,  after  a  sharp  con 
test,  he  was  driven  to  the  heights  beyond  in  our  front  and 
in  close  proximity  to  the  mountain,  and  there  I  was  pained 


162    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

to  learn  that  the  gallant  Lieutenant-Colonel  B.  F.  Carter 
was  severely  wounded  while  crossing  a  stone  wall  near 
the  base  of  the  mountain.  I  was  also  informed  that  Col. 
John  C.  G.  Key,  while  gallantly  urging  the  men  to  the 
front,  was  severely  wounded.  The  command  then  de 
volved  upon  me.  Many  of  the  officers  and  men  had  been 
killed  and  wounded  up  to  this  time. 

"  Finding  it  impossible  to  carry  the  heights  by  assault 
with  my  thinned  ranks,  I  ordered  my  command  to  fall 
back  in  the  skirt  of  timber,  the  position  then  occupied  being 
enfiladed  by  the  batteries  on  the  left  and  exposed  to  heavy 
fire  of  musketry  in  my  immediate  front.  Being  joined  by 
the  Fifth  Texas  on  my  right,  I  again  attempted  to  drive 
the  enemy  from  the  heights  by  assaults,  but  with  like  re 
sults.  Again,  being  reinforced  by  the  Forty-eighth  Ala 
bama,  commanded  by  the  gallant  Colonel  [James  L.]  Shef 
field,  and  the  Forty-fourth  Alabama,  whose  commander  I 
did  not  learn,  we  again  charged  their  works,  but  were  re 
pulsed,  and  then,  under  the  order  of  General  Law,  I  or 
dered  my  command  to  fall  back  under  cover  of  the  timber, 
on  a  slight  elevation  within  short  range  of  the  enemy.  I 
formed  my  regiment  in  line  of  battle,  leaving  the  battle 
field  contested  ground. 

"  At  the  dawn  of  day  I  had  a  stone  wall  about  two  feet 
high  thrown  up,  which  afforded  some  protection  to  the  men 
occupying  the  position  from  which  we  had  driven  the 
enemy,  until  sunset  of  the  3d  instant,  at  which  time  I  was 
ordered  to  move  my  command,  in  conjunction  with  the  re 
mainder  of  the  brigade,  by  the  right  flank,  to  occupy  the 
ground  from  which  we  first  advanced  upon  the  enemy. 

"  I  accord  to  each  and  all  of  my  officers  and  men  my 
warmest  congratulations  for  their  continued  and  unceasing 
gallantry  during  the  entire  engagement. 

"  The  following  list  of  casualties  is  appended. 

"  All  of  which  is  respectfully  submitted." 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       163 
Report  of  Lieut.  Col.  K.  Bryan,  Fifth  Texas  Infantry. 

"  NEAR  HAGERSTOWN,  MDV 

"July  8,    1863. 

"  Col.  R.  M.  Powell  having  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  it  devolves  upon  me,  as  lieutenant-colonel  of  the 
regiment,  to  report  the  part  taken  by  it  as  far  as  came 
under  my  observation  in  the  action  of  [July]  2  and  3,  near 
Gettysburg,  Pa. 

"  About  4  P.  M.  on  the  2d  instant  General  Hood's  di 
vision  was  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle  fronting  the  heights 
occupied  by  the  enemy.  The  Fifth  Texas  regiment  occu 
pied  the  right  of  the  brigade,  resting  on  General  Law's 
left,  whose  brigade  was  the  one  of  direction.  At  the  word 
'  Forward ! '  the  regiment  moved  forward  in  good  order. 
The  enemy  had  a  line  of  sharpshooters  at  the  foot  of  the 
first  height,  behind  a  stone  fence,  about  three-fourths  of  a 
mile  from  our  starting  point,  which  distance  was  passed 
over  by  our  line  at  a  double-quick  and  a  run. 

"  At  our  approach  the  enemy  retired  to  the  top  of  the 
first  height,  protected  by  a  ledge  of  rocks.  A  short  halt 
was  made  at  the  stone  fence,  to  enable  those  who  had  fallen 
behind  to  regain  their  places.  When  the  command  '  For 
ward!'  again  fell  from  the  lips  of  our  gallant  colonel, 
every  man  leaped  the  fence  and  advanced  rapidly  up  the 
hillside.  The  enemy  again  fled  at  our  approach,  shel 
tering  himself  behind  his  fortified  position  on  the  top 
of  the  second  height,  about  200  yards  distant  from  the 
first. 

"  From  this  position  we  failed  to  drive  them.  Our 
failure  was  owing  to  the  rocky  nature  of  the  ground  over 
which  we  had  to  pass,  the  huge  rocks  forming  defiles 
through  which  not  more  than  3  or  4  men  could  pass 
abreast,  thus  breaking  up  our  alignment  and  rendering  its 
re-formation  impossible.  Notwithstanding  the  difficulties 
to  overcome,  the  men  pressed  on  to  the  pass  of  the  precipi- 


1 64    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

tous  stronghold,  forming  and  securing  the  enemy's  second 
position,  many  of  our  officers  and  men  falling  in  passing 
the  open  space  between  the  heights.  Here  we  halted,  then 
being  small  clusters  of  rocks  far  below  the  elevated  posi 
tion  of  the  enemy,  which  gave  us  partial  protection.  Frorr 
this  position  we  were  enabled  to  deliver  our  fire  for  th( 
first  time  with  accuracy. 

"  Seeing  that  the  men  were  in  the  best  obtainable  posi 
tion  and  deeming  a  farther  advance  without  reinforce 
ments  impracticable  (a  great  many  of  the  regiment  having 
been  already  disabled),  I  looked  for  Colonel  Powell,  tc 
know  his  next  order.  Failing  to  see  him,  I  concluded  a 
once  that  he,  like  many  of  his  gallant  officers  and  men,  hac 
fallen  a  victim  to  the  deadly  missiles  of  the  enemy,  whicl 
were  being  showered  like  hail  upon  us.  I  moved  towarc 
the  center,  passing  many  officers  and  men  who  had  fallen 
having  discharged  their  whole  duty  like  true  soldiers.  " 
had  not  proceeded  far  when  I  discovered  the  prostrat< 
form  of  our  noble  colonel,  who  had  fallen  at  his  post,  hi: 
face  to  the  foe.  I  hastened  toward  him,  when  I  receivec 
a  wound  in  my  left  arm.  On  reaching  the  colonel,  ! 
found  that  he  was  not  dead ;  but  seeing  the  rent  in  his  coa 
where  the  ball  had  passed  out,  my  fears  were  excited  tha 
his  wound  would  prove  mortal.  The  hemorrhage  fron 
my  own  wound  forced  me  from  the  field,  leaving  the  com 
mand  upon  Major  Rogers. 

"  The  officers  and  men  of  my  wing  of  the  regiment  con 
tinued  to  discharge  their  duties  in  a  manner  worthy  of  oui 
cause  so  long  as  I  remained  upon  the  field,  and  from  theii 
conduct  heretofore  I  would  not  hesitate  to  vouch  for  then 
during  the  remainder  of  the  battle. 

"  Captain  [John  S.]  Cleveland,  of  Company  H,  wa: 
on  the  right.  His  skillful  management  of  his  own  com 
pany  aided  me  vastly  in  the  direction  of  my  wing." 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       165 
Report  of  Maj.  J.  C.  Rogers,  Fifth  Texas  Infantry. 

"  NEAR  HAGERSTOWN,  MD., 

"  July  8,  1863. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  forward  a  continuation  of  the  re 
port  of  the  part  taken  by  the  Fifth  Texas  regiment  in  the 
action  of  the  2d  and  3d  instant,  after  the  wounding  of 
Colonels  Powell  and  Bryan,  when  the  command  devolved 
upon  me,  the  regiment  still  holding  the  position  as  left  by 
Colonel  Bryan,  firing  with  accuracy  and  deadly  effect. 

"  The  order  to  fall  back  came  from  some  unknown 
source,  and,  finding  that  the  regiments  on  our  right  and 
left  had  retired,  it  became  necessary  to  follow.  I  there 
fore  gave  the  order  for  the  regiment  to  about-face  and  re 
tire  to  the  rear,  which  they  did  in  good  order  until  they 
reached  the  position  mentioned  in  Colonel  Bryan's  report 
as  the  second  position  of  the  enemy,  and  here  we  halted 
and  re-formed,  in  connection  with  the  other  regiments. 
From  the  exhausted  condition  of  the  men  it  was  deemed 
necessary  to  remain  here  for  a  few  moments. 

"  The  regiments  were  again  ordered  forward,  which 
they  did  in  the  most  gallant  manner,  and  regained  their 
first  position,  which  they  held  as  long  as  it  was  tenable; 
and  a  farther  advance  being  impracticable,  owing  to  the 
nature  of  the  ground,  as  expressed  in  Colonel  Bryan's  re 
port,  they  again  retired  in  good  order  to  an  open  space 
about  50  yards  in  rear,  when  here  it  was  discovered  for 
the  first  time  that  nearly  two-thirds  of  our  officers  and 
men  had  been  killed  and  wounded. 

"  Only  a  few  moments  were  here  consumed  to  allow 
the  men  to  recover  their  breath,  when,  in  obedience  to  or 
ders,  I  again  moved  the  regiment  forward  to  attack  the 
enemy  in  their  impregnable  position.  The  coolness  and  de 
termination  of  the  men  and  officers  were  equal  to  the  oc 
casion.  They  advanced  boldly  over  the  ground  strewn 


166    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

with  the  bodies  of  their  dead  and  dying  comrades  to  the 
base  of  what  they  knew  to  be  an  impregnable  fortification. 
We  held  this  position  until  it  was  discovered  that  we  had 
no  supports  either  on  the  right  or  left  and  were  about  to 
be  flanked,  and  therefore  were  again  compelled  to  retire, 
which  the  regiment  did  in  good  order  to  the  point  men 
tioned  in  Colonel  Bryan's  report  as  the  second  position  of 
the  enemy,  which  place  we  were  ordered  to  hold  at  all  haz 
ards,  which  we  did. 

'  Just  before  day  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  orders 
reached  me  that  breastworks  must  be  thrown  up,  and  the 
position  held.  The  order  was  obeyed.  During  the  day 
constant  skirmishing  was  kept  up  with  the  enemy,  which 
resulted  in  the  loss  to  us  of  many  of  our  best  scouts.  Late 
in  the  evening,  in  obedience  to  orders,  I  about-faced  my 
regiment  and  marched  three-quarters  of  a  mile  to  the  crest 
of  the  ridge  from  which  the  charge  of  the  day  previous 
commenced.  Here  we  threw  up  breastworks,  behind 
which  we  remained  during  the  night. 

"  I  would  respectfully  beg  leave  to  call  attention  to  the 
valuable  assistance  I  received  from  Capt.  John  S.  Cleve 
land  in  the  management  of  the  right  wing  of  my  regiment, 
and  Capt.  T.  T.  Clay  on  the  left;  also  to  the  heroic  con 
duct  of  T.  W.  Fitzgerald,  of  Company  A,  who  was  color- 
bearer.  He  pressed  gallantly  forward,  and  was  badly 
wounded  far  in  front.  J.  A.  Howard,  of  Company  B, 
color  corporal,  then  took  the  flag  and  remained  firmly  at 
his  post.  He  was  almost  instantly  killed.  The  colors 
were  then  taken  by  Sergeant  W.  S.  Evans,  of  Company  F, 
who  planted  them  defiantly  in  the  face  of  the  foe  during 
the  remainder  of  the  fight,  always  advancing  promptly  to 
the  front  when  the  order  was  given. 

"  The  general  conduct  of  officers  and  men  was  beyond 
all  praise." 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       167 
BENNING'S  BRIGADE 

Report  of  Brig-Gen.  Henry  L.  Benning,  C.  S.  Army, 
Commanding  Brigade. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  BENNING'S  BRIGADE, 

"  August  3,  1863. 

"  In  obedience  to  an  order  from  the  headquarters  of  this 
division,  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  to  you  the  following 
report  of  the  operations  of  this  brigade  since  it  left  Cul- 
peper  Court  House  for  the  other  side  of  the  Potomac : 

"  About  2  or  3  p.  M.  on  July  2,  ultimo,  I  was  informed 
by  Major-General  Hood  that  his  division,  as  the  right  of 
Lieutenant-General  Longstreet's  corps,  was  about  to  at 
tack  the  left  of  the  enemy's  line,  and  that  in  the  attack 
my  brigade  would  follow  Law's  brigade  at  the  distance  of 
about  400  yards.  In  order  to  get  to  the  place  they  as 
signed  me,  in  the  rear  of  General  Law,  it  was  necessary 
to  move  the  brigade  500  or  600  yards  farther  to  the  right. 
Having  done  this,  I  advanced  in  line  of  battle.  A  wood 
intervened  between  us  and  the  enemy,  which,  though  it  did 
not  prevent  their  shells  from  reaching  us  and  producing 
some  casualties,  yet  completely  hid  them  from  our  view. 
On  emerging  from  the  woods  their  position  became  visible. 
Before  us,  at  the  distance  of  600  or  800  yards,  was  an  ob 
long  mountain  peak,  or  spur,  presenting  to  us  a  steep  face, 
much  roughened  by  rocks.  To  the  right,  400  or  500  yards 
from  the  peak,  was  the  main  mountain  itself,  with  a  side 
that  looked  almost  perpendicular.  Its  summit  overlooked 
the  peak  just  sufficiently  to  command  it  well.  On  the  sum 
mit  of  the  peak  were  three  pieces  of  artillery,  and  a  little 
in  advance  of  them,  on  a  sort  of  uneven,  irregular  shelf, 
were  three  others.  To  the  right  and  left  of  the  battery, 
as  well  as  immediately  in  its  rear,  were  lines  of  infantry, 
as  we  afterward  ascertained.  This  formed  the  enemy's 
first  line  of  battle. 


1 68    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

"  On  the  top  of  the  mountain  itself,  and  a  little  to  the 
right  of  the  peak,  were  five  other  guns.  These  commanded 
our  approaches  to  the  peak  for  nearly  the  whole  way.  To 
the  right  and  left  of  these  guns  extended  the  enemy's  sec 
ond  line  of  infantry.  Where  that  line  crossed  the  gorge 
running  between  the  peak  and  the  mountain,  a  point  500  or 
600  yards  in  the  rear  of  the  peak,  were  two  other  guns. 
This  we  ascertained  when  the  right  of  the  brigade  reached 
the  gorge,  by  the  terrible  fire  from  them  which  swept  down 
the  gorge. 

'  Thus,  what  we  had  to  encounter  were  thirteen  guns, 
and  two,  if  not  more,  lines  of  infantry  posted  on  mountain 
heights.  The  intervening  spur  over  which  we  had  to 
march  to  reach  the  first  line  was  nearly  all  open.  Our 
own  first  line  also  became  visible,  advancing  about  400 
yards  in  our  front.  The  part  of  it  in  our  front  I  took  to 
be  Law's  brigade,  and  so  I  followed  it.  In  truth  it  was 
Robertson's,  Law's  being  farther  to  the  right.  This  I  did 
not  discover  until  late  in  the  fight,  a  wood  on  the  right 
concealing  from  me  most  of  Law's  brigade.  My  line  con 
tinued  to  follow  the  first  line,  halting  once  or  twice  to  pre 
serve  its  interval.  At  length  I  saw  that  the  first  line 
would  not  be  able  alone  to  carry  the  peak,  so  I  advanced 
without  halting  again. 

"  When  my  line  reached  the  foot  of  the  peak  I  found 
there  a  part  of  the  First  Texas,  struggling  to  make  the 
ascent,  the  rest  of  the  brigade  having  gone  to  the  right 
and  left,  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas  to  the  right,  and  the 
Third  Arkansas  to  the  left.  The  part  of  the  First  Texas 
referred  to  falling  in  with  my  brigade,  the  whole  line  com 
menced  ascending  the  rugged  steep  and  (on  the  right) 
crossing  the  gorge.  The  ground  was  difficult,  rocks  in 
many  places  presenting,  by  their  precipitous  sides,  insur 
mountable  obstacles,  while  the  fire  of  the  enemy  was  very 
heavy  and  very  deadly.  The  progress  was  therefore  not 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       169 

very  rapid;  but  it  was  regular  and  uninterrupted.  After 
a  while  the  enemy  were  driven  from  their  three  front 
guns.  The  advance  continued,  and  at  length  they  were 
driven  completely  from  the  peak,  but  they  carried  with 
them  the  three  rear  guns  on  its  summit,  its  sudden  descent 
on  the  other  side  favoring  the  operation,  so  that  we  cap 
tured  only  the  three  front  guns.  These  were  lo-pounder 
Parrotts.  A  number  of  prisoners  also  were  taken  — 
more,  I  suppose,  than  100. 

'  The  peak  being  thus  taken  and  the  enemy's  first  line 
driven  behind  his  second,  I  made  my  dispositions  to  hold 
the  ground  gained,  which  was  all  that  I  could  do,  as  I  was 
then  much  in  advance  of  every  other  part  of  our  line  of 
battle,  and  the  second  line  of  the  enemy  on  the  mountain 
itself  was  in  a  position  which  seemed  to  me  almost  impreg 
nable  to  any  merely  front  attack,  even  with  fresh  men. 
Indeed,  to  hold  the  ground  we  had,  appeared  a  difficult 
task.  The  shells  of  the  enemy  from  the  adjacent  moun 
tain  were  incessantly  bursting  along  the  summit  of  the 
peak,  and  every  head  that  showed  itself  was  the  target  of 
a  minie  ball.  Several  attempts  by  flank  movements  were 
made  to  dislodge  us,  but  by  the  gallantry  of  the  regiments 
on  the  right  and  left  they  all  failed.  We  held  the  position 
until  late  next  day,  when  we  were  ordered  back  to  the  crest 
of  the  wooded  hill  from  which  we  first  saw  the  enemy  on 
the  day  before. 

"  Our  loss  was  heavy,  not  less  than  400  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing.  Of  this  number  an  unusually  large 
proportion  were  killed  and  badly  wounded.  Among  the 
killed  were  Col.  John  A.  Jones,  of  the  Twentieth  Georgia, 
and  Lieut. -Col.  William  T.  Harris,  commanding  the  Sec 
ond  Georgia.  Colonel  Jones  was  killed  late  in  the  action, 
not  far  from  the  captured  guns,  after  the  enemy's  forces 
were  driven  from  the  position  and  they  had  themselves 
opened  upon  it  with  shell  from  their  other  batteries,  a 


1 70    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

fragment  of  one  of  which,  glancing  from  a  rock,  passed 
through  his  brain.  He  had  behaved  with  great  coolness 
and  gallantry.  He  fell  just  as  success  came  in  sight.  Col 
onel  Harris  was  farther  to  the  right,  where  he  and  his 
regiment  were  exposed  to  the  terrible  fire  of  the  two  pieces 
which  swept  the  gorge,  as  well  as  to  the  infantry  fire  of  the 
enemy's  left.  A  ball  passed  through  his  heart,  killing  him 
instantly.  His  gallantry  had  been  most  conspicuous. 

"  I  had  no  means  of  ascertaining  the  precise  loss  of  the 
enemy.  In  killed  and  wounded  it  must  have  been  large. 
Dead  and  wounded  lay  scattered  over  the  ground  of  the 
conflict  and  of  the  retreat.  From  the  latter  they  were 
removed  by  the  enemy  during  the  night.  We  took  about 
300  prisoners  in  all. 

"  The  conduct  of  both  officers  and  men  was  generally, 
as  far  as  I  could  observe  it,  excellent.  Under  a  fire  from 
so  many  cannon  and  toward  the  last  from  so  much  mus 
ketry,  they  advanced  steadily  over  ground  for  the  most 
part  open,  mounted  a  difficult  height,  drove  back  from  it 
the  enemy,  occupied  his  line,  took  three  guns,  captured  a 
number  of  prisoners,  and  against  his  utmost  efforts  held  all 
they  had  gained.  The  captured  guns  were  taken  by  the 
Twentieth  Georgia  (Colonel  Jones  and,  after  his  death, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Waddell),  the  part  of  the  First  Texas 
above  referred  to  (Colonel  Work),  and  the  Seventeenth 
Georgia  (Colonel  Hodges)  ;  but  the  honor  of  the  capture 
was  not  exclusively  theirs.  They  could  not  have  taken 
—  certainly  could  not  have  held — the  guns  if  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Harris  and,  after  his  death,  Major  [William  S.] 
Shepherd,  on  the  left  with  the  Second  Georgia,  and  Col 
onel  Du  Bose,  with  the  Fifteenth  Georgia,  on  the  right, 
had  not  by  the  hardest  kind  of  fighting  and  at  great  loss 
protected  their  flanks.  Colonel  Du  Bose  not  only  drove 
back  the  enemy's  line,  but  repulsed  repeated  attacks  made 
to  recover  it,  taking  over  100  prisoners.  The  same  may 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       171 

be  said  of  the  Second,  excepting  that  it  did  not  take  so 
many  prisoners." 

General  Hood  was  severely  wounded  during  the  can 
nonade  which  preceded  the  advance  of  the  infantry  and 
was  carried  to  the  rear.  General  Law  was  not  informed 
of  this  until  the  infantry  was  in  close  proximity  to  the 
Union  line,  when  as  senior  brigade  commander  he  assumed 
command  of  the  four  brigades  of  Hood's  division.  For 
reasons  explained  in  Law's  admirable  paper  published 
many  years  after  the  war,  in  the  Century  Magazine,  from 
which  I  have  quoted  extracts,  no  report  of  the  part  taken 
by  Hood's  division  was  made,  either  by  Hood  or  Law. 
As  Anderson's  brigade  was  too  far  to  the  left  to  have  had 
any  influence  in  the  attack  on  Little  Round  Top,  I  have 
omitted  its  report.  Benning's  report  of  his  brigade,  which 
attacked  Ward  at  the  Devil's  Den,  is  so  complete  that  I 
have  omitted  the  regimental  reports.  I  have  given  in 
full  the  regimental  reports  of  Law's  and  Robertson's  bri 
gades  and  the  brigade  report  by  Robertson.  The  Confed 
erates  left  the  scene  of  their  attack  almost  immediately. 
At  the  time  of  writing  these  reports  they  knew  nothing  of 
the  nomenclature  of  this  part  of  the  battlefield,  which 
since  has  become  so  familiar.  The  names  Devil's  Den, 
Little  Round  Top,  and  Big  Round  Top  do  not  appear;  in 
stead,  they  speak  of  high  peaks,  rocky  ridges,  mountains, 
gorges,  and  valleys  in  a  way  which  makes  it  difficult  in 
some  cases  to  trace  their  movements  exactly.  However, 
from  other  indications  I  think  I  have  been  able  to  locate 
them  correctly  in  stating  that  the  attack  on  the  Devil's 
Den  was  made  by  the  First  Texas  and  Third  Arkansas  of 
Robertson's  brigade,  the  four  regiments  of  Benning's  and 
Law's  Forty- fourth  Alabama,  and  that  the  attack  on  Lit 
tle  Round  Top  was  made  by  Robertson's  Fourth  and  Fifth 
Texas,  Law's  Fourth,  Fifteenth,  Forty-seventh,  and  Forty- 


172    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

eighth  Alabama,  with  a  possibility  that  the  Forty-fourth 
Alabama  joined  on  the  left  of  the  Forty-eighth  Alabama 
in  the  last  assault  on  Little  Round  Top,  as  shown  on  the 
Government  map  mentioned  elsewhere. 

FORTY-EIGHTH  ALABAMA 

I  have  placed  this  report  out  of  its  numerical  order  be 
cause  there  is  no  other  report  of  Law's  brigade,  and  Shef 
field  states  that,  having  learned  that  Hood  was  wounded 
and  Law  had  assumed  command  of  the  division,  he  was 
ordered  to  assume  command  of  the  brigade.  He  did  not 
learn  this  fact,  however,  until  his  regiment  had  been  fight 
ing  one  hour  and  a  half  and  been  three  times  repulsed.  So 
far  as  this  part  of  the  battle  is  concerned,  it  is  in  no  sense 
a  report  of  the  brigade.  He  makes  no  mention  of  having 
given  any  orders  to  any  other  regiments  during  the  attack 
on  Vincent,  and  none  of  the  regimental  reports  mention 
the  receipt  of  any  orders  from  him.  He  says  that  when 
he  took  command  of  the  brigade  Captain  T.  J.  Eubanks 
took  command  of  the  regiment  and  re-formed  it,  and  gal 
lantly  led  it  to  the  front.  This  change  of  commanders  ap 
pears  to  have  taken  place  after  the  brigade  had  been  three 
times  repulsed  and  had  retired  in  some  disorder  out  of 
range. 

I  have  been  unable  to  find  any  record  of  the  order  which 
moved  the  Forty-eighth  Alabama  and  the  Fourth  and 
Fifth  Texas  to  the  Confederate  left  to  make  the  attack 
on  Vincent's  right  flank.  As  soon  as  I  could  get  a  musket 
after  the  first  attack  on  Vincent's  center  began,  I  took  my 
place  in  the  line  between  the  right  of  the  Forty-fourth  New 
York  and  the  left  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan,  and  remained 
there  until  the  last  assault  was  repulsed.  I  am  sure  that 
these  three  Confederate  regiments  did  not  move  to  the  left 
directly  in  front  of  our  line.  Marching  by  the  flank  im 
mediately  in  front  of  our  position,  without  opportunity  to 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       173 

make  any  resistance,  they  would  have  been  cut  to  pieces 
before  they  had  covered  half  the  ground  necessary  to 
reach  the  place  from  which  they  made  the  assault.  They 
must  have  gone  north  in  the  Plum  Run  valley  behind  the 
big  rocks  which  separated  that  valley  from  the  western  foot 
of  Little  Round  Top.  By  this  time  Ward's  brigade  had 
been  driven  back  from  its  position  at  the  Devil's  Den  and 
the  way  was  open  in  that  direction.  May  it  not  be  pos 
sible  that  Colonel  Sheffield  ordered  this  movement  after 
the  troops  of  his  brigade  had  recovered  from  the  disorder 
of  their  last  repulse  and  had  got  into  reasonable  order 
again?  The  officers  and  men  were  plucky  and  determined. 
Having  failed  in  a  direct  assault  on  Vincent's  front,  they 
evidently  hoped  for  better  results  from  a  flank  attack  on 
Vincent's  right,  while  the  Fifteenth,  Forty-seventh  and 
Fourth  Alabama  were  attacking  Vincent's  left.  Sheffield's 
report,  like  the  others,  leaves  many  gaps  to  be  filled.  If 
the  above  explanation  is  not  correct,  a  better  one  will  be 
gladly  received. 

FOURTH  ALABAMA 

This  report  is  certainly  not  a  history  of  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg.  Without  violating  the  military  rule  which  re 
quires  official  reports  to  be  confined  to  the  operations  of 
the  organization  reported,  it  might  with  propriety  have 
given  a  more  extended  account  of  the  operations  of  this 
regiment.  On  the  first  reading  one  would  suppose  that 
this  regiment  did  not  participate  in  the  attack  on  Vincent, 
but  was  engaged  on  the  western  front  of  Big  Round  Top. 
Its  first  position  in  line  was  the  left  one  of  the  five  Ala 
bama  regiments  of  Law's  brigade.  Robertson's  brigade  of 
one  Arkansas  and  three  Texas  regiments  was  ordered  to 
keep  in  connection  with  the  left  of  Law's  brigade. 

In  advancing,  Law's  men  obliqued  to  the  right  and  Rob 
ertson's  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas  followed  this  movement. 


174    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Ward's  brigade  at  the  Devil's  Den  was  the  objective. 
Seeing  that  his  brigade  had  gone  too  far  to  the  right  and 
was  facing  the  south  side  of  Big  Round  Top,  Law  directed 
the  two  regiments  on  his  right,  the  Forty-eighth  and 
Forty-fourth  Alabama,  to  halt  and  then  move  by  the  flank 
to  the  left  of  his  brigade.  While  the  Fourth  and  Fifth 
Texas  had  followed  this  oblique  movement,  Robertson's 
other  two  regiments  had  gone  straight  on  to  the  Devil's 
Den,  leaving  a  considerable  interval  between  the  two  parts 
of  his  brigade.  The  Forty-eighth  and  Forty-fourth  Ala 
bama  continued  their  flank  movement  to  the  left  until  they 
had  passed  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas,  then  came  to  the 
front  with  the  Forty-eighth  on  the  left  of  the  Fourth  Texas 
and  the  Forty-fourth  on  the  extreme  left  of  Law's  line. 
Near  the  foot  of  the  hill  from  which  they  advanced  they 
struck  the  left  of  Stoughton's  sharpshooters  stationed  be 
hind  a  stone  wall  facing  south  near  the  west  front  of  Big 
Round  Top.  After  a  stubborn  resistance  the  sharpshooters 
retired,  three  companies  of  them  going  up  the  west  front 
of  Big  Round  Top  in  the  woods,  closely  followed  by  the 
right  two  regiments  of  Law's  brigade,  the  Fifteenth  and 
Forty-seventh  Alabama.  The  remainder  of  Law's  men 
crossed  the  western  slope  and  the  low  ground  to  the  west 
of  it  until  they  came  to  the  narrow  valley  which  runs  along 
the  north  side  of  Big  Round  Top.  Here  by  Law's  orders 
the  Forty-fourth  Alabama  wheeled  to  the  left  and  ad 
vanced  against  Smith's  battery  on  the  Devil's  Den. 

The  Fourth  and  Forty-eighth  Alabama,  with  the  Fourth 
and  Fifth  Texas,  marched  in  columns  up  this  valley  to 
seize  the  Little  Round  Top  or  turn  it.  The  Fourth  Ala 
bama  was  one  of  these  regiments.  Meeting  Vincent's 
skirmishers,  they  quickly  formed  in  line  of  battle  in  the 
following  order  from  right  to  left:  Fourth  Alabama,  Fifth 
Texas,  Fourth  Texas,  and  Forty-eighth  Alabama.  The 
Fourth  Alabama  swung  around  to  attack  the  Eighty-third 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       175 

Pennsylvania  from  the  south.  The  other  regiments  faced 
the  right  wing  of  the  Eighty-third,  Forty-fourth,  and  the 
left  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan.  After  a  few  minutes  of 
desperate  fighting  this  line  retired  a  short  distance  and  took 
shelter  behind  the  rocks,  but  soon  re-formed  the  line  and 
advanced  again.  I  think  the  Fourth  Alabama  retired  and 
returned  with  the  others.  In  any  event,  they  were  there 
when  Oates'  column,  consisting  of  the  Fifteenth  and  Forty- 
seventh  Alabama,  was  seen  advancing  along  the  foot  of 
Big  Round  Top  in  rear  of  the  Fourth  Alabama,  which  re 
mained  there  until  some  time  after  Oates'  men  had  come 
to  close  quarters  with  the  Twentieth  Maine.  When  the 
Fourth  Alabama  finally  retired,  with  the  troops  which  it 
had  accompanied,  it  took  shelter  on  the  western  slope  of 
Big  Round  Top  and  did  no  more  fighting  that  day. 

FIFTEENTH  ALABAMA 

As  Colonel  Oates  has  made  a  long  and  elaborate  account 
in  his  book,  "  The  War  Between  /the  Union  and  the  Con 
federacy,"  which  I  have  quoted  elsewhere,  with  my  com 
ments,  I  have  nothing  further  to  add  here.  The  reader 
is  referred  to  this  paper  among  my  extracts  from  the  his 
tories  (pp.  77-110). 

FORTY-FOURTH  ALABAMA 

This  regiment  appears  to  have  advanced  into  the  Plum 
Run  valley  on  the  flank  of  the  battery  on  the  Devil's  Den 
and  to  have  fought  the  infantry  posted  in  the  rear  of  the 
battery  to  support  it.  When  Benning's  brigade  advanced, 
its  line  more  than  covered  the  front  of  the  Devil's  Den, 
one  regiment  at  least  being  in  the  Plum  Run  valley,  and 
joining  the  left  of  the  Forty-fourth  Alabama.  The  Union 
line  retreated  from  the  three  front  guns  of  the  battery. 
The  remaining  three  were  taken  to  the  rear.  With  Ben- 


176    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

ning's  brigade  and  part  of  Robertson's  holding  this  posi 
tion,  the  Forty-fourth  was  left  free  to  join  the  Forty- 
eighth  in  the  advance  against  the  crest  of  Little  Round  Top 
if  it  wished  to  do  so.  Colonel  Perry  does  not  mention 
any  such  movement.  In  a  letter  written  to  Colonel  Gates 
by  Colonel  Perry  several  years  after  the  war,  which  I 
have  quoted  in  my  extracts  from  Gates'  book,  Perry  speaks 
of  his  exhaustion  and  of  his  having  been  stunned  by  the 
explosion  of  a  shell  near  him.  He  was  not  in  condition 
to  know  much  about  what  happened  at  the  end  of  the  fight 
about  the  Devil's  Den.  He  makes  no  mention  in  his  re 
port  of  the  withdrawal  of  his  regiment  nor  where  it  went 
when  withdrawn. 

FORTY-SEVENTH  ALABAMA 

This  report  is  very  incomplete.  It  makes  no  mention 
of  the  fact  that  the  regiment  went  with  the  Fifteenth  Ala 
bama  to  the  summit  of  Big  Round  Top.  From  Major 
Campbell's  statement  in  commendation  of  the  conduct  of 
the  officers  of  the  regiment,  not  including  the  colonel  and 
adjutant,  and  from  Gates'  statement  that  Law  told  him 
that  in  case  the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  were  separated 
from  the  brigade,  the  Forty-seventh  would  be  under  his 
command,  it  is  evident  there  was  considerable  demoraliza 
tion  among  the  field  and  staff  of  the  Forty-seventh.  The 
resignation  of  the  colonel  and  the  promotion  of  the  lieu 
tenant-colonel,  Bulger,  to  be  colonel  to  date  from  July  16, 
is  conclusive.  Gates'  statement  that  the  lieutenant-col 
onel,  although  very  courageous,  was  unfitted  to  command 
the  regiment  by  reason  of  his  age  and  his  inexperience  and 
ignorance  of  tactics,  may  explain  Law's  reason  for  placing 
the  direction  of  the  regiment  under  certain  contingencies 
in  the  hands  of  Colonel  Gates.  The  note  in  the  official  re 
port  which  states  that  Bulger  was  not  killed  in  the  action 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       177 

was  made  by  the  editor  or  compiler  of  the  "  Rebellion  Rec 
ords."  *  Bulger  was  the  officer  who  surrendered  to  Col 
onel  Chamberlain  by  handing  him  his  sword  with  one  hand 
and  firing  his  pistol  at  him  with  the  other.  He  was  well 
cared  for  by  the  Union  surgeons  and  lived  for  many  years 
after  the  war.  Major  Campbell's  statement  that  after  the 
first  repulse  of  the  brigade  he  deployed  a  part  of  his  men 
on  the  right  of  the  brigade,  where  they  remained  until  the 
close  of  the  fight,  is  not  very  probable,  if  it  refers  to  the 
repulse  by  Vincent's  brigade.  The  Fifteenth  Alabama  was 
on  the  right  of  the  Forty-seventh,  and  under  the  circum 
stances  it  is  not  likely  that  a  detachment  of  the  Forty-sev 
enth  would  have  been  sent  to  the  right  of  the  Fifteenth. 
Possibly  he  refers  to  a  movement  made  after  his  regi 
ment  had  returned  to  the  woods  on  the  western  foot  of 
Big  Round  Top.  The  first  repulse  of  the  brigade  occurred 
before  the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  Alabama  came 
down  from  the  mountain. 

ROBERTSON'S  BRIGADE  REPORT 

This  is  an  excellent  report.  If  all  the  official  reports 
were  like  it  in  careful  and  intelligible  description  there 
would  be  little  trouble  in  forming  a  correct  idea  of  the 
movements.  It  explains  clearly  how  two  of  his  regiments, 
the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas,  became  separated  from  the 
other  two  regiments  of  his  brigade  and  fought  with  Law's 
brigade  in  the  attack  on  Little  Round  Top.  His  regimen 
tal  reports  give  more  details. 

THIRD  ARKANSAS 

As  the  attack  of  this  regiment  in  connection  with  An 
derson's  brigade  was  made  against  De  Trobriand's  line  on 
the  west  of  the  Devil's  Den,  and  it  had  little  if  any  effect 
1  See  footnote,  p.  149. 


1 78    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

on  the  fight  for  possession  of  Little  Round  Top,  I  see  no 
occasion  for  comment.  I  mention  it  only  as  a  part  of 
Robertson's  brigade. 


FIRST  TEXAS 

This  regiment  was  principally  engaged  on  the  left  of 
the  line  in  front  of  Smith's  battery  at  the  Devil's  Den. 
One  company  of  the  Fourth  Texas  which  had  been  thrown 
out  as  skirmishers  in  the  advance  went  straight  forward 
while  its  regiment  moved  to  the  right  to  maintain  its  con 
nection  with  Law's  brigade.  This  company  fought 
through  the  day  with  the  First  Texas.  Benning's  bri 
gade,  following  closely  Robertson's  advance,  came  up  and 
its  left  mingled  with  the  First  Texas  in  the  assault  and 
capture  of  three  guns  of  this  battery. 

FOURTH  TEXAS 

This  report,  like  that  of  the  Fifth  Texas  and  some 
others,  is  wanting  in  definiteness  of  detail  about  positions. 
What  he  calls  the  first  position  of  the  enemy  is  evidently 
the  stone  wall  behind  which  Stoughton's  sharpshooters 
were  posted.  One  might  suppose  from  his  statement  that 
Stoughton  retreated  and  was  followed  to  his  second  posi 
tion  at  the  base  of  the  mountain,  but  he  evidently  means 
the  position  of  Vincent's  brigade,  against  which  repeated 
assaults  were  made  and  repulsed.  The  lieutenant-col 
onel,  Carter,  was  severely  wounded  in  the  fight  with  Stough 
ton  at  the  stone  wall.  This  was  followed  by  the 
wounding  of  Colonel  Key  in  the  assault  on  Vincent, 
leaving  Major  Bane  in  command.  Colonel  Key  was  able 
to  walk,  as  Robertson  in  his  report  mentions  seeing  him  as 
he  was  led  to  the  rear.  In  addition  to  the  fight  with 
Stoughton  at  the  stone  wall,  he  speaks  of  three  assaults,  in 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       179 

the  first  of  which  the  enemy  was  driven  to  the  heights  be 
yond,  in  close  proximity  to  the  mountain.  This  evidently 
refers  to  the  falling  back  of  Vincent's  skirmishers  to  the 
main  line,  followed  by  the  Confederates,  who  retreated 
after  a  few  minutes  of  close  fighting.  The  second  assault 
was  made  in  connection  with  the  Fifth  Texas,  with  like 
results.  He  does  not  mention  the  Fourth  Alabama  on  the 
right  of  the  Fifth  Texas,  nor  the  Forty-eighth  Alabama 
on  the  left  of  the  Fourth  Texas,  but  I  think  the  four  regi 
ments  were  there  and  continued  their  desperate  fighting 
for  some  time.  I  think  the  third  assault  was  that  made 
against  Vincent's  right  flank  which  was  repulsed  by  the 
One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York.  This  is  the  only 
instance  in  which  the  Forty-fourth  Alabama  is  mentioned 
as  participating  in  the  assaults  on  Little  Round  Top. 
During  the  first  part  of  the  battle  the  Forty- fourth  Ala 
bama  was,  according  to  the  report  of  its  commander,  fight 
ing  at  the  Devil's  Den.  As  I  have  stated  elsewhere,  this 
position  was  carried  by  the  Confederates  before  the  assault 
on  Vincent's  right  flank,  and  the  Forty-fourth  may  have 
joined  in  this  assault  with  the  Texas  regiments  and  the 
Forty-eighth  Alabama  on  the  left  of  the  latter,  as  repre 
sented  in  the  Government  map  showing  the  position  of 
troops.  In  this  assault  the  Forty-eighth  was  commanded 
by  Captain  Eubanks,  not  by  Colonel  Sheffield,  as  stated 
by  Major  Bane. 

FIFTH  TEXAS 

This  report  is  in  two  parts,  the  first  by  Lieutenant-Col 
onel  K.  Bryan,  who  took  command  when  Colonel  Powell 
was  wounded  in  front  of  Vincent's  brigade,  the  second  by 
Major  J.  C.  Rogers,  who  succeeded  to  the  command  when 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Bryan  was  wounded.  Like  the  report 
of  the  Fourth  Texas  by  Major  Bane,  it  is  very  difficult  to 
follow;  but  there  is  no  doubt  the  place  mentioned  in  both 


i8o    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

as  the  second  position  of  the  enemy  is  the  position  of  Vin 
cent's  brigade,  as  Colonel  Powell  was  wounded  in  front  of 
Vincent's  line  and  was  made  a  prisoner  there.  As  they 
speak  about  following  the  enemy  to  their  second  position, 
about  two  hundred  yards  distant,  from  which  they  drove 
them,  they  appear  to  have  supposed  that  their  first  en 
counter  at  the  stone  wall  was  with  Vincent's  men,  who  re 
treated  to  their  second  position  near  the  base  of  the  moun 
tain.  This  cannot  be  true,  for  two  reasons :  Vincent's 
men  were  not  at  the  stone  wall  where  the  first  encounter 
occurred.  They  did  not  follow  Stoughton,  because  three 
regiments  of  Law's  brigade  on  their  right  took  care  of 
Stoughton,  who  retreated  up  the  west  front  of  Big  Round 
Top.  Their  statement  that  they  drove  the  enemy  from 
their  second  position  into  their  fortified  line  near  the  base 
of  the  mountain,  from  which  they  failed  to  drive  them, 
must  refer  to  the  falling  back  of  Vincent's  skirmishers. 
This  would  not  be  so  clear  if  it  were  not  certain  that  their 
main  attack  was  against  Vincent.  There  Colonel  Powell 
was  wounded  and  made  prisoner  by  the  Eighty-third 
Pennsylvania,  as  were  a  large  number  of  his  men.  I  think 
there  is  no  question  that  after  driving  the  sharpshooters 
from  the  stone  fence,  the  Fourth  Alabama,  Fifth  Texas, 
Fourth  Texas,  and  Forty-eighth  Alabama  kept  straight  on 
in  more  or  less  regular  line  of  battle  until  they  reached 
the  little  valley  extending  along  the  north  side  of  Big 
Round  Top,  and  then,  by  Law's  direction,  moved  by  the 
right  flank  up  this  valley  until  they  reached  and  attacked 
Vincent. 

BENNING'S  BRIGADE  REPORT 

As  Benning  did  not  attack  Little  Round  Top,  but  fought 
his  battle  against  Ward's  brigade,  Smith's  battery,  and  the 
reinforcements  sent  to  their  support,  I  have  not  thought 
it  necessary  to  include  his  regimental  reports.  As  there 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       181 

were  several  claimants  for  the  honor  of  the  capture  of  the 
three  guns  of  Smith's  battery,  I  shall  not  attempt  to  decide 
between  them.  There  was  glory  enough  for  all. 


THE  OFFICIAL  REPORTS— UNION  x 

Report  of  Maj.-Gen.  George  Sykes,  U.  S.  'Army,  com 
manding  Fifth  Army  Corps. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS, 
"  CAMP  NEAR  WARRENTON,  VA.,  July  31,  1863. 

"  On  the  28th  ultimo,  by  the  assignment  of  General 
Meade  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  I  be 
came  the  senior  general  of  this  corps. 

"  On  June  29  and  30  and  on  July  i  and  2  I  made  long, 
rapid,  and  fatiguing  marches,  starting  at  Frederick,  Md., 
and  reaching  the  field  of  Gettysburg,  via  Liberty,  Union 
Mills,  Hanover,  etc.,  about  8  A.  M.,  on  the  latter  date.  My 
troops  took  position  on  the  right  of  our  line,  but  it  being 
thought  too  extended,  they  were  subsequently  massed  near 
the  bridge  over  Rock  Creek,  on  the  Baltimore  and  Gettys 
burg  pike  and  within  reach  of  the  Twelfth  Army  Corps. 
While  thus  situated,  I  was  directed  to  support  the  Third 
corps,  General  Sickles  commanding,  with  a  brigade,  should 
it  be  required. 

"At  3  P.  M.  General  Meade  sent  for  me,  and  while  my 
self  and  other  corps  commanders  were  conversing  with 
him,  the  enemy  formed,  opened  the  battle,  and  developed 
his  attack  on  our  left.  I  was  at  once  ordered  to  throw  my 
whole  corps  to  that  point  and  hold  it  at  all  hazards.  This, 
of  course,  relieved  my  troops  from  any  call  from  the  com 
mander  of  the  Third  corps.  En  route  to  the  position  thus 
assigned  the  Fifth  corps,  various  staff  officers  from  Gen- 
x"  Rebellion  Records,"  Series  I,  Vol.  xxvii,  part  I,  pp.  592-658. 


1 82    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

eral  Sickles  met  me,  and,  in  the  name  of  that  officer,  asked 
for  assistance.  I  explained  to  them  that  it  was  impossible 
for  me  to  give  it;  the  key  of  the  battlefield  was  intrusted 
to  my  keeping,  and  I  could  not  and  would  not  jeopardize 
it  by  a  division  of  my  forces. 

"  A  rocky  ridge,  commanding  almost  an  entire  view  of 
the  plateau  held  by  our  army,  was  on  our  extreme  left. 
Between  it  and  the  position  occupied  by  Birney's  division, 
Third  corps,  was  a  narrow  gorge  filled  with  immense 
boulders  and  flanked  on  either  side  by  dense  woods.  It 
afforded  excellent  cover  and  an  excellent  approach  for  the 
enemy,  both  of  which  he  promptly  made  use  of.  The 
rocky  ridge  commanded  and  controlled  this  gorge.  In  ex 
amining  it  and  the  ground  adjacent  previous  to  posting  my 
troops,  I  found  a  battery  at  its  outer  edge  and  without 
adequate  support.  I  galloped  to  General  Birney,  whose 
troops  were  nearest,  explained  to  him  the  necessity  of  pro 
tecting  the  guns,  and  suggested  that  he  should  close  his 
division  on  the  battery,  and  hold  the  edge  of  the  woods 
on  its  right.  I  promised  to  fill  the  gap  he  opened,  which 
I  did  with  Sweitzer's  and  Tilton's  brigades,  of  my  First 
division,  posting  them  myself. 

"  In  the  meantime  Vincent's  brigade,  of  this  division, 
had  seized  the  rocky  height,  closely  followed  by  Weed's 
brigade,  Second  division.  These  troops  were  posted  under 
the  direction  of  General  Warren,  chief  engineer  of  this 
army.  After  closing  the  interval  made  by  Birney  with 
the  brigades  of  General  Barnes,  I  rode  rapidly  to  the 
Taneytown  pike  to  bring  up  the  remaining  troops  of  the 
corps,  and  on  my  return  with  them  found  the  greater  part 
of  Weed's  brigade  moving  away  from  the  height  where  it 
had  been  stationed,  and  where  its  presence  was  vital.  I 
dispatched  a  staff  officer  to  know  of  the  general  why  he 
had  vacated  the  ground  assigned  him.  His  reply  was, 
'  By  order  of  General  Sickles.'  I  at  once  directed  him  to 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       183 

re-occupy  it,  which  was  done  at  the  double-quick  step. 
Hardly  had  he  reached  it  before  the  enemy  came  on  in 
tremendous  force.  Vincent's  brigade  and  O'Rorke's  regi 
ment  (Weed's  brigade)  were  and  had  been  sorely  pressed. 
Both  those  heroic  commanders  had  fallen;  but  Weed  again 
in  position,  Hazlett  working  his  guns  superbly,  and  the 
timely  arrival  of  Ayres'  brigades  of  Regulars,  who  were 
at  once  ordered  to  attack,  stemmed  the  tide,  and  rolled 
away  the  foe  in  our  front. 

"  At  a  later  hour,  by  the  withdrawal  or  retreat  of  the 
troops  on  his  right,  first,  a  division  of  the  Third  corps,  and 
next,  Caldwell's  command,  of  the  Second  corps,  a  large 
body  of  the  enemy  gained  his  right  and  rear,  and  Ayres 
was  compelled  to  fight  his  way,  front  and  flank,  to  the  heel 
of  the  gorge.  This  he  did  steadily,  in  excellent  order,  and 
connected  with  his  left  brigade  (Weed's)  on  the  general 
line  of  battle.  But  his  loss  was  fearful;  some  of  the  regi 
ments  left  sixty  per  cent,  of  their  number  on  the  ground. 
As  Ayres  assumed  this  new  position,  General  Crawford's 
command  (my  Third  division)  was  ordered  to  the  front, 
and,  entering  the  woods,  became  briskly  engaged  with  the 
enemy.  This  combat  lasted  till  dusk,  and  resulted  in  Gen 
eral  Crawford's  gaining  considerable  ground,  capturing 
many  prisoners,  and  a  flag  of  a  Georgia  regiment. 

"  Night  closed  the  fight.  The  key  of  the  battlefield  was 
in  our  possession  intact.  Vincent,  Weed,  and  Hazlett, 
chiefs  lamented  throughout  the  corps  and  army,  sealed 
with  their  lives  the  spot  intrusted  to  their  keeping,  and  on 
which  so  much  depended.  The  general  line  of  battle  on 
the  left  was  shortened,  strengthened,  firm.  Pickets  were 
established,  and  the  troops  slept  on  their  arms.  Sedgwick 
(Sixth  corps)  had  moved  up  to  my  aid. 

"  On  the  3d  Crawford  held  his  ground  in  front,  sus 
tained  by  Bartlett's  division  of  Sedgwick's  corps.  The 
troops  remained  as  the  day  before.  Desultory  firing  from 


1 84    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  pickets  continued  along  our  front.  At  i  P.  M.  the 
enemy  commenced  a  furious  cannonade  from  more  than 
one  hundred  guns,  and  occasionally  a  part  of  it  was  be 
stowed  on  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  corps.  It  was  the  prelude 
to  his  attack,  which  soon  followed  and  raged  to  our  right; 
but,  beaten,  baffled,  and  discomfited,  he  returned  to  the 
shelter  of  the  forests  west  of  the  Emmittsburg  and  Gettys 
burg  pike.  My  artillery  on  the  rocky  ridge  helped  to  shat 
ter  and  disorganize  his  troops. 

"  On  the  4th  reconnaissances  were  made,  but  developed 
nothing  save  a  line  of  skirmishers  covering  his  troops,  and 
artillery  on  the  slope  falling  away  from  the  turnpike  to 
the  west. 

"  On  the  5th  I  began  the  march  to  Williamsport. 

"  I  respectfully  call  the  attention  of  the  major-general 
commanding,  to  the  services  of  the  artillery  of  this  corps, 
under  its  chief,  Capt.  A.  P.  Martin,  and  the  subordinate 
battery  commanders,  as  detailed  in  his  report. 

"  The  regular  batteries  were  the  greatest  sufferers. 
Hazlett's  battery  (D,  Fifth  U.  S.  Artillery)  was  especially 
distinguished,  and  Watson's  battery  (I,  same  regiment) 
though  unfortunately  taken  away  by  General  Sickles,  with 
out  my  consent  or  knowledge,  after  falling  into  the  hands 
of  the  enemy,  was  recaptured  by  Lieutenant  Peeples,  of  the 
battery,  heading  the  Garibaldi  Guard,  in  the  most  heroic 
and  gallant  manner.  Lieutenant  Peeples  richly  deserves 
promotion  for  his  conduct,  and  I  trust  the  Government 
will  not  withhold  it. 

"  I  am  happy  to  say  the  Fifth  corps  sustained  its  repu 
tation.  An  important  duty  was  confided  to  it,  which  was 
faithfully  and  gallantly  performed.  Other  brave  men 
helped  them  in  its  execution,  among  whom  the  Sixth  corps 
was  the  most  prominent. 

"  I  respectfully  beg  leave  to  call  attention  to  the  reports 
of  division  and  brigade  commanders,  herewith  inclosed. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       185 

"  The  division  commanders,  Generals  Barnes,  Ayres, 
and  Crawford,  aided  me  in  every  particular  with  the  ut 
most  zeal  and  heartiness.  I  most  urgently  unite  in  their 
recommendations  of  the  various  gentlemen  who  dis 
tinguished  themselves  in  and  around  the  field  of  Gettys 
burg. 

"  Colonel  Rice,  who  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the 
Third  brigade,  First  division,  on  the  fall  of  Colonel  Vin 
cent,  deserves  great  credit  for  the  management  of  his 
troops.  His  position  on  our  extreme  left  was  one  of  the 
most  important  held  by  the  corps,  and  the  unflinching 
tenacity  with  which  he  maintained  it,  and  his  subsequent 
forcible  occupation  of  the  ground  possessed  by  the  enemy, 
with  Chamberlain's  regiment  (Twentieth  Maine)  and  two 
regiments  of  Fisher's  brigade,  Third  division,  are  worthy 
of  the  highest  praise. 

"  The  medical  department,  under  Surgeon  J.  J.  Milhau 
and  Asst.  Surg.  C.  P.  Russell,  was  organized  in  the  most 
effective  and  satisfactory  manner. 

"  My  personal  staff  and  the  chiefs  of  departments  were 
zealous,  indefatigable,  and  ready  for  any  emergency.  I 
name  them  in  the  order  of  rank,  and  respectfully  recom 
mend  them  to  the  notice  of  the  Department  of  War:  Lieut- 
Col.  Fred.  T.  Locke,  assistant  adjutant-general;  Lieut- 
Col.  William  H.  Owen,  chief  quartermaster;  Capt.  D.  L. 
Smith,  acting  chief  commissary  of  subsistence;  Surg.  J.  J. 
Milhau,  U.  S.  Army,  medical  director;  Asst.  Surg.  C.  P. 
Russell,  U.  S.  Army,  medical  inspector;  Capt.  John  W. 
Williams,  assistant  adjutant-general  and  acting  aide-de 
camp;  Capt.  William  Jay,  aide-de-camp,  and  First  Lieut. 
George  T.  Ingham,  Eleventh  U.  S.  Infantry,  aide-de-camp. 

"  The  signal  officers,  Capt.  W.  H.  Hill  and  Lieut.  I.  S. 
Lyon,  performed  their  duties  creditably. 

"  General  Weed  and  Colonel  Vincent,  officers  of  rare 
promise,  gave  their  lives  to  their  country.  The  former 


1 86    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

had  been  conspicuous  during  the  war,  won  and  adorned 
his  promotion,  and  surrendered  it  and  his  life  on  the  spot 
he  was  called  upon  to  defend. 

"  In  this  campaign  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  conse 
quent  upon  Lee's  second  invasion  of  Maryland,  troops 
never  endured  more,  marched  more  in  the  same  length  of 
time,  suffered  more,  deserved  more,  or  fought  better  than 
they.  Prompt  response  and  obedience  to  all  orders  char 
acterized  them.  Their  record  up  to  July  24,  with  its  in 
calculable  results,  is  a  study,  and  has  few  parallels  in  this 
history  of  the  rebellion. 

"  Tabular  and  nominal  lists  have  preceded  this  report. 

"  I  inclose  the  reports  of  division  and  other  commanders, 
and  with  them  a  list  of  casualties  in  the  corps." 

Report  of  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  Griffin,  U.  S.  Army,  com 
manding  First  Division. 

"  HDQRS.  FIRST  DIVISION,  FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS, 

"  NEAR  BEVERLY  FORD,  VA.,  August  14,  1863. 
"  In  compliance  with  circular  from  headquarters  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  dated  August  12,  1863,  I  have  the  honor 
to  report  that  I  arrived  at  Gettysburg  on  July  3  last,  and 
relieved  General  Barnes,  in  command  of  the  Division,  on 
the  4th.1  .  .  ." 

Report  of  Brig.-Gen.  James  Barnes,  U.  S.  Army,  com 
manding  First  Division. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  FIRST  DIVISION,  FIFTH  CORPS, 

"  BEVERLY  FORD,  VA.,  August  24,  1863. 
"  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report  of  the 
operations  of  the  First  division  of  the  Fifth  corps  from 

1  As  the  remainder  of  this  report  relates  to  movements  of  the 
division  after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  it  is  omitted. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       187 

June  28  to  July  9,  including  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  and 
the  movements  of  the  command  during  the  few  days  pre 
vious  and  subsequent  thereto,  in  conformity  with  instruc 
tions  from  headquarters: 

"  On  June  28,  after  a  succession  of  rapid  marches  from 
Virginia,  the  division  encamped  about  two  miles  south 
of  Frederick  City,  Md. 

"  On  the  29th,  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  having  devolved  upon  Major-General  Meade,  until 
then  commanding  the  Fifth  corps,  Major-General  Sykes, 
who  had  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  corps,  directed 
an  early  movement  forward.  The  First  division,  under 
my  command,  moved  accordingly  through  Frederick  City 
toward  the  town  of  Liberty,  and,  passing  beyond  that 
place  about  two  miles,  bivouacked  for  the  night. 

"  On  the  3Oth,  at  4  A.  M.,  the  march  was  resumed  and 
continued  toward  Union  Mills,  approaching  the  place  with 
proper  precautions,  on  account  of  a  heavy  body  of  cavalry 
of  the  enemy,  some  8,000  or  10,000  in  number,  as  re 
ported,  then  occupying  it.  Upon  reaching  the  town,  we 
found  that  this  cavalry  force  had  left  it  some  three  or  four 
hours  before  our  arrival,  and  had  gone  in  the  direction  of 
Hanover. 

"  The  division  halted  here  for  the  night,  and  on  the  fol 
lowing  morning,  July  i,  left  at  an  early  hour  for  Hanover, 
where  it  arrived  at  about  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Or 
ders  were  here  received  to  halt  for  the  night,  but  scarcely 
had  arms  been  stacked  when  news  was  received  that  an 
engagement  had  that  day  taken  place  between  the  enemy 
and  a  portion  of  the  army  at  Gettysburg.  Orders  were 
received  for  an  immediate  resumption  of  the  march  to 
ward  Gettysburg,  and,  notwithstanding  a  long  march  had 
already  been  accomplished,  the  orders  were  received  by  the 
troops  with  the  utmost  enthusiasm.  The  division  was 
soon  on  the  road,  and  continued  its  march  toward  Gettys- 


1 88    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

burg,  halting  after  midnight  about  2  miles  from  that  place. 
Resuming  its  march,  after  a  brief  rest  of  two  or  three 
hours,  the  division  reached  Gettysburg  at  about  7  o'clock 
in  the  morning  of  July  2. 

11  The  Eighteenth  Massachusetts,  Colonel  Hayes  com 
manding,  was  immediately  detached  to  support  a  battery 
upon  the  left  of  the  road,  and  the  remaining  portion  of  the 
command  was  placed  in  position,  by  direction  of  General 
Sykes,  on  the  right  of  the  Second  division  of  the  corps, 
south  of  and  facing  toward  the  village. 

"  The  Ninth  Massachusetts,  Colonel  Guiney  command 
ing,  was  here  detailed  from  the  Second  brigade,  as  skir 
mishers,  and  deployed  at  some  distance  in  front  of  the 
line. 

"  The  command  here  rested  for  further  instructions. 
After  the  lapse  of  an  hour  or  more  the  division  received 
orders  to  change  its  position,  moving  some  distance  to  the 
rear  and  toward  the  left  of  this  first  line,  but  it  remained 
in  this  new  position  for  a  short  period  only.  Orders  were 
again  received  to  move  still  farther  to  the  left,  and,  subse 
quently  crossing  the  creek  over  a  small  bridge,  we  were 
held  in  reserve  in  an  orchard  on  the  left  of  the  road,  with 
instructions  to  wait  there  for  further  orders.  Here  the 
Eighteenth  Massachusetts,  detached  as  above  stated  early 
in  the  morning,  rejoined  the  command,  and  was  posted  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  road.  These  various  movements 
occupied  the  time  until  long  after  midday.  The  sound  of 
the  enemy's  artillery  still  indicated  a  movement  toward  the 
left  of  the  point  where  we  were  then  halted. 

"  Between  4  and  5  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  orders  were 
received  from  General  Sykes  to  move  toward  the  left  and 
to  the  front.  The  column  was  immediately  formed,  and 
moved  rapidly  up  by  the  Taneytown  road  to  the  ground 
assigned  to  the  division.  General  Sykes  and  myself,  pre 
ceding  the  advance  of  the  column  upon  the  ground  upon 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       189 

which  it  was  to  take  position,  reconnoitered  the  field,  and 
the  position  to  be  held  by  the  command  was  determined 
upon  by  him. 

"  Soon  after,  the  head  of  the  column  entered  upon  the 
field.  At  the  same  time  General  Warren,  of  the  staff  of 
General  Meade,  came  up,  riding  rapidly  from  the  left,  and, 
pointing  out  the  position  of  the  elevation  known  as  the 
Round  Top,  not  far  off  and  toward  the  left,  urged  the  im 
portance  of  assistance  in  that  direction.  General  Sykes 
yielded  to  his  earnest  request,  and  I  immediately  directed 
Colonel  Vincent,  commanding  the  Third  brigade,  to  proceed 
to  that  point  with  his  brigade.  Colonel  Vincent  moved  with 
great  promptness  to  the  post  assigned  to  him.  The  brigade 
consisted  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan,  the  Forty-fourth  New 
York,  the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania,  and  the  Twentieth 
Maine  regiments. 

:<  The  Second  brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Sweitzer, 
arrived  next  upon  the  ground.  This  brigade  consisted  of 
the  Fourth  Michigan,  the  Sixty-second  Pennsylvania,  the 
Ninth  Massachusetts,  and  the  Thirty-second  Massachusetts. 
The  Ninth  Massachusetts,  however,  was  absent,  being  upon 
the  special  duty  for  which  it  had  been  detailed  in  the  morn 
ing.  Upon  receiving  his  instructions  Colonel  Sweitzer 
placed  his  command  promptly  in  position. 

'  The  First  brigade,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Til- 
ton,  arrived  next.  This  brigade  was  composed  of  the 
Eighteenth  Massachusetts,  the  Twenty-second  Massachu 
setts,  the  One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth  Pennsylvania,  and 
the  First  Michigan  regiments.  The  position  assigned  to 
it  was  on  the  right  of  the  ground  occupied  by  the  Second 
brigade,  and  was  immediately  placed  by  Colonel  Tilton, 
in  conformity  with  the  instruction  given  to  him. 

'  The  division  thus  in  position  constituted  the  right  of 
the  Fifth  corps,  and  its  place  in  line  was  on  the  left  of 
the  ground  assigned  to  the  Third  corps.  The  line  was 


190    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

on  the  edge  of  a  thick  wood,  the  ground  to  the  front 
being  cleared  of  timber,  but  interspersed  with  rocks  and 
some  straggling  trees.  As  the  two  brigades  entered  the 
wood  they  passed  over  a  line  of  troops,  understood  to  be  a 
portion  of  a  brigade  of  the  Third  corps;  they  were  lying 
down  upon  the  ground. 

"  Upon  the  right  of  our  position  an  open  space,  appar 
ently  unprotected,  extended  to  some  distance.  Upon  call 
ing  the  attention  of  General  Sykes  to  it,  he  remarked,  re 
ferring  to  the  part  of  the  Third  corps  over  which  we  had 
passed  and  then  lying  down  in  our  rear,  that  those  troops 
were  to  be  removed.  The  remaining  portion  of  the  Third 
corps  was  understood  to  be  at  some  distance  to  the  right, 
and  much  in  advance  of  what  seemed  to  be  their  natural 
and  true  position.  This  unguarded  space  was  watched 
with  great  anxiety.  There  was  little  time,  however,  for 
deliberation.  General  Sykes,  called  by  his  duty  to  the 
left  of  the  line,  went  toward  that  portion  of  his  command. 
The  attack  of  the  enemy  commenced  almost  immediately 
along  my  front.  It  was  very  severe,  but  was  gallantly 
withstood. 

"  After  some  time,  during  which  the  firing  was  very 
heavy,  the  enemy  showed  itself  in  great  force  upon  our 
right  flank.  He  had  penetrated  through  the  unguarded 
space  there,  and  commenced  pouring  in  a  destructive  fire 
from  the  advantageous  position  he  had  gained,  and  with 
out  changing  my  front  there  were  no  means  of  checking 
his  advance  toward  my  rear.  Colonel  Tilton,  command 
ing  the  First  brigade,  which  was  on  the  right,  was  im 
mediately  directed  to  change  his  front  to  the  right,  and 
the  order  was  at  once  executed,  deliberately,  yet  promptly, 
and  in  good  order.  Colonel  Sweitzer,  commanding  the 
Second  brigade,  on  the  left  of  the  First,  was  immediately 
notified  of  this  change  upon  his  right,  and  directed  to  fall 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       191 

back  in  good  order,  and  to  take  up  a  new  position  a  short 
distance  in  his  rear,  for  the  purpose  of  co-operating  in  op 
posing  this  heavy  attack  upon  the  flank.  This  brigade, 
consisting  at  that  time  of  only  three  regiments,  numbering 
in  all,  officers  and  men,  1,010,  was  placed  promptly  and  in 
good  order  as  directed.  The  First  brigade  numbered  in 
all,  officers  and  men,  654. 

"  Affairs  being  in  this  position,  General  Caldwell,  com 
manding  a  brigade  of  the  Second  corps,  came  up  in  great 
haste  and  stated  to  me  that  his  brigade,  then  in  the  woods 
a  short  distance  to  the  left,  was  driving  the  enemy  in  his 
front,  and  urgently  requested  assistance.  I  immediately 
directed  Colonel  Sweitzer  to  go  to  his  relief.  He  moved 
his  brigade  forward  in  line,  to  the  front  and  left,  his  men 
giving  cheers  as  they  advanced  across  an  open  field  to  the 
edge  of  the  wood;  but  the  progress  of  the  enemy  upon  our 
flank  still  continued,  and  this  brigade  was  compelled  again 
to  change  its  front  to  repel  his  advance,  and  soon  found 
itself  in  close  conflict  with  him.  The  Fourth  Michigan 
and  the  Sixty-second  Pennsylvania  were  in  actual  contact 
with  him.  Colonel  Jeffords,  commanding  the  Fourth 
Michigan,  was  thrust  through  with  a  bayonet  while  gal 
lantly  attempting  to  rescue  his  colors  from  the  grasp  of 
the  enemy. 

"  Finding  himself  unable  to  compete  with  numbers  far 
superior  to  his  own,  and  that  the  enemy  was  gaining 
ground  to  his  rear,  Colonel  Sweitzer  directed  his  command 
to  retire  slowly,  but  orderly,  halting  and  firing  as  they  re 
tired,  and  took  position  on  elevated  ground  a  short  distance 
to  his  rear,  and  succeeded  in  preventing  the  enemy  from 
making  any  further  progress  in  that  direction. 

"  In  the  meantime  the  movements  of  the  First  brigade, 
under  similar  circumstances,  corresponded  with  those  of 
the  Second.  This  brigade,  small  in  numbers,  fired,  and 


192    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

retired  in  good  order,  and  succeeded  in  reaching  the 
ground  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  open  field  toward  the 
left,  and  there  halted.  The  darkness  put  an  end  to  the 
conflict,  and  the  enemy  was  foiled  in  his  effort  to  get  in 
the  rear  of  the  command.  The  Ninth  Massachusetts 
shortly  afterward  rejoined  the  Second  brigade,  having 
been  relieved  from  the  duty  upon  which  it  had  been  de 
tailed  early  in  the  morning.  In  this  position  the  two  bri 
gades  remained  during  the  night. 

"  On  the  following  day  the  First  brigade  was  directed 
to  relieve  the  Third  brigade  at  Little  Round  Top,  where  it 
also  had  succeeded  in  maintaining  the  position  assigned 
to  it,  as  will  appear  in  the  sequel. 

"  I  cannot  speak  in  terms  too  commendatory  of  the 
bearing  of  the  officers  and  men  of  these  two  brigades  during 
the  progress  of  this  conflict.  Skillfully  directed  by  the  two 
brigade  commanders,  they  obeyed  with  cool  intrepidity 
every  order  issued  to  them,  under  the  most  trying  circum 
stances,  and  long  resisted  superior  numbers  with  firmness. 
Partly  surrounded  by  the  enemy,  they  succeeded  in  pre 
venting  the  left  of  the  line  from  being  taken  in  reverse, 
resisting  an  attack  not  exceeded,  I  am  sure,  in  violence  in 
any  contest  hitherto  occurring.  The  exposure  of  their 
flank,  arising  from  whatever  cause,  placed  them  in  a  most 
dangerous  position,  and  their  heroic  conduct  alone  saved 
the  command,  at  least,  if  not  the  entire  left  of  the  army, 
from  disaster.  The  statement  of  the  casualties  of  the 
contest  is  sufficient  evidence  of  their  gallant  resistance, 
and  it  is  alike  due  to  those  who  have  survived  and  to  the 
memory  of  the  gallant  dead  that  this  record  should  be 
made  of  their  valor  and  devotion. 

'  The  Third  brigade,  as  above  related,  was  detached 
from  the  division  upon  its  arrival  upon  the  ground  and 
was  consequently  removed  from  my  immediate  oversight. 
The  record  of  its  service,  however,  drawn  principally  from 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       193 

the  report  of  its  commander,  belongs  to  this  record  of  the 
service  of  the  division. 

"  Colonel  Vincent,  commanding  the  brigade,  upon  being 
detached,  as  above  mentioned,  proceeded  promptly  to  the 
position  assigned  him.  It  was  upon  an  elevated  and  rocky 
hill  known  as  the  Little  Round  Top.  It  was  situated  at 
some  distance  to  our  left,  and  near  the  extreme  left  of  the 
line  of  battle.  Its  defense  was  of  the  utmost  importance. 
When  the  brigade  was  placed  in  position  the  Twentieth 
Maine  occupied  the  left  of  the  line,  the  Sixteenth  Michi 
gan  the  right,  the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania  and  the 
Forty-fourth  New  York  the  center.  The  Third  division 
of  the  Fifth  corps  was  posted  on  the  right  of  the  brigade. 
The  enemy  had  concentrated  a  heavy  force  in  front  of  the 
line,  and  began  a  fierce  attack  immediately  after  the 
troops  were  in  position.  Repeated  charges  were  made 
upon  the  center  of  the  brigade,  but  the  line  was  unbroken. 
A  vigorous  attack  upon  the  right  caused  a  temporary  wav 
ering  there,  but,  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York 
coming  promptly  to  its  support,  it  was  re-established  at 
once. 

"  It  was  at  this  time  that  Colonel  Vincent,  command 
ing  the  brigade,  while  rallying  this  part  of  his  command, 
fell  mortally  wounded.  He  was  a  gallant  officer,  beloved 
and  respected  by  his  command  and  by  all  who  knew  him. 
His  death  is  a  serious  loss  to  the  army  and  the  country. 

"  Upon  the  removal  of  Colonel  Vincent  from  the  field, 
the  command  of  the  brigade  devolved  upon  Colonel  Rice, 
of  the  Forty-fourth  New  York  Volunteers.  The  enemy, 
as  stated,  having  in  vain  attempted  to  break  the  right  of 
the  brigade,  renewed  his  attack  upon  the  center  and  left. 
The  Twentieth  Maine,  Colonel  Chamberlain  commanding, 
was  posted  on  the  left.  It  consisted  of  380  men  and  of 
ficers.  While  the  enemy  in  its  front  was  making  a  fierce 
attack,  a  brigade  was  observed  in  the  rear  of  their  lines 


194    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

moving  by  its  right  flank  and  passing  through  a  slight  ra 
vine  on  our  left,  with  the  evident  purpose  of  gaining  a 
position  on  the  left  flank  of  this  regiment. 

"  Colonel  Chamberlain  at  once  threw  back  his  left  wing, 
and  extended  his  right  wing  by  intervals  toward  the  left, 
in  order  to  avoid  diminishing  the  extent  of  his  front.  The 
brigade  of  the  enemy  alluded  to  reaching  a  proper  position, 
attacked  him  furiously  on  the  left  flank,  advancing  within 
10  paces  and  rapidly  firing.  They  were  first  checked  and 
then  repulsed  by  the  left  wing  of  the  regiment,  thrown 
back  for  that  purpose. 

"  A  second,  third,  and  fourth  time  the  enemy  renewed 
their  attempt  to  break  this  line,  and  each  time  they  were 
successfully  repelled  by  that  handful  of  men.  Four  times 
that  little  interval  of  10  paces  was  the  scene  of  a  desperate 
conflict.  The  ground  was  strewed  with  dead  and  wounded 
men  of  both  sides,  promiscuously  mingled.  Their  am 
munition  was  exhausted;  they  replenished  it  from  the 
cartridge-boxes  of  the  men  lying  around  them,  whether 
friends  or  foes,  but  even  this  resource  soon  failed  them; 
the  enemy  in  greatly  superior  numbers  pressed  hard;  men 
and  officers  began  to  look  to  the  rear  for  safety,  but  the 
gallant  commander  of  the  regiment  ordered  the  bayonets 
to  be  fixed,  and,  at  the  command,  '  Forward ! '  that  wearied 
and  worn  body  of  men  rushed  onward  with  a  shout.  The 
enemy  fell  back.  Pressing  on  and  wheeling  to  the  right 
in  open  intervals,  the  left  wing  came  again  in  line  with  the 
right  wing,  and  then  the  whole  regiment  deployed  at  in 
tervals  of  5  paces,  followed  up  the  advantage  they  had 
gained.  The  enemy  threw  down  their  arms  and  surren 
dered  in  large  numbers;  the  others  fled  rapidly  from  the 
contest;  368  prisoners,  including  i  colonel,  i  lieutenant- 
colonel,  and  a  dozen  other  officers  of  lesser  rank,  were  sent 
to  the  rear;  50  of  their  dead  lay  upon  the  field,  and  large 
numbers  of  their  wounded;  30  of  this  gallant  regiment 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       195 

were  killed,  over  100  were  wounded,  but  not  one  was  taken 
a  prisoner,  and  none  were  missing. 

"  It  was  now  nearly  dark.  A  portion  of  the  enemy 
appeared  to  have  occupied  the  summit  of  the  rocky  hill  to 
the  left.  The  men  of  this  brave  regiment,  exhausted  by 
their  labors,  had  thrown  themselves  upon  the  ground,  and 
many  of  them  sunk  at  once  in  sleep.  Colonel  Rice,  now 
in  command  of  the  brigade,  directed  Colonel  Chamberlain 
to  drive  the  enemy  from  this  height.  The  order  was  at 
once  given.  Roused  again  to  action,  and  advancing  with 
fixed  bayonets  and  without  firing,  lest  the  smallness  of  their 
numbers  might  be  suspected,  they  rushed  up  the  hill. 

1  Twenty-five  more  prisoners,  including  some  staff  of 
ficers,  were  added  to  the  number  previously  taken,  with  a 
loss  to  the  regiment  of  I  officer  mortally  wounded  and  i 
man  taken  prisoner  by  the  enemy.  It  was  ascertained 
that  these  troops  occupying  the  hill  had  been  sent  from 
Hood's  division,  which  was  then  massed  a  few  hundred 
yards  distant,  and  that  their  object  was  to  reconnoiter  the 
position,  as  a  preliminary  to  taking  possession  of  the  height. 

"  In  addition  to  the  prisoners  above  mentioned  as  taken 
by  this  regiment,  300  stand  of  arms  were  also  captured 
by  them.  It  is  due  to  this  regiment  and  to  its  commander 
that  their  service  should  be  thus  recorded  in  some  detail. 

"  Upon  receiving  a  reinforcement  of  five  regiments  of 
the  Third  division,  under  command  of  Colonel  Fisher, 
Colonel  Rice  detached  two  of  them  to  the  aid  of  Colonel 
Chamberlain,  in  order  to  maintain  the  position  he  had 
gained,  and  he  was  thus  enabled  to  hold  it,  and  the  enemy, 
having  been  repelled  upon  every  point  of  his  attack  and 
night  coming  on,  withdrew  from  the  conflict. 

"  Colonel  Rice  directed  the  Forty-fourth  New  York  and 
the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania  to  move  to  the  front  and 
gather  up  the  wounded,  who,  including  those  of  the  enemy 
who  had  been  left  upon  the  field,  were  carefully  brought 


196    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

in.  The  total  results  of  the  service  of  this  brigade  are 
stated  by  Colonel  Rice  to  be  500  prisoners  captured,  in 
cluding  2  colonels  and  15  other  commissioned  officers,  and 
1,000  stand  of  arms.  The  brigade  numbered  about  1,000 
men. 

'  The  following  day  was  principally  occupied  in  burying 
the  dead.  The  Third  brigade  was  relieved  by  the  First 
brigade,  and  held  the  position  occupied  by  it. 

"  It  would  be  a  grateful  task  to  relate  in  detail  the  serv 
ices  of  many  who  deserve  a  more  particular  mention,  but 
the  limits  of  this  report  will  not  permit.  No  one  failed 
in  his  duty. 

"  A  tribute  is  due  to  the  memory  of  Colonel  Vincent, 
who  fell,  mortally  wounded,  early  in  the  engagement.  He 
lingered  a  few  days  after  the  engagement.  His  promotion 
as  a  brigadier-general  was  sent  to  him  at  once  as  an 
appreciation  of  his  services  by  the  Government,  but  it 
reached  him  too  late  for  his  own  recognition.  He  expired 
soon  after  its  receipt. 

"  A  special  mention  should  also  be  made  of  Colonel 
Jeffords,  of  the  Fourth  Michigan  Volunteers,  who  sealed 
his  devotion  to  his  country  with  his  blood  while  contend 
ing  hand-to-hand  with  overpowering  numbers,  in  endeav 
oring  to  rescue  the  colors  of  his  regiment  from  the  hands 
of  the  enemy. 

'  To  Colonels  Tilton,  Sweitzer,  and  Rice,  the  com 
manders  of  brigades,  great  credit  is  due  for  the  successful 
and  skillful  management  of  their  commands  under  the 
very  trying  circumstances  in  which  they  were  placed.  Col 
onel  Chamberlain,  of  the  Twentieth  Maine  Volunteers, 
whose  service  I  have  endeavored  briefly  to  describe,  de 
serves  especial  mention. 

''  To  the  officers  of  my  staff  I  am  indebted  for  efficient 
and  prompt  attention  to  their  arduous  duties,  namely: 
Captain  [Catharinus  B.]  Mervine,  assistant  adjutant-gen- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       197 

eral;  Lieuts.  [Charles  H.]  Ross  and  [T.  Corwin]  Case, 
aides;  Captain  [George  M.]  Barnard,  assistant  inspector- 
general  of  the  division,  and  Dr.  [Charles]  Shippen,  the 
medical  director  of  the  division. 

:<  The  command  remained  in  the  same  position  the  two 
following  days. 

"  Being  disabled  for  further  actual  command  of  the  di 
vision,  the  opportune  arrival  of  General  Griffin  enabled  me 
to  relinquish  it  to  him,  and  the  division  moved  toward 
Middletown,  where  it  arrived  on  July  8. 

"  A  tabular  and  a  nominal  return  of  casualties  have 
been  duly  forwarded.  The  total  strength  of  the  division 
upon  entering  the  engagement  was,  in  the  three  brigades, 
2664,  and  the  aggregate  of  killed,  wounded,  and  miss 
ing  897." 

Report  of  Col.  William  S.  Tilton,  Twenty-second  Mas 
sachusetts,  commanding  First  Brigade. 

"  HDQRS.  FIRST  BRIG.,  FIRST  Drv.,  FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS, 
"  MIDDLETOWN,  MDV  July  9,  1863. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  report  the  part  taken  by  this  bri 
gade  in  the  battles  of  the  2d  and  3d  instant. 

"  At  4 130  p.  M.,  on  July  2,  the  brigade  under  my  command 
advanced  to  the  front,  and  was  placed,  by  order  of  Gen 
eral  Barnes,  in  order  of  battle  in  a  piece  of  woods  at  the 
south  of  Mr.  Rose's  house.  The  Second  brigade  was  on 
our  left,  but  there  being  no  infantry  upon  our  right  I 
made  a  crotchet  by  refusing  the  right  wing  of  my  right 
battalion  (One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth  Pennsylvania 
Volunteers,  Colonel  Gwyn). 

"  No  sooner  was  the  line  formed  than  the  foe  attacked 
our  front.  The  onslaught  was  terrible  and  my  losses 
heavy,  so  much  so  that  I  was  somewhat  doubtful  if  our 
line  could  withstand  it.  This  fact  I  communicated  to  the 


198    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

general  commanding  division,  who  ordered  me  to  fail 
back  in  good  order  if  unable  to  hold  the  position;  but  my 
men  behaved  nobly,  and  twice  repulsed  the  assailants. 
My  colonels  wished  to  advance.  Being  anxious  about  my 
right,  however,  I  reconnoitered  in  person,  and  discovered 
the  enemy  in  large  force  coming  from  the  direction  of 
Rose's  house,  with  the  evident  design  of  outflanking  me. 
I  immediately  retired  and  took  up  a  new  position  (in  two 
lines)  at  the  left  and  rear  of  a  battery  which  had  been 
posted  about  three  hundred  yards  to  my  right  and  rear. 
The  battery  soon  commenced  to  retreat,  firing,  followed  by 
the  rebels,  who  were  now  again  upon  my  right  flank.  To 
avoid  this  flank  movement  I  retired,  firing,  a  short  distance 
in  the  timber,  and  then  moved  across  an  open  field,  took 
up  a  new  position  upon  the  right  of  the  Second  division, 
and  reported  to  General  Sykes.  In  this  last  movement  I 
was  greatly  embarrassed  by  squads  of  men  and  parts  of 
regiments  who,  hurrying  from  the  front,  broke  into  and 
through  my  line.  I  think,  however,  that  I  saved  my  bri 
gade  from  great  disaster  after  it  could  no  longer  do  any 
good  in  front,  and  succeeded  in  forming  a  new  line,  which 
was  retained  through  the  night. 

"  All  of  my  officers  and  men  did  their  duty,  their  whole 
duty,  and  showed  the  greatest  coolness  and  courage,  and 
where  all  did  so  well  it  were  invidious  to  mention  names. 

"  On  the  3d  we  relieved  the  Third  brigade,  on  duty, 
holding  the  rocky  hill  upon  the  extreme  left. 

"  On  the  4th  I  advanced  the  brigade  to  the  edge  of  the 
woods  in  our  front,  and  sent  out  a  strong  line  of  skir 
mishers  to  feel  the  enemy.  The  report  of  this  reconnais 
sance  has  been  made  by  order  directly  to  Major-General 
Sykes. 

"  My  loss  on  the  2d  instant  was  12  killed,  80  wounded, 
and  17  missing;  total,  109. 

"  Owing  to  forced  marches  we  had  remaining  on  the 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       199 

2d  only  474  men,  and  as  part  of  these  were  not  actually 
engaged,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  percentage  of  loss  is  very 
great." 

Report  of  Col.  Jacob  B.  Sweitzer,  Sixty-second  Penn 
sylvania,  commanding  Second  Brigade. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  SECOND  BRIGADE, 
"  CAMP  NEAR  WARRENTON,  VA.,  July  31,  1863. 

"  In  obedience  to  orders  I  respectfully  submit  the  fol 
lowing  report  of  the  operations  of  this  brigade  during  the 
recent  battle  of  Gettysburg: 

"  After  a  hard  march  on  the  day  previous,  July  i,  from 
Unionville,  Md.,  by  way  of  Hanover,  the  brigade  bivou 
acked  after  12  p.  M.,  with  the  division  in  the  woods  by  the 
roadside,  4  or  5  miles  distant  from  the  battlefield. 

"  Next  morning  by  daylight  we  were  on  the  march 
again,  the  Second  brigade  leading.  Having  arrived  near 
what  I  supposed  to  be  the  right  of  our  line,  and  near  a 
farmhouse  and  barn,  the  division  was  massed,  the  bri 
gades  occupying  positions  in  the  order  of  their  numbers 
from  right  to  left,  General  Sykes'  division  being  on  our 
left.  Here  a  call  was  made  for  a  regiment  from  this  bri 
gade  for  picket  duty  by  General  Barnes,  and  Colonel 
Guiney,  with  the  Ninth  Massachusetts,  was  directed  to 
report  to  him  for  instructions,  and  did  so. 

"  Shortly  after  this  the  division  changed  front  to  the 
left,  at  nearly  a  right  angle  with  its  former  position,  and 
formed  in  line  of  battalions  in  close  column  by  division. 

"  We  had  been  in  this  position  but  a  few  moments  be 
fore  we  were  again  moved  a  considerable  distance  to  the 
left ;  then  moved  by  the  front  across  the  creek,  and  massed 
in  an  orchard  on  the  hill  above  the  bridge  on  the  Gettys 
burg  turnpike.  There  we  remained  until  late  in  the  after 
noon  (the  precise  time  I  do  not  remember),  and  the  com 
mand  had  a  few  hours  quiet  and  rest. 


200    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

"  Meanwhile  there  had  been  very  little  firing  along  the 
line,  and  I  came  to  the  conclusion  the  day  would  pass  with 
out  the  division  being  called  into  action.  But  soon  after 
cannonading  was  heard  on  the  left,  and  we  were  moved 
quite  a  distance  farther  to  the  left,  and  diagonally  to  the 
front  skirting  in  our  march  the  woods  in  rear  of  or  in 
which  our  lines  were  formed.  When  we  moved  off  from 
the  orchard,  the  Third  brigade,  being  on  the  left  of  the  di 
vision,  moved  first,  the  Second  and  First  brigades  follow 
ing  in  the  inverted  order. 

"  The  Second  brigade  was  placed  in  position  in  a  wood 
fronting  an  open  field,  the  woods  bordering  two  sides  of 
the  field,  the  side  in  which  we  were  and  also  that  extend 
ing  at  right  angles  from  our  left  toward  the  enemy,  and 
in  the  last-mentioned  wood  the  First  brigade  was  posted, 
connecting  with  our  left.  Having  formed  the  three  regi 
ments  of  this  brigade  in  line  of  battle  (the  Ninth  Massa 
chusetts  being  still  absent  on  picket  duty)  in  their  regular 
order  from  right  to  left,  and  finding  this  formation  threw 
the  Thirty-second  Massachusetts,  which  was  on  the  left, 
into  an  exposed  position  beyond  the  woods  in  low,  cleared 
ground,  I  directed  Colonel  Prescott  to  change  his  front  to 
the  rear,  so  as  to  give  him  the  benefit  of  the  elevated 
ground  and  the  cover  of  the  woods,  which  movement  he 
executed. 

"  We  had  not  remained  long  in  this  position  before  an 
attack  commenced  by  the  enemy  in  front  of  the  First  bri 
gade  and  Thirty-second  Massachusetts.  As  there  was  no 
appearance  of  the  enemy  in  front  of  the  line  formed  by  the 
Sixty-second  Pennsylvania  and  Fourth  Michigan,  I  di 
rected  them  to  change  front  to  the  left,  and  form  lines  in 
rear  of  the  Thirty-second  Massachusetts,  to  strengthen 
that  position.  During  the  execution  of  this  order  the  at 
tack  continued;  the  firing  was  very  severe,  and  we  lost 
many  brave  officers  and  men.  Here  fell  Major  Lowry, 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       201 

second  to  none  in  all  the  attributes  of  a  soldier  and  a  gentle 
man. 

:<  When  the  attack  commenced  word  was  sent  by  Gen 
eral  Barnes  that  when  we  retired  we  should  fall  back  under 
cover  of  the  woods.  This  order  was  communicated  to 
Colonel  Prescott,  whose  regiment  was  then  under  the 
hottest  fire.  Understanding  it  to  be  a  peremptory  order 
to  retire  then,  he  replied,  '  I  don't  want  to  retire;  I  am  not 
ready  to  retire;  I  can  hold  this  place/  and  he  made  good 
his  assertion.  Being  informed  that  he  misunderstood  the 
order,  which  was  only  intended  to  inform  him  how  to  re 
tire  when  it  became  necessary,  he  was  satisfied,  and  he 
and  his  command  held  their  ground  manfully. 

"  Some  time  after  that  word  was  sent  that  the  First 
brigade  was  retiring,  and  General  Barnes  sent  me  word  to 
fall  back  also,  which  I  did  in  perfect  good  order,  the  regi 
ments  retaining  their  alignments  and  halting  and  firing  as 
they  came  back.  Having  arrived  at  the  road  leading  along 
the  rear  of  the  wheat-field,  the  brigade  was  formed  in  line 
in  the  woods  in  rear  of  the  road,  and  parallel  to  it,  the 
right  resting  at  the  corner  of  the  woods  toward  the  front. 
We  had  not  remained  here  more  than,  say,  fifteen  minutes, 
when  a  general  officer  I  had  never  seen  before  rode  up  to 
me,  and  said  his  command  was  driving  the  enemy  in  the 
woods  in  front  of  the  wheat-field;  that  he  needed  the  sup 
port  of  a  brigade,  and  desired  to  know  if  I  would  give  him 
mine. 

"  I  referred  him  to  General  Barnes,  and  said  I  would 
obey  his  directions  with  pleasure.  He  spoke  to  the  Gen 
eral,  who  was  not  far  off.  General  Barnes  came  and 
stated  to  me  what  had  been  said  to  him  by  General  Cald- 
well  (this  I  learned  was  the  officer  who  had  lately  spoken 
to  me),  and  asked  me  if  I  would  take  the  brigade  in.  I 
told  him  I  would  if  he  wished  me  to  do  so.  He  said  he 
did.  The  command  was  then  called  to  attention.  General 


202    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Barnes  got  out  in  front  of  them  and  made  a  few  patriotic 
remarks,  to  which  they  responded  with  a  cheer,  and  we 
started  off  across  the  wheat-field  in  a  line  parallel  to  the 
road,  our  right  flank  resting  on  the  woods.  We  advanced 
to  the  stone  fence  beyond  the  wheat-field  next  to  the 
woods,  and  took  position  behind  it  to  support,  as  we  sup 
posed,  our  friends  in  the  woods  in  front.  The  Fourth 
Michigan,  being  on  the  right  of  the  brigade,  extended  be 
yond  the  stone  fence,  and  was,  consequently,  most  ex 
posed. 

:<  We  had  scarcely  got  to  this  position  before  I  noticed 
regiments  retiring  from  the  woods  on  our  right,  which  I 
supposed  were  relieved  by  others  who  had  taken  their 
places,  and  would  protect  us  in  that  direction.  I  observed 
also  that  there  was  considerable  firing  diagonally  toward 
our  rear  from  these  woods,  which  I  then  thought  were 
shots  from  our  troops  aimed  over  us  at  the  enemy  in  the 
woods  beyond  and  falling  short.  They  were,  however, 
much  too  frequent  to  be  pleasant,  and  my  color-bearer, 
Ed.  Martin,  remarked,  'Colonel,  I'll  be-  -  if  I  don't 
think  we  are  faced  the  wrong  way;  the  rebs  are  up  there 
in  the  woods  behind  us,  on  the  right.' 

"  About  this  time,  too,  word  was  brought  me  from  the 
Fourth  Michigan  and  Sixty-second  Pennsylvania  that  the 
enemy  was  getting  into  our  rear  in  the  woods  on  the  right. 
I  directed  these  regiments  to  change  front,  to  face  in  that 
direction  and  meet  them,  which  they  did,  the  firing  in  the 
meanwhile  being  rapid  and  severe.  I  at  the  same  time  dis 
patched  Lieutenant  Seitz,  aide-de-camp,  to  communicate 
to  General  Barnes  our  situation.  He  reached  the  point 
where  he  had  last  seen  General  Barnes.  He  was  not  there. 
Lieutenant  Seitz  found  the  enemy  had  reached  that  point, 
and  he  came  near  falling  into  their  hands  himself;  his 
horse  was  killed,  and  he  made  his  way  back  to  me  on  foot ; 
reported  that  General  Barnes  was  not  to  be  found;  that 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       203 

the  enemy  was  in  the  woods  on  our  right  as  far  back  as 
where  we  had  started  from,  and  along  the  road  in  rear 
of  the  wheat-field. 

"  Finding  that  we  were  surrounded;  that  our  enemy  was 
under  cover,  while  we  were  in  the  open  field  exposed  to 
their  fire,  I  directed  the  command  to  fall  back.  This  was 
done  in  order,  the  command  halting  and  firing  as  it  re 
tired.  The  Fourth  Michigan  and  Sixty-second  Pennsyl 
vania  had  become  mixed  up  with  the  enemy,  and  many 
hand-to-hand  conflicts  occurred.  Colonel  Jeffords,  the 
gallant  commander  of  the  Fourth  Michigan,  was  thrust 
through  with  a  bayonet  in  a  contest  over  his  colors,  and 
Sergt.  William  McFairman,  Company  I,  and  Private  Wil 
liam  McCarter,  Company  A,  Sixty-second  Pennsylvania, 
receive  honorable  mention  by  Colonel  Hull  in  his  report, 
for  their  conduct  during  this  part  of  the  engagement. 

u  Finding  as  we  retired  in  the  direction  from  which  we 
advanced  that  the  fire  of  the  enemy  grew  more  severe  on 
our  right,  I  took  a  diagonal  direction  toward  the  corner 
of  the  wheat-field  on  our  left  and  rear.  We  crossed  the 
stone  fence  on  this  side  of  the  field,  and  retired  to  the  rear 
of  the  battery  on  the  elevation  beyond,  where  the  com 
mand  was  halted. 

"  We  had  lost  heavily  in  our  passage  across  the  field. 
The  Fourth  Michigan  and  Sixty-second  Pennsylvania  had 
been  surrounded,  and  a  large  proportion  of  those  regiments 
were  missing,  either  killed,  wounded,  or  prisoners.  What 
remained  of  the  command  formed  in  the  rear  of  the  bat 
tery  and  we  were  shortly  afterward  joined  by  the  Ninth 
Massachusetts,  which  had  been  absent  all  day  on  detached 
duty. 

"  It  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  a  more  trying  situation 
than  that  in  which  three  regiments  of  this  command  had 
lately  found  themselves,  and  from  which  they  had  just  ef 
fected  their  escape;  in  fact,  I  have  since  understood  that 


204    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

one  of  General  Barnes'  aides  remarked  to  him  shortly 
after  we  had  advanced,  when  it  was  discovered  the  enemy 
was  behind  us  on  the  flank,  that  he  might  bid  good-bye  to 
the  Second  brigade.  I  was  also  info<rmed  by  General 
Barnes  that,  learning  soon  after  we  had  advanced  the  sit 
uation  on  our  right,  he  had  dispatched  an  orderly  to  me 
with  the  information  and  a  verbal  order  to  withdraw,  but 
the  orderly  never  reached  me. 

"  Every  officer  and  man  in  the  command,  so  far  as  I  am 
informed,  did  his  whole  duty.  All  stood  their  ground  and 
fought  unflinchingly  until  they  were  ordered  by  me  to  re 
tire,  and  in  falling  back  behaved  with  coolness  and  delib 
eration.  We  lost  many  of  our  best  officers  and  men. 

"  I  subjoin  a  field  report  of  the  regiments  engaged  on 
the  morning  of  July  2,  and  also  a  report  of  the  same  regi 
ments  on  July  4.  A  nominal  and  tabular  report  of  casual 
ties  in  the  command  has  already  been  forwarded. 

"  About  dark  on  the  evening  of  the  2d  the  acting  assist 
ant  adjutant-general  of  the  First  brigade  came  to  me  and 
inquired  for  General  Barnes;  said  he  was  directed  by  Gen 
eral  Sykes  to  tell  him  to  have  the  Second  brigade  form  on 
the  right  of  the  First  in  the  position  they  then  were.  As 
General  Barnes  was  not  present,  I  received  the  order,  and 
put  the  Second  brigade  in  the  position  indicated,  where  we 
remained  until  the  evening  of  the  5th,  when  the  division 
advanced  toward  Emmittsburg. 

"  In  conclusion,  I  desire  to  express  my  gratification  at 
the  conduct  of  my  staff  during  the  engagement ;  Captain 
[George]  Monteith,  acting  assistant  adjutant-general; 
Captain  [Alvan  C]  Lamson,  acting  assistant  inspector- 
general;  Captain  [John  S.]  Burdett,  acting  commissary  of 
subsistence,  and  Lieutenant  [John  A.  M.]  Seitz,  acting 
aide-de-camp.  They  were  prompt  and  fearless  in  the  dis 
charge  of  their  duty.  We  were  all  fortunate  enough  to 
escape  being1  hit,  though  a  number  of  horses  in  the  party 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       205 

were  shot,  two  of  the  orderlies',  the  bugler's,  Lieutenant 
Seitz's,  and  my  own." 

Report  of  Colonel  James  C.  Rice,  Forty-fourth  New 
York,  commanding  Third  Brigade. 

"JULY  31,  1863. 

"  In  compliance  with  orders  from  division  headquarters, 
I  have  the  honor  to  report  the  operations  of  this  brigade 
during  the  battle  near  Gettysburg  on  the  2nd  and  3rd  inst. 

"  The  brigade,  under  the  command  of  the  late  Colonel 
Vincent,  was  detached  from  the  division  and  ordered  into 
position  at  about  4  p.  M.  of  the  2d  instant,  on  the  extreme 
left  of  our  line  of  battle.  The  Twentieth  Maine  occu 
pied  the  extreme  left  of  the  brigade  line,  the  Sixteenth 
Michigan  the  extreme  right,  connecting  with  the  Third 
Division,  under  General  Crawford,  while  the  Eighty-third 
Pennsylvania  and  Forty-fourth  New  York  occupied  the 
center.  The  muskets  taken  into  action  by  the  brigade 
numbered  about  one  thousand. 

"  The  ground  occupied  by  the  brigade  in  line  of  battle 
was  nearly  that  of  a  quarter  circle,  composed  mostly  of 
high  rocks  and  cliffs  in  the  center  and  becoming  more 
wooded  and  less  rugged  as  you  approached  to  the  left. 
The  right  was  thrown  forward  somewhat  to  the  front  of 
the  ledge  of  rocks,  and  was  much  more  exposed  than  other 
parts  of  the  line.  A  comparatively  smooth  ravine  ex 
tended  along  the  entire  front,  perhaps  50  yards  from  our 
line,  while  on  the  left  and  beyond  a  high  and  jagged  moun 
tain  rises,  called  Round  Top  hill.  That  the  disposition  of 
the  forces  and  the  nature  of  the  ground  may  be  better 
understood  by  the  general  commanding,  I  send  with  this 
report  a  diagram  of  the  same. 

"  The  brigade  had  scarcely  formed  in  line  of  battle  and 
pushed  forward  its  skirmishers  when  a  division  of  the 
enemy's  forces,  under  General  Hood,  made  a  desperate  at- 


206    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

tack  along  the  entire  line  of  the  brigade.  He  approached 
in  three  columns,  with  no  skirmishers  in  advance.  The 
object  of  the  enemy  was  evident.  If  he  could  gain  the 
vantage  ground  occupied  by  this  brigade,  the  left  flank  of 
our  line  must  give  way,  opening  to  him  a  vast  field  for 
successful  operations  in  the  rear  of  our  entire  army. 

'  To  effect  this  object  the  enemy  made  every  effort. 
Massing  two  or  three  brigades  of  his  force,  he  tried  for  an 
hour  in  vain  to  break  the  lines  of  the  Forty-fourth  New 
York  and  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania,  charging  again  and 
again  within  a  few  yards  of  these  unflinching  troops.  At 
every  charge  he  was  repulsed  with  terrible  slaughter.  De 
spairing  of  success  at  this  point,  he  made  a  desperate  at 
tack  upon  the  extreme  right  of  the  brigade,  forcing  back 
a  part  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan.  This  regiment  was 
broken,  and,  through  some  misunderstanding  of  orders,  ex 
plained  in  the  official  report  of  the  commanding  officer,  it 
was  thrown  into  confusion;  but  being  immediately  sup 
ported  by  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  Vol 
unteers,  the  line  became  again  firm  and  unbroken. 

"  It  was  at  this  point  of  time  that  Colonel  Vincent,  com 
manding  the  brigade,  fell  mortally  wounded.  Of  the 
character  of  this  gallant  and  accomplished  officer  I  will 
speak  before  I  close  this  report. 

'  The  enemy  again  attacked  the  center  with  great  vigor, 
and  the  extreme  left  with  desperation.  Passing  one  bri 
gade  of  his  forces  by  the  right  flank  in  three  columns,  he 
pushed  through  the  ravine  toward  the  left  of  our  brigade, 
came  immediately  to  a  '  front,'  and  charged  upon  the 
Twentieth  Maine.  Now  occurred  the  most  critical  time  of 
the  action.  For  above  half  an  hour  the  struggle  was  des 
perate.  At  length  the  enemy  pressed  so  strongly  upon  the 
left  flank  of  Colonel  Chamberlain's  regiment  that  he  wisely 
determined  to  change  the  order  of  battle,  and  commanded 
his  left  wing  to  fall  back  at  right  angles  to  his  right.  He 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       207 

then  ordered  a  charge  and  repulsed  the  enemy  at  every 
point. 

"  On  assuming  the  command  of  the  brigade  during  this 
attack  upon  the  center  and  left,  I  at  once  passed  along  the 
line,  and  notified  the  officers  and  men  of  my  own  regiment 
that  I  was  about  to  take  command  of  the  brigade  and  that 
they  must  hold  their  position  to  the  last.  I  did  this  that  no 
panic  might  arise.  I  then  notified  all  the  commanders  of 
the  regiments  in  person,  and  assured  them  of  my  deter 
mination  to  hold  the  line  to  the  last.  Colonel  Chamberlain 
and  other  officers  immediately  informed  me  that  their 
commands  were  out  of  ammunition.  I  had  at  this  time 
neither  an  aide  nor  an  orderly  even  to  bear  a  message. 
(See  P.  S.)  The  enemy  was  still  pressing  heavily  upon 
the  line.  I  immediately  pressed  into  service  every  of 
ficer  and  man  in  the  rear  not  engaged  in  the  action, 
whether  known  or  unknown,  and  made  them  pledge  their 
honor  that  they  would  deliver  in  person  every  order  that 
I  should  send  by  them.  I  sent  four  of  them,  one  after 
another,  with  orders  for  ammunition.  The  ammunition 
came  promptly,  was  distributed  at  once,  and  the  fight  went 
on. 

1  The  enemy  was  now  attempting  to  take  possession  of 
Round  Top  hill,  a  commanding  position  overlooking  our  left. 
It  was  evident  no  time  was  to  be  lost,  and  I  sent  at  once 
other  officers,  whom  I  pressed  into  my  service,  with  mes 
sages  to  the  general  commanding  the  corps,  asking  for  rein 
forcements  to  support  the  brigade.  The  messages  were 
promptly  delivered,  and  five  regiments  were  at  once  sent 
to  my  support  from  the  Third  division,  General  Crawford, 
under  command  of  Colonel  Fisher. 

"  Having,  with  the  aid  of  this  officer,  properly  disposed 
of  three  regiments  of  this  force,  I  ordered  Colonel  Cham 
berlain,  of  the  Twentieth  Maine,  to  advance  and  take 
possession  of  the  mountain.  This  order  was  promptly  and 


208    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

gallantly  executed  by  this  brave  and  accomplished  officer, 
who  rapidly  drove  the  enemy  over  the  mountain,  captur 
ing  many  prisoners.  Colonel  Fisher  at  once  ordered  two 
regiments  of  his  command  to  support  Colonel  Chamber 
lain,  and  the  hill  remained  permanently  in  our  possession. 

"  The  forces  of  the  enemy  being  now  repulsed  on  our 
left  and  front,  I  ordered  a  detachment  from  the  Forty- 
fourth  New  York  Volunteers  and  the  Eighty-third  Penn 
sylvania  to  push  forward  and  secure  all  the  fruits  of  this 
hard-earned  victory. 

"  It  was  now  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening,  and  before 
nine  o'clock  we  had  entire  possession  of  the  enemy's 
ground,  had  gathered  up  and  brought  in  all  of  our  own 
wounded  and  those  of  the  enemy,  and  had  taken  and  sent 
to  the  rear  over  five  hundred  prisoners,  including  two  col 
onels  and  fifteen  commissioned  officers,  together  with  over 
one  thousand  stand  of  arms  belonging  to  the  enemy. 

''  The  following  morning  the  prisoners  of  the  brigade 
buried  all  of  our  own  dead  and  a  large  number  of  those  of 
the  enemy. 

"  The  fearful  loss  of  the  enemy  during  this  struggle  may 
be  estimated  from  the  fact  that  over  fifty  of  his  dead  were 
counted  in  front  of  the  Twentieth  Maine  regiment,  and  his 
loss  was  nearly  in  that  proportion  along  our  entire  line. 

"  Although  this  brigade  has  been  engaged  in  nearly  all 
of  the  great  battles  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  has 
always  greatly  distinguished  itself  for  gallant  behavior,  yet 
in  none  has  it  fought  so  desperately  or  achieved  for  itself 
such  imperishable  honors  as  in  this  severe  conflict  of  the 
2d  instant. 

"  A  nominal  and  tabular  list  of  the  casualties  of  this  bri 
gade  has  already  been  forwarded  to  the  major-general 
commanding,  but  it  is  fitting  again  to  mention  the  names 
of  the  brave  and  faithful  officers  of  the  command  who  fell 
in  this  desperate  struggle.  Of  the  Forty-fourth  New  York 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       209 

Volunteers,  Captain  L.  S.  Larrabee  and  Lieutenants  Dun 
ham  and  Thomas;  of  the  Twentieth  Maine,  Lieutenant 
Kendall,  and  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan,  Lieutenants 
Browne,  Jewett,  and  Borden  were  killed. 

"  The  brigade  was  relieved  during  the  forenoon  of  the 
3d  instant  by  the  First  brigade,  and  ordered  to  the  center 
of  the  line,  where  it  remained  in  reserve  the  balance  of  the 
day,  exposed  to  a  severe  cannonading,  but  with  no  loss, 
from  the  security  of  its  position. 

'  The  colonel  commanding  would  commend  to  the  fa 
vorable  notice  of  the  general  commanding  the  following- 
named  officers,  for  their  gallant  conduct  in  battle  on  the 
2d  instant:  Colonel  Chamberlain  and  Adjutant  Chamber 
lain,  of  the  Twentieth  Maine;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Connor 
and  Major  Knox,  of  the  Forty-fourth  New  York  Volun 
teers;  Captain  Woodward  and  Adjutant  Gifford,  of  the 
Eighty-third  Pennsylvania,  and  Captain  Elliott  and  Adju 
tant  Jacklin,  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan. 

"  Especially  would  I  call  the  attention  of  the  general 
commanding  to  the  distinguished  services  rendered  by  Col 
onel  Chamberlain  throughout  the  entire  struggle. 

"  To  the  loss  sustained  by  this  command  in  the  death  of 
Colonel  Vincent  I  can  refer  in  no  more  appropriate  lan 
guage  than  that  used  in  the  general  order  announcing  it  to 
this  brigade,  a  copy  of  which  1  herewith  annex. 

"  P.  S. —  In  justice  to  the  officers  composing  the  staff, 
it  gives  me  satisfaction  to  state,  in  explanation  of  my  re 
port,  that  at  the  time  I  took  command,  Captain  (Eugene 
A.)  Nash,  inspector-general  of  the  brigade,  was,  in  obe 
dience  to  orders  received  from  Colonel  Vincent,  at  the  front 
watching  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  to  report  the  same 
if  he  should  attempt  a  flank  movement;  that  Captain  (John 
M.)  Clark,  assistant  adjutant-general,  in  obedience  to  or 
ders,  was  absent  for  ammunition,  and  that  Captain  (Amos 
M.)  Judson,  by  orders,  was  absent  for  reinforcements. 


210    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

During  the  night  these  officers  rendered  me  the  greatest 
service,  and  I  desire  to  commend  each  of  them  to  the  most 
favorable  notice  of  the  commanding  general  for  their  gal 
lant  conduct  both  under  Colonel  Vincent's  command  as 
well  as  my  own/' 

"General  Orders  No.  5. 

"  HEADQUARTERS   THIRD   BRIGADE,   FIRST   DIVISION,   FIFTH    CORPS, 

"July  12,  1863. 

"  The  colonel  commanding  hereby  announces  to  the  brigade  the  death 
of  Brig-Gen.  Strong  Vincent.  He  died  near  Gettysburg,  Pa.,  July  7, 
1863,  from  the  effects  of  a  wound  received  on  the  2d  instant,  and  within 
sight  of  that  field  which  his  bravery  had  so  greatly  assisted  to  win. 
A  day  hallowed  with  all  the  glory  of  success  is  thus  sombered  by  the 
sorrow  of  our  loss.  Wreaths  of  victory  give  way  to  chaplets  of  m'ourn- 
ing,  hearts  exultant  to  feelings  of  grief.  A  soldier,  a  scholar,  a  friend, 
has  fallen.  For  his  country,  struggling  for  its  life,  he  willingly  gave 
his  own.  Grateful  for  his  services,  the  State  which  proudly  claims 
him  as  her  own  will  give  him  an  honored  grave  and  a  costly  monument, 
but  he  ever  will  remain  buried  in  our  hearts,  and  our  love  for  his 
memory  will  outlast  the  stone  which  shall  bear  the  inscription  of  his 
bravery,  his  virtues,  and  his  patriotism. 

"  While  we  deplore  his  death,  and  remember  with  sorrow  our  loss, 
let  us  emulate  the  example  of  his  fidelity  and  patriotism,  feeling  that 
he  lives  but  in  vain  who  lives  not  for  his  God  and  his  country." 

Report  of  Col.  Joshua  L.  Chamberlain,  Twentieth  Maine 
Infantry. 

"  FIELD  NEAR  EMMITTSBURG,  July  6,  1863. 

"  In  compliance  with  the  request  of  the  colonel  com 
manding  the  brigade,  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  a  some 
what  detailed  report  of  the  operations  of  the  Twentieth 
Regiment  Maine  Volunteers  in  the  battle  of  Gettysburg, 
on  the  2d  and  3d  instant. 

"  Having  acted  as  the  advance  guard,  made  necessary 
by  the  proximity  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  on  the  march  of 
the  day  before,  my  command  on  reaching  Hanover,  Pa., 
just  before  sunset  on  that  day,  were  much  worn,  and  lost 
no  time  in  getting  ready  for  an  expected  bivouac.  Rations 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       211 

were  scarcely  issued,  and  the  men  about  preparing  supper, 
when  rumors  that  the  enemy  had  been  encountered  that 
day  near  Gettysburg  absorbed  every  other  interest,  and 
very  soon  orders  came  to  march  forthwith  to  Gettysburg. 

"  My  men  moved  out  with  a  promptitude  and  spirit  ex 
traordinary,  the  cheers  and  welcome  they  received  on  the 
road  adding  to  their  enthusiasm.  After  an  hour  or  two 
of  sleep  by  the  roadside  just  before  daybreak  we  reached 
the  heights  southeasterly  of  Gettysburg  at  about  7  A.  M., 
July  2. 

"  Massed  at  first  with  the  rest  of  the  division  on  the 
right  of  the  road,  we  were  moved  several  times  farther 
toward  the  left.  Although  expecting  every  moment  to  be 
put  into  action,  and  held  strictly  in  line  of  battle,  yet  the 
men  were  able  to  take  some  rest  and  make  the  most  of  their 
rations. 

"  Somewhere  near  4  p.  M.  a  sharp  cannonade,  at  some 
distance  to  our  left  and  front,  was  the  signal  for  a  sudden 
and  rapid  movement  of  our  whole  division  in  the  direc 
tion  of  this  firing,  which  grew  warmer  as  we  approached. 
Passing  an  open  field  in  the  hollow  ground  in  which  some 
of  our  batteries  were  going  into  position,  our  brigade 
reached  the  skirt  of  a  piece  of  woods,  in  the  farther  edge 
of  which  there  was  a  heavy  musketry  fire,  and  when  about 
to  go  forward  into  line  we  received  from  Colonel  Vincent, 
commanding  the  brigade,  orders  to  move  to  the  left  at  the 
double-quick,  when  we  took  a  farm  road  crossing  Plum 
Run  in  order  to  gain  a  rugged  mountain  spur  called  Gran 
ite  Spur,  or  Little  Round  Top. 

>f  The  enemy's  artillery  got  range  of  our  column  as  we 
were  climbing  the  spur,  and  the  crashing  of  the  shells 
among  the  rocks  and  the  tree  tops  made  us  move  lively 
along  the  crest.  One  or  two  shells  burst  in  our  ranks. 
Passing  to  the  southern  slope  of  Little  Round  Top,  Col- 


212    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

onel  Vincent  indicated  to  me  the  ground  my  regiment  was 
to  occupy,  informing  me  that  this  was  the  extreme  left 
of  our  general  line,  and  that  a  desperate  attack  was  ex 
pected  in  order  to  turn  that  position,  concluding  by  telling 
me  I  was  to  '  hold  that  ground  at  all  hazards.'  This  was 
the  last  word  I  heard  from  him. 

"  In  order  to  commence  by  making  my  right  firm,  I 
formed  my  regiment  on  the  right  into  line,  giving  such  di 
rection  to  the  line  as  should  best  secure  the  advantage  of 
the  rough,  rocky,  and  stragglingly  wooded  ground. 

"  The  line  faced  generally  toward  a  more  conspicuous 
eminence  southwest  of  ours,  which  is  known  as  Sugar 
Loaf,  or  Round  Top.  Between  this  and  my  position  in 
tervened  a  smooth  and  thinly  wooded  hollow.  My  line 
formed,  I  immediately  detached  Company  B,  Captain  Mor- 
rill  commanding,  to  extend  from  my  left  flank  across  this 
hollow  as  a  line  of  skirmishers,  with  directions  to  act  as 
occasion  might  dictate,  to  prevent  a  surprise  on  my  ex 
posed  flank  and  rear. 

"  The  artillery  fire  on  our  position  had  meanwhile  been 
constant  and  heavy,  but  my  formation  was  scarcely  com 
plete  when  the  artillery  was  replaced  by  a  vigorous  in 
fantry  assault  upon  the  center  of  our  brigade  to  my  right, 
but  it  very  soon  involved  the  right  of  my  regiment  and 
gradually  extended  along  my  entire  front.  The  action 
was  quite  sharp  and  at  close  quarters. 

"  In  the  midst  of  this  an  officer  from  my  center  in 
formed  me  that  some  important  movement  of  the  enemy 
was  going  on  in  his  front,  beyond  that  of  the  line  with 
which  we  were  engaged.  Mounting  a  large  rock,  I  was 
able  to  see  a  considerable  body  of  the  enemy  moving  by 
the  flank  in  rear  of  their  line  engaged,  and  passing  from 
the  direction  of  the  foot  of  Great  Round  Top  through  the 
valley  toward  the  front  of  my  left.  The  close  engage 
ment  not  allowing  any  change  of  front,  I  immediately 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       213 

stretched  my  regiment  to  the  left,  by  taking  intervals  by 
the  left  flank,  and  at  the  same  time  '  refusing '  my  left 
wing,  so  that  it  was  nearly  at  right  angles  with  my  right, 
thus  occupying  about  twice  the  extent  of  our  ordinary 
front,  some  of  the  companies  being  brought  into  single 
rank  when  the  nature  of  the  ground  gave  sufficient  strength 
or  shelter.  My  officers  and  men  understood  my  wishes 
so  well  that  this  movement  was  executed  under  fire,  the 
right  wing  keeping  up  fire,  without  giving  the  enemy  any 
occasion  to  seize  or  even  to  suspect  their  advantage.  But 
we  were  not  a  moment  too  soon;  the  enemy's  flanking  col 
umn  having  gained  their  desired  direction,  burst  upon  my 
left,  where  they  evidently  had  expected  an  unguarded 
flank,  with  great  demonstration. 

"  We  opened  a  brisk  fire  at  close  range,  which  was  so 
sudden  and  effective  that  they  soon  fell  back  among  the 
rocks  and  low  trees  in  the  valley,  only  to  burst  forth  again 
with  a  shout,  and  rapidly  advanced,  firing  as  they  came. 
They  pushed  up  to  within  a  dozen  yards  of  us  before  the 
terrible  effectiveness  of  our  fire  compelled  them  to  break 
and  take  shelter. 

"  They  renewed  the  assault  on  our  whole  front,  and  for 
an  hour  the  fighting  was  severe.  Squads  of  the  enemy 
broke  through  our  line  in  several  places,  and  the  fight  was 
literally  hand-to-hand.  The  edge  of  the  fight  rolled  back 
ward  and  forward  like  a  wave.  The  dead  and  wounded 
were  now  in  front  and  then  in  our  rear.  Forced  from  our 
position,  we  desperately  recovered  it,  and  pushed  the  enemy 
down  to  the  foot  of  the  slope.  The  intervals  of  the  strug 
gle  were  seized  to  remove  our  wounded  (and  those  of  the 
enemy  also),  to  gather  ammunition  from  the  cartridge- 
boxes  of  disabled  friend  or  foe  on  the  field,  and  even  to 
secure  better  muskets  than  the  Enfields,  which  we  found 
did  not  stand  service  well.  Rude  shelters  were  thrown  up 
of  the  loose  rocks  that  covered  the  ground. 


214    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

"  Captain  Woodward,  commanding  the  Eighty-third 
Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  on  my  right,  gallantly  maintain 
ing  his  fight,  judiciously  and  with  hearty  co-operation  made 
his  movements  conform  to  my  necessities,  so  that  my  right 
was  at  no  time  exposed  to  a  flank  attack. 

"  The  enemy  seemed  to  have  gathered  all  their  energies 
for  their  final  assault.  We  had  gotten  our  thin  line  into 
as  good  a  shape  as  possible,  when  a  strong  force  emerged 
from  the  scrub  wood  in  the  valley,  as  well  as  I  could  judge, 
in  two  lines  in  echelon  by  the  right,  and,  opening  a  heavy 
fire,  the  first  line  came  on  as  if  they  meant  to  sweep  every 
thing  before  them.  We  opened  on  them  as  well  as  we 
could  with  our  scanty  ammunition  snatched  from  the  field. 

"  It  did  not  seem  possible  to  withstand  another  shock 
like  this  now  coming  on.  Our  loss  had  been  severe. 
One-half  of  my  left  wing  had  fallen  and  a  third  of  my 
regiment  lay  just  behind  us  dead  or  badly  wounded.  At 
this  moment  my  anxiety  was  increased  by  a  great  roar  of 
musketry  in  my  rear,  on  the  farther  or  northerly  slope  of 
Little  Round  Top,  apparently  on  the  flank  of  the  regular 
brigade,  which  was  in  support  of  Hazlett's  battery  on  the 
crest  behind  us.  The  bullets  from  this  attack  struck  into 
my  left  rear,  and  I  feared  that  the  enemy  might  have 
nearly  surrounded  the  Little  Round  Top,  and  only  a  des 
perate  chance  was  left  for  us.  My  ammunition  was  soon 
exhausted.  My  men  were  firing  their  last  shot  and  getting 
ready  to  l  club  '  their  muskets. 

"  It  was  imperative  to  strike  before  we  were  struck  by 
this  overwhelming  force  in  a  hand-to-hand  fight,  which  we 
could  not  probably  have  withstood  or  survived.  At  that 
crisis  I  ordered  the  bayonet.  The  word  was  enough.  It 
ran  like  fire  along  the  line  from  man  to  man,  and  rose  into 
a  shout,  with  which  they  sprang  forward  upon  the  enemy, 
now  not  thirty  yards  away.  The  effect  was  surprising; 
many  of  the  enemy's  first  line  threw  down  their  arms  and 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       215 

surrendered.  An  officer  fired  his  pistol  at  my  head  with 
one  hand  while  he  handed  me  his  sword  with  the  other. 
Holding  fast  by  our  right,  and  swinging  forward  our  left, 
we  made  an  extended  '  right  wheel,'  before  the  enemy's 
second  line  broke,  and  fell  back,  fighting  from  tree  to  tree, 
many  being  captured,  until  we  had  swept  the  valley  and 
cleared  the  front  of  nearly  our  entire  brigade. 

"  Meantime,  Captain  Morrill  with  his  skirmishers  (sent 
out  from  my  left  flank),  with  some  dozen  or  fifteen  of 
the  U.  S.  Sharpshooters  who  had  put  themselves  under 
his  direction,  fell  upon  the  enemy  as  they  were  breaking, 
and  by  his  demonstrations,  as  well  as  his  well-directed  fire, 
added  much  to  the  effect  of  the  charge. 

"  Having  thus  cleared  the  valley  and  driven  the  enemy 
up  the  western  slope  of  the  Great  Round  Top,  not  wishing 
to  press  so  far  out  as  to  hazard  the  ground  I  was  to  hold 
by  leaving  it  exposed  to  a  sudden  rush  of  the  enemy,  I 
succeeded  (although  with  some  effort  to  stop  my  men,  who 
declared  they  were  '  on  the  road  to  Richmond  ')  in  getting 
the  regiment  into  good  order  and  resuming  our  original 
position. 

"  Four  hundred  prisoners,  including  two  field  and  sev 
eral  line  officers,  were  sent  to  the  rear.  These  were  mainly 
from  the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  Alabama  regiments, 
with  some  of  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas.  One  hundred 
and  fifty  of  the  enemy  were  found  killed  and  wounded  in 
our  front. 

"  At  dusk  Colonel  Rice  informed  me  of  the  fall  of  Col 
onel  Vincent,  which  had  devolved  the  command  of  the 
brigade  on  him,  and  that  Colonel  Fisher  had  come  up  with 
a  brigade  to  our  support.  These  troops  were  massed  in 
our  rear.  It  was  the  understanding,  as  Colonel  Rice  in 
formed  me,  that  Colonel  Fisher's  brigade  was  to  advance 
and  seize  the  western  slope  of  Great  Round  Top,  where 
the  enemy  had  shortly  before  been  driven.  But  after  con- 


216    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

siderable  delay  this  intention  for  some  reason  was  not  car 
ried  into  execution. 

"  We  were  apprehensive  that  if  the  enemy  were  allowed 
to  strengthen  himself  in  that  position  he  would  have  a 
great  advantage  in  renewing  the  attack  on  us  at  daylight 
or  before.  Colonel  Rice  then  directed  me  to  make  the 
movement  to  seize  that  crest. 

"  It  was  now  9  P.  M.  Without  waiting  to  get  ammuni 
tion,  but  trusting  in  part  to  the  very  circumstance  of  not 
exposing  our  movement  or  our  small  front  by  firing,  and 
with  bayonets  fixed,  the  little  handful  of  200  men  pressed 
up  the  mountain  side  in  every  extended  order,  as  the  steep 
and  jagged  surface  of  the  ground  compelled.  We  heard 
squads  of  the  enemy  falling  back  before  us,  and,  when 
near  the  crest,  we  met  a  scattering  and  uncertain  fire, 
which  caused  us  the  great  loss  of  the  gallant  Lieutenant 
Linscott,  who  fell,  mortally  wounded.  In  the  silent  ad 
vance  in  the  darkness  we  laid  hold  of  25  prisoners,  among 
them  a  staff  officer  of  General  (E.  M.)  Law,  command 
ing  the  brigade  immediately  opposed  to  us  during  the 
fight.  Reaching  the  crest,  and  reconnoitering  the  ground, 
I  placed  the  men  in  a  strong  position  among  the  rocks, 
and  informed  Colonel  Rice,  requesting  also  ammunition 
and  some  support  to  our  right,  which  was  very  near  the 
enemy,  their  movements  and  words  even  being  now  dis 
tinctly  heard  by  us. 

"  Some  confusion  soon  after  resulted  from  the  attempt 
of  some  regiment  of  Colonel  Fisher's  brigade  to  come  to 
our  support.  They  had  found  a  wood  road  up  the  moun 
tain,  which  brought  them  on  my  right  flank,  and  also  in 
proximity  to  the  enemy,  massed  a  little  before.  Hearing 
their  approach,  and  thinking  a  movement  from  that  quarter 
could  only  be  from  the  enemy,  I  made  disposition  to  re 
ceive  them  as  such.  In  the  confusion  which  attended  the 
attempt  to  form  them  in  support  of  my  right,  the  enemy 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       217 

opened  a  brisk  fire,  which  disconcerted  my  efforts  to  form 
them  and  disheartened  the  supports  themselves,  so  that  I 
saw  no  more  of  them  that  night. 

"  Feeling  somewhat  insecure  in  this  isolated  position,  I 
sent  in  for  the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania,  which  came 
speedily,  followed  by  the  Forty-fourth  New  York,  and, 
having  seen  these  well  posted,  I  sent  a  strong  picket  to  the 
front,  with  instructions  to  report  to  me  every  half  hour 
during  the  night  and  allowed  the  rest  of  my  men  to  sleep 
on  their  arms. 

"  At  some  time  about  midnight  two  regiments  of  Col 
onel  Fisher's  brigade  came  up  the  mountain  beyond  my 
left,  and  took  position  near  the  summit;  but  as  the  enemy 
did  not  threaten  from  that  direction  I  made  no  effort  to 
connect  with  them. 

"  We  went  into  the  fight  with  386,  all  told  —  358  guns. 
Every  pioneer  and  musician  who  could  carry  a  musket 
went  into  the  ranks.  Even  the  sick  and  footsore,  who  could 
not  keep  up  in  the  march,  came  up  as  soon  as  they  could 
find  their  regiments  and  took  their  places  in  line  of  battle, 
while  it  was  battle,  indeed.  Some  prisoners  I  had  under 
guard  under  sentence  of  court-martial,  I  was  obliged  to 
put  into  the  fight,  and  they  bore  their  part  well,  for  which 
I  shall  recommend  a  commutation  of  their  sentence. 

'The  loss,  so  far  as  I  can  ascertain  it,  is  136  —  30  of 
whom  were  killed,  and  among  the  wounded  are  many 
mortally. 

"  Captain  Billings,  Lieutenant  Kendall,  and  Lieutenant 
Linscott  are  officers  whose  loss  we  deeply  mourn  —  ef 
ficient  soldiers  and  pure  and  high-minded  men. 

"  In  such  an  engagement  there  were  many  incidents  of 
heroism  and  noble  character  which  should  have  place  even 
in  an  official  report;  but,  under  present  circumstances,  I 
am  unable  to  do  justice  to  them.  I  will  say  of  that  regi 
ment  that  the  resolution,  courage,  and  heroic  fortitude 


218    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

which  enabled  us  to  withstand  so  formidable  an  attack 
have  happily  led  to  so  conspicuous  a  result,  that  they  may 
safely  trust  to  history  to  record  their  merits. 

"  About  noon  on  the  3d  of  July  we  were  withdrawn, 
and  formed  on  the  right  of  the  brigade,  in  the  front  edge 
of  a  piece  of  woods  near  the  left  center  of  our  main  line 
of  battle,  where  we  were  held  in  readiness  to  support  our 
troops,  then  receiving  the  severe  attack  of  the  afternoon 
of  that  day. 

"  On  the  4th  we  made  a  reconnaissance  to  the  front,  to 
ascertain  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  but  finding  that 
they  had  retired,  at  least  beyond  Willoughby's  Run,  we 
returned  to  Little  Round  Top,  where  we  buried  our  dead 
in  the  place  where  we  had  laid  them  during  the  fight,  mark 
ing  each  grave  by  a  head-board  made  of  ammunition 
boxes,  with  each  soldier's  name  cut  upon  it.  We  also 
buried  50  of  the  enemy's  dead  in  front  of  our  position  of 
July  2.  We  then  looked  after  our  wounded,  whom  I  had 
taken  the  responsibility  of  putting  into  the  houses  of  citi 
zens  in  the  vicinity  of  Little  Round  Top,  and  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  5th  took  up  our  march  on  the  Emmittsburg 
road." 

Report  of  Lieut -Col.  Norval  E.  Welch,  Sixteenth  Michi 
gan  Infantry. 

"  NEAR  EMMITTSBURG,  MD.,  July  6,  1863. 

"  In  reply  to  circular  of  this  date  from  brigade  head 
quarters  as  to  the  part  this  regiment  sustained  in  the  action 
of  July  2  and  3,  I  have  the  honor  to  report: 

"  The  regiment,  under  my  command,  lay  with  the  Third 
brigade,  First  division,  Fifth  corps,  closed  in  mass,  near 
and  in  rear  of  Gettysburg,  to  the  left  of  the  main  road, 
during  most  of  the  day.  The  brigade  was  commanded  by 
Col.  Strong  Vincent,  Eighty-third  Regiment,  Pennsyl 
vania  Volunteers. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       219 

"  About  4  P.  M.  we  moved  rapidly  to  the  extreme  left  of 
our  line  of  battle,  and  went  into  position  on  the  left  of  the 
brigade,  at  that  time  circling  the  crest  of  a  high,  rocky 
hill.  After  deploying  two  of  my  largest  companies  as 
skirmishers  —  Brady's  Sharpshooters  from  the  left  and 
Company  A  from  the  right  —  I  was  ordered  at  double- 
quick  to  the  right  of  the  brigade,  and  to  take  my  position 
on  the  right  of  the  Forty-fourth  New  York.  Before  this 
could  be  accomplished,  however,  we  were  under  a  heavy 
fire  of  the  enemy's  infantry.  We  succeeded,  however,  in 
securing  our  places  after  some  loss. 

"  We  remained  in  this  position  nearly  half  an  hour, 
when  someone  (supposed  to  be  General  Weed  or  Major- 
General  Sykes)  called  from  the  extreme  crest  of  the  hill 
to  fall  back  nearer  the  top,  where  a  much  less  exposed  line 
could  be  taken  up.  This  order  was  not  obeyed,  except 
by  single  individuals.  From  some  misconstruction  of  or 
ders,  and  entirely  unwarrantable  assumption  of  authority, 
Lieutenant  Kydd  ordered  the  colors  back.  None  left  with 
them,  however,  but  three  of  the  color-guard.  They  fol 
lowed  the  brigade  colors  to  where  Colonel  Vincent,  after 
being  wounded,  had  been  carried,  where  they  remained  all 
night,  joining  the  regiment  in  the  morning  with  45  men 
who  had  left  the  field  during  and  after  the  fight.  All  the 
remainder  of  the  regiment  retained  their  position  until  re 
lieved. 

"  The  two  companies  sent  out  as  skirmishers  num 
bered  about  50.  The  number  of  muskets  taken  in  line  was 
about  150;  the  number  killed  and  wounded  59  —  21  killed. 
Several  wounded  have  since  died. 

"  On  the  3d  we  took  up  a  new  line  farther  to  the  right, 
at  the  left  of  the  brigade,  and  remained  on  our  arms  for 
twenty- four  hours. 

"  Captain  Elliott  and  Adjutant  Jacklin  behaved  with 
their  usual  gallantry.  Captain  Partridge,  Lieutenants 


220    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Borgman  (wounded),  Woodruff,  Forsyth,  Cameron 
(wounded,  with  arm  amputated),  Swart,  Graham,  Salter, 
and  Captain  Chandler  behaved  nobly  and  handled  their 
men  with  coolness  and  valor.  Lieutenants  Browne,  Com 
pany  E,  Jewett,  Company  K,  and  Borden,  Company  F, 
died  bravely  defending  the  flag  they  had  sworn  to  support 
and  that  they  loved  in  their  hearts,  and  emulating  the 
bravest.  I  had  no  truer  or  purer  officers,  and  their  loss 
cannot  be  replaced.'* 

Report  of  Lieut.-Col.  Freeman  Connor,  Forty-fourth 
New  York  Infantry.  «  JULY  ^  ^ 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report  of  the 
action  taken  by  this  regiment  in  the  engagement  of  July  2 : 

"  About  4  P.  M.  our  regiment,  Col.  J.  C.  Rice  command 
ing,  was  placed  in  position  on  Round  Top  Hill,  with  the 
Eighty-third  Pennsylvania  on  our  left  and  the  Sixteenth 
Michigan  on  our  right.  Company  B  was  immediately 
thrown  out  as  skirmishers.  When  they  had  advanced 
about  200  yards  they  met  the  enemy  advancing  in 
three  lines  of  battle. 

"  Orders  were  immediately  given  by  Capt.  L.  S.  Lar- 
rabee,  commanding  the  company,  to  fall  back  upon  the  bat 
talion.  It  was  while  executing  this  order  that  that  faith 
ful  and  brave  officer  was  shot  through  the  body  and  in 
stantly  killed,  being  the  first  officer  that  this  regiment  had 
ever  had  killed  in  battle. 

"  The  enemy  continued  to  advance  until  the  first  line 
came  within  about  40  yards  of  our  line.  Upon  their 
first  appearance  we  opened  a  heavy  fire  upon  them,  which 
was  continued  until  they  were  compelled  to  retreat.  After 
they  had  disappeared  in  our  immediate  front  we  turned 
our  fire  upon  those  who  had  advanced  in  the  hollow  to  our 
right,  and  continued  it  until  we  were  out  of  ammunition. 

"  After  we  had  been  engaged  about  one  hour  Colonel 
Vincent,  commanding  brigade,  was  wounded,  and  the  com- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       221 

mand  fell  upon  Col.  J.  C.  Rice,  and  the  command  of 
the  regiment  upon  myself. 

"  We  remained  in  our  position  until  the  next  morning 
about  8  A.  M.,  when  we  were  relieved  by  Colonel  Hayes, 
Eighteenth  Massachusetts.  We  were  then  moved  to  the 
right  about  three-eighths  of  a  mile,  and  formed  in  line  of 
battle,  the  Sixteenth  Michigan  on  our  left  and  the  Twen 
tieth  Maine  on  our  right. 

"  I  regret  to  add  that  in  addition  to  Captain  Larrabee, 
whose  death  I  have  already  noted,  the  officers  are  called 
upon  to  mourn  the  loss  of  First  Lieutenant  Eugene  L. 
Dunham,  Company  D,  a  brave  and  efficient  officer,  who 
was  instantly  killed  during  the  heavy  firing  from  the  enemy 
in  our  front ;  Capt.  William  R.  Bourne,  Company  K ;  Capt. 
Bennett  Munger,  Company  C;  Adjt.  George  B.  Heren- 
deen;  First  Lieut.  Charles  H.  Zeilman,  commanding  Com 
pany  F,  and  Second  Lieut.  Benjamin  N.  Thomas,  Com 
pany  K,  were  wounded,  the  latter,  it  is  feared,  mortally. 

"  It  affords  me  great  pleasure  to  be  able  to  state  that 
both  officers  and  men  behaved  with  the  greatest  coolness 
and  bravery,  not  a  single  case  of  cowardice  having  come 
to  my  ear." 

Report  of  Capt.  Orpheus  S.  Woodward,  Eighty-third 
Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

"  NEAR  EMMITTSBURG,  MD.,  July  6,  1863. 

"  In  compliance  with  orders  from  headquarters  Third 
brigade,  First  division,  Fifth  corps,  I  have  the  honor  to 
report  the  following  as  the  operations  of  my  command 
during  the  battle  of  the  2d,  3d,  4th,  and  5th  instant. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  2d  instant,  moved  to  the  front. 
At  about  2  130  p.  M.  was  ordered  into  position  on  our  ex 
treme  left,  the  Forty-fourth  New  York  on  my  right,  the 
Twentieth  Maine  on  my  left.  At  3:15  P.  M.  the  enemy 
advanced  and  engaged  my  skirmishers,  pressing  on  in 
force,  with  bayonets  fixed.  They  soon  drove  in  my  skir- 


222    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

mishers  and  engaged  my  regiment,  posted  behind  rocks 
and  stones  hastily  thrown  up  for  defense.  The  contest 
continued  lively  until  nearly  6  p.  M.,  when  the  enemy  fell 
back.  I  instantly  threw  forward  a  strong  line  of  skir 
mishers,  who  captured  between  50  and  60  prisoners  and 
200  stand  of  arms. 

"  My  men  and  officers  acted  splendidly.  Where  all  did 
so  well,  I  cannot  discriminate. 

"  My  loss  amounted  to  10  killed  and  45  wounded. 

"  At  1 130  A.  M.  on  the  3d  moved  to  the  support  of  the 
Twentieth  Maine,  which  had  succeeded  in  taking  a  high 
hill  a  little  to  the  left  of  my  former  position.  Remained 
here  until  10  A.  M.,  when,  being  relieved  by  a  regiment  of 
the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  rejoined  my  brigade,  massed 
in  the  woods  just  at  the  right  of  General  Sykes'  headquar 
ters.  Here  I  remained  until  12  M.,  the  4th,  when  the 
brigade  was  thrown  forward  on  a  reconnaissance.  We 
moved  out  and  occupied  the  position  occupied  by  the  enemy 
the  previous  day;  threw  forward  skirmishers,  but  found 
no  opposing  force  within  two  miles.  I  deem  it  but  proper 
to  state  that  but  for  the  prompt  and  skillful  disposition 
made  by  Colonel  Vincent  of  the  troops  under  his  command 
(the  Third  brigade),  the  enemy  would  have  succeeded  in 
turning  our  left. 

"  I  regret  to  state  that  Colonel  Vincent  was  severely 
wounded.  My  command  (his  regiment)  esteemed  him 
highly  as  a  gentleman,  scholar,  and  soldier,  and  bitterly 
avenged  his  injury." 

Report  of  Brig-Gen.  Romeyn  B.  Ayers,  U.  S.  Army, 
commanding  Second  Division. 

"  HDQRS.  SECOND  DIVISION,  FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS, 

"  July  28,  1863. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  a  report  of  the  operations 
of  this  division  in  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  Pa, 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       223 

"  The  division  was  marched  forward  on  the  night  of 
July  i  and  2  on  the  Gettysburg  and  Hanover  road,  and 
was  formed  in  line  of  battle  in  rear  of  and  facing  that 
road,  the  First  division  on  its  right.  Later  in  the  day  it 
was  marched  to  the  left  and  center,  and  massed  there.  In 
the  afternoon  the  enemy's  attack  on  the  left  of  our  posi 
tion  being  developed,  the  division,  preceded  by  the  First 
division,  was  marched  to  the  support  of  our  troops  en 
gaged,  the  Third  brigade  being  placed  in  position  on  the 
general  line  of  battle  upon  a  rocky  hill  (usually  called 
Round  Top  Hill)  of  great  importance,  facing  the  Em- 
mittsburg  and  Gettysburg  pike.  This  brigade  was  ordered 
to  hold  this  hill,  which  duty  it  performed  well  and  ef 
fectually.1 

"  In  the  death  of  Brig.  Gen.  Stephen  H.  Weed,  volun 
teers,  and  captain  Fifth  U.  S.  Artillery,  the  service  lost  a 
distinguished  and  gallant  soldier.  Col.  P.  H.  O'Rorke,  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  Volunteers  and  First 
Lieutenant  U.  S.  Engineers,  was  a  brave  and  valuable  officer. 

"  I  inclose  reports  of  brigade  commanders.  The  list  of 
casualties  is  now  in  your  hands." 

Report  of  Col.  Kenner  Garrard,  One  Hundred  and 
Forty-sixth  New  York  Infantry,  commanding  Third  Bri 
gade. 

"  HDQRS.  THIRD  BRIGADE,  SECOND  DIVISION, 

FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS, 
"  CAMP  NEAR  BERLIN,  MD.,  July  16,  1863. 
"  I  have  the  honor  to  make  the  following  report  of  the 
part  taken  by  the  Third  brigade  in  the  late  battle  near 
Gettysburg : 

"  On  the  2d  instant,  after  changing  position  several  times 

1  The  succeeding  paragraphs  relating  to  the  action  of  the  First  and 
Second  brigades,  and  the  commendation  of  staff  and  other  officers, 
are  omitted. 


224    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

in  the  early  part  of  the  morning,  the  brigade  with  the  di 
vision  remained  idle,  lying  by  their  arms  until  about  4  P.  M. 
At  this  time  the  brigade  was  moved  rapidly  forward  (most 
of  the  time  at  the  double-quick)  nearly  ii  miles,  when  it 
came  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  musketry. 

"  At  this  point  the  leading  regiment,  under  the  direction 
of  General  Warren,  chief  engineer  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
was  led  to  the  left,  up  on  what  is  known  as  Round  Top 
ridge.  Hazlett's  battery  ascended  the  ridge  immediately 
in  rear  of  this  regiment  (the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth 
New  York  Volunteers,  Col.  P.  H.  O'Rorke  commanding), 
and  went  into  battery  on  the  summit.  The  One  Hundred 
and  Fortieth  was  formed  in  line  and  was  immediately  closely 
engaged  with  the  enemy  at  short  musket-range  on  the  left 
slope  of  the  ridge. 

"  A  portion  of  the  First  division,  Fifth  Army  corps,  was 
engaged  to  the  left  of  the  ridge,  and  this  regiment  and 
Hazlett's  battery  were  brought  up  to  assist  the  First  division 
in  repelling  a  heavy  assault  of  the  enemy,  with  the  evident 
design  of  gaining  this  ridge.  Colonel  O'Rorke  was  mortally 
wounded  at  the  head  of  his  regiment  while  leading  it  into 
action. 

"  The  other  regiments,  One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth 
New  York  Volunteers  and  the  Ninety-first  and  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fifty-fifth  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  were 
led  to  the  right  and  front  some  distance,  and  formed  in  line 
in  a  narrow  valley  to  support  a  portion  of  the  Third  corps 
and  Watson's  battery,  then  severely  pressed  by  the  enemy. 
Before  becoming  engaged,  however,  orders  were  received 
for  these  regiments  to  return  at  double-quick  to  Round 
Top  Ridge,  and  secure  and  hold  that  position.  The  Ninety- 
first  was  posted  on  the  left  of  the  battery,  connecting  with 
the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth.  The  One  Hundred  and 
Forty-sixth  and  One  Hundred  and  Fifty-fifth  were  posted 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       225 

on  the  right,  extending  from  the  battery  on  the  summit, 
along  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  to  the  gorge  on  the  right. 

"  As  soon  as  the  regiments  had  their  positions,  men  from 
each  regiment  were  advanced  down  the  slope  to  the  front, 
in  among  the  rocks,  and,  together  with  those  in  line  on  the 
crest,  actively  engaged  the  enemy  during  the  rest  of  that 
day.  At  night  this  ridge,  naturally  strong,  was  strength 
ened  by  building  a  stone  wall  about  halfway  down  the  slope, 
wherever  the  rocks  offered  no  protection  to  the  men. 

"  The  next  day  the  brigade  remained  in  the  same  posi 
tion,  and,  though  under  the  shells  of  the  enemy  and  ex 
posed  to  their  sharpshooters,  it  was  not  engaged  to  any  ex 
tent. 

"  When  the  brigade  and  Hazlett's  battery  seized  this 
ridge,  it  was  done  under  a  heavy  musketry  fire,  and  was  en 
tirely  unoccupied,  excepting  by  a  part  of  the  First  division, 
on  the  extreme  left,  and  I  am  gratified  to  report  to  the 
general  commanding  the  division  that  the  order  to  secure 
and  hold  this  ridge  was  faithfully  executed.  At  no  time 
during  July  2,  3,  and  4,  after  its  position  was  assigned  it, 
did  any  regiment  of  the  brigade  leave  its  place,  excepting 
at  the  time  of  heavy  assault  a  portion  of  some  of  the  regi 
ments  advanced  to  the  front  down  the  slope  of  the  ridge, 
in  order  to  have  a  better  fire  at  the  enemy. 

"  A  few  moments  after  General  Weed,  the  brigade  com 
mander,  had  placed  his  command  in  position  on  this  ridge, 
he  was  mortally  wounded,  on  the  summit,  near  the  battery. 
Lieutenant  Hazlett,  commanding  the  battery,  while  offer 
ing  his  assistance  to  General  Weed,  fell,  mortally  wounded. 

"  I  am  pleased  to  report  that  all  the  regiments  performed 
their  duty  well,  and  that  during  the  two  days'  battle  the  of 
ficers  and  men  conducted  themselves  in  the  most  praise 
worthy  manner. 

"  A  report  of  the  casualties  has  already  been  furnished." 


226    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Report  of  Brig,  Gen.  Samuel  W.  Crawford,  U,  S.  Army, 
commanding  Third  Division. 

"  HDQRS.  PA.   RESERVES,  THIRD  Div.,  FIFTH  CORPS, 

"July  10,  1863. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report  of  the 
operations  of  this  division  in  the  recent  battle  near  Gettys 
burg,  Pa. : 

"  At  daylight  on  the  2d  instant,  while  resting  my  com 
mand  near  McSherrystown,  having  marched  nearly  all  the 
previous  night,  I  received  an  order  from  the  major-gen 
eral  commanding  the  corps  to  march  immediately  toward 
Gettysburg.  The  column  was  put  in  motion  at  once,  and 
by  noon  had  arrived  at  the  position  occupied  by  the  First 
and  Second  divisions  of  the  corps,  near  the  Gettysburg 
and  Hanover  turnpike. 

"  At  2  o'clock  an  order  reached  me  to  form  my  command 
at  once  and  proceed  toward  the  left  flank  of  our  line, 
when  my  position  would  be  indicated  by  a  staff  officer. 
The  First  division  of  the  corps,  which  I  had  been  directed 
to  follow,  had  taken  a  different  road  from  that  indicated 
to  me.  Under  the  guidance,  however,  of  Captain  Moore, 
an  aide  of  the  general  commanding  the  army,  who  had 
come  from  the  field  for  fresh  troops,  I  pushed  rapidly  for 
ward,  and  arrived  in  a  short  time  upon  the  field,  and  re 
ported  to  Major-General  Sykes.  I  received  orders  at  once 
to  mass  my  troops  upon  the  right  of  a  road  running 
through  our  line,  near  our  left  flank,  and  which,  descend 
ing  a  rocky  slope,  crossed  a  low  marshy  ground  in  front 
to  a  wheat-field  lying  between  two  thick  belts  of  woods 
beyond. 

'  The  position  occupied  by  our  troops  on  the  left  was 
naturally  a  strong  one.  A  rocky  ridge,  wooded  at  the 
top,  extended  along  the  left  of  our  position,  ending  in  a 
high  hill,  called  the  Round  Top,  whose  sides  covered  with 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       227 

timber  terminated  abruptly  in  the  plain  below,  while  the 
entire  ridge  sloped  toward  a  small  stream  that  traversed 
the  marshy  ground  in  front.  Beyond  this  lay  two  thick 
masses  of  timber,  separated  by  a  large  wheat-field,  and 
skirting  this  timber  a  low  stone  wall  ran  from  right  to  left. 

'''  The  movement  indicated  had  not  been  completed  when 
I  received  a  subsequent  order  to  cross  the  road  to  the  slope 
of  the  rocky  ridge  opposite  the  woods,  and  to  cover  the 
troops  then  engaged  in  front,  should  it  become  necessary 
for  them  to  fall  back.  In  carrying  out  this  order  I  re 
ceived  instructions  to  detach  one  brigade  of  my  command, 
to  go  to  the  left  of  Barnes'  division,  on  the  crest  of  the 
ridge.  The  Third  brigade,  under  Col.  J.  W.  Fisher,  was 
detailed,  and  moved  at  once.  The  firing  in  front  was 
heavy  and  incessant.  The  enemy,  concentrating  his  forces 
opposite  the  left  of  our  line,  was  throwing  them  in  heavy 
masses  upon  our  troops,  and  was  steadily  advancing. 

"  Our  troops  in  front,  after  a  determined  resistance, 
unable  to  withstand  the  force  of  the  enemy,  fell  back,  and 
some  finally  gave  way.  The  plain  to  my  front  was  cov 
ered  with  fugitives  from  all  divisions,  who  rushed  through 
my  lines  and  along  the  road  to  the  rear.  Fragments  of 
regiments  came  back  in  disorder,  and  without  their  arms, 
and  for  a  moment  all  seemed  lost.  The  enemy's  skir 
mishers  had  reached  the  foot  of  the  rocky  ridge;  his  col 
umns  were  following  rapidly. 

"  My  command  was  formed  in  two  lines,  the  second 
massed  on  the  first.  The  Sixth  regiment,  Lieutenant-Col 
onel  Ent,  on  the  right,  the  First  regiment,  Colonel  Talley, 
on  the  left,  and  the  Eleventh  regiment,  of  Fisher's  brigade, 
under  Colonel  Jackson,  in  the  center.  The  second  line 
consisted  of  the  First  Rifles  (Bucktails),  Colonel  Taylor, 
and  the  Second  regiment,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Woodward. 
Colonel  McCandless,  the  brigade  commander,  commanded 
the  whole. 


228    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

"  Not  a  moment  was  to  be  lost.  Uncovering  our  front, 
I  ordered  an  immediate  advance.  The  command  advanced 
gallantly  with  loud  cheers.  Two  well-directed  volleys 
were  delivered  upon  the  advancing  masses  of  the  enemy, 
when  the  whole  column  charged  at  a  run  down  the  slope, 
driving  the  enemy  back  across  the  space  beyond  and  across 
the  stone  wall,  for  the  possession  of  which  there  was  a 
short  but  determined  struggle.  The  enemy  retired  to  the 
wheat-field  and  the  woods. 

"  The  second  line  was  immediately  deployed  to  the  left, 
the  First  Rifles  (Bucktails),  under  their  gallant  leader, 
Colonel  Taylor,  gaining  the  flank  and  dashing  upon  the 
enemy,  who,  endeavoring  for  a  moment  to  make  a  stand, 
finally  broke  and  fled  in  disorder  across  the  field,  leaving 
his  dead  and  wounded  in  our  hands.  As  night  was  ap 
proaching  and  my  flanks  were  unprotected,  I  directed  Col 
onel  McCandless  to  hold  the  line  of  the  stone  wall  and  the 
woods  on  the  right.  Heavy  lines  of  skirmishers  were 
thrown  out,  and  the  ground  firmly  and  permanently  held. 

"  I  then  rode  to  the  left,  toward  Fisher's  brigade.  Upon 
ascending  the  crest  of  the  ridge  I  found,  from  the  report 
of  that  officer,  as  well  as  from  Colonel  Rice,  of  Barnes' 
division,  that  the  Round  Top  was  still  in  possession  of  the 
enemy's  skirmishers,  who  were  firing  upon  our  men. 

"  It  was  important  to  hold  this  hill,  as  from  its  position 
it  commanded  that  part  of  our  line.  I  directed  Colonel 
Fisher  to  occupy  it  at  once.  He  immediately  detached  the 
Twelfth  regiment,  under  Colonel  Hardin,  the  Fifth,  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Dare,  and  the  Twentieth  Maine  regi 
ment,  under  Colonel  Chamberlain,  who  advanced  promptly, 
driving  the  enemy  before  them,  capturing  over  30  pris 
oners. 

"  During  the  night  the  division  commanded  by  Brig 
adier-General  Bartlett,  of  the  Sixth  corps,  was  moved  up 
to  my  support.  At  five  o'clock  on  the  3<d  I  received  orders 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       229 

from  General  Sykes,  commanding  the  corps,  to  advance 
that  portion  of  my  command  which  was  holding  the  ground 
retaken  on  the  left,  and  which  still  held  the  line  of  the 
stone  wall  in  front,  to  enter  the  woods,  and,  if  possible, 
drive  out  the  enemy.  It  was  supposed  that  the  enemy  had 
evacuated  the  position. 

"  I  proceeded  at  once  to  the  spot,  and  directed  the  move 
ment  to  be  made.  McCandless'  brigade,  with  the  Eleventh 
regiment,  under  Colonel  Jackson,  was  ordered  to  advance, 
throwing  out  skirmishers  toward  the  right  in  the  direction 
of  a  battery  established  by  the  enemy  at  noon,  and  which 
was  plainly  visible.  I  requested  Brigadier-General  Bart- 
lett  to  move  up  one  of  his  regiments  to  the  stone  wall  from 
which  I  advanced,  and  also  to  throw  a  force  toward  my 
right,  to  protect  that  flank.  The  men  of  his  command 
moved  promptly  into  position,  and  rendered  efficient  serv 
ice.  The  movement  had  hardly  begun  before  this  battery 
opened  with  grape  and  canister.  The  woods  on  the  right 
were  soon  cleared;  as  soon  as  the  skirmishers  approached 
the  battery  it  ceased  firing  and  fled. 

"  The  line  was  then  formed,  and,  under  the  immediate 
direction  of  Colonel  McCandless,  dashed  across  the  wheat- 
field  and  into  the  upper  end  of  the  woods.  The  enemy's 
skirmishers  were  driven  back  as  he  advanced,  and  the 
upper  end  of  the  woods  was  now  cleared.  The  command 
then  changed  front  to  rear,  and  charged  through  the  en 
tire  length  of  woods.  One  brigade  of  the  enemy,  com 
manded  by  Brigadier-General  [George  T.]  Anderson  and 
composed  of  Georgia  troops,  was  encountered.  It  had 
taken  position  behind  a  stone  wall  running  through  the 
woods,  and  which  they  had  made  stronger  by  rails  and 
logs.  We  fell  upon  their  flank,  completely  routing  them, 
taking  over  200  prisoners,  one  stand  of  colors  belonging 
to  the  Fifteenth  Georgia,  and  many  arms.  The  colors 
were  taken  by  Sergt.  John  B.  Thompson,  Company  G, 


23o    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

First  Rifles.  Another  brigade,  under  General  Robertson, 
and  composed  of  Texas  troops,  which  lay  concealed  be 
yond  the  woods  and  near  the  foot  of  the  ridge,  ran,  as  re 
ported  by  the  prisoners,  without  firing  a  shot. 

'  The  enemy's  force  at  this  point  (his  extreme  right) 
consisted  of  the  division  of  Major-General  Hood,  and  was 
composed  of  three  brigades,  under  the  rebel  Generals  An 
derson,  [J.  B.]  Robertson,  and  [H.  L.]  Benning.  They 
very  greatly  outnumbered  us,  but  the  rapidity  of  the  move 
ment  and  the  gallant  dash  of  my  men  completely  surprised 
and  routed  them.  They  fell  back  nearly  a  mile  to  a  sec 
ond  ridge,  and  intrenched  themselves.  By  this  charge  of 
McCandless'  brigade  and  the  Eleventh  regiment,  Colonel 
Jackson,  the  whole  of  the  ground  lost  the  previous  day 
was  retaken,  together  with  all  of  our  wounded,  who, 
mingled  with  those  of  the  rebels,  were  lying  uncared  for. 

"  The  dead  of  both  -sides  lay  in  lines  in  every  direction, 
and  the  large  number  of  our  own  men  showed  how  fierce 
had  been  the  struggle  and  how  faithfully  and  how  persist 
ently  they  had  contested  for  the  field  against  the  superior 
masses  of  the  enemy. 

"  The  result  of  this  movement  was  the  recovery  of  all 
the  ground  lost  by  our  troops,  one  12-pounder  Napoleon 
gun  and  three  caissons,  and  upward  of  7000  stand  of  arms. 
Large  piles  of  these  arms  were  found  on  brush  heaps  ready 
to  be  burned. 

"  Our  wounded  were  at  once  cared  for,  and,  under  the 
able  and  prompt  management  of  Surg.  L.  W.  Read,  sur- 
geon-in-chief  of  this  division,  who  came  promptly  upon 
the  field,  they  were  moved  to  hospitals  in  the  rear  and 
carefully  provided  for. 

"  On  the  4th  the  large  number  of  arms  were  collected, 
under  the  immediate  direction  of  Lieutenant  Harding,  the 
ordnance  officer  of  the  division,  and  the  brigade,  which 
had  been  on  incessant  duty  for  forty-eight  hours,  under 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       231 

an  annoying  picket  fire  for  a  great  period  of  the  time,  was 
withdrawn  to  the  rear. 

"  My  list  in  killed  and  wounded  was  20  officers  and  190 
men,  3  only  missing. 

'  The  nominal  and  tabular  list  is  inclosed. 

"  Col.  Charles  Fred.  Taylor,  the  gallant  and  brave 
leader  of  the  Bucktail  Regiment,  fell  while  leading  his  regi 
ment  to  the  charge.  No  braver  soldier  and  patriot  has 
given  his  life  to  the  cause. 

'  The  gallant  men  of  this  division  fought  upon  their  own 
soil,  some  of  them  at  their  very  homes;  and  there  was  not 
an  officer  or  private  soldier  who  did  not  realize  that  the 
very  contingency  to  meet  which  the  division  was  formed 
had  now  arisen.  The  result  is  evinced  in  the  gallantry 
displayed  by  those  who  were  fortunate  enough  to  enter  the 
field  when  our  left  was  overpowered  and  the  enemy  was 
boldly  advancing  upon  the  key  of  our  position. 

"  Great  credit  is  due  to  Col.  William  McCandless, 
commanding  the  First  brigade,  for  his  management  of 
his  brigade  and  the  prompt  and  faithful  execution  of  the 
order  given  to  him  in  the  face  of  a  galling  fire  on  the  2d, 
and  for  the  rapid  and  successful  dash  upon  the  enemy  on 
the  3d,  and  I  recommended  him  especially  to  the  notice  of 
the  major-general  commanding  the  corps. 

*  To  Colonel  Fisher,  commanding  the  Third  brigade, 
great  credit  is  also  due  in  early  realizing  the  importance  of 
the  occupation  of  the  Round  Top  and  in  promptly  and  suc 
cessfully  occupying  it.  The  enemy  would  undoubtedly 
have  occupied  it  during  the  night. 

"  The  prompt  and  efficient  support  given  to  me  by  Brig 
adier-General  Bartlett,  commanding  division,  Sixth  corps, 
I  desire  here  to  acknowledge. 

'  The  officers  of  my  staff  accompanied  me  throughout 
the  action.  Captain  [Louis]  Livingston,  my  senior  aide; 
Captain  [Richard  T.]  Auchmuty,  assistant  adjutant-gen- 


232    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

eral;  Major  [James  P.]  Speer,  inspector-general,  and 
Lieutenant  [Richard  P.]  Henderson,  aide-de-camp,  ac 
companied  the  command  on  the  charge  and  were  among 
the  foremost. 

"  Captain  Livingston  and  Lieutenant  Henderson  are  de 
serving  of  especial  commendation  for  the  prompt  and 
fearless  conveyance  of  orders  intrusted  to  them  on  the  3d, 
under  the  immediate  fire  of  the  enemy's  battery. 

"  Lieutenant  [William]  Harding,  the  ordnance  officer, 
managed  his  department  with  great  credit,  and  promptly 
moved  from  the  field  a  large  proportion  of  the  small-arms 
secured.  His  report  has  already  been  submitted." 

Report  of  Col.  Joseph  W.  Fisher,  Fifth  Pennsylvania 
Reserves,  Commanding  Third  Brigade. 

"  HDQRS.  THIRD  BRIGADE,  PENNSYLVANIA  RESERVE  CORPS, 

"July  9,  1863. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  at  the  recent  battle  of 
Gettysburg  I  marched  my  brigade  to  the  left  of  General 
Sykes'  corps,  being  the  extreme  left  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  at  once  engaged  the  enemy,  although  very 
shortly  afterward  he  retired,  leaving  large  numbers  of  his 
killed  and  wounded  on  the  field. 

"  Soon  after  the  close  of  the  fight  of  the  2d  I  discov 
ered  in  my  immediate  front  a  hill  called  Round  Top,  from 
the  summit  of  which  the  enemy  was  doing  us  great  dam 
age.  I  thought  it  highly  important  that  we  should  at  once 
occupy  it.  I  accordingly  took  two  regiments  of  my  bri 
gade,  viz.,  the  Fifth,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dare,  and  the 
Twelfth,  Colonel  Hardin,  and  the  Twentieth  Maine,  com 
manded  by  Colonel  Chamberlain,  and  at  10  P.  M.  ascended 
the  hill,  which  was  occupied  by  a  full  brigade  of  the  enemy. 
We  went  up  steadily  in  line  of  battle,  taking  over  30  pris 
oners  in  our  ascent. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       233 

"  In  the  morning  I  discovered  that  the  hill  was  of  im 
mense  importance  to  us,  inasmuch  as  that,  if  we  had  not 
taken  it,  the  enemy  most  undoubtedly  would  have  done  so, 
and  in  that  event  our  left  would  have  suffered  very  much, 
if,  indeed,  it  could  have  held  its  position  at  all.  I  also 
discovered  that  our  troops  were  not  well  posted  for  de 
fense,  so  I  changed  my  position,  throwing  the  left  flank 
of  the  two  regiments  which  had  not  gone  up  the  hill 
around  so  as  to  completely  cover  the  ravine  between  the 
two  hills,  and  at  once  threw  up  a  stone  wall  across  the  en 
tire  ravine  and  up  the  hill,  thus  giving  my  men  a  sure 
protection  against  any  advance  which  could  possibly  have 
been  made  by  the  enemy. 

"  My  officers  and  men  behaved  throughout  with  great 
coolness  and  bravery.  Among  others  equally  worthy  of 
and  deserving  special  mention,  I  beg  leave  to  call  your  at 
tention  to  the  conduct  of  Colonel  Hardin,  of  the  Twelfth 
regiment,  who,  still  suffering  from  wounds  received  at 
Bull  Run,  went  gallantly  up  the  mountain,  leading  his 
regiment  to  where  hot  work  was  expected;  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Dare,  of  the  Fifth  regiment,  who  was  also 
wounded  at  Fredericksburg,  led  his  regiment  up  the  hill, 
over  rocks  and  ravines;  Colonel  Warner,  of  the  Tenth 
regiment,  who  is  still  so  lame  from  wounds  received  at 
Antietam  as  to  be  unable  to  walk  without  support,  went 
into  the  engagement  against  my  wishes,  and  behaved  with 
great  coolness  and  courage;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Snodgrass, 
of  the  Ninth,  evinced  all  the  elements  of  a  soldier  in  his 
calm  and  dignified  demeanor,  while  all  the  subordinate  field 
officers  are  deserving  of  special  mention,  especially  Maj. 
James  H.  Larrimer,  of  the  Fifth  regiment,  who,  suffering 
from  acute  rheumatism,  refused  to  remain  out  of  the  bat 
tle,  although,  in  my  judgment,  unfit  for  duty. 

"  The  members  of  my  staff,  Lieutenant  [John  L.] 
Wright,  acting  assistant  adjutant-general;  Captain  [Hart- 


234    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

ley]  Howard,  brigade  inspector;  Lieutenants  [Charles  K.] 
Chamberlain  and  [William  H.  H.]  Kerns,  aides,  all  ren 
dered  me  efficient  support.  Sergt.  Thomas  M.  Fisher, 
acting  as  one  of  my  orderlies,  deserves  special  mention  as 
exhibiting  most  remarkable  coolness  and  bravery. 

"  My  brigade  captured  and  turned  in  to  the  proper  of 
ficer  over  1000  stand  of  arms,  brought  off  over  200 
wounded  rebels,  and  buried  80  of  their  dead.  Taking  it 
all  in  all,  I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  my  brigade 
fulfilled  their  mission  to  Gettysburg." 

Report  of  Maj.  Homer  R.  Stoughton,  Second  U.  S. 
Sharpshooters,  Third  Army  Corps.1 

"  HDQRS.  SECOND  REGIMENT  U.  S.  SHARPSHOOTERS, 

"  July  27,  1863. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  report  the  operations  of  the  Sec 
ond  U.  S.  Sharpshooters  at  Gettysburg,  Pa.,  as  follows: 

"  On  the  morning  of  July  2  I  was  placed  in  line  on  the 
extreme  left  of  the  Third  corps,  remaining  there  for  nearly 
one  hour,  when  the  colonel  commanding  instructed  me  to 
place  my  command  in  a  position  to  cover  a  ravine  near 
Sugar  Loaf  hill,  which  I  did  by  putting  Company  H  on 
the  brow  of  the  hill,  with  vedettes  overlooking  the  ravine, 
and  Company  D  in  the  ravine  near  the  woods,  to  watch 
the  enemy's  movements  in  that  direction.  Companies  A, 
E,  G,  and  C  formed  a  line  perpendicular  to  the  cross-road 
that  intersects  with  the  Emmittsburg  pike.  Companies  B 
and  F  I  held  in  reserve. 

"  I  remained  in  this  position  until  about  2  P.  MV  when 
General  Ward  directed  that  I  should  deploy  my  regiment 
across  the  ravine  and  through  the  woods  on  the  right,  and 
advance.  I  moved  forward  to  a  brook  some  200  yards 
beyond  a  second  cross-road  running  perpendicular  to  the 
Emmittsburg  pike,  and  intersecting  with  it  in  front  of 
x"  Rebellion  Records,"  Vol.  xxvii,  part  I,  page  518. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       235 

Sugar  Loaf  hill.  I  sent  forward  scouts  to  reconnoiter  the 
ground.  I  then  rode  out  perhaps  the  distance  of  half  a 
mile,  and  discovered  the  enemy's  skirmishers  advancing  on 
my  right,  which,  being  unsupported  by  any  connection  with 
skirmishers  on  my  right,  I  was  compelled  to  withdraw  to 
protect  my  flank.  In  this  position  we  had  but  little  time 
to  wait.  The  enemy's  skirmishers  advanced  to  the  top  of 
the  hill  in  our  front,  and  immediately  after  they  placed  a 
battery  directly  in  our  front,  and,  being  too  far  for  our 
range,  I  sent  forward  a  few  men  under  cover  of  woods  on 
the  left,  and  silenced  one  piece  nearest  us. 

"  The  enemy  then  advanced  a  line  of  battle  covering  our 
entire  front  and  flank.  While  they  were  advancing,  the 
Second  regiment  did  splendid  execution,  killing  and 
wounding  a  great  many.  One  regiment  broke  three  times, 
and  rallied,  before  it  would  advance.  I  held  my  position 
until  their  line  of  battle  was  within  100  yards  of  me  and 
their  skirmishers  were  pushing  my  right  flank,  when  I  or 
dered  my  men  to  fall  back,  firing  as  they  retired.  My 
left  wing  retreated  up  the  hill  and  allowed  the  enemy  to 
pass  up  the  ravine,  when  they  poured  a  destructive  fire  into 
his  flank  and  rear. 

"  Here  Adjutant  Norton,  with  about  a  dozen  men,  cap 
tured  and  sent  to  the  rear  22  prisoners.  Special  mention 
should  be  made  of  this  officer  for  his  coolness  and  bravery 
during  this  day's  engagement. 

c<  The  right  wing  fell  back  gradually  until  they  mingled 
with  the  regiments  composing  the  Second  brigade,  and  re 
mained  till  night,  when  the  brigade  was  relieved. 

"  In  this  day's  action  were  wounded  Capts.  E.  T.  Rowell, 
(acting  major),  J.  McClure,  and  A.  Buxton.  Our  loss 
was  28  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  Among  the  miss 
ing  was  Lieut.  D.  B.  Petti  John,  Company  A. 

"  On  the  3d  instant  the  Second  regiment  was  not  en 
gaged,  with  the  exception  of  about  a  dozen  volunteers, 


236    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

who  went  out  to  the  front  of  the  breastworks  of  the  First 
Army  corps,  to  silence  one  of  the  enemy's  guns,  which  was 
accomplished,  losing  i  killed  and  i  wounded. 

"  On  the  4th  instant  I  was  ordered  to  move  forward  to 
the  Emmittsburg  pike,  a  few  hundred  yards  to  the  left  of 
the  cemetery,  and  to  deploy  four  companies  to  skirmish 
through  the  field  to  the  woods  in  front.  The  enemy  was 
driven  back  to  his  earthworks,  about  150  or  200  yards 
from  his  first  position.  We  held  this  position  through  the 
day,  under  a  sharp  fire  from  his  sharpshooters. 

:<  The  regiment  sustained  a  loss  this  day  of  3  killed  and  8 
wounded.  Among  the  wounded  was  Lieutenant  Law, 
Company  E. 

"At  7:30  P.  M.  I  was  relieved  by  a  New  Jersey  regi 
ment,  of  the  Sixth  corps,  and  rejoined  the  brigade." 

The  reader  will  find  in  these  reports,  as  well  as  in  those 
of  the  Confederate  officers,  some  omissions,  discrepancies, 
and  contradictory  statements ;  but  they  are  exact  copies 
of  the  original  documents  published  by  authority  of  the 
War  Department  as  the  official  records  of  the  War  of  the 
Rebellion.  In  my  comments  I  shall  assume  that  in  gen 
eral  they  present  the  facts  according  to  the  best  knowledge 
and  belief  of  the  officers  who  made  the  reports  at  the  time 
they  were  made,  except  in  a  few  cases  where  I  have  good  rea 
son  to  believe  that  they  contain  deliberate  misstatements 
made  with  the  purpose  of  concealing  misconduct  or  of  un 
duly  magnifying  the  importance  of  the  service  of  the  or 
ganization  under  the  command  of  the  officer  who  makes 
the  report.  In  justice  to  the  truth  of  history,  I  think  such 
misstatements  should  be  exposed. 

SYKES'  REPORT  OF  THE  FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS 

General  Sykes  had  been  a  soldier  all  his  life  since  his 
boyhood.  He  entered  the  Military  Academy  as  a  cadet 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       237 

in  1838,  was  graduated  in  1842,  and  continued  in  the  army 
until  his  death,  in  1880,  passing  through  all  the  grades 
from  second  lieutenant  to  major-general  of  Volunteers  and 
brevet  major-general  in  the  Regular  Army.  He  served  in 
the  war  with  Mexico,  and  was  brevetted  for  gallant  and 
meritorious  conduct  in  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo.  He 
was  made  a  brigadier-general  of  Volunteers  September  28, 

1 86 1,  and    major-general    of    Volunteers    November    29, 

1862,  and  placed  in  command  of  the  Second  division  of 
the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  which  contained  the  two  brigades 
of  the  Regular  Army.     On  June  28,   1863,  when  General 
Meade,   who  had  been  in  command  of  the   Fifth  Army 
Corps,  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  Sykes  succeeded  him  in  command  of  the  corps. 

General  Barnes,  who  commanded  the  First  division  of 
Sykes'  corps,  was  graduated  from  the  Military  Academy 
in  1829  as  second  lieutenant.  Having  served  in  this  grade 
about  seven  years,  he  was  promoted  to  be  first  lieutenant, 
and  within  a  month  resigned  and  left  the  army.  July  26, 
1 86 1,  he  was  commissioned  colonel  of  the  Eighteenth 
Massachusetts,  which  became  part  of  Porter's  division, 
later  the  First  division  of  the  Fifth  corps.  The  same  day 
that  Sykes  was  made  major  general  of  Volunteers,  No 
vember  29,  1862,  Barnes  was  made  brigadier-general  of 
Volunteers  and  assigned  to  the  command  of  this  brigade. 
In  the  changes  which  occurred,  General  Griffin  became 
commander  of  this  First  division.  After  the  battle  of 
Chancellorsville  General  Griffin  was  absent  temporarily  on 
account  of  illness,  and  Barnes  as  senior  brigadier  assumed 
command  of  the  division.  He  was  one  of  the  oldest  of 
ficers  in  the  army.  If  he  entered  the  Academy  at  sixteen 
years  of  age,  the  lowest  limit  for  cadets,  he  must  have  been 
born  in  1809,  or  earlier.  Although  Sykes  speaks  kindly 
of  him  in  his  report,  it  is  evident  from  his  statement  that 
he  posted  Barnes'  brigades  himself,  that  he  had  no  great 


238    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

confidence  in  him  as  an  officer  to  be  trusted,  on  this  day  at 
least,  to  act  on  his  own  responsibility.  This  is  confirmed 
by  the  statements  of  Tilton  and  Sweitzer,  commanders  of 
two  brigades  of  which  Barnes  had  charge  during  the  bat 
tle,  that  when  they  reached  their  last  position  at  the  close 
of  the  action  they  reported  to  the  corps  commander  and 
received  orders  from  him,  as  Barnes  was  not  present. 
Griffin  arrived  on  the  field  July  3,  and  relieved  Barnes  in 
the  command  of  the  division  July  4.  We  hear  no  more 
of  Barnes  during  the  war,  except  as  commander  in  charge 
of  a  camp  of  Confederate  prisoners.  I  give  these  facts 
as  the  reason  for  my  opinion  that  Barnes'  statement  can 
not  be  received  as  entitled  to  full  credence. 

The  reader  will  note  that  in  Sykes'  report  there  is  no 
confirmation  of  Barnes'  statement  that  while  he  and  Sykes 
were  together,  Warren  came  to  them  asking  for  troops  for 
Little  Round  Top;  that  Sykes  yielded  to  his  importunity 
and  that  he,  Barnes,  sent  Vincent's  brigade.  The  state 
ment  so  often  made  that  Barnes'  division,  preceded  by 
Sykes  and  Barnes,  moved  out  by  the  road  which  crosses 
the  ridge  at  the  north  foot  of  Little  Round  Top  and  runs 
to  the  Emmittsburg  road  north  of  the  wheat-field  and  the 
peach  orchard  is  not  correct.  My  recollection  is  that 
Barnes'  division  moved  by  the  road  which  runs  from  the 
Baltimore  Pike  to  the  Taneytown  road  south  of  Cemetery 
hill,  then  turned  south  on  the  Taneytown  road  until  they 
were  in  rear  of  the  position  which  had  been  occupied  by 
Humphreys'  division  in  the  morning,  then  left  the  road 
and  marched  across  the  fields  to  a  point  a  little  northeast 
of  the  wheat-field,  where  they  halted,  and  Sykes  and 
Barnes  went  forward  into  the  woods  west  of  the  wheat- 
field.  When  Vincent's  brigade  moved  to  its  position  be 
tween  Round  Top  and  Little  Round  Top,  it  came  by  this 
road  crossing  the  Plum  Run  valley  just  west  of  the  north 
front  of  Little  Round  Top. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       239 

I  think  Sykes  is  mistaken  in  the  statement  that  Vincent's 
and  Weed's  brigades  were  posted  under  the  direction  of 
Warren.  Sykes  had  ordered  Weed,  when  he  met  him  be 
fore  his  brigade  reached  Little  Round  Top,  to  take  posi 
tion  there.  He  knew  that  Warren  was  there  at  that  time, 
and  evidently  supposed  that  he  would  take  charge  of  troops 
sent  there.  Sykes  says  that  when  he  returned  he  saw  the 
greater  part  of  Weed's  brigade  moving  away  from  the 
position  which  he  had  assigned  to  it,  and  sent  a  staff  of 
ficer  to  inquire  why  he  had  vacated  the  position.  Learning 
that  Weed's  brigade  was  moving  to  the  front  by  order  of 
Sickles,  he  ordered  him  to  return  and  reoccupy  it.  He 
could  not  reoccupy  a  position  which  he  had  not  previously 
occupied.  All  other  accounts  agree  that  no  part  of  Weed's 
brigade  except  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York 
had  previously  been  on  Little  Round  Top,  and  when  it 
finally  arrived  Warren  was  not  there.  When  Warren  de 
tached  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  and  sent 
it  to  the  crest  of  Little  Round  Top,  he  left  Lieutenant 
Roebling,  of  his  staff,  to  conduct  it  there  and  rode  away  to 
meet  General  Meade.  He  did  not  return  to  the  hill,  did 
not  see  Vincent's  brigade  come  up,  and  had  nothing  to  do 
with  posting  it.  For  confirmation  of  this  statement  see 
Warren's  letters  to  Captain  Farley,  quoted  Ch.  vii.,  pp.  307- 
329  infra. 

Sykes'  statement  that  Crawford's  division  moved  to  the 
front  across  the  Plum  Run  Valley  is  only  partly  correct. 
Only  two  brigades  of  Crawford's  division  were  present  in 
the  battle.  One  of  Crawford's  brigades  under  McCandless, 
with  the  Eleventh  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  made  this  at 
tack  under  Crawford's  personal  direction.  The  remaining 
four  regiments  of  Fisher's  brigade  remained  in  reserve. 
About  dusk  Fisher  was  sent  with  these  four  regiments  to 
support  Vincent,  but  they  did  not  arrive  in  time  to  take  any 
part  in  the  repulse  of  the  enemy  on  that  part  of  the  field. 


240    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

BARNES'  REPORT  FIRST  DIVISION 

This  report  was  not  made  until  August  24,  nearly  two 
months  after  the  battle,  and  then  only  in  conformity  to 
instructions  from  headquarters.  It  is  made  up  in  great 
part  by  copying  from  the  reports  of  his  brigade  com 
manders.  This  is  excusable,  so  far  as  the  report  of  Vin 
cent's  brigade  is  concerned,  because  it  was  removed  from 
his  personal  observation.  I  wish  to  treat  Barnes  fairly. 
Concerning  his  statement  that  he  detached  Vincent's  bri 
gade  and  sent  it  to  Little  Round  Top,  I  give  him  the  bene 
fit  of  supposing  that  the  officer  of  Sykes'  staff  who  told 
Vincent  that  Sykes  had  sent  him  to  direct  Barnes  to  send 
one  of  his  brigades  to  that  hill  yonder,  pointing  to  Little 
Round  Top,  found  Barnes  after  Vincent  had  gone,  and 
Barnes  sent  the  order  to  Vincent.  Barnes  was  not  with 
his  division,  and  did  not  return  to  the  other  two  brigades 
until  after  Vincent  had  gone.  If  he  had  been  with  Sykes, 
as  he  states,  Sykes  would  not  have  sent  one  of  his  staff 
with  an  order  for  him,  but  would  have  given  it  to  him  in 
person.  Barnes'  statement  that  Warren  came  to  them, 
when  he  and  Sykes  were  together,  has  no  confirmation 
either  from  Warren,  Sykes,  or  any  other  person  entitled 
to  know,  so  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  ascertain.  On  the 
contrary,  the  letter  from  Lieutenant  Mackenzie  to  General 
Meade,  which  I  have  quoted  elsewhere,1  shows  clearly  that 
Warren  sent  Mackenzie  to  Sickles  and  Sykes  to  ask  for 
troops  on  Little  Round  Top.  Sickles  refused,  but  Sykes 
granted  his  request.  This  letter  is  short  and  formal,  and 
is  evidently  in  reply  to  an  inquiry  from  General  Meade; 
it  should  settle  that  question.  I  think  Warren  did  not 
leave  the  vicinity  of  the  signal  station,  after  he  arrived 
there  some  time  before  half  past  three  o'clock,  until  Ward 
was  driven  back  from  the  Devil's  Den,  when  he  went 
down  to  Weed's  brigade,  detached  O'Rorke's  regiment,  and 

1  P.  292  infra. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       241 

then  rode  away  to  find  General  Meade  and  report.  By 
this  time  Vincent's  brigade  had  been  fighting  for  half  an 
hour. 

It  is  evident  from  Sykes'  statement  that  he  posted  the 
brigades  of  Tilton  and  Sweitzer  himself,  and,  from  the 
reports  of  both  these  brigade  commanders,  that  Barnes  did 
not  give  them  much  assistance,  and  that  when  their  stub 
born  fight  ended  by  their  occupation  of  the  position  which 
they  held  during  the  night,  Barnes  had  disappeared;  but 
Sykes  was  looking  after  them;  he  gave  them  orders  and 
they  reported  to  him.  Where  Barnes  was  at  this  time  is 
not  stated  by  himself  or  either  of  his  brigade  commanders. 

TILTON'S  FIRST  BRIGADE 

This  report,  as  before  stated,  indicates  very  little  as 
sistance  received  from  Barnes.  The  only  order  of  Barnes 
which  he  mentions  is  one  to  fall  back  in  good  order  if 
unable  to  hold  the  position.  When  he  was  flanked  by  over 
whelming  numbers  he  retired  in  as  good  order  as  the  cir 
cumstances  permitted  and  secured  a  position  on  a  ridge 
not  far  from  the  Devil's  Den,  which  he  held  during  the 
night.  He  reported  to  General  Sykes. 

SWEITZER'S  SECOND  BRIGADE 

This  report  and  that  of  the  First  Brigade  show  splendid 
fighting  by  the  men  and  skillful  management  by  the  brigade 
commanders  under  trying  circumstances.  I  think  that 
nearly  every  division  commander  in  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  would  have  prevented  the  surprise  which  over 
whelmed  these  brigades.  The  reader  will  note  Sweitzer's 
statement  that  when  his  brigade  reached  its  last  position 
Barnes  was  not  present,  and  he  received  and  obeyed  the 
order  which  Sykes  had  sent  to  Barnes. 


242         THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 
VINCENT,  THIRD  BRIGADE 

This  report  was  made  by  Colonel  James  C.  Rice,  who 
succeeded  to  the  command  when  Vincent  fell.  As  I  have 
so  fully  described  elsewhere  the  part  taken  by  this  brigade 
in  the  battle,  I  make  no  further  comment  on  this  report. 

TWENTIETH  MAINE 

Colonel  Chamberlain  wrote  this  report  July  6,  while  the 
events  were  distinctly  remembered.  It  was  carefully  pre 
pared  by  an  officer  who  knew  the  facts.  His  commenda 
tion  of  the  character  of  his  men  is  not,  in  my  opinion, 
stronger  than  they  deserve.  His  subsequent  career  in 
later  campaigns,  concluding  with  the  surrender  at  Appo- 
mattox,  shows  his  ability  and  the  esteem  and  regard  of  his 
superior  officers.  I  have  accepted  his  statements  in  this  re 
port  as  substantially  correct.  When  he  succeeded  to  the 
command  of  the  brigade  the  officers  and  men  of  this  or 
ganization  looked  upon  him  as  a  worthy  successor  to  But- 
terfield,  Vincent,  and  Rice. 

SIXTEENTH  MICHIGAN 

It  is  with  the  deepest  regret  that  I  feel  obliged  to  con 
demn  this  report  as  unworthy  of  its  author  and  his  gallant 
regiment,  which  formed  a  part  of  the  Third  brigade  from 
Hall's  Hill  in  front  of  Washington  in  the  fall  of  1861  to 
the  surrender  of  the  Confederate  army  at  Appomattox, 
April  9,  1865,  and  on  all  other  occasions  I  believe  it  per 
formed  its  full  duty  with  great  credit.  The  greater  part 
of  the  regiment  fought  with  its  usual  valor  at  Gettysburg. 
The  report  is  an  effort  to  explain  the  misconduct  of  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Welch  and  a  large  portion  of  three  com 
panies  on  the  right  of  the  regiment.  It  is  full  of  rnis- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       243 

statements  which  were  not  accepted  at  the  time  by  the  bri 
gade  commander  nor  the  commanders  of  the  other  regi 
ments.  It  is  not  true  that  when  the  brigade  reached  its 
position  the  Sixteenth  was  on  the  left  of  the  line,  and  that 
there  two  of  its  companies  were  thrown  out  as  skir 
mishers.  No  skirmishers  were  thrown  out  by  this  regi 
ment.  The  Twentieth  Maine  was  the  left  of  the  line  when 
the  brigade  took  its  position  and  remained  there.  The 
Sixteenth  came  on  the  ground  between  the  Forty-fourth 
and  Eighty-third;  and  at  Colonel  Rice's  request  that  these 
two  regiments  might  fight  side  by  side,  as  they  had  done  in 
all  their  previous  battles,  Vincent  ordered  the  Sixteenth 
to  pass  the  Forty-fourth,  and  placed  it  on  the  right  of  the 
line.  The  brigade  was  all  in  position  and  ready  for  the 
enemy  before  a  shot  was  fired.  There  was  no  loss  in  the 
regiment  before  it  reached  its  place  in  line.  General  Weed 
was  not  on  the  top  of  the  high  rock  in  rear  of  the  regi 
ment  at  any  time  during  the  battle;  in  fact,  he  did  not 
reach  Little  Round  Top  until  after  the  last  assault  of  the 
enemy  was  repulsed.  I  have  found  no  evidence  that  Gen 
eral  Sykes  was  on  that  part  of  the  field  where  Vincent's 
brigade  fought  during  the  battle  of  July  2.  The  fact  is 
that  Welch  was  not  in  his  proper  place  in  rear  of  his  regi 
ment,  where  a  competent  officer,  encouraging  and  sustain 
ing  his  men,  might  have  prevented  the  break  which  oc 
curred.  Vincent  went  up  there  and  tried  to  restore  order, 
but  fell  before  he  could  do  so.  It  is  true  that  the  enemy 
in  great  force  had  reached  that  part  of  the  line,  but  the 
men  of  the  Sixteenth  had  maintained  their  ground  before, 
in  face  of  determined  assaults,  and  might  have  done  so  at 
this  time  if  properly  commanded;  but  they  were  seized  with 
panic  and  ran  for  shelter  behind  the  rocks.  Colonel  Rice 
in  his  report  commends  the  commanders  of  each  of  the 
other  regiments  and  some  of  their  subordinate  officers,  but 
does  not  mention  Lieutenant-Colonel  Welch,  commending 


244    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

only  Captain  Elliott  and  Adjutant  Jacklin  of  the  Sixteenth 
Michigan.  These  officers  remained  with  that  part  of  the 
regiment  which  held  fast. 

About  dusk,  after  the  fighting  there  had  ceased,  Colonel 
Rice  directed  me  to  take  my  flag,  ride  to  the  rear,  and 
try  to  get  some  ambulances  and  stretcher  bearers  to  care 
for  our  wounded.  I  found  the  whole  country  to  the 
northeast  of  Little  Round  Top  filled  with  field  hospital 
tents,  and  ambulances  coming  and  going,  but  all  the  am 
bulance  officers  that  I  appealed  to  replied  that  they  were 
under  orders  and  could  not  go  where  I  asked  without  an 
order  from  the  surgeon  in  charge.  I  was  unable  to  find 
this  officer,  and  continued  on  down  the  road  running  east 
from  Little  Round  Top  until  I  reached  the  last  field  hos 
pital.  Returning,  I  saw  Colonel  Welch  sitting  on  his  horse 
near  the  Bushman  house,  with  his  regimental  colors  and 
near  him  some  forty  or  fifty  of  his  men.  I  asked  him 
where  the  brigade  was.  He  replied  that  he  did  not  know; 
that  they  had  been  driven  from  their  position  and  he  had 
followed  my  brigade  flag,  thinking  they  had  gone  in  that 
direction.  I  think  Welch  and  these  men  had  been  skulk 
ing  behind  the  high  rocks  and  followed  my  flag  when  they 
saw  me  go  down  the  hill.  Welch  told  me  that  Colonel 
Vincent  was  in  that  house.  This  was  the  Bushman  farm 
house,  where  Vincent  had  been  carried  after  receiving 
his  fatal  wound.  Dismounting,  I  left  my  horse  and  flag 
with  one  of  the  men  of  the  Sixteenth.  This  man  told  me 
that  he  did  not  believe  the  brigade  had  left  its  position; 
neither  did  I.  I  entered  the  house,  which  was  full  of 
wounded  men.  I  found  Colonel  Vincent  in  a  room  on  the 
first  floor.  He  was  very  pale  and  unable  to  speak,  but  he 
held  out  his  hand  to  me.  When  I  said  to  him,  "  The  boys 
are  still  there,  Colonel,"  his  face  lighted  up  with  pleasure 
and  he  pressed  my  hand.  I  tried  to  say  a  few  words  ex 
pressing  my  grief,  but  was  too  much  overcome  by  the  pa- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       245 

thetic  scene.  He  died  in  that  house  five  days  later.  I  hur 
riedly  left  the  room  and  the  house  and  returned  to  my 
post.  I  found  the  brigade  there,  as  I  expected.  Some 
ambulances  and  stretchers  had  arrived  and  the  surgeons 
were  there.  The  men  were  gathering  up  the  wounded 
men,  Union  and  Confederate,  and  bringing  them  to  the 
surgeons  near  the  ambulances.  The  Confederate  pris 
oners  able  to  walk  had  been  gathered  in  a  squad  under 
guard,  and  were  soon  sent  to  the  rear. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Welch  in  later  campaigns  and  bat 
tles  redeemed  his  reputation.  He  was  made  colonel  of 
the  regiment  and  was  killed  in  one  of  the  minor  engage 
ments  on  the  lines  south  of  Petersburg.  He  was  leading 
a  charge  on  the  enemy's  intrenchments  and  received  a  shot 
at  close  range  from  one  of  the  Confederates,  which  killed 
him  instantly. 

FORTY-FOURTH  NEW  YORK 

In  view  of  the  important  part  taken  by  the  regiment  in 
this  battle,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Conner's  report  is  very 
modest.  One  would  suppose  from  reading  it  that  the  Con 
federates  made  only  one  attack  on  the  front  of  this  regi 
ment,  and  that  this  lasted  about  an  hour.  This  does  not 
agree  with  the  reports  of  the  Confederate  regiments  which 
made  this  attack;  but  as  a  part  of  these  men  took  shelter 
behind  the  large  rocks  within  short  range  and  continued 
firing,  it  seemed  like  a  continuous  battle.  His  remark 
about  firing  on  the  enemy  in  the  hollow  on  the  right  evi 
dently  refers  to  the  attack  on  the  right  of  the  brigade. 
Until  Colonel  Vincent  fell  Colonel  Rice  was  in  command 
of  this  regiment.  He  describes  the  attack  in  his  brigade 
report.  He  overestimates  the  force  of  the  enemy,  as  two 
or  three  brigades,  but  as  prisoners  taken  were  from  Rob 
ertson's  and  Law's  brigades,  he  is  perhaps  excusable.  He 
says  the  enemy  charged  again  and  again  within  a  few  yards 


246    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

of  these  unflinching  troops.  As  Connor  did  not  take  com 
mand  until  the  last  of  the  assaults  on  the  Forty-fourth  was 
repulsed,  Colonel  Rice's  statement,  in  my  opinion,  is  pref 
erable. 

EIGHTY-THIRD  PENNSYLVANIA 

Captain  Woodward  is  mistaken  about  the  time  of  the 
engagement.  The  Fifth  corps  did  not  move  from  its  posi 
tion  on  the  Baltimore  Pike  until  some  time  after  three 
o'clock.  The  Confederate  infantry  was  a  mile  distant 
from  the  Devil's  Den  when  at  four  o'clock  they  began 
their  advance  against  our  line.  The  attack  on  Vincent's 
brigade  must  have  commenced  at  some  time  between  4:30 
and  5  P.  M.  Colonel  and  Brevet  Brigadier-General  Wood 
ward  is  still  living,  or  was  a  few  months  ago,  at  Neosho 
Falls,  Kansas.  He  is  seventy-seven  years  old,  and,  al 
though  minus  one  leg  which  he  lost  in  battle  in  1864,  still 
enjoys  fairly  good  health.  In  a  letter  which  I  received 
from  him,  dated  January  12,  1912,  he  admits  his  mistake 
in  regard  to  the  time,  and  authorizes  me  to  correct  that 
statement  to  accord  with  the  facts. 


GENERAL  ROMEYN  B.  AYRES,  SECOND  DIVISION 

As  the  First  and  Second  brigades  did  not  participate  in 
the  battle  on  Little  Round  Top,  I  make  no  comment  on 
their  gallant  service  elsewhere.  The  statement  about  the 
Third  brigade  (Weed's),  that  they  were  placed  on  Little 
Round  Top  and  ordered  to  hold  the  hill, —  which  duty  it 
performed  well  and  effectually, —  is  technically  true,  al 
though,  with  the  exception  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Fortieth  New  York  regiment,  commanded  by  Colonel 
O'Rorke,  it  did  not  arrive  on  the  hill  until  the  last  as 
sault  on  that  position  had  been  repulsed. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       247 
THIRD  BRIGADE, —  WEED'S 

As  General  Weed  was  mortally  wounded  in  the  battle 
and  died  a  few  hours  later,  the  report  is  made  by  Colonel 
Kenner  Garrard,  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth 
New  York,  who  assumed  command  when  Weed  fell. 
There  are  no  regimental  reports  of  this  brigade.  Col 
onel  Garrard  makes  no  distinction  between  the  different 
regiments  of  this  brigade  in  regard  to  the  importance  of 
the  part  which  each  took  in  the  action.  The  brigade  was 
composed  of  good  men,  well  officered.  If  they  had  been 
given  the  opportunity  I  have  no  doubt  the  other  regiments 
would  have  maintained  their  reputation  by  the  side  of  the 
One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  but  unfortunately 
they  did  not  arrive  until  this  regiment  had  been  fighting 
nearly  or  quite  half  an  hour,  had  repulsed  the  last  Confed 
erate  charge,  and  had  lost  a  large  number  of  its  men  and 
officers,  including  Colonel  O'Rorke.  During  this  time  the 
remainder  of  the  brigade,  which  Sykes  had  ordered  to  Lit 
tle  Round  Top,  had  marched  by  that  position  and  under 
an  order  from  Sickles  had  moved  out  toward  the  Emmitts- 
burg  road,  to  support  the  Third  corps.  By  the  time 
Sykes  discovered  this  movement  and  ordered  it  back  to 
Little  Round  Top,  the  attack  by  the  Confederates  had 
been  repulsed  by  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New 
York,  and  the  battle  had  dwindled  to  long  distance  firing 
between  the  sharpshooters  and  individuals  of  both  sides. 

When  Warren  from  his  position  near  the  signal  corps 
saw  the  preparations  for  this  attack,  he  rode  down  the 
hill  and  detaching  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New 
York  from  the  rear  of  Weed's  brigade,  which  was  then 
moving  out  to  the  front,  sent  it  up  to  the  crest  of  the  ridge, 
where  it  arrived  just  in  time  to  prevent  the  success  of  the 
movement  against  the  right  flank  of  Vincent's  brigade. 

I  regret  that  no  regimental  reports  of  this  brigade  in  re- 


248    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

gard  to  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  are  to  be  found  in  the 
"  Official  Records."  In  the  absence  of  these,  for  the  part 
taken  by  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  I  re 
fer  the  reader  to  the  admirable  paper  entitled  Captain  Far 
ley's  "  Number  Nine,"  which  will  be  found  in  another 
part  of  this  book  (p.  125).  Captain  Farley  was  acting  as 
adjutant  of  the  regiment  at  this  time,  and  had  an  excellent 
opportunity  to  know  what  occurred. 

It  had  been  a  mystery  to  me  why  Warren  knew  so  little 
about  the  fight  which  Vincent  was  making  on  the  southern 
slope  of  the  ridge.  In  a  visit  to  Little  Round  Top  which 
I  made  last  spring  in  company  with  Captain  Farley  and 
some  other  gentlemen,  I  discovered  the  reason.  Near  the 
middle  of  the  ridge  from  north  to  south  is  its  highest 
point;  from  there  the  crest  slopes  both  to  the  north  and 
to  the  south.  There  is  also  a  more  or  less  pronounced 
ridge  running  from  this  point  toward  the  west,  separating 
into  two  parts  the  western  slope.  With  reference  to  the 
surroundings  Vincent's  position  may  be  said  to  be  almost 
in  a  hole.  From  this  position  the  ground  ascends  sharply 
to  the  top  of  this  ridge  on  the  western  slope,  then  de 
scends  quite  rapidly  from  that  point  to  the  vicinity  of  the 
signal  station  where  Warren  stood.  There  was  no  artil 
lery  with  Vincent,  the  wind  was  blowing  toward  the  south, 
and,  with  the  noise  of  the  battle  at  the  Devil's  Den  and  be 
yond  and  the  firing  of  Hazlett's  battery  near  him,  the  mus 
ketry  firing  of  Vincent's  men  and  the  Confederates  at 
tacking  them  could  not  be  heard. 

CRAWFORD,  THIRD  DIVISION 

This  division  was  composed  exclusively  of  the  "  Penn 
sylvania  Reserves."  Only  two  brigades  commanded  by 
McCandless  and  Fisher  were  present  at  Gettysburg.  As 
McCandless'  brigade,  with  one  regiment  of  Fisher's,  was 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       249 

engaged  on  another  part  of  the  field,  and  this  force  with 
Bartlett's  brigade  of  the  Sixth  corps,  all  under  command 
of  General  Crawford,  made  the  last  attack  which  drove  the 
Confederates  from  that  part  of  the  field,  and  this  accord 
ing  to  McCandless  under  the  direct  supervision  of  Craw 
ford  in  the  dusk  after  sunset,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  Craw 
ford  found  time  to  visit  Fisher's  brigade,  as  stated  by  him. 
The  reader  will  notice  that  Rice,  Fisher,  and  Chamber 
lain  make  no  mention  of  orders  received  from  Crawford, 
or  of  his  presence  in  that  part  of  the  field.  Crawford's  at 
tack  continued  until  dark,  and  finished  the  battle  of  July 
2  on  the  left  of  our  line.  It  was  well  planned  and  well 
executed.  It  was  the  first  and  last  permanent  success  on 
the  advanced  position  of  Sickles'  corps.  There  is  glory 
enough  for  Crawford  and  his  men  without  his  claiming  a 
share  in  the  deeds  of  the  officers  and  men  of  Vincent's  and 
Fisher's  brigades. 

FISHER,  THIRD  BRIGADE 

This  brigade  was  composed  of  as  good  material  —  of 
ficers  and  men  —  as  McCandless'  brigade,  which  distin 
guished  itself  in  its  fight  near  the  wheat-field.  If  given  the 
opportunity,  I  have  no  doubt  they  would  have  done  as  well ; 
but  unfortunately  they  did  not  arrive  until  the  fight  on 
that  part  of  the  field  was  done.  The  brigade  was  massed 
in  the  rear  of  Vincent's  position.  The  last  sentence  in 
Fisher's  report,  is,  "  Taking  it  all  in  all,  I  have  no  hesita 
tion  in  saying  that  my  brigade  fulfilled  their  mission  to 
Gettysburg."  The  report  appears  to  have  been  written 
with  the  purpose  of  preparing  a  way  for  this  conclusion, 
but  with  too  little  regard  for  the  facts.  On  his  arrival 
he  did  not  engage  the  enemy,  because  that  part  of  the 
enemy's  force  not  killed,  wounded,  or  prisoners  was  al 
ready  out  of  sight.  He  says  that  soon  after  the  close  of 
the  fight  of  the  2d  he  discovered  a  hill  in  his  front,  from 


250    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  summit  of  which  the  enemy  was  doing  us  great  dam 
age,  and  at  10  p.  M.  he  took  two  regiments  of  his  brigade 
and  the  Twentieth  Maine  and  ascended  the  hill,  which  was 
occupied  by  a  full  brigade  of  the  enemy.  He  went  up  in 
line  of  battle,  taking  about  thirty  prisoners  during  the 
ascent.  The  fight  against  Vincent's  brigade  finished  be 
tween  6  and  7  p.  M.  If  he  sustained  the  fire  from  this 
full  brigade  on  the  summit  of  Big  Round  Top  for  three 
or  four  hours  without  reply,  his  equanimity  is  surprising. 
He  does  not  give  the  name  of  the  full  brigade  of  the  enemy 
which  he  encountered.  There  was  no  Confederate  brigade 
on  the  right  of  their  line  not  fully  accounted  for  else 
where.  The  only  soldiers  of  the  enemy  which  could  pos 
sibly  have  been  in  that  location  were  one  small  company 
of  Gates'  Fifteenth  Alabama,  which  followed  a  few  of 
Stoughton's  sharpshooters,  drove  them  off  the  east  end 
of  the  hill,  and,  as  Gates  says,  did  not  return  to  the  regi 
ment  until  some  time  during  the  night.  The  thirty  pris 
oners  which  Fisher  claims  to  have  captured  during  the  as 
cent  may  have  belonged  to  this  company,  with  possibly 
the  addition  of  some  men  from  the  Fifteenth  Alabama 
who  left  their  places  in  line  and  climbed  the  hill  while  the 
Fifteenth  Alabama  was  fighting  the  Twentieth  Maine. 
The  appearance  of  this  full  Confederate  brigade,  which 
somehow  melted  away,  resembles  Falstaff's  "  men  in  buck 
ram." 

Fisher  certainly  did  not  take  the  Twentieth  Maine  with 
his  two  regiments  and  ascend  the  hill.  He  had  no  juris 
diction  over  the  regiments  of  Vincent's  brigade.  Rice 
would  not  have  turned  over  to  him  the  regiment  of  his  bri 
gade  if  asked  for  by  Fisher.  If  a  brigade  commander  had 
been  needed  for  this  expedition,  Rice  himself  would  have 
gone.  He  was  satisfied,  however,  to  send  Colonel  Chamber 
lain,  with  the  Twentieth  Maine,  which  he  did  an  hour  before 
the  time  when  Fisher's  men  started.  Chamberlain  says 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG      251 

that  about  midnight  two  regiments  of  Fisher's  brigade 
came  up  the  mountain  beyond  his  left  and  took  position 
near  the  summit ;  but  as  the  enemy  did  not  threaten  in  that 
direction  he  made  no  effort  to  connect  with  them. 

The  other  two  regiments  of  Fisher's  brigade  some  time 
during  the  night  passed  Vincent's  brigade  going  down  the 
valley  on  the  north  side  of  Big  Round  Top,  and  halted  at 
the  foot  of  the  trail  which  runs  up  the  mountain-side  to  the 
place  where  the  observatory  now  stands  and  formed  a  line 
across  the  valley,  which  they  slightly  fortified  during  the 
night  by  piling  up  a  wall  of  loose  stones.  A  portion  of 
these  men  went  up  this  trail  to  a  point  near  Chamberlain's 
right.  Hearing  the  noise  they  made,  Chamberlain  sup 
posed  the  enemy  was  coming  from  that  direction,  and  made 
preparation  to  receive  them.  The  Confederates  had  es 
tablished  a  strong  skirmish  and  picket  line  from  north  to 
south  near  the  top  of  the  western  slope.  The  north  end 
of  this  line  was  not  far  from  the  trail  up  which  Fisher's 
men  had  come.  The  Confederates  opened  a  brisk  fire 
on  them,  and  they  soon  returned  to  the  valley. 

The  losses  of  Fisher's  brigade  at  Gettysburg,  as  re 
ported,  were  three  killed  and  eleven  wounded.  It  is 
probable  that  these  losses  occurred  on  the  trail,  although 
the  fire  of  that  full  brigade  of  the  enemy  on  the  summit  of 
Big  Round  Top  may  have  been  responsible  for  some  of 
them. 

In  the  publication  entitled  "  Pennsylvania  at  Gettys 
burg,"  near  the  close  of  the  second  volume  is  a  list  of  the 
inscriptions  on  each  of  the  Pennsylvania  monuments  on 
the  Gettysburg  battlefield.  These  inscriptions  state  the 
casualties  of  each  of  the  regiments  engaged  in  this  battle. 
The  following  is  the  list  of  casualties  in  the  four  regiments 
of  Fisher's  brigade : 

Fifth  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  two  men  wounded.  Ninth 
Pennsylvania  Reserves,  five  men  wounded.  Tenth  Penn- 


252    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

sylvania  Reserves,  two  men  killed,  three  men  wounded. 
Twelfth  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  one  man  killed,  one  man 
wounded.  Total  casualties  in  the  brigade,  three  men 
killed,  eleven  men  wounded. 

Above  does  not  include  the  casualties  in  the  Eleventh 
Pennsylvania  Reserves,  which  fought  with  McCandless' 
brigade  near  the  wheat-field. 


IV 

ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF  LITTLE  ROUND  TOP 
Gettysburg,  July  2,  1863. 

THE  ATTACK 

ON  the  morning  of  July  2  General  Lee,  after  carefully 
examining  the  position  on  and  about  Cemetery  and  Gulp's 
hills,  which  the  Union  army  had  taken  up  at  the  close  of 
the  previous  day's  battle,  decided  to  make  his  attack  on  the 
left  of  the  Union  line.  Longstreet's  corps  had  not  been 
present  during  the  battle  of  July  i,  but  McLaws'  and 
Hood's  divisions,  with  the  exception  of  Law's  brigade  of 
the  latter,  arrived  during  the  morning  and  were  placed  on 
Lee's  right.  Pickett's  division  had  not  yet  arrived. 
Law's  brigade  came  up  later,  and  was  placed  on  the  right 
of  Hood's  division.  After  much  marching  and  counter 
marching  in  the  attempt  to  conceal  their  movements  from 
the  signal  station  on  Little  Round  Top,  they  arrived  about 
three  o'clock  at  the  Emmittsburg  road  at  a  point  a  con 
siderable  distance  south  of  the  Peach  Orchard.  Mean 
time  Sickles  had  posted  the  two  divisions  of  his  corps, 
Humphreys'  on  the  right  along  the  Emmittsburg  road  with 
his  left  near  the  Peach  Orchard,  his  line  facing  Seminary 
ridge;  Birney's  division  occupied  a  line  facing  south,  with 
Graham's  brigade  at  the  Peach  Orchard,  De  Trobriand  in 
the  center,  and  Ward  on  the  left  among  the  rocks  of  the 
Devil's  Den  near  the  Plum  Run  valley,  which  separated 
his  position  from  the  western  front  of  Little  Round  Top. 
Hood  crossed  the  Emmittsburg  road  and  formed  his  di 
vision  in  the  woods*  on  a  ridge  facing  Birney's  line.  The 
division  of  four  brigades  was  formed  in  these  woods  in 

253 


254    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

two  lines,  Law's  brigade  on  the  right,  Robertson's  on  the 
left  in  the  first  line,  Benning's  Georgia  brigade  on  the 
right  and  Anderson's  Georgia  brigade  on  the  left  in  the 
second  line.  The  four  batteries  of  the  division  were 
massed  on  its  left.  McLaws'  division,  consisting  of  the 
brigades  of  Kershaw,  Semmes,  Barkesdale,  and  Wofford, 
was  formed  in  the  same  order,  with  the  division  artillery 
of  four  batteries  on  its  left.  Law's  brigade  consisted  of 
five  Alabama  regiments  in  the  following  order  from  right 
to  left:  Forty-eighth,  Forty-fourth,  Fifteenth,  Forty-sev 
enth  and  Fourth.  Robertson's  brigade  consisted  of  one 
Arkansas  and  three  Texas  regiments,  arranged  in  the  fol 
lowing  order  from  right  to  left:  Fifth,  Fourth,  and  First 
Texas  and  Third  Arkansas.  Benning  was  in  rear  of  Law 
and  Anderson  in  rear  of  Robertson.  As  McLaws'  division 
directed  its  attack  on  Graham  and  De  Trobriand,  and  did 
not  participate  directly  in  the  struggle  for  Little  Round 
Top,  we  need  not  follow  its  movements. 

Before  crossing  the  Emmittsburg  road  Hood  and  Law 
had  sent  out  trained  scouts  to  the  south  and  east  to  look 
for  the  Union  cavalry.  They  found  no  sign  of  cavalry 
in  that  part  of  the  field.  Longstreet  in  the  morning  had 
urged  Lee  not  to  make  a  direct  attack,  but  to  move  by  his 
right  around  Meade's  left  to  his  rear,  threatening  his  com 
munications  and  forcing  him  to  leave  his  strong  position 
and  attack  the  Confederates  on  ground  of  their  own  choos 
ing;  but  Lee  refused.  Law's  scouts  had  gone  to  the  top 
of  Big  Round  Top  without  encountering  so  much  as  a 
picket  of  the  Union  army.  They  reported  to  Law  that  the 
Union  trains  of  commissary  and  ordnance  wagons  were 
in  plain  view  from  Big  Round  Top,  there  were  no  troops 
on  Little  Round  Top,  and  only  a  few  wagon  guards  near 
the  train.  Law  reported  this  to  Hood,  and  the  latter 
urged  Longstreet  to  permit  his  division  to  move  around 
the  east  of  Big  Round  Top  and  attack  from  that  direction; 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       255 

but  Longstreet  replied  to  Hood's  importunities,  that  Lee's 
order  was  to  attack  up  the  Emmittsburg  road,  and  it  must 
be  obeyed.  Hood  had  discovered  the  strong  position  of 
Birney's  line,  and  made  a  formal  protest  against  an  attack 
in  that  direction,  but  finally  yielded  reluctantly  and  gave 
his  orders  for  the  attack.  According  to  Longstreet's  in 
structions  the  attack  was  to  be  made  by  the  right  en  eche 
lon,  and  taken  up  by  the  brigades  in  succession  from  right 
to  left.  The  attack  opened  about  half  past  three  o'clock 
by  a  furious  cannonade  on  Birney's  line  from  Hood's  and 
McLaws'  batteries,  which  was  answered  by  all  the  Union 
batteries  which  were  in  position  to  reply.  After  this 
bombardment  had  lasted  about  half  an  hour  Hood's  in 
fantry  advanced.  During  this  artillery  battle  Hood  was 
badly  wounded  by  a  shell  while  standing  near  his  batteries, 
and  was  carried  to  the  rear.  It  was  not  until  the  infantry 
had  arrived  near  the  Union  lines  that  Law  was  informed 
that  Hood  was  disabled.  Upon  receiving  this  informa 
tion,  as  senior  brigadier  he  assumed  command  of  the  di 
vision. 

The  ground  over  which  the  Confederates  advanced  was 
rocky  and  very  rough,  divided  by  numerous  stone  fences 
and  other  obstructions.  As  soon  as  their  advance  was 
seen,  the  Union  artillery  turned  its  fire  on  them,  at  first 
with  shell,  followed  by  canister  as  they  came  nearer.  This 
made  it  impossible  to  maintain  very  good  order  in  the  ad 
vancing  line.  Robertson  had  been  directed  to  keep  his 
brigade  closed  on  Law's  left.  For  some  reason  not  ex 
plained  by  Law,  his  brigade  in  advancing  obliqued  to  the 
right.  This  movement  was  followed  by  the  Fourth  and 
Fifth  Texas  obliquing  to  the  right,  to  keep  closed  on  the 
Fourth  Alabama.  Robertson's  other  two  regiments,  the 
First  Texas  and  Third  Arkansas,  with  Robertson  himself, 
went  straight  on  to  the  Devil's  Den.  Law's  brigade  had 
gone  so  far  to  the  east  that  for  more  than  half  its  length 


256    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

it  faced  the  southern  side  of  Big  Round  Top.  To  remedy 
this,  instead  of  moving  the  whole  brigade  to  the  left,  he 
directed  the  two  regiments  on  his  right  to  halt  and  then 
move  to  the  left  of  the  brigade.  This  was  done;  but  they 
went  so  far  that  they  came  up  on  the  left  of  the  Fourth 
and  Fifth  Texas,  thus  leaving  them  in  the  middle  of  Law's 
brigade.  This  left  the  regiments  in  the  following  order 
from  right  to  left:  Fifteenth,  Forty-seventh,  and  Fourth 
Alabama,  Fifth  and  Fourth  Texas,  Forty-eighth  and  Forty- 
fourth  Alabama. 

Ward,  after  getting  his  brigade  into  position  at  the 
Devil's  Den  on  the  left  of  Birney's  line,  had  sent  out  the 
Second  battalion  of  United  States  Sharpshooters  under 
Major  Stoughton  as  skirmishers  to  cover  his  front.  This 
battalion  consisted  of  eight  small  companies,  not  more  than 
half  an  ordinary  regiment;  but  the  superiority  of  their 
arms  and  their  skill  in  using  them  made  them  a  formidable 
force.  Stoughton  crossed  the  little  valley  in  front  of 
Ward  and  deployed  his  men  behind  a  stone  wall  covering 
Ward's  front  and  flank.  The  right  was  in  the  air,  but  the 
left  had  a  good  position  at  the  foot  of  the  wooded  western 
slope  of  the  Big  Round  Top.  The  well-directed  fire  of 
this  line  from  their  position  behind  the  stone  wall  checked 
the  Confederates  for  a  time,  but  their  courage  and  su 
perior  numbers  forced  the  sharpshooters  to  retire.  The 
five  companies  on  the  right  being  outflanked  and  in  danger 
of  capture  fell  back  to  the  main  line  of  the  brigade.  The 
other  three  companies  with  Major  Stoughton  retired  into 
the  woods  and  up  the  western  slope  of  Big  Round  Top, 
closely  followed  by  the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  Ala 
bama. 

Colonel  Gates  says  that  after  he  got  in  the  woods  he 
was  ordered  to  wheel  his  line  to  the  left,  but  he  disre 
garded  the  order  because  the  right  of  the  Forty-seventh 
was  crowding  in  on  the  left  of  his  regiment  and  he  could 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       257 

not  execute  the  movement  without  increasing  the  con 
fusion.  He  did  not  dare  to  make  a  movement  which 
would  place  his  line  in  a  position  to  be  enfiladed  by  the 
sharpshooters  on  the  mountain,  so,  straightening  his  line 
and  that  of  the  Forty-seventh,  which  by  direction  of  Gen 
eral  Law  was  temporarily  under  his  command,  he  advanced 
toward  the  top  of  the  mountain.  When  part  way  up  the 
sharpshooters  divided,  the  greater  part  of  them  going  to 
the  left  around  the  Forty-seventh,  which,  continuing,  passed 
them.  Another  part  of  the  sharpshooters  moved  to  the 
right,  menacing  his  right  flank.  He  deployed  Company 
A  of  his  regiment  as  flankers,  and  with  the  Forty-seventh 
pressed  on  to  the  top  of  the  mountain.  His  Company  A 
followed  the  sharpshooters  until  they  drove  them  down  the 
eastern  end  of  the  mountain,  and  he  saw  no  more  of  this 
company  until  after  the  battle.  Having  reached  the  top 
of  the  mountain,  he  halted  for  a  time  to  give  his  men  oppor 
tunity  to  recover  from  the  heat  and  from  the  fatigue  caused 
by  their  exertions  in  climbing  over  the  rocks. 

Meantime  the  other  regiments  of  Law's  brigade,  with 
the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas,  had  cleared  the  western  slope 
of  Big  Round  Top,  and  reached  the  narrow  valley  which 
runs  along  the  northern  side  of  Big  Round  Top  and  far 
ther  east  separates  it  from  Little  Round  Top.  Colonel' 
Perry,  of  the  Forty- fourth  Alabama,  which  was  then  the 
left  of  the  line,  says  that  Law  rode  up  and  told  him  that 
he  was  expected  to  take  that  battery  (Smith's  battery  on 
the  Devil's  Den)  which  had  played  such  havoc  with  their 
line  in  its  advance.  He  wheeled  his  regiment  to  the  left 
until  it  faced  the  battery  and  then  advanced  directly 
against  it.  The  other  regiments  of  Law's  brigade  —  the 
Fourth  and  Forty-eighth  Alabama  and  Robertson's  Fourth 
and  Fifth  Texas  —  advanced  up  this  narrow  valley  toward 
the  east  in  columns  of  fours,  without  skirmishers,  hoping 
tc  arrive  before  any  Union  troops  reached  that  part  of  the 


258    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

field.  But  Vincent's  brigade  had  already  got  into  position 
on  the  southern  slope  of  Little  Round  Top  and  thrown 
out  two  or  three  companies  in  their  front  as  skirmishers. 
The  skirmishers  of  the  Forty-fourth  New  York  and 
Eighty-third  Pennsylvania  advanced  down  this  valley  to 
ward  the  west.  Captain  Merrill's  company  of  the  Twen 
tieth  Maine  wrent  to  the  left  to  the  east  of  Big  Round  Top. 
The  skirmishers  of  the  Forty-fourth  New  York  and 
Eighty-third  Pennsylvania  had  not  gone  far  before  they 
met  the  heads  of  the  Confederate  columns.  The  latter 
were  surprised,  and  both  sides  began  firing.  Captain  Lar- 
rabee,  in  command  of  the  skirmishers  of  the  Forty-fourth 
New  York,  was  instantly  killed  and  several  of  the  men 
were  killed  or  badly  wounded.  These  skirmishers  fell 
back  to  their  regiments. 

The  Confederates  quickly  formed  in  line  of  battle,  with 
the  Fourth  Alabama  on  the  right,  the  Fifth  and  Fourth 
Texas  in  the  center,  and  the  Forty-eighth  Alabama  on  the 
left.  They  advanced  against  Vincent,  with  the  Fourth 
Alabama  extending  around  toward  Vincent's  left,  the 
other  regiments  in  front  of  the  western  side  of  Vincent's 
position.  Vincent's  men  were  well  protected  by  the  rocks 
and  boulders  behind  which  they  had  sheltered  themselves. 
Finding  that  they  could  not  be  driven  from  their  position, 
the  Confederate  line  wavered  and  fell  back  a  short  dis 
tance,  sheltering  themselves  behind  the  rocks,  which  were 
numerous  in  that  vicinity.  After  a  time  they  advanced 
again,  this  time  moving  a  little  further  to  their  right  and 
covering  some  of  the  companies  on  the  right  of  the  Twen 
tieth  Maine. 

Meantime  the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  Alabama, 
under  Colonel  Gates,  came  down  from  the  top  of  Big 
Round  Top  by  the  trail  which  leads  to  where  the  observa 
tory  now  stands.  They  were  discovered  moving  to  the 
right  in  column  along  the  foot  of  Big  Round  Top  in  the 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       259 

effort  to  extend  the  Confederate  line  and  turn  the  left 
flank  of  the  Twentieth  Maine.  They  passed  so  far  in  this 
direction  that  Chamberlain  was  obliged  to  throw  back  the 
left  wing  of  his  regiment  to  a  line  nearly  at  right  angles 
with  his  right  wing.  The  Texas  regiments  and  the  Forty- 
eighth  Alabama  finding  they  could  not  break  Vincent's 
center,  determined  to  attack  the  right  flank  while  Oates 
was  fighting  Chamberlain.  They  could  not  safely  move 
to  the  left  directly  in  Vincent's  front;  instead,  they  re 
tired  to  the  Plum  Run  valley.  By  this  time  the  other  bri 
gades  of  Hood's  division  had  succeeded  in  driving  back 
Ward's  brigade  from  the  Devil's  Den  and  capturing  three 
of  the  guns  of  Smith's  battery.  The  other  three  guns 
which  had  been  placed  on  a  ledge  further  to  the  rear  were 
drawn  back.  This  opened  the  way  for  the  two  Texas 
regiments  and  the  Forty-eighth  Alabama  to  advance  north 
ward  under  shelter  of  the  large  rocks  between  Plum  Run 
and  the  western  slope  of  Little  Round  Top,  until  they 
passed  beyond  Vincent's  right  flank,  held  by  the  Sixteenth 
Michigan.  The  Fourth  Alabama  did  not  fall  back  with 
the  others.  It  continued  fighting  until  its  ammunition  was 
exhausted,  then  retreated  to  the  western  foot  of  Big 
Round  Top,  and  remained  there  during  the  night. 

The  Forty-eighth  Alabama  and  Fourth  and  Fifth  Texas 
having  passed  beyond  the  right  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan, 
turned  and,  climbing  the  western  slope  of  Little  Round 
Top  in  a  southeasterly  direction,  made  a  fierce  assault  on 
the  right  three  companies  of  that  regiment.  The  line  of 
these  companies  was  refused,  so  that  they  faced  in  a  north 
erly  direction  with  their  right  resting  at  the  foot  of  the 
large  rocks  which  formed  the  crest  of  the  ridge.  The 
steepness  of  the  ascent  and  the  loose  stones  which  covered 
its  surface  made  it  impossible  to  maintain  any  orderly  for 
mation.  They  came  up  in  a  mass  with  great  courage, 
without  stopping  to  fire  until  they  reached  the  Union  line; 


2<5o         THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

here  they  engaged  in  a  hand-to-hand  conflict  with  the 
Michigan  men,  firing  and  using  the  bayonet.  Their  in 
creasing  numbers  and  the  fury  of  the  assault  caused  these 
three  companies  to  fall  back  in  disorder.  Vincent  has 
tened  to  the  spot,  urging  the  men  to  stand  fast,  but  he  fell 
among  them  mortally  wounded  by  a  shot  from  one  of  the 
assailants,  without  succeeding  in  stopping  the  retreat. 
The  greater  part  of  these  companies  which  survived  the 
attack  retired  behind  the  large  rocks,  taking  with  them 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Welch  and  the  regimental  colors.  The 
remainder  of  the  regiment  stood  fast  and,  although  not 
well  placed  to  resist  such  an  attack  on  their  right  and  rear, 
did  good  service  in  repelling  the  assault. 

It  was  just  at  this  moment  that  Colonel  O'Rorke,  with 
the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  came  over  the 
crest  of  the  hill  to  the  right  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan. 
They  charged  down  the  hill  against  the  Confederates,  who 
were  swarming  up  the  slope,  and  drove  them  back  to  the 
valley.  This  unexpected  reinforcement  disheartened  the 
Confederates,  whose  success  in  the  first  onset  inspired  the 
hope  of  being  able  at  last  to  drive  back  Vincent's  brigade. 
Many  of  them  dropped  their  arms  and  surrendered,  others 
were  shot  in  their  attempt  to  retreat.  The  fighting  was 
severe  for  a  few  moments,  but  the  hillside  was  soon  cleared 
of  the  enemy,  who  retired  to  the  valley  and,  sheltering 
themselves  behind  the  rocks,  there  continued  a  desultory 
fire  on  the  Union  line.  O'Rorke,  who  led  his  men  so  gal 
lantly  in  this  charge,  was  almost  instantly  killed  within  a 
few  feet  of  where  Vincent  lay.  The  One  Hundred  and 
Fortieth  New  York  formed  an  irregular  line  among  the 
rocks,  extending  northward  from  the  remaining  com 
panies  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan,  where  they  remained 
until  the  end  of  the  battle. 

In  a  map  published  by  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  in  1876,  revised  in  1883,  made  from  a  survey  con- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       261 

ducted  by  Brevet  Major  General  G.  K.  Warren,  Major  of 
Engineers,  by  order  of  Brevet  Major  General  A.  A.  Hum 
phreys,  Chief  of  Engineers,  showing  the  position  of  the 
Union  and  Confederate  troops  in  the  battle  of  Gettysburg, 
the  Forty-fourth  Alabama  is  shown  on  the  left  of  the 
Forty-eighth  Alabama,  in  front  of  the  position  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York.  Whether  the  Forty- 
fourth  joined  the  Forty-eighth  in  this  flank  movement  is 
an  open  question.  The  official  report  of  the  Forty-fourth 
Alabama,  made  by  Colonel  Perry,  contains  no  mention  of 
any  fighting  by  this  regiment,  except  the  attack  on  the 
Devil's  Den. 

While  this  assault  was  in  progress  on  Vincent's  right, 
the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  Alabama  moved  in  col 
umn  along  the  foot  of  Big  Round  Top  until  they  had 
passed  to  the  right  of  the  Fourth  Alabama,  when  they 
came  into  line  and  advanced  against  the  Twentieth  Maine. 
Adjutant  Waddell,  of  the  Fifteenth,  with  about  fifty  men 
of  that  regiment,  continued  further  to  the  right,  passing 
the  Twentieth  Maine,  then  advanced  to  a  position  from 
which  he  could  enfilade  Chamberlain's  regiment  and  the 
left  wing  of  the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania.  To  meet  this 
attack  Chamberlain  refused  his  left  wing  to  a  position 
nearly  at  right  angles  with  the  remainder  of  his  regiment. 
The  Alabama  men  rushed  upon  Chamberlain  in  a  furious 
assault.  There  was  desperate  fighting  for  some  time. 
The  Confederates  made  repeated  charges,  which  were  met 
with  countercharges  by  Chamberlain's  men.  The  Fourth 
Alabama  by  this  time  had  retired,  followed  by  what  was 
left  of  the  Forty-seventh.  Chamberlain's  ammunition 
was  nearly  exhausted.  Taking  advantage  of  the  apparent 
reluctance  of  the  Confederates  to  advance  again,  Cham 
berlain  fixed  bayonets  and  ordered  a  charge.  His  left 
wing  came  forward  into  line  with  his  right;  then,  rein 
forced  by  Merrill's  company,  which  returned  about  this 


262    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

time  with  twelve  or  fifteen  of  the  sharpshooters,  he  made 
a  right  wheel  with  his  line,  which  cleared  the  valley  of  the 
Confederates.  Some  of  the  latter  went  back  to  the  top 
of  Big  Round  Top ;  others  went  down  the  valley  in  the  di 
rection  of  the  Devil's  Den.  The  force  under  Adjutant 
Waddell,  which  had  been  cut  off  by  this  movement,  sur 
rendered,  although  the  adjutant  made  his  escape.  This 
was  the  last  of  the  direct  assaults  on  Little  Round  Top. 

THE  DEFENSE 

The  Fifth  Army  Corps,  which  came  by  the  Hanover 
road,  began  to  arrive  on  the  field  about  7  A.  M.  on  July  2. 
The  First  and  Second  divisions  were  placed  on  the  right 
of  the  Twelfth  corps  in  the  vicinity  of  Rock  Creek. 
When  the  head  of  the  Sixth  corps  arrived,  about  2  p.  M., 
it  was  ordered  to  the  right  to  relieve  the  two  divisions  of 
the  Fifth.  These  two  divisions,  with  two  brigades  of  the 
Third  division  under  Crawford,  which  arrived  about  this 
time,  were  massed  in  rear  of  the  center  near  the  point  where 
the  Baltimore  Pike  crosses  Rock  Creek.  About  3  P.  M. 
General  Meade  directed  General  Sykes  to  move  his  corps 
to  the  left  and  occupy  that  part  of  the  line.  General 
Sickles  had  been  ordered  in  the  morning  to  form  his 
corps  on  the  low  ridge  between  Cemetery  Hill  and  the 
northern  foot  of  Little  Round  Top,  relieving  General 
Geary's  division  of  the  Twelfth  corps,  which  had  spent  the 
night  on  the  northern  foot  of  Little  Round  Top,  and  which 
was  ordered  to  rejoin  its  corps  on  Gulp's  hill. 

In  the  middle  of  the  day,  being  dissatisfied  with  his  posi 
tion,  Sickles  moved  forward  to  the  Emmittsburg  road, 
where  he  placed  Humphreys'  division  along  that  road  fac 
ing  Seminary  Ridge,  and  Birney's  division  facing  south, 
with  his  right  at  the  Peach  Orchard  and  his  left  at  the 
Devil's  Den  near  the  Plum  Run  valley,  which  separates 


BRIGADE    HEADQUARTERS    FLAG 
THIRD    BRIGADE,    FIRST    DIVISION,   FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS 

Facing    Page   262 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       263 

it  from  the  western  front  of  Little  Round  Top.  About 
three  o'clock  Meade  rode  to  the  left  to  examine  his  line. 
He  rode  out  to  Sickles'  position,  and  from  there  sent  Gen 
eral  Warren  to  examine  the  left  and  report  the  situation. 
Warren  continued  on  until  he  reached  the  signal  station 
near  the  north  end  of  Little  Round  Top.  This  must  have 
been  a  little  before  half  past  three  o'clock.  No  enemy  was 
in  sight  from  that  position,  but  the  signal  officer  told 
him  he  thought  he  had  seen  troops  in  the  woods  between 
Plum  Run  and  the  Emmittsburg  road. 

Warren  had  with  him  as  aides  three  young  lieutenants 
of  engineers,  Mackenzie,  Reese,  and  Roebling,  and  some 
mounted  orderlies.  He  sent  an  orderly  to  the  commander 
of  Smith's  battery  at  the  Devil's  Den,  directing  him  to 
fire  a  shot  into  the  woods  where  the  signal  officer  thought 
he  had  seen  the  Confederates.  This  shot,  whistling  over 
the  heads  of  these  men,  caused  them  to  make  involuntary 
movements.  The  sunlight  reflected  from  their  glistening 
bayonets  and  gun  barrels  revealed  a  long  line  of  infantry, 
far  outflanking  the  left  of  Birney's  line  and  in  position 
ready  to  advance.  At  this  time  no  troops  except  Birney's 
division  were  in  place  to  resist  them.  He  sent  a  note 
by  one  of  his  aides,  Reese  or  Roebling,  to  General  Meade, 
with  a  request  that  a  division,  at  least,  be  sent  to  occupy 
Little  Round  Top.  He  then  sent  Lieutenant  Mackenzie 
with  a  request  to  General  Sickles  to  send  a  brigade,  but 
Sickles  declined,  saying  that  he  could  not  spare  a  man. 

While  Mackenzie  was  interviewing  Sickles,  Sykes  and 
Barnes  arrived  near  the  wheat-field  with  Barnes'  division. 
The  division  was  halted  while  Sykes  rode  forward  with 
Barnes  to  select  a  position.  Having  found  it,  Sykes  di 
rected  Barnes  to  bring  on  the  division,  and  rode  on  to 
find  General  Birney  and  suggest  to  him  to  move  some 
of  his  troops  to  the  left,  promising  to  fill  the  place  vacated 
by  them  with  Barnes'  men.  Mackenzie  met  Sykes  while 


264    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

he  was  looking  for  Birney.  Having  explained  to  him 
the  need  for  troops  on  Little  Round  Top,  Sykes  agreed 
to  send  one  of  Barnes'  brigades.  Mackenzie  then  returned 
to  Warren  and  reported.  Sykes  immediately  sent  one  of 
his  staff  to  direct  Barnes  to  send  one  of  his  brigades. 
Barnes  had  not  returned  to  the  division.  Vincent  was  sit 
ting  on  his  horse  at  the  head  of  the  column,  waiting  orders. 
Seeing  Sykes'  aide  approaching,  he  rode  forward  to  meet 
him.  I  followed  with  the  flag,  and  distinctly  heard  the 
following  conversation:  "  Captain,  what  are  your  orders?  " 
The  captain  replied,  "Where  is  General  Barnes?"  Vin 
cent  said,  "  What  are  your  orders?  Give  me  your  orders." 
The  captain  answered,  "  General  Sykes  told  me  to  direct 
General  Barnes  to  send  one  of  his  brigades  to  occupy  that 
hill  yonder,"  pointing  to  Little  Round  Top.  Vincent  said, 
"  I  will  take  the  responsibility  of  taking  my  brigade  there." 
Returning  to  the  brigade,  he  directed  Colonel  Rice,  the  sen 
ior  colonel,  to  bring  the  brigade  to  the  hill  as  rapidly  as 
possible,  then  rode  away  toward  the  northwest  face  of 
the  hill.  I  followed  him.  Reaching  the  foot  of  the  hill 
and  finding  it  impossible  to  ride  up  to  the  top  in  that  di 
rection,  owing  to  the  steepness  of  the  ascent  and  the  loose 
stones  which  covered  the  surface,  he  turned  to  the  left  and, 
skirting  the  northern  foot  of  the  ridge,  turned  into  the  woods 
behind  the  ridge  on  the  eastern  side.  He  rode  on  until  we 
reached  the  south  end,  where  the  line  of  great  rocks  which 
form  the  summit  suddenly  terminates  by  an  abrupt  de 
scent  of  perhaps  fifty  feet.  From  the  foot  of  this  rock 
the  ground  slopes  to  the  east,  south,  and  west  on  a  spur 
which  is  partly  covered  by  scattered  boulders  and  smaller 
rocks.  At  the  southern  extremity  of  this  spur  is  a  ridge 
running  east  and  west  for  a  distance  of  about  three  hun 
dred  feet.  From  this  ridge  southward  toward  Big  Round 
Top  extends  a  sparsely  wooded  valley  which  runs  along 
the  northern  side  of  the  mountain  its  whole  length.  There 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       265 

are  many  rocks  and  boulders  scattered  over  the  surface  of 
this  valley,  far  enough  apart,  however,  to  afford  room  be 
tween  them  for  the  passage  of  troops. 

Vincent  rode  around  this  big  rock  and  halted  a  few  paces 
to  the  west  of  it,  at  the  place  which  was  occupied  a  few 
minutes  later  by  the  Sixteenth  Michigan.  I  sat  on  my 
horse  behind  him  with  the  flag.  Almost  immediately  a 
shell  exploded  to  our  right,  followed  by  another  just  to 
our  left.  Vincent  said  to  me,  "  They  are  firing  at  the 
flag,  go  behind  the  rocks  with  it."  I  rode  behind  the  rock 
and  stopped.  Almost  immediately  he  came  and,  dismount 
ing,  gave  me  the  bridle  of  his  horse.  He  then  went  down 
among  the  rocks,  selecting  a  position  for  the  brigade.  In 
a  few  moments  the  brigade  arrived,  with  the  regiments  in 
the  following  order:  Forty-fourth  New  York,  Sixteenth 
Michigan,  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania,  and  Twentieth 
Maine.  The  field  officers  dismounted,  leaving  their  horses 
with  the  mounted  orderlies  behind  the  rock.  Vincent  said 
to  Colonel  Rice,  "  Form  your  regiment  here,  Colonel,  with 
the  right  against  the  rock."  Rice  replied,  "  In  every 
battle  in  which  we  have  been  engaged  the  Eighty-third 
and  Forty-fourth  have  fought  side  by  side.  I  wish  it 
might  be  so  to-day."  Vincent  understood  and  sym 
pathized  with  this  feeling.  He  replied,  "  All  right,  let 
the  Sixteenth  pass  you."  The  Sixteenth  came  forward 
and  was  placed  in  the  position  which  Vincent  had  desig 
nated  for  the  Forty-fourth.  The  ground  was  too  rough 
for  much  precision  in  movements,  but  the  men  came  for 
ward  in  as  good  order  as  possible.  The  Forty-fourth 
formed  along  the  western  edge  of  this  spur,  with  its  right 
joining  the  left  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan,  the  Eighty- 
third  next,  with  part  of  its  line  facing  west,  and  the  re 
mainder  facing  south  on  the  east  and  west  ridge.  The 
Twentieth  Maine  continued  this  line  toward  the  east. 
Skirmishers  were  sent  out  by  the  Forty-fourth  and  Eighty- 


266    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

third  down  the  valley  toward  the  west,  and  a  company 
from  the  Twentieth  Maine  toward  the  southeast  to  guard 
against  an  approach  from  that  quarter.  I  think  no  skir 
mishers  were  sent  out  from  the  Sixteenth.  The  ground 
in  their  front  was  open  to  the  foot  of  the  hill,  and  an 
advance  of  the  enemy  from  that  direction  could  be  plainly 
seen  from  the  main  line. 

The  position  chosen  by  Vincent  for  his  brigade  was  the 
best  possible  for  preventing  the  Confederates  from  turning 
or  capturing  the  hill.  Had  he  placed  his  men  on  the  crest 
of  the  ridge  the  enemy  could  have  turned  his  flank  and 
attacked  from  the  rear.  Or  having  opened  the  way,  they 
could  have  held  it  for  Hood's  whole  division  to  follow, 
cutting  Meade's  communications,  capturing  his  trains,  and 
forcing  him  to  leave  his  strong  position  and  attack  the 
Confederates  in  the  open.  Not  all  the  troops  that  could 
have  been  placed  on  the  crest  of  Little  Round  Top  could 
have  prevented  this  if  the  spur  occupied  by  Vincent's  bri 
gade  and  the  valley  along  the  north  side  of  Big  Round 
Top  had  been  left  open. 

In  two  respects  justice  has  never  been  done  to  Vincent. 
He  would  have  gone  with  his  brigade  wherever  he  was 
ordered.  He  was  thoroughly  alive  that  day.  A  glance 
at  Little  Round  Top  was  enough  for  him  to  realize  its 
importance  in  relation  to  the  field  of  battle  and  the  neces 
sity  of  occupying  it  without  delay.  Minutes  were  precious. 
In  spite  of  all  that  Warren,  Sykes,  and  Barnes  did,  it  would 
have  been  too  late  had  not  Vincent  moved  without  wait 
ing  for  an  order  from  his  immediate  superior.  The  in 
stant  he  knew  that  Sykes  had  sent  an  order  to  Barnes  to 
send  one  of  his  brigades,  without  designating  any  special 
brigade,  he  took  the  responsibility  of  taking  his  brigade 
there  without  waiting  for  the  order  to  reach  him  through 
the  ordinary  channel.  Had  he  waited  for  that,  it  would 
have  been  too  late.  He  gave  the  order  to  Rice  to  bring 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       267 

on  the  brigade  as  rapidly  as  possible.  He  did  not  march 
at  the  head  of  the  brigade,  but  preceded  it,  and  when  it 
arrived  he  had  already  selected  its  position. 

The  second  respect  is  in  not  giving  him  the  credit  due 
for  his  knowledge  and  skill  in  the  choice  of  a  position. 
No  general  or  staff  officer  directed  or  accompanied  him. 
He  knew  only  that  Sykes  had  sent  an  order  to  Barnes  to 
send  one  of  his  brigades  to  occupy  that  hill.  Half  the 
brigade  commanders  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  if  they 
received  such  an  order,  would  have  construed  it  as  a  direc 
tion  to  place  their  troops  on  the  hill,  where  at  that  moment 
they  would  have  been  useless.  Vincent  used  his  discretion 
as  to  the  manner  of  its  occupation.  The  event  proved  that 
his  instinct  for  the  point  of  vantage  was  of  the  highest' 
order.  The  historians  have  vied  with  one  another  in  tell 
ing  how  it  was  not  done.  Nearly  all  of  them  have  cred 
ited  Warren  with  taking  the  responsibility  of  detaching 
Vincent's  brigade  and  placing  it  where  it  fought.  In  doing 
this  they  have  relegated  Vincent  to  the  place  of  an  officer 
who  obeyed  orders  and  stayed  where  he  was  put.  Warren 
performed  most  important  services  that  day.  I  yield  to 
no  man  in  my  admiration  and  gratitude  for  what  he  did, 
but  that  is  no  reason  for  others  to  claim  for  him  acts  which 
he  disclaims  for  himself,  as  I  will  show  later  by  his  own 
words.  If  I  can  show  that  the  retention  by  the  Union 
army  of  this  key  to  the  battlefield  on  July  2,  1863,  is  due 
primarily  to  Strong  Vincent  and  his  gallant  brigade,  aided 
at  the  supreme  moment  by  O'Rorke  and  his  regiment,  I 
shall  feel  that  Vincent,  O'Rorke,  and  the  men  of  their 
commands  who  gave  up  their  lives  in  that  supreme  effort 
did  not  die  in  vain. 

In  describing  the  Confederate  attack  it  has  been  impos 
sible  to  separate  from  it  the  action  of  the  Union  troops 
in  repelling  it.  After  the  Union  skirmishers  retired  to 
their  line,  followed  by  the  advance  of  the  Confederates 


268    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

in  line  of  battle,  Vincent's  brigade,  with  the  exception  of 
the  charge  by  the  Twentieth  Maine  at  the  close  of  the 
fight,  confined  itself  until  after  dark  to  maintaining  its 
strong  position.  It  was  there  to  hold  Little  Round  Top, 
and  it  held  it.  It  is  doubtful  whether  any  good  could 
have  been  accomplished  by  following  up  the  Confederate 
retreat.  The  failure  of  the  repeated  Confederate  assaults, 
and  their  ultimate  withdrawal,  is  sufficient  justification,  if 
any  is  needed.  The  time  soon  came  for  taking  the  offen 
sive.  The  attack  against  the  left  of  the  brigade,  under 
Chamberlain,  had  been  vigorous  and  persistent. 

Time  and  again  the  Confederates  had  succeeded  in  driv 
ing  back  Chamberlain's  men  a  few  paces,  only  to  be  forced 
to  retire  in  their  turn.  The  rocks  where  the  Twentieth 
Maine  was  posted  were  smaller  and  less  numerous  than 
those  behind  which  the  Forty-fourth  New  York  and  Eigh 
ty-third  Pennsylvania  fought.  At  one  time  Chamberlain 
asked  Captain  Woodward  if  he  could  spare  a  company  to 
enable  him  to  close  up  toward  the  left  his  depleted  ranks. 
Woodward  could  not  do  this ;  but,  by  taking  advantage  of 
the  rocks  and  thinning  his  line  in  places  where  it  was  safe 
to  do  so,  he  extended  it  to  the  left  enough  to  give  material 
assistance  to  Chamberlain.  Finally,  with  his  ammunition 
exhausted  and  with  no  prospect  of  reinforcements,  the  psy 
chological  moment  arrived,  and  Chamberlain  seized  the  op 
portunity.  He  ordered  a  charge  with  the  bayonet.  I  have 
described  this  in  my  statement  of  the  attack.  Its  success 
put  the  finishing  touch  to  the  Union  victory. 

Colonel  Rice,  who  assumed  command  when  Vincent  fell, 
had  not  been  idle.  After  the  temporary  break  on  the  right 
had  been  checked  by  the  arrival  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Fortieth  New  York,  order  was  restored  on  that  part  of 
the  line.  Realizing  the  perilous  situation  of  the  Twentieth 
Maine,  and  the  impossibility  of  sparing  any  men  from 
other  parts  of  the  line,  Rice  sent  an  officer  (not  named 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       269 

in  his  report)  to  the  corps  commander  to  ask  for  rein 
forcements.  Vincent  had  previously  sent  Captain  Judson 
of  his  staff  for  the  same  purpose.  While  Vincent's  bri 
gade  was  fighting  in  this  isolated  position,  the  remainder 
of  the  Fifth  corps  had  come  up.  The  brigades  of  Sweitzer 
and  Tilton,  of  Barnes'  division,  had  been  fighting  along 
Birney's  line.  The  two  brigades  of  Regulars  in  Ayres'  di 
vision  had  been  sent  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Devil's  Den. 
Weed's  brigade  of  this  division  had  been  ordered  by  Sykes 
to  Little  Round  Top,  but  by  some  misunderstanding  of 
orders  it  went  to  the  front  to  reinforce  Sickles,  except 
the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  which  Warren 
detached  as  the  brigade  was  passing. 

When  Sykes  returned  from  the  rear,  where  he  had  been 
to  order  up  more  troops,  and  found  that  Weed  had  gone  to 
the  front,  he  ordered  him  back  to  Little  Round  Top.  The 
three  regiments  of  this  brigade,  Ninety-first  Pennsylvania, 
One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth  New  York,  and  One  Hun 
dred  and  Fifty-fifth  Pennsylvania,  finally  got  into  position 
along  the  crest  of  the  ridge  on  the  right  of  the  One  Hun 
dred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  but  they  did  not  arrive  until 
all  the  close  fighting  on  that  part  of  the  line  was  done. 
Following  Ayres,  General  Crawford,  commanding  the 
Third  division,  came  up  with  two  brigades  of  the  Penn 
sylvania  Reserves  under  McCandless  and  Fisher.  Mc- 
Candless'  brigade,  with  one  regiment  of  Fisher's,  the  Elev 
enth  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  was  sent  to  the  front  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  wheat-field.  Fisher  had  five  regiments  in 
his  brigade.  He  was  sent  with  the  remaining  regiments  to 
the  support  of  Vincent,  but  did  not  arrive  until  the  fighting 
was  all  done  and  the  Confederates  had  disappeared  from 
that  vicinity. 

About  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening  Rice  sent  Chamberlain 
with  the  Twentieth  Maine  to  the  summit  of  Big  Round 
Top.  They  climbed  the  steep  ascent  directly  south  of  the 


270    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

position  of  the  brigade.  On  the  way  up  the  mountain  they 
drove  before  them  some  Confederate  stragglers,  capturing 
on  the  way  and  at  the  top  twenty-five  prisoners,  including 
an  officer  of  General  Law's  staff.  Chamberlain  placed  his 
men  in  a  very  strong  position  among  the  rocks,  facing  the 
western  slope  of  the  mountain,  which  was  occupied  by 
the  enemy.  He  then  sent  back  to  Rice  for  ammunition 
and  reinforcements.  Meantime  two  regiments  of  Fisher's 
brigade  advanced  down  the  valley  toward  the  west  and 
formed  line  across  the  valley  near  the  trail  down  which 
the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-seventh  Alabama  had  come.  Part 
of  their  force  ascended  this  trail  to  a  point  near  the  right 
of  Chamberlain's  line.  They  were  in  close  proximity  to 
the  enemy  and  some  confusion  occurred,  as  Chamberlain 
mistook  them  for  the  enemy  and  made  disposition  to  re 
ceive  them.  The  Confederates  opened  fire  on  them  and 
they  retired  to  their  line  in  the  valley,  where  they  piled  up 
a  breastwork  of  stone  in  their  front.  The  entire  loss  of 
these  four  regiments  of  Fisher's  brigade  during  the  battle, 
as  reported,  was  three  killed  and  eleven  wounded.  This 
probably  occurred  in  the  ranks  of  the  men  who  went  up 
the  trail  in  the  direction  of  Chamberlain's  right  and  en 
countered  the  strong  picket  line  of  the  Confederates  on 
the  western  slope  of  the  mountain.  After  this  encounter 
they  retired  to  the  valley. 

Later  in  the  night  the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania,  with 
a  portion  of  the  Forty-fourth  New  York,  went  up  the 
mountain  and  formed  in  line  on  Chamberlain's  right,  where 
they  remained  until  the  brigade  was  relieved  in  the  fore 
noon  of  July  3,  by  the  first  brigade  of  Barnes'  division. 
About  midnight  Colonel  Fisher  went  up  the  mountain  near 
the  eastern  end  with  the  other  two  regiments  of  his  bri 
gade,  the  Fifth  and  Twelfth  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 

It  may  be  proper  to  say  at  this  point  a  few  words  about 
the  regiments  which  composed  Vincent's  brigade  at  Gettys- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       271 

burg.  The  Sixteenth  Michigan  was  a  good  regiment,  with 
a  most  honorable  record.  It  entered  the  service  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  and  served  to  the  end.  With  two 
other  regiments  of  the  brigade,  the  Eighty-third  Pennsyl 
vania  and  the  Twentieth  Maine,  it  formed  part  of  the  line 
which,  under  command  of  General  Chamberlain,  received 
the  formal  surrender  of  the  Confederate  army  at  Appo- 
mattox.  Its  first  commander  was  Colonel  T.  B.  W.  Stock 
ton,  a  graduate  of  the  Military  Academy  and  commander 
of  a  regiment  in  the  war  with  Mexico.  He  entered  the 
Academy  in  1823,  was  graduated  in  1827,  remaining  in 
the  regular  army  until  1836,  when  he  resigned,  with  rank 
of  first  lieutenant.  He  was  commissioned  colonel  of  the 
First  Regiment  Michigan  Volunteers,  December  9,  1847, 
and  was  honorably  mustered  out  July  9,  1848.  Commis 
sioned  as  colonel  Sixteenth  Michigan  September  8,  1861. 
Resigned  May  18,  1863.  As  senior  colonel  he  commanded 
the  brigade  at  the  battles  of  Fredericksburg  and  Chan- 
cellorsville.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Norval  E.  Welch  suc 
ceeded  him  in  command  of  the  regiment.  Welch's  conduct 
at  Gettysburg  in  leaving  the  brigade  with  a  portion  of  his 
regiment  was  not  creditable,  but  he  was  a  good  officer,  and 
redeemed  his  reputation  in  all  the  battles  of  later  cam 
paigns.  He  was  killed  in  action  in  one  of  the  battles  south 
of  Petersburg  while  leading  a  charge  of  his  regiment  against 
the  enemy's  intrenchments. 

The  Sixteenth  Michigan,  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania, 
and  Forty-fourth  New  York  entered  the  service  at  about 
the  same  time,  in  September,  1861.  A  brigade  was  be 
ing  organized  under  command  of  General  Daniel  Butter- 
field.  When  the  Eighty-third  crossed  the  Potomac  and 
went  into  camp  at  Hall's  Hill,  in  front  of  Washington,  it 
found  the  Sixteenth  Michigan  already  there  and  pitched  its 
camp  in  line  with  the  Sixteenth.  A  few  days  later  the 
Forty-fourth  New  York  arrived,  about  dusk,  tired  and 


272    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

hungry  at  the  end  of  its  first  march  into  the  enemy's  coun 
try.  The  Eighty-third  had  its  camp  in  order  and  its  cook 
fires  burning  brightly. 

Colonel  McLane  had  been  informed  during  the  after 
noon  of  the  approach  of  a  new  regiment  to  join  the  bri 
gade.  He  called  his  officers  together  and  suggested  the 
propriety  of  inviting  the  officers  and  men  of  the  new  regi 
ment  to  partake  of  our  hospitality.  The  Forty-fourth 
marched  by  our  camp  and,  halting  on  the  right,  broke  into 
column  of  companies  and  stacked  arms.  McLane  with  his 
field  and  staff  officers  called  at  the  headquarters  of  the 
Forty-fourth  and  invited  all  the  officers  of  that  regiment 
to  take  supper  with  the  officers  of  the  Eighty-third.  A 
deputation  from  the  enlisted  men  of  the  Eighty-third, 
headed  by  the  first  sergeant  of  each  company,  went  over 
to  the  new  regiment  and  invited  the  company  with  the  same 
letter  to  come  to  the  camp  of  the  Eighty-third  and  be  their 
guests.  The  invitation  was  gladly  accepted,  and  there  be 
gan  a  friendship  between  the  officers  and  men  of  those  two 
regiments  which  has  not  yet  ceased  and  will  not  cease  until 
the  last  survivors  have  passed  over  the  river.  These  regi 
ments  were  called  "  Butterfield's  Twins."  A  generous  ri 
valry  sprang  up,  each  regiment  striving  to  outdo  the  other 
in  drill,  discipline,  and  all  the  manifold  duties  of  a  soldier's 
life.  Although  under  different  officers,  the  two  organiza 
tions  were  like  one  great  regiment.  This  explains  Rice's 
request  and  Vincent's  quick  response  that  brought  the  two 
regiments  side  by  side  at  Little  Round  Top. 

The  Twentieth  Maine  was  organized  in  1862.  It  joined 
the  brigade  during  the  Antietam  campaign,  after  the  army 
returned  to  Washington  from  the  battlefield  of  the  second 
Bull  Run.  Its  first  colonel  was  Adelbert  Ames.  He  was 
graduated  from  the  Military  Academy  July  i,  1860,  and 
was  second  lieutenant  and  first  lieutenant  of  artillery,  serv 
ing  part  of  the  time  with  Griffin's,  afterward  Hazlett's, 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       273 

battery  of  the  Fifth  Artillery.  He  was  commissioned  col 
onel  of  the  Twentieth  Maine  August  20,  1862.  He  was 
promoted  to  be  brigadier-general  of  Volunteers  May  20, 
1863.  At  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  he  commanded  a  di 
vision  in  the  Eleventh  corps.  Joshua  L.  Chamberlain,  who 
had  much  to  do  with  the  organization  of  the  regiment,  was 
commissioned  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  Twentieth  Maine 
August  8,  1862.  When  Colonel  Ames  Avas  promoted, 
Chamberlain  succeeded  him  as  colonel  of  the  regiment, 
May  20,  1863.  When  Colonel  Rice  was  made  brigadier- 
general  of  Volunteers,  August  17,  1863,  and  transferred 
to  another  corps,  Chamberlain  succeeded  him  in  the  com 
mand  of  the  brigade.  June  18,  1864,  Chamberlain  was 
commissioned  brigadier-general  of  Volunteers.1  On  March 
29,  1865,  he  was  made  brevet  major-general  of  Volun 
teers  for  conspicuous  gallantry  and  meritorious  service 
in  action  on  the  Quaker  Road,  Virginia.  He  was  hon 
orably  mustered  out  of  the  service  January  15,  1866. 
August  n,  1893,  he  was  given  a  medal  of  honor  by  Con 
gress  for  daring  heroism  and  great  tenacity  in  holding  his 
position  on  the  Little  Round  Top,  and  carrying  the  ad 
vance  position  on  the  Great  Round  Top  at  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg,  Pennsylvania,  July  2,  1863. 

1  The  following  is  a  copy  of  the  special  order  of  General  Grant  pro 
moting  Chamberlain  to  brigadier  general,  the  verbal  order  having  been 
given  on  the  evening  of  June  18: 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
SPECIAL  ORDER  No.  39.  June  20,  1864. 

Colonel  J.  L.  Chamberlain,  Twentieth  Maine  Infantry  Volunteers, 
for  meritorious  and  efficient  services  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  espe 
cially  for  gallant  conduct  in  leading  his  brigade  against  the  enemy  at 
Petersburg  on  the  i8th  instant,  in  which  he  was  dangerously  wounded, 
is  hereby,  in  pursuance  of  authority  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  ap 
pointed  Brigadier  General  United  States  Volunteers,  to  rank  as  such 
from  the  i8th  of  June,  1864,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  President. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant  General. 


274    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Although  the  Twentieth  Maine  entered  the  service  a 
year  later  than  the  other  regiments  of  the  brigade,  the  abil 
ity  of  its  commanders,  with  the  character  and  intelligence 
of  its  subordinate  officers  and  men,  soon  placed  it  on  an 
equality  with  the  best. 

Captain  Woodward,  who  commanded  the  Eighty-third 
Pennsylvania  at  Gettysburg,  was  made  colonel  of  the  regi 
ment  March  28,  1864.  He  lost  a  leg  in  the  campaign  of 
1864,  and  was  honorably  mustered  out  September  20,  1864. 
He  was  given  the  brevet  of  brigadier-general  of  Volun 
teers  March  13,  1865,  for  gallant  and  meritorious  service 
during  the  war.  General  Rice  was  killed  May  10,  1864, 
at  the  battle  of  Laurel  Hill,  Virginia. 

Freeman  Connor  was  a  member  of  the  famous  "  Ells 
worth  Zouaves."  He  was  a  captain  in  the  Chicago  Zouave 
Regiment,  April  22,  1861,  and  a  first  lieutenant  in  the  Elev 
enth  New  York  Volunteer  Infantry,  in  which  regiment  he 
fought  at  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  July  21,  1861 ;  re 
signed  his  commission  and  enlisted  as  a  private  in  the 
Forty-fourth  New  York  Volunteer  Infantry,  August  8, 
1 86 1.  He  was  commissioned  captain  of  Company  D,  in 
this  regiment,  and  in  succession  -its  major,  lieutenant-col 
onel,  and  colonel.  He  served  in  this  regiment  until  it  was 
mustered  out,  October  n,  1864.  He  died  in  Chicago 
March  28,  1906. 

Of  the  regimental  monuments  which  have  been  erected 
on  the  battlefield  of  Gettysburg,  those  of  the  Sixteenth 
Michigan  and  the  Twentieth  Maine  are  located  on  the  lines 
where  these  regiments  fought.  That  of  the  Eighty-third 
Pennsylvania  stands  in  rear  of  the  center  of  the  brigade, 
and  is  surmounted  by  a  bronze  statue  of  Colonel  Vincent. 
The  monument  of  the  Forty- fourth  New  York  stands  on 
the  summit  of  the  large  rock  which  forms  the  crest  of  the 
hill,  a  little  to  the  right  of  the  position  occupied  by  the 
Sixteenth  Michigan.  It  is  a  large  circular  granite  tower 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       275 

forty-four  feet  high,  with  a  spiral  stairway  in  the  interior 
leading  to  a  platform  at  the  top,  which  affords  a  fine  view 
of  nearly  the  whole  of  the  battlefield.  On  the  inside  are 
bronze  tablets  giving  the  names  of  the  members  of  the 
regiment. 


V 

BIOGRAPHICAL 
GENERAL  GOUVERNEUR  KEMBLE  WARREN 

General  Warren  was  an  excellent  officer,  a  great  en 
gineer,  an  educated  and  polished  gentleman  of  the  old 
school.  In  the  last  years  of  the  war  he  served  as  com 
mander  of  an  army  corps,  the  highest  rank  obtainable  ex 
cept  that  of  the  commander  of  the  army.  He  was  greatly 
loved  and  admired  by  the  officers  and  men  of  his  command. 
After  the  war  he  continued  in  the  army  until  his  death, 
using  his  knowledge  as  an  engineer  in  the  service  of  the 
country  in  many  important  works.  His  death  was  an 
nounced  to  the  army  in  the  following  memorial  notice  re 
counting  his  career  and  services. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS, 

"  UNITED  STATES  ARMY, 
"  WASHINGTON,  D.  C,  August  9,  1882. 
"  GENERAL  ORDERS 

"No.  5. 

"  It  has  become  the  painful  duty  of  the  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  Commanding  to  announce  to  the  Corps  of  Engineers 
the  death  of  a  brother  officer,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Gouver- 
neur  K.  Warren,  Brevet  Major  General,  United  States 
Army,  who  died  at  Newport,  R.  I.,  yesterday. 

"  General  Warren  was  graduated  from  the  Military 
Academy  and  promoted  to  the  rank  of  Brevet  Second  Lieu 
tenant  in  the  Corps  of  Topographical  Engineers,  July  i, 
1850.  He  served  as  Assistant  Engineer  on  the  topograph- 

276 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       277 

ical  and  hydrographical  Survey  of  the  Delta  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  i85o-'52,  and  to  the  Board  for  the  improvement  of 
canal  around  the  Falls  of  the  Ohio,  i852-'53;  in  charge  of 
Surveys  for  the  improvement  of  Rock  Island  and  Des 
Moines  Rapids,  Mississippi  River,  i853~'54;  in  compiling 
the  General  Map  and  Reports  (conjointly  with  Captain, 
now  General,  A.  A.  Humphreys)  of  Pacific  Railroad  Ex 
plorations,  1854;  as  Chief  Topographical  Engineer  on 
Sioux  Expedition,  1855,  being  engaged  in  the  action  of 
Blue  Water,  September  3,  1855 ;  in  charge  of  reconnais 
sances  in  Dakota  Territory,  and  making  Map  and  Report 
of  same,  i855-'56,  and  in  Nebraska  Territory,  i856-'57, 
and  preparing  Maps  and  Reports  thereof,  i857~'59. 

"  He  was  Assistant  Professor  of  Mathematics  at  the 
Military  Academy,  1859,  and  Principal  Assistant  Profes 
sor,  i859~'6i. 

"  He  entered  upon  his  distinguished  service  in  the  late 
civil  war  (i86i-'66)  in  the  Department  of  Virginia,  as 
Lieutenant  Colonel  of  the  Fifth  New  York  Volunteers, 
being  engaged  in  the  action  at  Big  Bethel  Church,  June 
10,  1 86 1.  He  was  engaged  on  the  defenses  of  Baltimore, 
and  constructing  Fort  on  Federal  Hill,  i86i-'62,  being 
temporarily  detached  on  expedition  to  Northampton  and 
Accomac  counties,  Va.,  1861 ;  in  the  Virginia  Peninsular 
Campaign  (Army  of  the  Potomac),  1862,  being  engaged 
in  the  siege  of  Yorktown,  April  n-May  4,  1862,  and  in 
command  of  Brigade,  May  24,  1862;  skirmish  on  Pamun- 
key  River,  May  26,  1862;  capture  of  Hanover  Court 
House,  May  27,  1862;  battle  of  Games'  Mill,  June  27, 
1862,  where  he  was  wounded;  repulse  of  Wise's  Division 
at  Malvern  Hill  (in  command),  June  29,  1862;  battle  of 
Malvern  Hill,  July  i,  1862,  and  skirmish  at  Harrison's 
Landing,  July  2,  1862. 

"  In  the  Northern  Virginia  Campaign,  1862,  he  was 
engaged  in  the  battle  of  Manassas,  August  30,  1862,  and 


278    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

skirmish  near  Centreville,  September  i,  1862.  He  was  in 
command  of  Brigade  (Army  of  the  Potomac)  in  the  Mary 
land  Campaign,  1862,  being  engaged  in  skirmishes  and  bat 
tle  of  Antietam,  September  15-17,  1862;  skirmish  with  the 
enemy's  rear-guard  on  the  Potomac,  September  19,  1862; 
and  march  to  Falmouth,  Va.,  1862.  In  the  Rappahannock 
Campaign,  i862-'63,  he  was  in  command  of  Brigade  till 
February  4,  1863.  He  then  became  Chief  Topographical 
Engineer  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  was  engaged 
in  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  December  13-16,  1863; 
making  reconnaissances,  i862-'63;  action  on  Orange  Pike, 
May  i,  1863;  storming  of  Marye  Heights,  May  3,  1863, 
and  battle  of  Salem,  May  3-4,  1863,  and  as  Chief  Engineer 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  June  8- August  12,  1863. 

"  In  the  Pennsylvania  Campaign  he  was  engaged  in 
charge  of  the  re-embarkation  of  stores  at  Aquia  Creek, 
1863;  reconnaissance  and  battle  of  Gettysburg,  July  1-3, 
1863,  where  he  was  wounded;  and  construction  of 
bridges,  and  making  reconnaissances  while  pursuing  the 
enemy,  July- August,  1863. 

"  He  was  in  command  of  Second  Corps  (Army  of  the 
Potomac),  from  August  12,  1863,  to  March  24,  1864. 

"  In  the  operations  in  Central  Virginia,  he  was  en 
gaged  in  movement  to  Culpeper  and  the  Rapidan,  Septem 
ber  13-16,  1863;  combat  at  Auburn  and  Bristoe  Station 
(in  command),  October  14,  1863;  skirmish  at  Bull  Run, 
October  15,  1863,  and  at  Kelly's  Ford,  November  8,  1863; 
movement  to  Mine  Run,  with  heavy  skirmishing,  Novem 
ber  26-30,  1863,  and  demonstration  upon  the  enemy  across 
Morton's  Ford,  February  6,  1864. 

"  He  was  in  command  of  Fifth  Corps  (Army  of  the 
Potomac),  from  March  24,  1864,  to  April  i,  1865. 

"  In  the  Richmond  Campaign  he  was  engaged  in  the 
battle  of  the  Wilderness,  May  5-6,  1864;  battles  about 
Spottsylvania,  May  8-20,  1864;  battles  of  North  Anna, 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       279 

May  23-25,  1864;  skirmish  on  Tolopotomy  Creek,  May 
29,  1864;  battle  of  Bethesda  Church,  May  30,  1864;  bat 
tles  of  Cold  Harbor,  June  1-4,  1864;  skirmish  on  White 
Oak  Swamp,  June  13,  1864;  assaults  on  Petersburg,  June 
17-18,  1864;  siege  of  Petersburg,  June  18,  1864- April  2, 
1865;  Petersburg  Mine  assault,  July  30,  1864;  actions  for 
the  occupation  of  the  Weldon  Railroad,  August  18-25, 
1864;  combat  of  Peebles'  Farm,  September  30,  1864;  action 
at  Chapel  House,  October  i,  1864;  skirmishes  near 
Hatcher's  Run,  October  27-28,  1864;  destruction  of  Wel 
don  Railroad  to  Meherrin  River,  December  7-10,  1864; 
combat  near  Dabney's  Mill  (in  command),  February  6-7, 
1865;  actions  and  movement  to  White  Oak  Ridge,  March 
29-31,  1865;  battle  of  Five  Forks,  April  i,  1865. 

"  He  was  in  command  of  the  defenses  of  Petersburg  and 
Southside  Railroad,  April  3-May  i,  1865;  in  command  of 
the  Department  of  Mississippi,  May  14-30,  1865,  and  was 
at  New  York  City  preparing  Maps  and  Reports  of  his  cam 
paigns,  June  20,  1865,  to  July  31,  1866. 

"  General  Warren  was  promoted  successively  from  the 
grade  of  Lieutenant  to  that  of  Lieutenant  Colonel,  Corps 
of  Engineers,  and  Major  General,  U.  S.  Volunteers.  He 
received  the  brevets  of  Lieutenant  Colonel,  U.  S.  Army, 
'  for  gallant  and  meritorious  services  at  the  battle  of 
Games'  Mill,'  Va.,  1862;  Colonel  U.  S.  Army,  'for  gal 
lant  and  meritorious  services  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg/ 
Pa.,  1863;  Brigadier  General,  U.  S.  Army,  'for  gallant 
and  meritorious  services  at  the  battle  of  Bristoe  Station,' 
1863,  and  Major  General,  U.  S.  Army,  '  for  gallant  and 
meritorious  services  in  the  field  during  the  Rebellion/ 
1865. 

"  Since  the  close  of  the  war  he  has  been  Superintending 
Engineer  of  surveys  and  improvements  of  the  Upper 
Mississippi  and  its  Tributaries,  i866-'7o;  of  survey  of  the 
Battlefield  of  Gettysburg,  Pa.,  i868-'69,  and  survey  of  the 


280    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Battlefield  of  Manassas,  1878;  of  Rock  Island  Bridge 
across  the  Mississippi,  1870,  of  the  fortifications  of  New 
London  and  New  Haven,  Conn.,  1  870*74;  of  the  improve 
ment  of  certain  rivers  and  harbors  on  Long  Island,  1870- 
'74;  of  construction  of  Block  Island  Breakwater,  R.  L, 


"  He  was  a  member  of  Commission  to  examine  Union 
Pacific  Railroad  and  Telegraphic  Lines,  i868-'69,  and  Mem 
ber  of  many  important  Boards  of  Officers  of  the  Corps  of 
Engineers  organized  for  the  consideration  of  the  plans  and 
the  execution  of  the  works  of  the  Corps,  among  which 
were  the  Board  on  Improvement  of  the  Des  Moines 
Rapids,  1867;  Board  on  Bridge  across  Niagara  River,  at 
Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  i870-'7i  ;  on  Bridging  the  Ohio  River, 
i87O-'7i,  and  i  878^82;  on  plan  for  docks  constructed  for 
Breakwater  at  Chicago  Harbor,  111.,  1871  ;  on  the  comple 
tion  of  Cincinnati  and  Newport  Bridge  over  the  Ohio, 
1871;  on  the  harbors  of  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  and  Alton,  111., 
and  Banks  of  the  Mississippi,  1872;  on  Bridging  the  chan 
nel  between  Lake  Huron  and  Lake  Erie,  1873;  on  Ship 
Canal  from  the  Mississippi  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  1873- 
'74;  to  examine  the  St.  Louis  Bridge  across  the  Mississippi, 
1873;  on  the  reclamation  of  the  Alluvial  Basin  of  the 
Mississippi,  i874-'75;  on  Mississippi  Bridges  between  St. 
Paul,  Minn.,  and  St.  Louis,  Mo.,  1876,  and  on  the  improve 
ment  of  the  Mississippi  River,  from  the  Falls  of  St.  An 
thony  to  Rock  Island  Rapids,  1878.  He  was  engaged  in 
the  survey  of  the  Battlefield  of  Groveton,  Va.,  and  in  the 
preparation  of  campaign  maps  of  certain  operations  in 
i862-'63  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  Virginia. 

"  He  was  appointed  a  Member  of  the  Advisory  Coun 
cil  of  the  Harbor  Commissioners  of  the  State  of  Rhode 
Island,  1878. 

"  In  1870  General  Warren  was  assigned  to  the  charge 
of  the  surveys  and  improvements  of  various  rivers  and  har- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       281 

bors  in  southeastern  Massachusetts;  and  in  Rhode  Island 
and  Connecticut,  on  which  duty  and  in  the  supervision  of 
the  construction  and  repair  of  the  fortifications  of  New 
Bedford,  Mass.,  of  Narragansett  Bay  and  of  Newport, 
R.  L,  he  remained  until  the  time  of  his  death. 

"  In  scientific  investigations  General  Warren  had  few 
superiors;  and  his  elaborate  reports  on  some  of  the  most 
important  works  which  have  been  confided  to  the  Corps  of 
Engineers  are  among  the  most  valuable  contributions  to  its 
literature. 

"  In  the  field,  in  the  late  civil  war,  he  was  a  brave  and 
energetic  officer,  and  in  the  high  command  to  which  he  at 
tained  by  his  patriotic  valor  and  skill  he  merited  the  ad 
miration  of  the  army  and  the  applause  of  his  country. 

"  He  was  kind  and  considerate  in  all  the  relations  of  life, 
and  his  family  in  its  affliction  will  have  the  hearty  sympathy 
of  the  Corps  of  Engineers. 

"  As  a  testimonial  of  respect  for  the  deceased,  the  officers 
of  the  Corps  will  wear  the  usual  badge  of  mourning  for 
thirty  days.  "  GEORGE  H.  ELIOT, 

f(  Major  of  Engineers. 

"  By  command  of  BRIG.-GEN.  WRIGHT." 

STRONG  VINCENT,  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  VOLUNTEERS 

Strong  Vincent  was  born  at  Waterford,  Erie  County, 
Pennsylvania,  June  17,  1837.  He  was  the  son  of  B.  B. 
Vincent  and  Sarah  Ann  Strong  Vincent.  As  the  name  in 
dicates,  Strong  Vincent  was  of  English  Puritan  and  French 
Huguenot  ancestry.  During  his  childhood  his  father  re 
moved  from  Waterford  to  Erie,  Pennsylvania,  engaging 
in  business  there  as  an  iron-founder  and  banker.  He  was 
also  largely  interested  in  grain  elevators  in  Chicago. 

Strong  Vincent  entered  the  Erie  Academy  in  1843,  re~ 
maining  there  until  1850;  learned  the  trade  of  iron-moulder 


282    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

in  his  father's  foundry  1850-1852;  was  a  clerk  in  the 
foundry  office  1852-1854;  entered  Trinity  College,  Hart 
ford,  Connecticut,  1854;  entered  Harvard  College  1856, 
and  was  graduated  at  Harvard  in  1859.  He  read  law  in 
Erie  1859-1860,  with  W.  S.  Lane,  Esquire;  was  admited  to 
the  Erie  Bar  in  December,  1860,  and  practiced  law  until  he 
entered  the  Army  in  1861. 

In  April,  1861,  he  married  Elizabeth  H.  Carter  of  New 
ark,  New  Jersey,  to  whom  he  had  been  engaged  since  his 
college  days. 

MILITARY  RECORD. —  Upon  the  call  of  the  President  in 
April,  1 86 1,  for  volunteers  for  three  months'  service,  he 
enlisted  in  Colonel  John  W.  McLane's  Erie  Regiment  of 
Volunteers;  was  elected  second  lieutenant  of  his  company; 
was  promoted  to  first  lieutenant  and  adjutant  of  the  regi 
ment,  serving  as  such  until  the  muster  out  of  the  regiment 
at  the  close  of  its  service  in  July,  1861. 

Colonel  McLane  received  an  order  from  the  Secretary 
of  War,  dated  July  24,  1861,  authorizing  him  to  raise  a 
regiment  of  volunteers  to  serve  for  three  years  or  during 
the  war.  About  half  the  three  months  regiment  re-enlisted 
and  by  the  end  of  August  the  full  complement  of  men  and 
officers  had  been  secured.  The  regiment  was  mustered 
into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  September  14,  1861, 
as  the  Eighty-third  Regiment  Pennsylvania  Volunteers, 
with  John  W.  McLane  as  colonel  and  Strong  Vincent  as 
lieutenant-colonel,  to  rank  as  such  from  July  24,  1861. 

Colonel  McLane  was  killed  at  the  battle  of  Games'  Mill, 
Virginia,  June  27,  1862.  Vincent  was  promoted  to  be 
colonel  of  the  regiment,  ranking  as  such  from  June  27, 
1862.  When  Colonel  Stockton  (who  as  senior  colonel  had 
commanded  the  brigade  after  General  Butterfield's  promo 
tion)  resigned,  soon  after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville, 
Vincent,  who  was  next  in  rank,  was  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  brigade  and  continued  in  command  until  he 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL  STRONG  VINCENT 


Facing    Page    282 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG      283 

was  wounded  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  July  2,  1863. 
In  consideration  of  his  distinguished  service  at  this  battle 
General  Meade  telegraphed  that  night  to  President  Lin 
coln,  requesting  that  he  be  promoted  to  be  brigadier-gen 
eral.  The  President  sent  the  commission  at  once  by  special 
messenger,  but  Vincent's  wound  was  fatal,  and  he  died  a 
few  days  later. 

Vincent  without  previous  military  training  showed  at 
the  outset  an  appreciation  of  the  need  of  discipline,  pre 
cision,  and  accuracy  in  all  military  matters.  My  first  recol 
lection  of  him  is  his  appearance  as  adjutant  in  forming  the 
line  of  the  regiment  for  its  first  dress  parade.  As  I 
stood,  a  private  in  the  ranks,  and  heard  his  command  on 
the  right,  "  To  the  rear  open  order,  March !  "  and  saw  the 
line  officers  step  to  the  front  in  an  irregular  line  and  heard 
him  correct  their  faults,  then  saw  him  march  to  the  center, 
halt,  turn  on  his  heel,  face  the  colonel,  who  stood  like  a 
statue  at  some  distance  with  his  arms  folded,  gauntlets 
reaching  near  to  his  elbows,  salute  with  his  sword  and  re 
port,  "  Sir,  the  parade  is  formed,"  I  confess  my  first  im 
pression  of  him  was  not  favorable.  I  thought  him  a  dude 
and  an  upstart.  I  soon  came  to  know  that  he  wished  to 
impress  on  that  mob  of  green  country  boys,  by  example  as 
well  as  precept,  the  proper  way  for  a  soldier  to  stand  and 
to  move.  It  was  the  beginning  for  that  regiment  of  its 
military  education.  By  the  end  of  its  three  months'  service 
spent  in  continual  drill  and  practice  in  all  the  duties  of  a 
soldier,  that  part  of  this  regiment  which  re-enlisted  for 
three  years  formed  a  trained  nucleus  for  the  Eighty-third 
Regiment  of  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  which  placed  it  in 
the  front  rank  of  volunteers  for  the  war,  and  kept  it  there. 
Vincent  had  demonstrated  his  fitness  for  a  higher  position. 
McLane  had  seen  service  in  the  Mexican  war  and  had  kept 
up  his  training  by  the  command  of  a  militia  company  for 
several  years  in  Erie.  He  was  a  tall,  commanding  figure, 


284    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

with  a  strong  voice,  and  was  glad  to  have  Vincent  as  his 
second  in  command.  McLane  was  a  fine  officer,  and  had 
he  lived  would  have  been  worthy  of,  and  no  doubt  received, 
higher  rank;  but  he  was  instantly  killed  in  the  first  great 
battle  in  which  the  regiment  participated  —  Games'  Mill. 

The  long  and  weary  months  of  the  fall  and  winter  of 
1861-1862  were  not  spent  in  idleness.  The  men  and  of 
ficers  of  this  regiment,  like  those  of  the  other  regiments  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  were  drilled  and  disciplined  into 
a  thorough  familiarity  with  their  duties.  The  company 
officers  were  as  ignorant  as  their  men.  An  officers'  school 
was  established,  of  which  Vincent  was  the  schoolmaster. 
He  made  a  good  one.  What  he  did  not  know  about  tactics 
and  army  regulations  he  learned,  and  forced  the  junior  of 
ficers  to  learn  and  practice.  The  result  was  that  General 
McClellan,  late  in  the  fall,  pronounced  the  Eighty-third 
Pennsylvania  the  best  drilled  regiment  in  Fitz  John  Por 
ter's  division,  if  not  the  best  in  the  army.  Of  course  this 
result  cannot  be  attributed  entirely  to  Vincent,  although  his 
quiet,  persistent  work  had  much  to  do  with  it.  The  regi 
ment  was  fortunate  in  having  McLane  as  its  colonel  and 
General  Daniel  Butterfield  as  its  brigade  commander,  and 
from  Hall's  Hill  to  Appomattox  the  Eighty-third  Pennsyl 
vania  showed  the  effect  of  this  early  training. 

Vincent  was  of  medium  stature,  but  well  formed.  He 
was  a  fine  horseman,  and  when  mounted  looked  much 
larger  than  when  on  foot.  He  was  a  gentleman  by  nature, 
quiet  and  considerate  in  his  demeanor,  deserving  and  re 
ceiving  the  respect  of  his  men  and  officers,  as  well  as  that 
of  his  superiors  in  rank.  Severe  in  discipline  when  sever 
ity  was  needed,  no  officer  in  the  army  was  more  thought 
ful  and  considerate  of  the  comfort  and  health  of  his  men. 
Without  the  schooling  of  West  Point,  by  the  help  of  his 
trained  mind,  quickness  of  perception,  and  constant  study, 
stimulated  by  his  intense  patriotism,  his  knowledge  of  the 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       285 

art  of  war  made  him  equal  to  any  emergency  in  which  he 
was  placed. 

He  was  generally  of  a  cheerful  disposition,  but  during 
his  last  campaign  he  seemed  to  have  a  presentiment  that  it 
might  be  his  last.  On  July  i,  when  after  a  long  march 
the  brigade  went  into  bivouac  just  before  reaching  Han 
over,  expecting  to  spend  the  night  there,  news  came  of  the 
battle  at  Gettysburg,  with  the  order  to  continue  the  march 
in  that  direction.  The  brigade  was  quickly  formed  and 
in  the  road.  Just  before  reaching  Hanover  Vincent  sent 
back  for  the  drum  corps  and  the  color  guard  of  the  Eighty- 
third  to  come  to  the  front  of  the  brigade  with  their  flag. 
As  the  flag  was  unfurled  and  rippled  in  the  breeze,  he  rev 
erently  bared  his  head,  and  said  to  Captain  Clark,  his  ad 
jutant-general,  "  What  death  more  glorious  can  any  man 
desire  than  to  die  on  the  soil  of  old  Pennsylvania  righting 
for  that  flag?" 

Just  before  leaving  for  the  war,  in  April,  1861,  he  mar 
ried  Elizabeth  Carter  and  left  her  with  his  father  and 
mother  in  Erie.  While  the  army  was  in  permanent  camps 
at  Hall's  Hill,  Virginia,  in  1861-1862,  and  in  front  of 
Fredericksburg,  Virginia,  1862-1863,  Mrs.  Vincent  joined 
her  husband,  and  remained  with  him  in  the  winter  quar 
ters  until  the  army  started  on  its  campaigns,  when  she  re 
turned  to  Erie.  She  was  a  very  handsome  young  woman, 
tall,  graceful,  and  a  superb  horsewoman.  When  his  du 
ties  permitted,  Vincent  loved  to  ride  with  her  through  the 
camps  of  the  army  and  about  the  surrounding  country. 
They  were  followed  with  looks  of  admiration  wherever 
they  appeared.  Their  love  was  ideal.  She  knew  the 
risks  of  the  service,  but  she  always  encouraged  him  to  do  his 
full  duty.  It  was  not  military  glory,  but  the  purest  patri 
otism  which  actuated  both.  At  this  writing  Mrs.  Vincent 
still  survives  him,  one  of  the  noblest  of  the  noble  women 
of  our  country. 


286    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

LETTERS  ABOUT  VINCENT  AND  His  BRIGADE  AT 
GETTYSBURG 

In  1901  the  compiler  of  this  book,  in  response  to  his  in 
quiry  as  to  the  character  of  General  Vincent,  his  conduct 
at  Gettysburg,  and  its  effect  in  determining  the  result  of 
the  battle,  received  letters  from  the  following  gentlemen, 
with  permission  to  publish  them.  Extracts  from  which 
are  subjoined. 

(From  Major-General  DANIEL  BUTTERFIELD,  Chief  of  Staff,  Army  of 
the  Potomac  at  Gettysburg.) 

"  HOTEL  ROYAL  PALM,  MIAMI,  FLORIDA, 

February  19,  1901. 

"  No  man  who  lived  and  fought  in  the  battle  of  Gettys 
burg  did  more  for  his  country  than  Vincent.  I  knew  the 
whole  matter  from  beginning  to  end.  He  was  a  mag 
nificent  soldier,  a  gentleman  of  high  education  and  great 
ability. 

"  General  Tremain  brought  messages  to  General  Meade 
and  to  me  from  the  field,  describing  the  exigency  and  great 
need  for  the  immediate  occupation  of  Round  Top,  and  au 
thority  was  given  him  to  send  the  troops  there.  In  my 
judgment  there  was  not  another  command  on  the  field 
which  could  have  been  more  effective  in  the  matter  of  time 
and  rapidity  of  movement  in  getting  to  the  spot  in  time  to 
have  saved  the  day,  owing  to  its  wonderful  efficiency,  drill, 
and  discipline  under  Vincent,  who  had  been  trained  and 
educated  with  it." 

(From   JOSHUA   L.    CHAMBERLAIN,   Brevet  Major-General    U.   S.    V., 
Colonel  Commanding  Twentieth  Maine  Volunteers  at  Gettysburg.} 

"  PORTLAND,  MAINE,  November  18,  1901. 
"  Colonel   Vincent's   conduct    in   taking  his   brigade   to 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       287 

Little  Round  Top  and  placing  it  in  position,  and  in  throw 
ing  his  great  personal  energy  and  determination  into  the 
fight  there,  are  personally  well  known  to  me.  I  regard  the 
timely  occupation  of  that  position,  which  was  at  that  stage 
of  the  battle  the  key  of  the  Union  defense,  as  due  to  the 
energy  and  skill  of  Colonel  Vincent." 

(From  CHARLES  W.  ELIOT,  President  of  Harvard  University.) 

"  CAMBRIDGE,  MASS.,  November  27,  1901. 
"  I  am,  of  course,  incompetent  to  express  an  opinion 
about  the  precise  value  of  Colonel  Vincent's  energetic  ac 
tion  at  Gettysburg;  but  I  remember  him  as  a  student  in 
Harvard  College  with  perfect  distinctness,  and  I  should 
like  to  testify  to  anybody  who  wants  to  know  what  man 
ner  of  man  he  was  —  that  he  was  one  of  the  manliest  and 
most  attractive  persons,  that  I  ever  saw.  I  remember 
thinking  that  his  death  was  an  unspeakable  loss  to  the  army 
on  which  the  hopes  of  the  country  rested  at  the  time,  and 
to  the  country  which  he  would  have  greatly  served  if  his 
life  had  been  spared." 

(From  General  ELLIS   SPEAR,  Major  Twentieth  Maine   Volunteers  at 

Gettysburg.) 

"WASHINGTON,  D.  C,  November  23,  1901. 
"  I  have  read  carefully  the  foregoing  statement  in  re 
gard  to  General  Vincent's  services  at  Gettysburg.  As  to 
the  greater  part  of  the  statement,  I  know  of  my  own  knowl 
edge  that  it  is  strictly  accurate.  What  happened  on  the 
right  of  the  brigade  when  Vincent  was  mortally  wounded 
I  did  not  see,  being  then  with  the  Twentieth  Maine  closely 
engaged  on  the  left,  but  it  was  a  matter  of  common  report 
at  the  time,  and  beyond  question  the  statement  is  strictly 
accurate.  I  had  seen  General  Vincent  in  battle  before  and 
knew  what  he  would  do  then.  He  was  a  very  valuable  of- 


288    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

ficer  and  of  great  promise,  and  his  death  was  a  great  loss 
to  the  army ;  but  the  success  he  achieved  in  averting  the  im 
minent  and  great  danger  on  the  left  at  Gettysburg  on  the 
second  day  of  the  battle,  was  worth  what  it  cost,  though 
the  price  was  great." 

(From  General  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  C.  S.  A.) 

"WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  December  6,  1901. 
"  It  gives  me  pleasure  to  state  in  reference  to  the  worth 
of  Little  Round  Top  to  the  Union  Army  at  Gettysburg, 
it  was  everything  to  the  success  of  the  Union  battle.  Gen 
eral  Vincent's  prompt  action  in  moving  to  save  that  point 
held  it,  and  was  the  means  of  getting  the  battle  to  his  side. 
Many  minutes'  delay  would  have  given  the  Confederates 
the  field." 

SKETCH  OF  COLONEL  PATRICK  H.  O'RORKE 
BY  CAPTAIN  PORTER  FARLEY 

Colonel  O'Rorke  was  born  in  County  Cavan,  Ireland,  on 
March  28,  1836.  He  was  brought  to  America  when  he 
was  only  one  year  old.  His  parents  settled  for  a  year  or 
so  in  Montreal,  Canada,  then  moved  to  Ogdensburg,  New 
York,  where  they  remained  about  two  years,  when  they 
moved  to  Rochester,  New  York,  where  they  established 
their  permanent  home  and  where  the  survivors  of  the  fam 
ily  still  abide.  Young  O'Rorke  attended  No.  9  public 
school,  and  therein  obtained  such  schooling  as  he  had  en 
joyed  previous  to  his  entrance  at  the  Military  Academy  at 
West  Point. 

About  the  year  1855  the  University  of  Rochester  estab 
lished  two  free  scholarships  open  on  competition  to  the  boys 
of  the  public  schools  of  the  city.  O'Rorke  competed  with 
others,  and  stood  first  on  the  list  at  the  close  of  the  exam 
ination.  His  parents  were  devoted  Roman  Catholics,  and 


COLONEL   PATRICK   H.    O'RORKE 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       289 

objected  to  the  denominational  control  of  the  Rochester 
College.  On  this  account  he  had  to  forego  the  educational 
advantages  which  were  thus  open  to  him.  Soon  after 
graduating  from  the  public  school  he  began  to  learn  the 
trade  of  his  father,  which  was  that  of  marble  cutter. 

His  general  ability  had  by  this  time  become  well  recog 
nized  and  had  attracted  the  attention  of  the  congressman 
from  the  Rochester  district,  who  obtained  for  him  an  ap 
pointment  to  a  cadetship  at  West  Point.  He  entered  the 
Military  Academy  in  June,  1857,  with  the  class  which  was 
graduated  in  June,  1861.  From  the  first  O'Rorke  took  a 
high  stand  in  his  class  and  finally  was  graduated  at  its 
head,  in  a  class  of  thirty-four.  Among  his  classmates  the 
two  best  known  for  distinguished  sen-ices  during  the  Civil 
War  were  Lieutenant  Alonzo  H.  Cushing,  killed  on  July 
3  at  Gettysburg,  and  General  George  A.  Custer,  who  fell 
in  the  massacre  on  the  Little  Big  Horn  in  1876. 

Immediately  upon  his  graduation  O'Rorke  was  com 
missioned  as  second  lieutenant  of  Engineers.  He  served 
on  the  staff  of  General  Tyler  at  the  Battle  of  Bull  Run, 
July  21,  1 86 1.  Later  he  acted  as  assistant  engineer  on  the 
defenses  of  Washington  and  at  Fortress  Monroe.  In  Oc 
tober,  1 86 1,  he  went  to  Port  Royal  as  one  of  the  staff  of 
General  W.  T.  Sherman.  For  his  sen-ices  on  this  occasion 
he  received  the  brevet  of  captain.  In  September.  1862,  he 
was  commissioned  colonel  of  the  One  Hundred  and  For 
tieth  Xew  York  Volunteers.  During  all  the  sen-ice  of 
Colonel  O'Rorke  as  commander  of  this  regiment  it  formed 
a  part  of  the  Third  Brigade,  Second  Division,  Fifth  Army 
Corps.  It  was  due  to  O'Rorke's  devotion  and  skill  that  this 
regiment  attained  an  efficiency  which  was  a  source  of  pride 
to  him  and  to  the  men  who  sen*ed  under  him. 

During  the  Chancellorsville  campaign  O'Rorke  was  in 
command  of  the  brigade,  as  our  brigade  commander.  Gen 
eral  Warren,  had  been  assigned  to  duty  as  chief  engineer 


290    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

of  the  army  under  Hooker.  During  the  Gettysburg  cam 
paign,  which  closed  his  admirable  and  promising  career,  he 
was  again  in  command  of  his  regiment.  He  fell,  instantly 
killed,  on  July  2,  1863,  near  the  foot  of  the  southern  slope 
of  Little  Round  Top.  The  last  effort  of  his  life  was  the 
gallant  leadership  displayed  as  he  headed  the  successful 
charge  down  the  slope  up  which  Hood's  impetuous  men 
were  already  pushing  their  way.  He  died  in  the  actual  dis 
charge  of  a  service  of  the  most  vital  importance  to  his 
country. 

Colonel  O'Rorke  had  been  married  to  Miss  Clara  W. 
Bishop  in  July,  1862,  only  a  few  weeks  before  his  appoint 
ment  as  colonel.  He  left  no  children.  About  a  year  and 
a  half  after  his  death  his  widow  entered  the  religious  or 
der  of  the  Sacred  Heart.  She  died  only  a  few  years  ago, 
being  then  Lady  Superior  in  the  convent  of  her  order  in 
Providence,  Rhode  Island. 

Colonel  O'Rorke's  body  was  buried  on  the  Bushman 
farm  near  Gettysburg.  As  soon  as  possible  his  wife  came 
to  the  spot  and  caused  its  removal  to  Rochester,  where  it 
was  buried  in  the  cemetery  on  Pinnacle  hill.  It  was  later 
removed  to  a  more  eligible  spot  in  the  same  cemetery,  and 
still  again  some  years  later,  when  the  old  Pinnacle  ceme 
tery  was  abandoned,  it  was  removed  to  the  new  cemetery 
of  the  Holy  Sepulchre,  north  of  Rochester.  All  this  is 
mentioned  to  lead  up  to  the  interesting  and  remarkable  fact 
that  the  body  of  Colonel  George  Ryan,  who  succeeded 
O'Rorke  in  command  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth 
New  York,  and  who  was  killed  at  Spottsylvania,  has  also 
been  four  times  buried,  and  now  lies  beside  that  of  Col 
onel  O'Rorke  in  his  family  burial  lot. 

CAPTAIN  PORTER  FARLEY 

MILITARY  RECORD  —  Extracts  from  the  report  of  the 
Adjutant  General  of  the  State  of  New  York. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       291 

"  PORTER  FARLEY. —  Age  at  enlistment,  22  years.  En 
rolled  at  Rochester  to  serve  three  years,  and  mustered  in 
as  Second  Lieutenant  Company  G,  One  Hundred  and  For 
tieth  New  York  Volunteers,  August  30,  1862.  As  First 
Lieutenant  January  i,  1865.  As  First  Lieutenant  and 
Quartermaster,  October  28,  1863.  As  Captain  of  Com 
pany  B,  January  16,  1864.  Discharged  for  disability, 
August  4,  1864." 

Lieutenant  Farley  served  as  acting  adjutant  of  the  regi 
ment  from  the  day  the  regiment  left  Falmouth  for  the  Get 
tysburg  campaign  until  October  28,  1863,  when  he  was 
commissioned  regimental  quartermaster.  He  served  in  this 
capacity  until  he  was  commissioned  captain  of  Company  B. 


VI 

LETTERS  AND  PAPERS 
LIEUTENANT  MACKENZIE  TO  GENERAL  MEADE  * 

"  BRANDY  STATION,  VA.,  March  22,   1864. 
"  MAJOR-GENERAL  MEADE  : 

"  Sir :  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  state 
ment  of  facts  relative  to  the  battle  of  July  2,  at  Gettysburg : 

"  At  the  opening  of  the  battle  of  July  2  there  were  no 
troops  belonging  to  General  Sickles'  corps  on  Round  Top 
ridge. 

"  General  Sickles,  when  called  upon  by  General  War 
ren  through  me,  to  furnish  troops  for  the  defense  of  that 
position,  refused  to  do  so,  stating  that  his  whole  command 
was  necessary  to  defend  his  front,  or  words  to  that  ef 
fect. 

"  General  Sykes  furnished  troops  for  the  object  stated 
above  as  soon  as  called  upon  to  do  so. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient 
servant,  "  RANALD  S.  MACKENZIE, 

"  First  Lieutenant,  Corps  of  Engineers." 

Lieutenant  Mackenzie  was  one  of  three  lieutenants  of 
engineers  serving  on  the  staff  of  General  Warren,  chief 
engineer  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  the  battle  of  Get 
tysburg.  This  letter  is  evidently  a  reply  to  one  from  Gen 
eral  Meade,  which  the  writer  has  not  been  able  to  find  in 
the  "  Official  Records."  It  is  a  link  in  the  chain  of  evi 
dence  that  Warren  did  not  leave  Little  Round  Top  before 
the  arrival  of  Weed's  brigade,  but  remained  there  with  the 
officers  at  the  signal  station,  sending  his  requests  for  troops 

x"  Rebellion   Records,"   Vol.   xxvii,   part   I,   p.    138. 
292 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG      293 

to  occupy  this  position  through  the  officers  of  his  staff. 
He  sent  Lieutenant  Mackenzie  to  General  Sickles  first.  If 
it  be  objected  that  Lieutenant  Mackenzie  does  not  say  that 
Warren's  request  to  Sykes  was  sent  "  through  me,"  the  in 
ference  is  fair  that  it  was,  and  that  he  would  not  repeat 
these  words  in  a  brief  formal  letter  to  General  Meade. 

A  letter  from  the  Adjutant  General's  office,  War  Depart 
ment,  informs  me  that,  with  one  exception,  all  the  officers 
of  General  Sykes'  staff  at  Gettysburg  mentioned  in  his  offi 
cial  report  are  dead.  Correspondence  with  the  only  sur 
vivor  satisfies  me  that  he  is  not  the  officer  who  carried  the 
order  from  Sykes  to  Barnes,  to  send  one  of  his  brigades  to 
Little  Round  Top,  which  was  intercepted  by  Vincent  and 
acted  upon  before  it  reached  Barnes. 

It  is  possible  that  wtien  Mackenzie  delivered  to  Sykes  the 
request  of  Warren  that  a  brigade  should  be  sent  to  Little 
Round  Top,  Sykes  agreed  and  sent  the  order  to  Barnes  by 
Mackenzie  and  that,  supposing  that  Barnes  would  be  found 
with  his  division,  Mackenzie  rode  there;  and  not  finding 
Barnes,  told  Vincent  of  the  order  which  Sykes  had  au 
thorized  him  to  deliver  to  Barnes. 

GENERAL  SYKES'  LETTER  1 

"DEAR  SIR:  Your  letter  has  just  reached  me  through 
the  War  Department,  and  it  gives  me  pleasure  to  answer 
such  of  the  questions  it  asks  as  I  can.  I  enclose  a  copy  of 
my  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  which  is  confined 
exclusively  to  what  I  knew  of  events  then  taking  place. 
The  only  error  in  it  I  have  ever  discovered,  is  that  Birney 
did  not  close  the  gap  I  asked  him  to,  near  the  battery  on 
the  left  of  his  line.  Through  that  gap  the  enemy  in  part 
forced  his  way.  The  Divisions  of  the  Fifth  Corps  moved 

1  Copy  of  letter  from  General  George  Sykes,  commanding  Fifth 
Army  Corps  at  Gettysburg,  to  Captain  Porter  Farley,  Rochester,  New 
York,  dated  Fort  Snelling,  Minnesota,  August  5,  1872. 


294    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

from  the  Baltimore  pike  where  it  crossed  Rock  Creek,  as 
follows:  First  Division,  Second  Division,  Third  Division. 
About  3  P.  M.  on  the  2d  of  July  the  Corps  Commanders 
were  at  the  headquarters  of  General  Meade.  After  con 
sultation,  I  was  directed  by  him  to  establish  the  Fifth  Corps 
on  the  left  of  the  general  line  of  the  army,  terminating  at 
Little  Round  Top,  and  hold  that  part  of  the  field.  The 
crest  of  the  valley  sweeping  from  Cemetery  Ridge  around 
to  the  left  and  embracing  Little  Round  Top  was  the  gen 
eral  line  of  battle  adopted  by  the  commanding  General. 
The  position  of  the  Third  Corps  was  not  known  to  me,  and 
no  staff  officer  was  given  me  to  find  it  out.  In  looking  for 
it,  I  found  the  gap  spoken  of  in  my  Report,  in  consequence 
of  which,  I  sought  the  commander  of  the  troops  nearest 
it,  and  asked  that  it  be  closed,  promising  to  fill  the  interval 
he  might  make  with  my  own  troops.  To  accomplish  this, 
I  hastened  to  the  leading  Brigades,  Sweitzer  and  Tilton, 
First  Division,  and  posted  them  on  the  edge  of  a  wood  in 
front  of  part  of  Birney's  line,  to  cover  the  interval  I  ex 
pected  him  to  make.  How  Vincent  got  to  Round  Top  I 
do  not  know,  unless  hearing  my  aide-de-camp  deliver  the 
order  for  the  Corps  to  take  the  left  of  the  line,  he  made 
his  way  there  of  his  own  soldierly  instinct.  As  I  con 
ducted  the  two  leading  brigades  across  the  Taneytown  pike 
to  the  position  I  gave  them,  I  do  not  remember  to  have 
seen  Vincent's  troops.  I  was  at  the  head,  and  he  at  the 
rear  of  the  column,  and  a  sputtering  fire  having  com 
menced,  I  was  anxious  to  get  the  foremost  brigades  in  their 
place.  The  interference  with  orders  given  by  me  to  my 
troops  occurred  only  in  Warren's  hurrying  up  Weed's 
Brigade  to  Round  Top,  which  was  very  judicious,  and  an 
interference  of  General  Sickles  by  which  General  Weed 
was  withdrawn  in  part  from  Round  Top,  and  placed  en 
route  towards  the  right,  until  I  met  him,  and  at  once  re- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       295 

turned  him  to  his  place.  Watson's  Battery  of  regular  ar 
tillery  was  likewise  appropriated  by  Sickles  without  my 
knowledge,  in  consequence  of  which  it  was  for  a  time  lost. 
General  Ayres  took  position  to  the  right  of  Little  Round 
Top  until  I  ordered  him  to  attack  in  the  direction  of  the 
'  Den,'  and  Crawford  was  to  be  the  right  rear  of  Ayres 
until  I  moved  him  to  the  attack  at  a  later  hour.  You  are 
right  about  two  Brigades  of  the  First  Division  being  out 
towards  the  peach  orchard;  I  placed  them  there  myself, 
and  for  the  reason  given.  The  rocky  glen  did  not  admit 
of  troops  being  posted  across  it.  If  the  left  of  the  line  of 
the  Third  Corps  had  not  been  thrust  out  into  the  valley, 
there  would  have  been  no  interval  near  the  glen,  and  I  do 
not  believe  the  enemy  would  have  made  the  headway  he 
did,  but,  being  there,  the  glen  enabled  Longstreet  to  use 
it  as  a  cover,  and  gave  him  power  to  turn  the  flank  of  the 
Third  Corps.  Had  not  the  Fifth  Corps  held  Round  Top 
and  the  ground  adjacent,  nothing  would  have  stopped  him 
from  reaching  the  Baltimore  turnpike.  Our  Corps  never 
got  the  credit  it  deserved  that  day.  It  simply  saved  de 
feat,  and  every  fair-minded  soldier  knows  it.  The  mili 
tary  politicians  did  not  want  one  of  their  pets  to  suffer, 
and  were  strong  enough  to  uphold  '  their  own/ 

"  I  have  thus,  Captain,  replied  to  your  letter  as  far  as 
I  am  able.  I  cannot  tell  you  much  not  known  to  you  be 
fore.  I  am,  Captain, 

"  Yours  Very  Respectfully, 

"  GEO.  SYKES." 

This  letter  was  written  nine  years  after  the  battle.  In 
a  measure  it  confirms  my  statement.  Warren  sent  Cap 
tain  Mackenzie  of  his  staff  to  Sykes,  asking  for  troops 
for  the  hill.  Sykes  sent  one  of  his  staff  to  direct  General 
Barnes  to  send  one  of  his  brigades.  Vincent,  learning  of 


296    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  order,  in  the  absence  of  Barnes  assumed  the  responsi 
bility  of  taking  his  brigade.  He  would  not  have  left  the 
column  except  in  anticipation  of  an  order  which  he  knew 
had  been  issued  by  Sykes  to  send  one  brigade.  Macken 
zie,  in  a  letter  to  be  found  in  VOL.  xxvn,  "  Rebellion  Rec 
ords,"  says  that  Sykes  responded  promptly  to  Warren's 
request.  As  Sykes  did  not  designate  which  of  Barnes' 
brigades  should  be  sent,  he  may  well  be  pardoned  for  not 
knowing  how  Vincent  got  to  Little  Round  Top.  What 
he  says  in  this  respect  shows  a  very  high  regard  for  Vin 
cent.  Apparently  he  thinks  Vincent's  brigade  was  the 
rear  of  the  column,  as  he  says  he  posted  the  two  leading 
brigades  himself.  In  fact,  Vincent  led  the  division  with 
the  third  brigade,  Sweitzer  came  next  with  the  second, 
followed  by  Tilton  with  the  first.  Barnes'  statement  in 
his  official  report,  that  Warren  in  person  came  to  Sykes 
is  pure  fiction.  Warren  remained  on  the  hill  at  the  signal 
station  until  Weed's  brigade  arrived  and  passed  to  the 
front  to  reinforce  Sickles.  Warren  rode  down  the  hill 
at  this  time  and,  detaching  the  rear  regiment  of  the  bri 
gade,  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  sent  it  to 
the  crest  of  Little  Round  Top,  under  the  guidance  of 
Lieutenant  Roebling.  Later  the  remaining  regiments  of 
Weed's  brigade  were  ordered  back  by  General  Sykes  and 
took  position  on  Little  Round  Top,  on  the  right  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York. 

NOTES  ON  THE  TAKING  AND  HOLDING  OF 
LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG.1 

'  This   regiment,   known  as  the  Halleck   Infantry,   was 
commanded  by  Colonel  Kenner  Garrard  of  the  regular  army, 

1  Prepared  for  the  New  York  State  Commissioners  of  Gettysburg 
Monuments  by  Lieutenant  A.  P.  Case,  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Forty-sixth  New  York,  acting  as  aid  on  the  staff  of  General  Weed, 
and  after  his  death  on  the  staff  of  Colonel  Garrard. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       297 

who  left  the  post  of  Commandant  at  West  Point  by  re 
quest  of  General  Halleck  for  that  purpose.  The  regiment 
first  joined  General  Warren's  Third  brigade,  Second  divi 
sion,  Fifth  corps.  This  brigade  was  then  composed  of  the 
Fifth  New  York,  Colonel  Winslow  (Duryea's  Zouaves), 
the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  Colonel 
O'Rorke,  and  the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth  New 
York.  Warren,  O'Rorke,  and  Garrard  were  together  at 
West  Point.  The  two  other  brigades  of  Sykes'  Second 
division  were  all  Regulars.  But  at  the  time  of  the  Gettys 
burg  campaign  the  brigade  was  commanded  by  General 
Stephen  H.  Weed  of  the  regular  army,  and  was  composed 
of  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  the  One 
Hundred  and  Forty-sixth  New  York,  and  the  Ninety-first 
and  One  Hundred  and  Fifty-fifth  Pennsylvania. 

"The  Fifth  corps,  after  marching  nearly  all  night, 
reached  the  Gettysburg  field  about  6  A.  M.  July  2,  and  was 
stationed  on  the  west  side  of  Rock  Creek,  near  the  bridge 
of  the  Baltimore  Pike,  on  the  extreme  right  on  the  Union 
line.  It  was  so  posted,  as  we  understood,  because  Gen 
eral  Meade  that  morning  contemplated  an  attack  by  the 
Fifth  and  Twelfth  corps  on  Ewell's  position  at  Benner's 
Hill.  Soon  after  our  arrival  General  Meade  sent  for  Gen 
eral  Weed,  who  had  an  excellent  reputation  as  an  artillery 
officer  in  the  regular  army,  to  visit  the  battery  positions  in 
this  part  of  the  line,  including  Gulp's  Hill.  The  writer, 
an  extra  aide  on  General  Weed's  staff,  was  ordered  to  ac 
company  him.  Several  batteries  were  changed  at  General 
Weed's  suggestion.  But  no  attack  was  made  on  Ewell. 

"  About  3  P.  M.  the  Fifth  corps  was  ordered  in  to  support 
General  Sickles,  who  held  the  extreme  left  of  the  Union 
line.  At  this  time  the  Union  line  made  nearly  a  horseshoe 
shape,  so  that  the  corps  was  marched  from  the  right  heel 
of  the  shoe  across  to  the  left  heel.  General  Sykes  himself 
took  in  Barnes'  First  division,  going  by  the  Peach  Orchard 


298    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

cross-road.  General  Ayres'  Second  division  followed,  Gen 
eral  Weed's  Third  brigade  leading,  the  other  two  brigades 
following  at  quite  a  distance.  The  Peach  Orchard  cross 
road  connects  the  Taneytown  and  the  Emmittsburg  roads, 
and  as  it  leaves  the  former  it  crosses  over  the  north  foot 
of  Little  Round  Top.  When  the  head  of  General  Weed's 
column  had  reached  the  woods  south  of  Trostles'  house  and 
near  where  the  Third  Massachusetts  battery  was  placed, 
the  smoke  of  the  battle  was  so  dense  that  General  Weed 
rode  ahead  to  see  where  he  was  wanted,  and  told  his  staff 
to  bring  the  column  along  very  slowly  until  he  returned. 

"  At  this  time  the  rear  of  the  column,  the  One  Hundred 
and  Fortieth  New  York,  had  just  passed  the  foot  of  Lit 
tle  Round  Top,  which  was  then  bare  of  troops,  and  was 
occupied  only  by  General  Warren  and  the  signal  corps. 
They  had  just  discovered  a  movement  of  rebel  troops  from 
the  southwest,  to  occupy  this  hill,  from  which  the  whole 
left  of  the  Union  army  could  be  enfiladed.  Realizing  the 
vital  necessity  of  holding  this  point,  and  seeing  the  troops 
passing  through  the  valley  at  its  north  foot,  General  War 
ren  hastened  down  to  them  and  found  them  to  be  his  old 
brigade.  The  men  greeted  him  with  repeated  cheers,  for 
he  was  greatly  beloved  and  respected  by  his  old  regiments. 
Detaching  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth,  he  sent  it  up  the 
hill,  and  then  rode  forward  to  the  head  of  the  column  and, 
finding  General  Weed  gone,  ordered  it  halted  for  Weed's 
return.  Weed  soon  came  back  with  Sykes'  order  to  take 
his  brigade  on  to  Little  Round  Top.  He  at  once  moved 
up  the  hill  by  a  countermarch.  The  writer  never  learned 
whether  he  saw  General  Sykes  or  got  the  order  from  a 
messenger.  A  short  time  before  this  General  Sykes  had 
detached  Vincent's  brigade  from  Barnes'  division  and  sent 
it  to  occupy  the  level  gap  south  of  Little  Round  Top  and 
lying  between  it  and  Big  Round  Top,  as  that  passage  of 
fered  an  easy  route  for  the  rebel  troops  to  the  rear  of  the 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       299 

Union  left.  I  do  not  think  that  the  occupancy  or  defense 
of  Little  Round  Top  was  then  thought  of,  for  it  appeared 
almost  inaccessible.  But  the  rebel  troops  that  Warren  had 
seen  advancing  towards  the  hill  met  Vincent's  troops  in  the 
gap  and  at  the  south  slope  of  Little  Round  Top,  and  had 
there  a  hard  fight,  in  which  Vincent  was  killed.  His  right 
was  gradually  driven  back,  and  Hood's  Texas  brigade 
reached  the  southern  summit  of  the  hill,  where  they  were 
met  by  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  which 
had  been  rushed  up  from  the  opposite  side.  Never  was 
there  a  more  opportune  arrival.  A  rebel  occupancy  of  the 
hill  would  probably  have  been  fatal  to  the  success  of  the 
Union  army. 

"  The  hill  is  sparsely  covered  with  trees,  and  the  ground 
thickly  strewn  with  huge  rocks,  so  that  no  deployment  of 
troops  could  be  made.  A  desperate  hand-to-hand  conflict 
ensued,  the  men  loading  and  firing  as  they  passed  around 
the  rocks.  Colonel  O'Rorke,  two  of  his  officers,  and 
twenty-five  privates  were  killed  at  the  first  onset.  The 
Texans  were  driven  down,  Vincent's  lines  re-formed,  with 
his  right  touching  the  left  of  Weed's  brigade,  now  all  on 
the  hill.  The  attack  was  renewed,  and  again  repulsed. 
The  regiments  then  took  the  positions  they  remained  in  un 
til  they  left  the  Gettysburg  field  on  the  5th  of  July.  Their 
line,  facing  west,  occupied  the  whole  west  crest  of  the  hill 
in  a  north  and  south  line,  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth 
at  the  left,  next  the  Ninety-first  Pennsylvania,  then  the 
One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth,  with  the  One  Hundred  and 
Fifty-fifth  Pennsylvania  on  the  right.  The  One  Hundred 
and  Fortieth  lay  partly  down  the  south  slope,  and  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fifty-fifth  Pennsylvania  partly  down  the 
north  slope. 

"  There  is  some  uncertainty  as  to  which  of  the  regiments 
first  followed  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth,  but  the 
writer  thinks  it  was  the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth. 


300    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

While  the  regiments  were  ascending  the  hill,  Captain  Haz- 
lett's  U.  S.  battery  of  four  guns  was  also  taken  up,  the 
horses  being  lashed  to  their  utmost  exertions,  and  the  in 
fantry  assisting  at  the  wheels.  It  was  a  terrible  place  for 
horses  or  guns,  but  the  emergency  had  to  be  met.  The 
ground  on  the  west  front  of  the  hill  was  covered  by  the 
rocks  of  the  Devil's  Den,  which  were  occupied  by  hundreds 
of  rebel  sharpshooters.  This  fight  on  Little  Round  Top 
took  place  between  4  p.  M.  and  5  P.  M.  The  rebel  sharp 
shooters  were  a  great  annoyance  to  both  infantry  and  ar 
tillery.  The  guns  of  the  battery  could  not  be  enough  de 
pressed  to  dislodge  them.  Soon  after  5  P.  M.  General 
Weed  was  instantly  killed  by  a  bullet,  and  as  he  sank  to 
the  ground  Captain  Hazlett,  of  the  battery,  who  had  been 
standing  by  his  side,  leaned  over  to  speak  to  him,  when  he 
too  was  shot  and  fell  by  Weed's  side,  neither  of  them 
speaking  a  word,  except  that  Colonel  Jenkins  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Forty-sixth  thought  he  heard  General  Weed 
say  '  My  sister.* 

"  During  the  whole  of  the  next  day,  July  3,  the  rebel 
sharpshooters  killed  all  who  showed  themselves  on  the  hill. 
The  men  protected  themselves  as  well  as  they  could,  the 
One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth  piling  up  loose  stones,  which 
I  am  told  still  remain  as  they  left  them.  As  the  hill  made 
an  excellent  outlook  over  the  field  of  the  third  day's  fight, 
General  Meade  and  his  staff,  with  the  signal  corps,  were 
there  all  day,  occupying  a  rocky  pen  directly  in  the  line 
held  by  the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth.  A  company 
of  Berdan's  sharpshooters  was  brought  up  and  afforded 
some  protection.  It  was  here  that  General  Warren 
thought  he  could  use  one  of  the  heavy  rifles  better  than  the 
man  who  had  it.  After  firing  it  a  few  times,  with  what 
effect  no  one  could  tell,  his  own  neck  was  grazed  by  a  rebel 
bullet.  He  bound  it  up  with  his  handkerchief  and  relin 
quished  the  rifle.  The  writer,  on  going  over  that  Devil's 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       301 

Den  on  the  morning  of  July  4  to  relieve  the  wounded  Union 
soldiers  who  had  lain  there  since  the  afternoon  of  July  2, 
found  those  rocky  crevices  full  of  dead  rebel  sharpshooters, 
most  of  them  still  grasping  their  rifles.  Behind  one  short 
low  ridge  of  rock  lay  a  row  of  eighteen  dead  who  had  been 
tallied  out  one  by  one  by  our  sharpshooters.  One  of  the 
One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth  brought  in  the  sword  of 
General  Barksdale,  of  Mississippi,  which  was  found  by 
the  side  of  his  dead  body.  Colonel  Garrard  sent  it  to 
General  Sykes. 

"  During  Lee's  great  charge  on  the  afternoon  of  July  3, 
Hazlett's  battery  (commanded  by  Lieutenant  Rittenhouse 
after  Hazlett  was  killed)  had  a  terrible  raking  fire  on  the 
rebel  line,  which  was  made  with  great  effect.  This  caused 
a  concentration  of  the  fire  of  many  rebel  batteries  upon 
Hazlett's  position,  their  shell  and  shot  crashing  among 
the  rocks  as  if  the  world  was  coming  to  an  end.  The 
Fifth  corps  hospital  had  been  made  at  the  house  and  barns 
of  J.  Weikart  on  the  Taneytown  road  at  the  foot  of  the 
east  front  of  Little  Round  Top,  and  during  this  cannonade 
many  of  the  rebel  shells  came  over  the  hill  and  struck  our 
hospital,  wounding  some  a  second  time.  It  was  then 
moved  to  Lewis  Bushman's,  about  a  mile  to  the  southeast. 
The  losses  of  Weed's  brigade  were  as  follows :  Staff,  one ; 
One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  one  hundred  and 
thirty-three;  One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth  New  York, 
twenty-eight;  Ninety-first  Pennsylvania,  nineteen;  One 
Hundred  and  Fifty-fifth  Pennsylvania,  nineteen;  total,  two 
hundred. 

"  It  was  a  curious  coincidence  that  while  the  First  and 
Second  brigades  of  the  First  and  Second  divisions,  respec 
tively,  of  the  Fifth  corps  were  supporting  General  Sickles, 
the  Third  brigades  of  those  divisions  should  have  been 
separately  detached  and  sent  by  different  routes  to  the  de 
fense  of  Little  Round  Top,  these  two  brigades  containing 


302    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

the  only  three  New  York  regiments  in  the  Fifth  corps. 
Thus  the  Forty-fourth  New  York,  Colonel  Cross,  of  Vin 
cent's  brigade  came  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Colonel 
O'Rorke's  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  and  Col 
onel  Garrard's  One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth  New  York 
in  one  of  the  most  critical  moments  of  the  Gettysburg  fight. 
So  the  New  York  men  of  the  Fifth  corps  made  a  most 
gallant  fight,  and  made  it  side  by  side.  And  as  General 
Weed's  death  left  Colonel  Garrard  in  command  of  one  bri 
gade,  so  did  Colonel  Vincent's  death  bring  Colonel  Cross  in 
command  of  the  other  brigade.  Colonel  David  T.  Jenkins, 
afterwards  killed  in  the  Wilderness  fight,  succeeded  Col 
onel  Garrard  in  the  command  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Forty-sixth.  The  Fifth  corps  left  the  Gettysburg  field  on 
the  afternoon  of  July  5.  Death  has  come  to  most  of  the 
leaders  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth  —  Meade  and 
Sykes  of  the  corps;  Warren,  Weed  and  Garrard  of  the  bri 
gade  ;  Jenkins  and  Curran  of  the  regiment.  The  One  Hun 
dred  and  Forty-sixth  had  other  ties  which  united  it  closely 
to  General  Warren,  as  one  of  his  brothers  was  quarter 
master  of  the  brigade,  and  his  youngest  brother,  Robert 
P.  Warren,  was  a  captain  in  the  regiment,  and  he  too  is 
dead." 

[Hazlett  did  not  speak  after  he  was  shot  in  the  brain, 
but  Weed  lived  some  time,  long  enough  to  give  to  Lieu 
tenant  W.  H.  Crennell,  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New 
York,  acting  on  his  staff,  minute  directions  as  to  disposi 
tion  of  his  effects  and  messages  to  his  family  and  to  others. 
I  believe  the  above  account  of  movements  of  the  brigade, 
and  particularly  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New 
York,  is  substantially  corfect." — CAPTAIN  PORTER  FARLEY.] 

"  A  short  time  before  this,"  says  Lieutenant  Case  in  the 
preceding  paper,  "  General  Sykes  had  detached  Vincent's 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       303 

brigade  from  Barnes'  division  and  sent  it  to  occupy  the 
level  gap  south  of  Little  Round  Top  and  lying  between  it 
and  Big  Round  Top,  as  that  passage  offered  an  easy  route 
for  the  rebel  troops  to  the  rear  of  the  Union  left."  Con 
tinuing,  he  says : 

'  Thus  the  Forty-fourth  New  York,  Colonel  Cross,  of 
Vincent's  brigade  came  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Colonel 
O'Rorke's  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  and  Col 
onel  Garrard's  One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth  New  York 
in  one  of  the  most  critical  moments  of  the  Gettysburg  fight. 
So  the  New  York  men  of  the  Fifth  corps  made  a  most  gal 
lant  fight,  and  made  it  side  by  side.  And  as  General 
Weed's  death  left  Colonel  Garrard  in  command  of  one  bri 
gade,  so  did  Colonel  Vincent's  death  bring  Colonel  Cross 
in  command  of  the  other  brigade."  And  again: 

"  Death  has  come  to  most  of  the  leaders  of  the  One  Hun 
dred  and  Forty-sixth  —  Meade  and  Sykes  of  the  corps ; 
Warren,  Weed,  and  Garrard  of  the  brigade;  Jenkins  and 
Curran  of  the  regiment.  The  One  Hundred  and  Forty- 
sixth  had  other  ties  which  united  it  closely  to  General 
Wrarren,  as  one  of  his  brothers  was  quartermaster  of  the 
brigade  and  his  youngest  brother,  Robert  P.  Warren,  was 
a  captain  in  the  regiment,  and  he  too  is  dead." 

The  greater  part  of  the  foregoing  paper  may  be  found 
in  "  New  York  at  Gettysburg,"  having  been  read  at  the 
dedication  of  the  monument  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Forty-sixth  New  York  on  Little  Round  Top. 

The  paper  contains  much  that  is  true,  and  some  sur 
prising  errors.  The  statement  that  Sykes  detached  Vin 
cent's  brigade  and  sent  it  to  occupy  the  level  ground  south 
of  Little  Round  Top  is  an  error,  if  it  is  to  be  interpreted 
that  Sykes  in  person  detached  Vincent's  brigade.  If  it 
means  that  the  movement  was  made  by  Sykes'  order,  it 
confirms  rather  than  disproves  my  statement.  The  ground 
on  which  Vincent's  brigade  fought  is  not  level,  but  is  the 


304    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

southern  slope  of  Little  Round  Top.  Vincent  selected  his 
own  ground  without  direction  or  assistance.  There  is  no 
record  that  Sykes  saw  this  position  at  any  time  during  the 
battle. 

The  statement  that  the  three  New  York  regiments 
fought  side  by  side,  and  that  Colonel  Cross  of  the  Forty- 
fourth  New  York  succeeded  Colonel  Vincent  in  command 
of  the  brigade,  is  contrary  to  all  the  records.  The  Six 
teenth  Michigan  was  between  the  Forty-fourth  and  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  and  the  Ninety-first 
Pennsylvania  between  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  and 
One  Hundred  and  Forty-sixth  New  York.  Colonel  Cross 
commanded  a  brigade  of  Caldwell's  division,  Second  corps, 
and  was  killed  on  Birney's  line  near  the  wheat-field. 

In  his  account  of  the  movements  of  the  divisions  and 
brigades  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  he  sets  the  time  of  the  arrival 
of  General  Weed,  with  three  regiments  of  his  brigade  on 
Little  Round  Top,  an  hour  earlier  than  I  would. 

LETTERS  FROM  THE  COMTE  DE  PARIS  TO 
CAPTAIN  PORTER  FARLEY 

CHATEAU  D'Eu,  SEINE  INFERIEURE, 

December  22,  1877. 

DEAR  SIR:  I  thank  you  very  much  for  your  letter  and 
the  first  installment  of  your  account  of  the  campaigns  of  the 
One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  Volunteers,  which 
I  read  with  great  pleasure.  I  am  very  grateful  to  General 
Warren  for  having  suggested  to  you  to  send  me  that  ac 
count,  as  especially  the  next  part  concerning  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg  will  be  most  valuable  for  me  in  the  task  I  have 
undertaken  —  to  give  an  accurate  narrative  of  that  great 
fight.  I  have  read  already  a  great  deal  about  the  splendid 
achievements  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York 
on  Little  Round  Top,  but  an  account  by  a  member  of  that 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       305 

regiment  will  be  still  more  interesting   for  me.     Believe 
me,  Dear  Sir,  Yours  truly, 

L.  P.  ORLEANS, 

Comte  de  Paris. 

MADRID,  January  24,  1878. 

DEAR  SIR:  Your  letters  dated  December  7th  and  28th 
were  duly  received,  and  I  beg  you  to  accept  my  best  thanks 
for  the  very  interesting  and  valuable  information  which 
you  have  taken  the  trouble  to  supply  me  with  in  addition 
to  your  excellent  account  of  the  campaigns  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  Volunteers.  The  letter 
of  Mr.  Roebling  is  a  striking  and  unexpected  confirmation 
of  your  account,  although,  as  you  remark,  he  must  have 
made  a  mistake  about  the  position  of  the  remainder  of 
Weed's  Brigade  at  the  time  he  rode  from  Round  Top  to 
the  Peach  Orchard.  If  I  wrote  a  monograph  of  the  bat 
tle  of  Gettysburg  it  would  afford  me  great  pleasure  to  give 
a  detailed  account  of  all  the  incidents  which  are  so  graph 
ically  described  by  yourself  and  some  other  eye-witnesses. 
But  my  space  is  limited;  the  whole  battle  must  be  con 
densed  into  some  fifty  or  sixty  pages,  and  therefore  every 
sentence  must  be  reduced  to  its  minimum.  An  act  of  hero 
ism  worthy  of  the  admiration  of  the  world  must  be 
quoted  in  a  single  word.  The  documents  which  are  in 
my  hands  will  enable  me  to  give  to  each  word  a  real  value, 
but  I  feel  it  is  a  pity  not  to  be  able  to  do  more  out  of  these. 
Nevertheless,  my  task  is  already  large  enough  and  I  can 
not  alter  it.  Believe  me,  Dear  Sir, 

Yours  truly, 

L.  P.  ORLEANS, 

Address  Chateau  d'Eu,  Comte  de  Paris. 

Seine  Inferieure,  France. 


306    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

CHATEAU  o'Eu,  SEINE  INFERIEURE, 

April  20,  1878. 

DEAR  SIR:  I  thank  you  very  much  for  your  letter  of 
March  loth,  and  for  the  way  in  which  you  point  out  to  me 
some  serious  blemishes  in  the  translation  of  the  first  part  of 
my  history  of  the  Civil  War.  The  transposition  of  the 
word  "only,"  occurring  so  frequently,  must  be  especially 
annoying  to  the  reader.  The  translator,  Mr.  Tasistro,  is, 
I  believe,  a  Pole,  but  the  last  correction  ought  to  have  been 
made  by  a  native  hand. 

Having  declined  to  revise  the  translation  and  to  correct 
its  mistakes,  in  order  not  to  take  the  responsibility  of  every 
blunder  which  might  remain,  I  did  not  take  the  trouble  to 
read  more  than  a  few  pages.  But  any  blemish  pointed  out 
to  me  will  be  noted  down  for  the  next  edition  which  Messrs. 
Porter  &  Coates  may  issue.  Believe  me,  Dear  Sir, 

Yours  truly, 

L.  P.  ORLEANS, 

Comte  de  Paris. 


VII 
THE   WARREN   LETTERS 

THE  following  letters  from  General  G.  K.  Warren  to 
Captain  Porter  Farley  are  copied  from  the  original  manu 
script,  and  with  the  exception  of  part  of  the  letter  of  July 
13,  1872,  have  never  before  been  published.  This  1872 
letter,  omitting  some  paragraphs  at  the  beginning  and  at 
the  end,  appeared  as  a  note  to  General  Hunt's  paper  on  the 
Battle  of  Gettysburg  in  the  "  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the 
Civil  War."  It  is  also  printed  in  full  in  the  History  of  the 
One  Hundred  and  Fifty-fifth  Pennsylvania  Volunteers. 
The  letter  from  Lieutenant  Roebling  to  Captain  Farley  is 
inserted  in  this  collection,  because  it  is  referred  to  by 
General  Warren  in  subsequent  letters. 

These  letters  were  not  written  for  publication,  but  it  is 
from  just  such  letters  that  true  history  is  made.  It  seems 
eminently  proper  that  in  the  interest  of  the  truth  these  let 
ters  should  be  taken  from  the  files  where  they  have  slum 
bered  for  nearly  half  a  century  and  be  given  to  the  public. 
They  may  contradict  the  statements  of  some  historians  who 
have  attributed  to  General  Warren  deeds  which  he  never 
claimed  for  himself.  It  was  not  possible  for  any  one  man 
to  have  seen  all  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  The  most 
careful  writers  made  use  of  such  material  as  they  had,  to 
make  their  accounts  correspond  with  the  facts  as  nearly  as 
possible.  The  differences  between  the  various  accounts 
show  conclusively  that  some  of  them  must  be  erroneous. 
The  compiler  of  this  book  believes  that  the  writers  of  ac 
counts  which  he  feels  obliged  to  criticise  would,  in  the  light 
of  later  evidence,  admit  their  errors.  Some  passages  in 
General  Warren's  letters  show  the  way  in  which  these 

307 


308    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

differences  should  be  treated  by  fair-minded  persons.  This 
spirit  does  not  oblige  the  treatment  with  tolerance  of  de 
liberate  misrepresentation. 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  July  13,  1872. 
To  CAPTAIN  PORTER  FARLEY, 

One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  Regiment  New  York 
Volunteers,  Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Dear  Captain:  I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  8th 
inst.  in  relation  to  certain  events  at  Little  Round  Top  hill 
at  Gettysburg  on  July  2,  1863.  As  nearly  as  I  remember, 
"  the  light,  almost  yellow  haired  "  officer  that  rode  up  the 
hill  with  your  regiment,  was  Captain  Chauncey  B.  Reese, 
of  the  Engineer  Corps,  U.  S.  Army.  He  and  First  Lieu 
tenant  Ranald  S.  Mackenzie  of  the  Engineer  Corps,  U.  S. 
Army,  were  serving  with  me  at  the  time  and  it  was  like 
either  of  them  to  have  done  it.  Both  afterwards  were  pro 
moted  to  the  rank  of  Brigadier  General  for  gallant  and  ef 
ficient  services.  General  Reese  (then  Captain)  went  from 
Gettysburg  to  Charleston,  S.  C,  and  conducted  the  siege 
operations  by  which  Ft.  Wagner  was  reduced.  He  was 
one  of  the  very  best  officers  of  the  army.  He  died  of  yel 
low  fever  Sept.  22,  1870,  at  Mobile.  General  R.  S.  Mac 
kenzie  may  be  able  to  give  you  some  interesting  items 
about  the  matter,  and  you  can  address  him  care  of  the  Ad 
jutant  General  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Mr.  John  B.  Bachelder  has  collected  a  vast  deal  of  in 
formation  about  the  order  of  occurrences  at  Gettysburg 
and  you  should  write  to  him.  I  am  getting  engraved  a 
Map  of  the  Battlefield  of  Gettysburg,  under  direction  of 
General  Humphreys,  and  I  will  try  to  procure  you  transfer 
impressions  to  print  with  your  book,  if  you  desire  it. 

Your  second  question  I  will  now  answer  as  well  as  I 
can: 

Just  before  the  action  began  in  earnest  on  July  2nd,  I 


GENERAL    GOUVERNEUR    K.    WARREN 


l:dtiti(j    Page    308 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       309 

was  with  General  Meade  near  General  Sickles,  whose 
troops  seemed  very  badly  disposed  on  that  part  of  the  field. 
At  my  suggestion  General  Meade  sent  me  to  the  left  to  ex 
amine  the  condition  of  affairs  and  I  continued  on  till  I 
reached  Little  Round  Top.  There  were  no  troops  on  it 
and  it  was  used  as  a  Signal  Station.  I  saw  that  this  was 
the  key  of  the  whole  position  and  that  our  troops  in  the 
woods  in  front  of  it  could  not  see  the  ground  in  front  of 
them,  so  that  the  enemy  would  come  upon  them  before 
they  would  be  aware  of  it.  The  long  line  of  woods  on  the 
west  [east *]  side  of  the  Emmittsburg  road,  which  road  was 
along  a  ridge,  furnished  an  excellent  place  for  the  enemy 
to  form  out  of  sight,  so  I  requested  the  Captain  of  a  rifle 
battery  just  in  front  of  Little  Round  Top  to  fire  a  shot  into 
these  woods.  He  did  so,  and  as  the  shot  went  whistling 
through  the  air  the  sound  of  it  reached  the  enemies'  troops 
and  caused  every  one  to  look  in  the  direction  of  it.  The 
motion  revealed  to  me  the  glistening  of  gun  barrels  and 
bayonets  of  the  enemy's  line  of  battle  already  formed  and 
far  outflanking  the  position  of  any  of  our  troops,  so  that 
the  line  of  his  advance  from  his  right  to  Little  Round  Top 
was  unopposed.  I  have  been  particular  in  telling  this,  as 
the  discovery  was  intensely  thrilling  to  my  feelings  and  al 
most  appalling.  I  immediately  sent  a  hastily  written  dis 
patch  to  General  Meade  to  send  a  division  at  least  to  me, 
and  General  Meade  directed  the  Fifth  Army  Corps  to  take 
position  there.  The  battle  was  already  beginning  to  rage 
at  the  Peach  Orchard  and  before  a  single  man  reached 
Round  Top  the  whole  line  of  the  enemy  moved  on  us  in 
splendid  array,  shouting  in  the  most  confident  tones. 
While  I  was  still  all  alone  with  the  signal  officer,  the  mus- 

1 1  think  this  word  "  west "  is  a  slip  of  the  pen,  in  a  hastily  written 
letter,  for  the  word  "east."  The  shot  fired  by  Smith's  battery,  by 
Warren's  order,  was  directed  against  Hood's  division,  then  concealed 
in  the  woods  east  of  the  Emmittsburg  road,  between  it  and  Plum  Run, 
facing  the  Devil's  Den.— O.  W.  N. 


310    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

ket  balls  began  to  fly  around  us  and  he  was  about  to  fold 
up  his  flags  and  withdraw,  but  remained  at  my  request  and 
kept  waving  them  in  defiance.  The  first  arrival  I  remem 
ber  seeing  was  First  Lieutenant  Charles  E.  Hazlett,  of 
the  Fifth  Artillery,  with  his  battery  of  rifled  cannon.  He 
comprehended  the  situation  instantly  and  planted  a  gun  on 
the  summit  of  the  hill.  He  spoke  to  the  effect  that  though 
he  could  do  little  execution  on  the  enemy  with  his  guns, 
he  could  aid  in  giving  confidence  to  the  infantry,  and  that 
his  battery  was  of  no  consequence  whatever  compared  with 
holding  the  position.  He  stayed  there,  you  know,  till  he 
was  killed. 

I  did  not  see  Vincent's  brigade  come  up,  but  I  suppose  it 
was  about  this  time  they  did,  and  coming  up  behind  me 
through  the  wroods  and  taking  post  to  the  left  (their  proper 
place)  I  did  not  see  them.  The  full  force  of  the  enemy 
was  now  sweeping  the  Third  Army  Corps  from  its  unten 
able  position,  and  no  troops  nor  any  reinforcements  could 
maintain  it.  It  was  the  dreadful  misfortune  of  the  day 
that  any  reinforcements  went  to  that  line,  for  all  alike, 
Third  Corps,  Second  Corps,  and  Fifth  Corps,  were  driven 
from  it  with  great  loss.  The  earnest  appeals  for  support 
drew,  I  suppose,  the  troops  of  the  Fifth  Corps  away  from 
where  they  were  intended  (that  is,  Little  Round  Top)  out 
on  the  road  to  the  Peach  Orchard,  and  so  it  was  that  the 
Fifth  Corps  reached  the  vital  point  in  such  small  detach 
ments. 

As  soon  as  Hazlett  was  in  position  I  rode  down  to  the 
troops  going  out  on  the  Peach  Orchard  road,  and  fortu 
nately  met  my  old  brigade.  General  Weed,  commanding 
it,  had  already  passed  the  point  with  part  of  the  command 
and  I  took  the  responsibility  to  detach  Colonel  O'Rorke, 
the  head  of  whose  regiment  I  struck,  who,  on  hearing  my 
few  words  of  explanation  about  the  position,  moved  at 
once  to  the  hill  top.  I  sent  word  to  General  Weed,  or  Col- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       311 

onel  O'Rorke  did,  and  he  soon  joined  his  command  on  the 
hill.  I  did  not  see  General  Weed,  for  soon  after  Colonel 
O'Rorke  went  into  action  General  Sidney  Burbank  arrived 
with  his  brigade,  and  from  that  moment  I  felt  confident 
the  hill  could  be  held  by  us.  I  was  wounded  with  a  musket 
ball  while  talking  with  Lieutenant  Hazlett  on  the  hill,  but 
not  seriously,  and  seeing  the  position  saved  while  the  whole 
line  on  the  right  and  front  of  us  was  yielding  and  melting 
away  under  the  enemy's  fire  and  advance,  I  left  the  hill  to 
rejoin  General  Meade  near  the  center  of  the  field,  where 
another  crisis  was  at  hand.  This  was  finally  settled  in  our 
favor  by  the  determined  bravery  and  gallantry  of  the  troops 
posted  there. 

I  am  too  much  occupied  now  to  make  you  a  fair  copy 
of  this  letter,  but  hope  as  it  is  it  will  do  for  your  purpose. 

I  think  General  Vincent's  brigade  as  well  as  your  own, 
were,  as  you  say,  rushed  up  to  Little  Round  Top  after  the 
enemy  were  seen  making  for  that  point. 

Yours  respectfully, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  July  24,  1872. 
CAPTAIN  PORTER  FARLEY, 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Captain:  I  have  received  your  letter  of  July  21.  I 
wrote  my  letter  to  you  without  consulting  any  notes,  and 
I  may  not  have  given  the  strict  order  of  occurrences  in  it. 
If  you  should  wish  to  publish  anything  from  me,  I  wish 
you  would  let  me  have  time  to  revise  it  first.  It  was  a  time 
of  most  intense  importance,  while  we  were  on  Little 
Round  Top,  and  it  seems  to  me  I  can  see  everything  now 
with  the  same  distinctness,  as  if  it  were  again  before  my 
eyes.  Nevertheless,  some  important  matters  may  have  es 
caped  my  attention.  I  will  not  be  sure  that  Hazlett's  bat 
tery  got  up  before  I  went  down  to  Colonel  O'Rorke.  It 


312    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

may  be  that  it  was  afterward,  and  that  he,  Hazlett,  passed 
you,  or  it  may  be  that  only  a  section  of  the  battery  got 
there  first.  There  was  not  room  for  more  than  two  can 
non  on  the  hill  top,  and  I  and  some  stragglers  from  the 
Third  Corps  took  hold  of  the  gun  carriage  of  one  gun  and 
lifted  it  bodily  over  the  rocks  where  it  was  caught  by  a 
projecting  piece  on  the  summit.  If  I  detached  Vincent's 
brigade  I  don't  recollect  it.  General  Barnes'  report  to 
General  Sykes  I  think  says  something  of  the  sort  was  done 
by  me,  which  was  Swinton's  authority.  Perhaps  it  was 
Reese  or  Mackenzie  acting  under  my  orders  who  did  it. 
In  fact,  the  whole  Fifth  Corps,  I  believe,  was  ordered  to 
join  me,  and  it  was  only  by  a  miscomprehension  of  the  sit 
uation  or  of  orders,  that  any  went  to  any  other  place. 
The  authority  I  assumed  was  on  the  responsibility  of  my 
judgment,  and  I  would  not  have  hesitated  to  take  any 
troops  I  could  get  hold  of,  to  maintain  ourselves  on  the 
hill.  Yours  respectfully, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

NEWPORT,  R.  L,  Oct.  12,  1877. 
CAPTAIN  PORTER  FARLEY, 

Dear  Sir:  I  have  received  yours  of  the  8th  inst.  I 
shall  be  very  glad  to  receive  the  publications  you  proffer, 
and  hope  there  will  be  no  delay  in  the  publication.  I  am 
specially  interested  about  the  fight  at  Gettysburg  on  July 
2nd  and  the  death  of  O'Rorke.  If  I  had  that  part  now 
I  would  at  once  send  it  to  the  Comte  de  Paris  at  Chateau 
d'Eu,  Seine  Inferieure,  France.  He  is  at  present  writing 
the  account  of  the  battle  for  his  history,  and  I  know  he  will 
give  O'Rorke  and  your  regiment  the  high  credit  they  won 
there.  You  can  send  anything  to  him  also,  to  the  care  of 
Theodore  Lyman,  Brookline,  Mass. 

Yours  very  truly, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG      313 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  October  17,  1877. 
CAPTAIN  PORTER  FARLEY, 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Dear  Friend:  I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  I5th 
and  am  glad  you  are  going  to  send  your  account  to  the 
Comte  de  Paris.  It  will,  I  think,  be  in  good  season  if  you 
can  send  it  before  long. 

I  am  very  much  interested  in  your  two  articles  (which  I 
have  received)  of  the  history  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Fortieth  New  York  Volunteers.  I  shall  grow  very  im 
patient  for  it  from  week  to  week.  Such  accounts  faith 
fully  written  are  the  most  important  contributions  to  his 
tory.  I  remember  Snicker's  Gap  that  first  night  well 
enough,  and  my  bones  ached  again  with  sympathetic  cold, 
as  they  did  at  that  time,  in  reading  your  account  of  it. 

Yours  truly, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

NEWPORT,  R.  L,  October  23,  1877. 
CAPTAIN  PORTER  FARLEY, 

No.  9  Rochester  Savings  Bank. 

Dear  Friend:  I  have  received  yours  of  the  2ist  inst. 
and  the  inclosure  to  the  Comte  de  Paris.  I  venture  to  hold 
it  till  I  can  write  to  you  about  the  order  of  march.  You 
say,  "  When  we  reached  the  beginning  of  the  rising  ground 
at  the  northern  extremity  of  Little  Round  Top,  we  being 
the  rear  regiment  of  our  brigade,  and  our  brigade  the  rear 
brigade  of  the  division,  General  Warren,"  etc.  This  or 
der  of  movement  does  not  agree  with  my  impression,  nor 
with  that  of  my  brother,  who  was  there  and  on  General 
Weed's  staff.  I  am  making  further  inquiries  about  it. 
Are  you  sure  of  what  you  say,  or  do  you  derive  it  from 
someone  else? 

I  do  not  know  who  was  Swinton's  informant,  in  par- 


314    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

ticulars,  if  he  had  one.  I  did  not  furnish  him  any  detailed 
information,  first,  because  it  would  have  been  necessarily 
too  personal,  and  I  did  not  know  what  the  greater  part  of 
the  Fifth  Corps  did;  nor  have  I  seen  any  of  the  detailed 
official  reports.  You  may  be  sure  if  I  had  given  the  ac 
count  of  my  taking  the  responsibility  of  detaching  troops 
and  hurrying  them  at  the  last  moment  to  the  hill  top,  I 
should  have  said  it  was  O'Rorke  and  his  regiment  that  I 
detached.  My  recollections  agree  exactly  with  yours  as  to 
that  matter  after  I  met  O'Rorke.  General  Sykes  had  or 
dered  Vincent's  brigade  up,  at  my  urgent  request  made 
some  time  before,  but  I  did  not  see  it  come  up,  as  it  must 
have  passed  behind  me  in  the  woods.  But  then  I  think 
this  brigade  did  essential  service  in  holding  the  hill,  be 
cause  the  troops  they  met  and  beat  back  would  otherwise 
have  turned  the  position. 

I  don't  think  Swinton's  account  does  justice  to  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York  and  Weed's  brigade;  al 
though  I  am  willing  to  award  all  the  praise  to  the  brigade 
of  Vincent  that  has  been  given  it.  O'Rorke  and  Hazlett, 
however,  I  saw,  and  I  know  they  deserve  all  the  praise  that 
could  be  given  them.  I  have  so  written  to  the  Comte  de 
Paris.  He  will  not  fail  to  divide  the  honors  more  evenly 
I  am  sure. 

The  battery  that  I  directed  to  fire,  which  you  inquire  fur 
ther  about,  was  a  battery  of  the  Third  Corps,  Smith's 
Fourth  New  York,  I  believe,  on  Bachelder's  map  of  posi 
tions.  The  word  "  requested  "  used  by  me  seems  to  have 
misled  you.  I  sent  word  by  an  orderly,  I  think,  written 
on  a  slip  of  paper. 

Your  questions : 

ist.  I  was  Chief  Engineer  at  Gettysburg.  General 
Meade  offered  me  the  place  of  Chief  of  Staff,  but  I  was 
not  suited  with  it.  It  always  kept  a  man  away  from  the 
front  in  battle  and  the  other  took  him  there.  My  ex- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG      315 

perience  that  was  valuable,  was  in  the  fighting  I  had  seen 
or  taken  part  in. 

2nd.  The  corps  badge  system  originated  with  General 
Kearney,  who  had  his  men  tuck  a  little  piece  of  red  flan 
nel  on  their  hats,  cut  diamond  shape.  When  Hooker  came 
in  command  he,  through  Butterfield,  his  Chief  of  Staff, 
took  up  the  idea  of  making  it  general.  I  was  asked,  as  I 
had  many  draughtsmen  under  me,  to  get  up  specimens  of 
badges.  I  am  not  sure  that  some  part  of  the  Fifth  Army 
Corps  had  not  already  adopted  the  Maltese  Cross. 

I  made  a  lot  of  rude  designs  for  badges,  of  simple  forms, 
from  which  those  adopted  were  selected.  I  have  the  orig 
inals  yet.  Such  credit  as  attaches  to  the  matter  belongs  to 
General  Hooker  and  General  Butterfield. 

Swinton,  I  think,  is  in  New  York  City.  I  have  not  seen 
him  for  many  years  nor  written  to  him.  Probably  the 
editor  of  the  New  York  Times  would  be  a  good  address  to 
send  a  letter  to  him  to  the  care  of. 

I  do  not  think  the  Comte  de  Paris  will  get  through  his 
history  of  Gettysburg  very  soon.  I  learn  he  is  carefully 
investigating  points  in  all  directions,  so  there  will  be  time 
to  give  him  your  account  with  all  the  distinctness  that  is 
attainable.  Yours  truly, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

P.  S. —  When  the  point  I  have  raised  is  settled  I  will 
send  your  letter  to  the  Army  and  Navy  Journal. — G.  K.  W. 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  October  26,  1877. 
CAPTAIN  PORTER  FARLEY, 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Dear  Captain:  I  have  a  letter  from  Bachelder  which 
states  that  Weed's  brigade  was  leading,  as  shown  by  his 
notes  made  in  the  winter  following,  but  that  your  regiment 
was  in  rear  of  the  brigade.  It  is  not  an  important  matter 
in  itself,  but  becomes  interesting  as  illustrative  of  the  dif- 


3i6    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

ferent  impressions  preserved  by  different  persons,  of  oc 
currences  in  exciting  moments  of  battles,  when  there  could 
be  no  motive  for  differing.  Have  you  consulted  official 
reports  for  your  order  of  march? 

Yours  truly, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  October  31,  1877. 
DOCTOR  PORTER  FARLEY, 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Dear  Friend:  I  have  received  this  morning  yours  of 
the  26th,  and  at  the  same  time  one  from  Captain  Marvin, 
who  was,  as  you  know,  Adjutant  of  the  Brigade.  He  wrote 
to  me :  "I  recollect  the  circumstances  of  our  brigade's  ap 
proach  to  Gettysburg.  General  Weed  and  one  of  his 
staff  had  gone  ahead  towards  Sickles'  Corps  leaving  orders 
with  me  to  have  the  brigade  follow  him.  The  One  Hun 
dred  and  Fortieth  New  York  Volunteers  was  in  front  with 
Colonel  O'Rorke  in  charge  of  the  brigade,  Ninety-first 
Pennsylvania  Volunteers  next,  and  One  Hundred  and 
Forty-sixth  New  York  and  One  Hundred  and  Fifty-fifth 
Pennsylvania.  I  well  remember  your  riding  rapidly  down 
from  Little  Round  Top  as  we  approached  it  and  inquiring 
of  us  what  troops  ours  were  and  where  General  Weed  was. 
You  assumed  the  responsibility  of  taking  away  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York.  I  went  with  the  others 
and  met  General  Weed,"  etc. 

My  brother  was  the  staff  officer  that  went  with  General 
Weed,  and  his  recollection  is  the  same  as  Marvin's.  Mar 
vin  kept  a  journal.  This  recollection  corresponds  exactly 
with  mine. 

In  view  of  all  this,  do  you  think  still  that  you  were  the 
rear  regiment  of  the  brigade?  I  was  in  such  anxiety  to 
get  troops  that  it  seems  to  me  impossible  that  I  would  have 
allowed  a  regiment  even  to  pass  me. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       317 

I  would  be  very  glad  to  get  letters  such  as  you  refer  to, 
when  you  have  time  to  make  copies. 

I  note  what  you  say  about  your  letter  to  the  Comte,  only 
waiting  to  hear  from  you  about  this  final  route  of  order 
of  march.  Yours  truly, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

P.  S. —  I  sent  the  Gettysburg  map  to  you  from  this  place, 
but  it  is  well  to  acknowledge  its  receipt  to  the  Chief  of 
Engineers  U.  S.  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. 

[Marvin  is  all  wrong  in  stating  that  the  One  Hundred 
and  Fortieth  Regiment  led  the  brigade,  and  that  O'Rorke 
was  in  temporary  command  of  the  same.  On  the  face  of 
it  he  is  mistaken.  If  O'Rorke  had  been  in  command  he 
would  have  been  at  the  head  of  the  brigade  and  would  conse 
quently  have  gone  out  to  or  near  the  Trostle  House ;  whereas 
he  and  his  regiment  never  crossed  the  northern  end  of  Lit 
tle  Round  Top  by  the  roadway,  but  were  deflected  from  it 
by  Warren  in  person  (to  my  certain  knowledge),  who  then 
followed  the  balance  of  the  brigade  till  he  reached  its  head 
and  halted  it.  Warren  left  Lieutenant  Roebling  with  us, 
who  accompanied  our  regiment  to  the  crest  at  southern  end 
of  Little  Round  Top.  See  Lieutenant  Roebling's  letter.1 
See  statement  by  Lieutenant  A.  P.  Case,  of  One  Hundred 
and  Forty-sixth  New  York.2  If  O'Rorke  had  been  at  the 
head  of  the  brigade,  and  in  command  of  it,  would  Warren, 
when  he  met  him  as  he  did  on  the  eastern  slope,  have  ever 
allowed  the  balance  of  the  brigade  to  pass  out  in  the  road  to 
the  Trostle  House? — PORTER  FARLEY.] 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  November  17,  1877. 
DOCTOR  PORTER  FARLEY, 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Dear    Friend:     Yours    of    the    8th    inst.    was    received 
during  my  absence.     I  hope  my  "  query  "  did  not  disturb 
1  P.  330  infra.  2  P.  296-303. 


3i8    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

your  energies  in  the  political  battle  you  were  engaged  in, 
which  must  have  been  a  very  close  contest,  judging  by  the 
small  margin  of  victory  which  you  report.  Your  county 
must  be  a  splendid  field  for  fair  play,  with  parties  so  evenly 
balanced. 

I  think  your  remarks  about  Marvin's  statement  are 
reasonable,  but  of  course  not  conclusive.  According  to  my 
ideas,  Marvin's  expression,  "  leaving  O'Rorke  in  charge," 
expresses  more  than  he  meant.  You  know  a  General  often 
leaves  his  command  and  goes  ahead  to  learn  about  the  use 
he  is  to  make  of  his  command,  leaving  some  staff  officer 
like  Marvin  to  represent  him,  with  the  instruction  that  if 
any  important  emergency  arises  in  his  absence,  to  con 
sider  the  next  ranking  officer  in  command.  Such  an  idea 
of  "  in  charge  "  might  exist  in  Marvin's  mind  at  the  time 
without  his  communicating  it  to  Colonel  O'Rorke,  and  even 
if  he  did  communicate  it  it  was  of  such  a  temporary  nature 
that  O'Rorke  would  not  disarrange  his  regimental  organiza 
tion  on  account  of  it,  preferring,  as  I  always  did,  to  hold 
the  double  charge  until  permanently  assigned  to  the  higher. 

There  is  no  reliance,  however,  to  be  placed  on  our  mem 
ories,  when  their  record  is  made  to  tally  with  our  reason, 
based  upon  collateral  experience;  for  instance,  as  when  I 
wrote  to  you,  as  you  quote,  that  my  anxiety  was  too  great 
for  me  to  have  allowed  any  troops  to  pass  me.  That  is 
my  impression  now,  and  I  was  filled  with  restless  activity 
at  that  time,  so  that  I  think  no  accidents  of  ground  would 
have  prevented  my  seeing,  as  your  last  letter  suggests. 

Let  all  those  things  go.  My  memory  is  supported  by 
Marvin's  statement  and  my  brother's,  both  on  Weed's 
staff.  Your  memory  is  sustained  by  General  Garrard's 
and  Mr.  Bachelder's  notes,  so  I  see  no  reason  why  you 
should  not  hold  to  your  own  impressions,  but  give  them 
the  weight  of  the  doubt  which  other  memories  cause.  That 
is  what  I  do.  There  is  no  special  importance  attached  to 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       319 

the  matter,  that  I  know  of,  and  it  is  a  curious  instance  of 
the  uncertainties  of  memory,  for  all  were  actors  in  the 
scene,  and  all  truthful  and  disinterested. 

General  Garrard  thinks  I  met  General  Weed,  and  that  he 
consented  to  let  O'Rorke's  regiment  go.  But  I  did  not 
meet  Weed,  I  am  sure.  And  to  back  that  up  with  an  in 
ference  which  I  feel  it  is  due  to  General  Weed  to  use,  I  am 
sure  that  if  I  had  met  him  he  would  have  taken  his  whole 
brigade  at  once  where  I  asked  him.  I  have  stood  by  him  in 
trying  places  in  battle,  so  that  I  know  he  would  have  done 
it  at  once,  just  as  O'Rorke  did,  and  just  as  I  think  General 
Garrard  would  have  done,  or  any  other  man  who  knew  me 
as  well  as  they  did. 

I  cannot  tell  you  how  grieved  I  was  at  O'Rorke's  death. 
My  earnest  appeal  appreciated  and  responded  to  was  his 
knell.  I  would  have  died  to  save  him  if  I  could.  If  any 
honor  attaches  to  what  I  did,  it  should  all  be  given  to  him, 
for  what  I  did  would  have  been  nothing  but  for  him. 

Yours  truly, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  November  20,  1877. 
CAPTAIN  PORTER  FARLEY, 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Dear  Friend:  I  have  to-day  received  galley  proofs  of 
Article  IX,  Gettysburg.  I  admire  it  very  much  and  sug 
gest  several  minor  changes,  which  I  make  on  the  enclosed 
copy. 

First:  I  correct  the  spelling  of  O'Rorke's  name.  It  is 
thus  on  all  the  army  registers. 

Then,  in  "  two  "  I  have  changed  "  pell-mell  "  to  "  rap 
idly."  You  can  make  it  "  excitedly,"  "  furiously,"  or  any 
other  word  you  think  proper;  but  not  that. 

Then,  I  have  struck  out  six  lines  before  the  quotation 
from  my  letter,  the  words,  "  the  discovery  he  had  just 


320    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

made  was  the."  I  wish  this  done  because  many  think  I  had 
just  found  the  importance  of  the  position,  whereas  I  had 
been  there  and  perceived  it  before  it  was  attacked,  as  my 
letter  shows. 

Next,  I  have  altered  and  a  little  shortened  the  quotation 
you  made  from  my  letter.  I  wrote  that  in  a  hurry,  but  I 
have  lately  looked  over  all  the  evidence  I  have  and  wish  in 
it  now,  not  to  assert  anything  positively  about  points  in 
which  I  differ  from  you.  The  point  of  difference  is  not 
great,  and  the  change  enables  you  to  make  your  own  state 
ment  without  the  necessity  of  reconciling  an  apparent  in 
consistency  between  us.  I  have  thus  struck  out  your  ex 
planation  too.  All  this  shortens  and  strengthens  your  ar 
ticles. 

Immediately  after  the  quotation  I  strike  out  the  word 
"  just "  again. 

In  the  last  paragraph  I  strike  out  "  entirely  unknown 
to  Warren,"  which  may  be  a  little  too  strong,  and  it  does  not 
weaken  your  narration  to  do  so. 

In  the  last  paragraph  of  "  four "  I  query  the  word 
"  poor."  *  It  is  often  used  in  the  sense  you  use  it,  but  as  he 
was  a  hero  "  mart  dans  le  champ  de  bataille,"  you  better 
use  a  more  exalted  term  of  qualification.  "  Dulce  et  de 
corum  est  pro  patria."  Dickens  makes  little  Paul  Dombey 
wonder  why  they  called  him  "  poor  little  Dombey,"  and 
he  felt  hurt  at  the  word  even  as  a  term  of  endearment. 

Your  article  is  very  stirring  and  I  don't  think  it  will  be 
injured  by  the  changes  I  suggest. 

Yours  truly, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

P.  S. —  I  think  his  classmates  always  called  him  Paddy 
O'Rorke.  He  was  a  man  of  noble  character,  and  had  noth 
ing  of  the  wild  Irishman  about  him. — G.  K.  W. 

Please  send  me  another  proof. — G.  K.  W. 

[This  letter  was  written  commenting  on,  criticising,  and 
1 1  had  used  the  phrase  "  poor  O'Rorke."— P.  F. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       321 

correcting  my  first  draft  of  the  account  of  our  going  up 
on  to  Little  Round  Top.  I  sent  him  first  galley  proof,  and 
after  receiving  this  letter  I  sent  him  a  corrected  proof,  and 
the  article  was  not  printed  until  after  I  got  that  back.  So 
my  story  had  Warren's  complete  approval,  and  he  ordered 
one  hundred  and  fifty  copies  of  it  for  distribution  among 
officers  of  the  Engineer  corps. — P.  F.] 

(O'Rorke's  Death) 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  November  23,   1877. 
CAPTAIN  PORTER  FARLEY, 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Dear  Friend:  I  have  added  a  phrase  accidentally  left 
off  in  my  change  of  my  letter,  and  struck  out  an  unneces 
sary  "  was,"  so  that  I  think  it  now  reads  straight.  The 
copy  I  kept  wras  arranged  this  way. 

I  am  such  a  poor  writer  myself  that  no  one  should  feel 
hurt  at  my  effort  to  call  attention  to  the  propriety  of  using 
certain  words  in  certain  places.  On  this  particular  matter 
of  O'Rorke's  death  I  feel  perhaps  too  much  to  be  a  good 
judge  of  the  proper  use  of  words.  To  me  he  was  not 
poor,  he  was  glorious.  What  was  dear,  became  heroic. 
I  love  to  think  of  him  as  Carthon  in  Ossian,  when  he  ex 
claims,  "  Carthon  dies  unknown."  "  But  thou  shalt  not 
die  unknown,"  replied  the  king  of  woody  Morven ;  "  my 
bards  are  many,  O  Carthon!  their  songs  descend  to  future 
times.  The  children  of  years  to  come  shall  hear  the  fame 
of  Carthon." — "  The  beam  of  Heaven  delights  to  shine  on 
the  grave  of  Carthon."  "  Happy  are  they  who  die  in  their 
youth  when  their  renown  is  around  them." 

The  subject  you  are  treating  of  is,  I  consider,  a  very 
grand  one ;  the  simplest  words  of  truth  make  it  exalting. 
It  requires  some  art  in  the  narrator  to  bring  us  back  to 
the  consideration  of  the  ordinary  affairs  of  the  campaign. 


322    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

Your  last  paragraph  I  think  does  this  very  handsomely, 
and  is  not  bad  just  as  it  stands.  The  last  three  lines  I 
think  you  may  improve.  I  have  indicated  some  changes 
for  your  consideration,  although  I  am  by  no  means  certain 
that  they  would  be  improvements,  and  would  not  have  done 
it  if  you  had  not  requested  it.  I  think  the  simple  words 
"  last  look  "  will  be  understood  by  everyone  to  convey  more 
than  can  be  expressed.  Poetry  is  full  of  illustrations  of  it. 

"  Slowly  and  sadly  we  laid  him  down 
On  the  field  of  his  fame,   fresh  and  gory,"  etc. 

"  He  who  hath  bent  him'  o'er  the  dead 
E'er  yet  the  day  of  death  has  fled 

Before   decay's   effacing  fingers 
j  Have  swept  the  lines   where  beauty  lingers, 

The    first,    last    look    by    death    revealed." 

Yours  truly, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

P.  S.—  I  don't  like  the  phrase  "  whiff  of  a  bullet  "  as 
you  use  it.  It  was  the  bullet  itself,  and  not  the  whiff,  that 
was  fatal.  You  see  Shakespeare's  use  of  it  was  to  denote 
the  feebleness  of  the  "  unnerved  father."  Hamlet,  act  n, 
scene  u.  You  and  I  treat  the  subject  differently.  I 
would  grieve  as  you  do,  but  I  would  make  the  last  act 
round  up  a  perfect  life.  A  great  achievement  by  the  great 
est  sacrifice.  As  the  biographer  of  Nelson  says,  "  If  the 
phaeton  and  horses  of  fire  had  been  designed  for  his  trans 
lation,  he  could  not  have  departed  in  a  brighter  blaze  of 
glory."—  G.  K.  W. 

NEWPORT,  R.  L,  November  24,  1877. 
DOCTOR  PORTER  FARLEY, 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 
Dear  Doctor:    Your  letter  card  of  the  22nd  is  just  re- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       323 

ceived.  I  think  there  is  no  objection  to  putting  the  matter 
as  you  suggest.  I  have  sent  you  answers  to  all  your  ref 
erences  heretofore,  and  if  they  do  not  accord  with  your 
ideas,  use  your  judgment  as  to  what  to  do,  for  I  think  it 
will  be  quite  as  good. 

Be  careful  in  statements  of  facts,  for  I  see  Longstreet, 
like  everyone  in  the  South,  always  gets  whipped  with  over 
whelming  numbers,  according  to  his  own  statement,  which 
I  know  were  quite  as  often  just  the  reverse. 

Yours  truly, 

G.   K.   WARREN. 

NEWPORT,  R.  L,  November  28,   1877. 
DOCTOR  PORTER  FARLEY, 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Dear  Friend:  I  have  read  your  revised  proof,  and 
think  it  very  good  indeed. 

I  would  like  to  have  you  strike  out  the  words  "  with  part 
of  the  command  "  in  my  letter.  It  may  have  been  so,  but 
that  is  not  according  to  the  best  of  my  recollection  and  be 
lief.  I  would  rather  leave  that  an  open  question.  My  let 
ter  to  you  was  written  in  great  haste,  without  careful  think 
ing  over  minute  points,  to  give  you  a  general  idea  of  the 
situation  as  I  comprehended  it,  and  in  which  your  regiment 
took  such  an  important  part.  You  must  have  overlooked 
my  striking  these  words  out  before,  or  else  I  did  not  do 
what  I  meant  to.  Yours  truly, 

G.   K.  WARREN. 

P.  S. —  Order  for  me  one  hundred  and  fifty  copies  of 
the  papers  containing  No.  IX.  I  want  to  send  one  to  every 
officer  of  Engineers. — G.  K.  W. 

NEWPORT,  R.  L,  December  2,  1877. 
Dear  Friend:     I   have  received  yours  of  the  3Oth,  and 
note  your  kind  offer  to  mail  the  papers   for  me,   which 


324    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

would  save  some  trouble  and  expense.  But  I  want  to  send 
them  in  bulk  to  Washington,  D.  C,  to  be  sent  out  from 
there.  By  doing  this  each  officer  will  see  that  they  are  sent 
to  all,  and  may  take  more  special  notice  of  them  than  if 
sent  like  newspapers  ordinarily  are.  Moreover,  I  will 
write  a  short  note  and  have  it  printed  to  accompany  them. 

If  I  can  get  time  I  shall  soon  write  up  my  report  of  Get 
tysburg,  and  I  shall  do  all  I  can  to  see  that  such  a  noble 
sacrifice  as  O'Rorke  made  is  appreciated  and  his  name  hon 
ored. 

What  has  ever  been  done  about  his  memory?  Where  is 
he  buried?  What  kind  of  stone  marks  the  spot?  Where 
are  his  family?  How  many  children  did  he  leave?  What 
circumstances  are  they  in?  I  would  like  to  know  all  about 
them. 

Please  send  the  one  hundred  and  fifty  papers  by  ex 
press,  to  William  J.  Warren,  Esq.,  Office  of  Chief  of  En 
gineers  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C.,  and  send  me  the  bill 
for  expenses,  including  expressage  prepaid. 

Yours  truly, 

G.   K.  WARREN. 

NEWPORT,  R.  L,  December  5,  1877. 

Dear  Friend:  Article  IX  came  to-day,  and  I  have 
sent  a  copy  to  the  Comte  de  Paris.  I  thought  perhaps  you 
would  like  your  own  letter  to  go  somewhat  modified,  so  I 
return  it  to  you.  I  believe  I  told  you  Swinton  got  his  ac 
count  very  much  from  Bachelder,  and  he  got  it  from  Col 
onel  Rice  (afterwards  General  and  killed  at  Spottsylvania 
in  May,  1864),  and  from  General  Chamberlain. 

I  send  you  back  also  the  reserved  copy  I  had  of  the  first 
proof,  of  which  you  sent  me  two. 

Yours  truly, 

G.   K.  WARREN. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       325 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  December  6,  1877. 
DOCTOR  FARLEY, 

Dear  Friend:  I  have  just  received  your  interesting 
letter  giving  me  an  account  of  the  O'Rorkes.  I  remember 
Ryan  well. 

I  enclose  you  a  check  for  $5.50  for  the  papers. 

In  regard  to  the  question  you  raise  in  the  attached  slip, 
I  know  nothing.  I  heard  something  of  it  at  the  time,  but 
did  not  heed  it.  My  brother  recollects  no  special  failure 
wait  on  the  occasion.  He  was  on  his  staff. 

O'Rorke  was  about  twenty-one  years  old  when  he  en 
tered  the  Military  Academy,  twenty-five  years  old  when  he 
graduated  in  1861.  Twenty-seven  years  old  when  he  died 
at  Gettysburg. 

I  was  thirty-three  years,  six  months  old  at  that  time. 

Yours  truly, 

G.   K.  WARREN. 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  December  16,   1877. 

Dear  Friend:  I  have  received  yours  of  the  I4th,  and 
enclosed  letter  from  Colonel  Roebling.1  If  I  said  the  staff 
officer  was  Captain  Reese,  it  was  only  a  surmise,  for  I  have 
no  personal  recollection.  I  had  Reese,  Mackenzie,  and 
Roebling  with  me  that  day  at  different  times,  and  they  were 
all  such  bright,  gallant  men,  proved  on  hundreds  of  trying 
occasions,  that  I  might  not  recollect  the  special  service  of 
either  of  them.  Roebling,  however,  was  on  my  staff,  and 
I  think  performed  more  able  and  brave  service  than  any 
one  I  knew. 

It  is  singular  that  you  should  have  received  this  infor 
mation  and  sent  it  to  me,  for  he  is  my  brother-in-law,  and  I 
see  him  quite  frequently,  and  this  letter  is  written  by  my 
sister  at  his  dictation.  When  we  are  together  we  never 
talk  about  the  war,  because  it  is  an  exciting  subject.  Col 
onel  Roebling's  health  was  very  much  injured  by  the  air 
1  Colonel  Roebling's  letter  is  reproduced  on  p.  330  infra. 


326    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

pressure  in  the  caissons  of  the  Brooklyn  Bridge,  and  it  re 
quires  all  his  strength  to  keep  up  with  the  management  of 
the  great  bridge  he  now  has  charge  of.  So  all  of  us  spare 
him  from  every  exciting  topic  in  conversation.  He  has  a 
wonderful  mind  and  memory,  and  as  he  says,  "  a  slight  hint 
sometimes  brings  up  a  whole  chain  of  forgotten  events." 

I  sent  my  sister  a  copy  of  your  article,  and  they  have 
very  properly  sent  their  acknowledgments  of  its  merits  to 
you. 

I  am  very  glad  this  matter  has  come  out  as  it  has,  because 
it  makes  Roebling's  recollections  and  mine  free  from  any 
charges  of  collusion.  Colonel  Roebling  married  my  sister 
in  January,  1865. 

I  wish  Colonel  Roebling  would  write  a  narrative  of  the 
war,  and  perhaps  when  the  bridge  is  finished  he  may  do  so. 
That  bridge  itself  is  as  sad  as  a  battlefield  to  us.  Colonel 
Roebling's  father  lost  his  life  in  beginning  it,  and  he  is 
wearing  himself  out  in  finishing  it,  and  all  for  the  glory  of 
the  thing,  for  he  has  plenty  of  means  and  money,  and  bril 
liant  education,  so  that  "  knowledge  with  her  ample  page 
rich  with  the  spoils  of  time  "  is  all  unfolded  to  him. 

I  am  very  glad  you  received  his  letter,  which  I  return  to 
you.  Yours  truly, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

P.  S. — Are  you  not  going  to  publish  your  articles  in  book 
form?— G.  K.  W. 

(Relating  to  Battle  of  the  Wilderness) 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  December  22,  1877. 
DOCTOR  FARLEY, 

Dear  Friend:  I  have  yours  of  the  2Oth.  I  cannot  re 
call  the  number  or  designation  of  the  section  of  the  battery 
you  refer  to,  nor  the  name  of  the  officer  in  command  of  it. 
I  well  remember,  however,  that  he  was  a  gallant,  brave 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG      327 

fellow.  I  am  very  anxious  to  get  time  to  write  an  account 
of  this  battle,  which  is  so  little  understood  and  is  so  con 
fused.  I  do  not  know  whether  you  propose  to  comment  on 
the  matter  or  not,  but  I  will  tell  you  that  it  was  my  order 
that  these  two  pieces  should  accompany  the  attacking  force. 
Under  orders  I  had  moved  every  man  that  was  up,  in  the 
assault,  and  I  thought  that  when  the  enemy's  line  was  taken 
these  guns  would  give  steadiness  to  the  men  by  its  firing, 
which  would  be  heard  all  along  it,  and  have  a  demoralizing 
effect  upon  the  enemy.  If  General  Grant  would  only  have 
accepted  my  suggestion  to  let  me  deploy  my  whole  corps, 
and  wait  till  Sedgwick  with  one  division  could  reach  and 
assault  the  enemy's  left  flank,  towards  which  I  knew  he  was 
moving,  then  my  advance  would  certainly,  I  think,  have 
been  a  great  success,  and  Swell's  corps  alone  and  unsup 
ported  must  have  been  driven  from  the  field.  Hill's  corps 
could  then  have  been  beaten  in  its  isolated  position.  I  saw 
that,  that  day,  and  I  was  so  astonished  at  General  Lee's 
temerity  in  offering  us  such  an  opportunity.  I  think  it  is 
wrong  to  say  the  Wilderness  did  not  allow  of  such  grand 
tactics.  We  had  become  familiar  with  it  by  that  time  —  at 
least  I  had.  But  all  my  suggestions  were  received  with 
contumely  and  scorn  that  was  positively  insulting. 

The  guns  were  left  on  the  road  under  the  fire  of  both 
lines,  so  that  neither  could  draw  them  off,  and  when  we 
left  the  position  we  abandoned  them.  The  officer  in  com 
mand,  I  think,  was  killed. 

Write  to  General  H.  J.  Hunt,  U.  S.  Army,  Charleston, 
S.  C,  for  any  information  about  the  artillery.  It  is  be 
cause  I  knew  he  kept  so  exact  an  account  of  everything  re 
lating  to  artillery  that  I  have  not  more  notes  about  it. 

My  sister,  Mrs.  Roebling,  has  sent  me  your  letter  to  Col- 
enel  R.,  so  that  that  cycle  of  correspondence  seems  com 
plete.  She  says  her  first  impression  of  Roebling  was  the 
same  as  yours,  but  singularly  he  never  made  that  impres- 


328    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

sion  upon  me.  In  fact,  I  got  my  impressions  of  men  in  the 
war  very  much  from  what  they  did  and  not  from  personal 
appearance.  Every  now  and  then  I  meet  some  small-sized, 
modest  fellow  in  citizen's  clothes,  that  I  knew  only  on 
horseback  in  the  field,  where  he  appeared  to  me  almost  like 
a  Centaur,  and  grand  in  physical  strength. 

Yours  truly, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  January  16,  1878. 
DOCTOR  FARLEY, 

Dear  Friend:  I  write  to  thank  you  for  your  considerate 
mention  of  me  at  Mine  Run.  I  believe  you  spoke  the  gen 
eral  sentiment  of  the  army  about  that  matter.  I  never  at 
tend  an  army  gathering  that  numbers  of  officers  and  men 
do  not  come  forward  and  personally  thank  me  for  taking 
the  stand  I  then  did. 

I  have  sent  your  Gettysburg  number  around,  and  one  of 
ficer  of  Engineers  writes  me :  "  O'Rorke  was  two  years  my 
junior  at  West  Point,  but  I  remember  him  as  a  '  pleb ' 
[name  for  new  cadet],  a  noble,  true,  manly  fellow,  who 
wore  a  watch  and  chain  presented  to  him  by  the  Humane 
Society  for  heroism  in  saving  a  boy's  life  when  he  was 
drowning,  at  the  peril  of  his  own." 

Such  an  act  seems  so  to  forecast  his  conduct  at  Gettys 
burg  that  I  hope  it  is  a  true  story,  and  would  like  to  know 
all  the  details  of  it.  Yours  truly, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

No.  218  EAST  SEVENTEENTH  STREET, 

NEW  YORK,  April  10,  1878. 
DOCTOR  PORTER  FARLEY, 

Dear  Sir:  I  was  pleased  to  receive  your  letter  of  the 
24th  ult,  and  especially  to  learn  your  personal  reasons  for 
leaving  the  service  when  you  did.  There  were  a  great 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       329 

many  heart-breaking  troubles  which  men  in  our  war  had  to 
bear  that  few  ever  thought  of,  outside  of  it.  But  I  knew 
them  well  in  several  instances,  and  I  could  often  imagine 
them  when  I  did  not  know  the  circumstances. 

Separation  from  those  dear  to  me,  at  that  period  in  my 
life,  was  the  greatest  hardship  I  had  to  endure.  I  hope  to 
hear  from  you  occasionally  at  least. 

Yours  truly, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 

NEWPORT,  R.  I.,  May  15,  1878. 
DOCTOR  PORTER  FARLEY, 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Dear  Friend:  I  have  just  returned  here  after  two 
months'  absence,  and  find  your  translation  of  Schweigger's 
"  Ophthalmology,"  which  you  have  so  kindly  sent  me  with 
your  compliments.  I  shall  read  it  with  much  interest  if  it 
is  not  too  technical  for  my  understanding.  I  hope  you  will 
be  rewarded  for  your  labor  pecuniarily,  but  think  you  can 
not  fail  to  add  to  your  reputation. 

I  hear  your  articles  on  Gettysburg  and  the  whole  series 
very  flatteringly  spoken  of.  It  is  a  great  pity  that  circum 
stances  of  ill  health  prevented  your  continuing  them  all  the 
way  through,  and  it  makes  us  all  regret  with  you  that  you 
could  not  have  continued  on  to  the  end. 

In  talking  with  my  sisters  about  O'Rorke's  watch,  they 
both  say  it  was  given  to  him  for  saving  the  life  of  another, 
though  they  do  not  know  certainly  whether  it  was  his 
schoolmates  or  others  who  did  it.  What  his  classmate, 
Major  Wilson,  says,  is  therefore  correct.  Mrs.  Roebling 
says  she  often  had  the  watch  in  her  hand  and  heard  the 
whole  matter  talked  over. 

Hoping  to  hear  from  you  now  and  then,  I  remain, 

Very  truly  yours, 

G.  K.  WARREN. 


330         THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 
LIEUTENANT  ROEBLING'S  LETTER 

No.  no  COLUMBIA  HEIGHTS, 

BROOKLYN,  December  13,  1877. 
PORTER  FARLEY,  ESQ., 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Dear  Sir:  I  have  read  with  much  interest  in  the  Roch 
ester  Democrat  and  Chronicle  of  December  3rd  your 
graphic  description  of  the  critical  episode  on  Round  Top 
Mountain  at  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg.  , 

I  was  the  mounted  officer  who  accompanied  General 
Warren  on  that  occasion.  I  went  with  Colonel  O'Rorke 
and  your  regiment  to  the  top  of  the  hill,  where  you  at 
once  became  engaged  with  the  enemy,  who  had  almost 
reached  the  crest  of  the  hill  during  the  short  interval 
which  elapsed  before  we  met  your  regiment,  after  we  came 
down  from  the  hill  where  the  signal  officer  was.  I  had 
been  on  the  summit  of  Little  Round  Top  for  half  an  hour 
with  the  signal  officer,  before  we  rushed  down  to  call  on 
you  for  help. 

I  left  Colonel  O'Rorke  as  soon  as  he  went  into  battle, 
and  started  with  a  message  to  General  Meade,  to  inform 
him  of  what  had  been  done.  I  passed  through  the  re 
mainder  of  Weed's  brigade  and  along  the  line  of  troops 
lying  on  the  Peach  Orchard  road,  who  were  already  en 
gaged  with  the  enemy,  and  it  seemed  to  me,  before  I  had 
passed  from  one  end  of  the  line  to  the  other,  they  had  lost 
half  their  members,  showing  the  severity  of  this  onset  and 
also  the  shortness  of  its  duration,  because  it  was  all  over  in 
half  an  hour. 

Vincent's  brigade  was  to  the  back  and  left  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fortieth  regiment.  They  were  marching 
through  the  woods,  and  arrived  just  in  time  to  check  the 
head  of  the  rebel  advance,  which  was  coming  up  the  ravine 
between  the  two  Round  Tops,  but  they  did  not  become  gen- 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       331 

erally  engaged  until  after  your  regiment  had  made  its  on 
slaught  on  the  rebels. 

So  far  as  my  memory  serves  me,  your  account  is  accurate 
in  every  respect,  even  down  to  very  minute  details  which 
could  only  have  been  seen  by  two  or  three  persons. 

The  tugging  of  the  horses  and  men  to  get  those  guns  up 
the  hill,  I  remember  as  if  it  were  yesterday. 

If  there  are  any  points  on  which  your  memory  may  have 
failed  you,  I  shall  be  happy  to  help  you  if  I  can.  A  slight 
hint  sometimes  brings  up  a  whole  chain  of  forgotten 
events.  Yours  very  truly, 

W.   A.   ROEBLING. 

The  statements  by  the  historians  about  the  battle  for  the 
possession  of  Little  Round  Top  are  so  contradictory  that 
their  inaccuracy  is  evident.  The  discovery  by  me,  a  few 
months  ago,  of  these  letters  from  General  Warren,  and 
Captain  Farley's  consent  to  their  publication,  led  to  the 
preparation  of  this  book.  If  any  further  evidence  is  needed 
to  show  that  the  historians  were  misinformed,  these  let 
ters  furnish  the  proof.  They  were  not  written  in  any 
spirit  of  controversy.  They  were  not  written  with  any 
thought  of  their  publication.  Had  Warren  lived  until  some 
or  all  of  these  histories  were  published  he  might  have  had 
something  to  say  about  the  matter;  but  he  died  in  1882. 
It  is  nearly  half  a  century  since  the  battle  of  Gettysburg 
was  fought.  An  earnest  effort  to  relate  the  true  story  of 
Little  Round  Top  justifies  the  publication  of  these  letters. 
They  prove  by  direct  statement,  or  by  fair  inference : 

First:  That  Warren  was  at  the  signal  station  on  Lit 
tle  Round  Top  before  the  Confederate  infantry  or  artillery 
made  its  appearance  in  front  of  Birney's  line,  and  that  he 
remained  there  until  the  arrival  of  Weed's  brigade,  which 
was  then  passing  over  the  low  ridge  at  the  north  end  of 
Little  Round  Top  into  the  Plum  Run  valley,  on  its  way  to 


332    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

reinforce  Sickles,  when  he  left  the  hill  and  detached  from 
that  brigade  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York, 
which  was  the  rear  regiment  of  the  brigade,  sent  it  to  the 
crest  of  the  hill  with  one  of  his  staff,  Lieutenant  Roebling, 
to  conduct  it  to  its  position,  while  the  remainder  of  the 
brigade  continued  its  march  to  the  front.  Warren  did  not 
return  to  the  hill,  but  rode  away  to  join  General  Meade. 

Second:  That  he  did  not  go  to  Sykes  and  Barnes;  that 
he  did  not  detach  Vincent's  brigade  and  conduct  it  to  its 
position  on  the  southern  slope  of  Little  Round  Top;  that 
he  did  not  see  Vincent's  brigade  come  up;  that  he  used  his 
aides,  Lieutenants  Mackenzie  and  Reese,  in  sending  for 
troops  to  occupy  the  hill. 

Third :  That  Warren,  being  unable  to  see  the  location  of 
Vincent's  brigade  from  his  point  of  observation,  knew  very 
little,  at  the  time,  of  the  fight  which  Vincent's  men  made 
there,  but  later  recognized  its  importance  and  gave  full 
credit  to  Vincent. 

The  reader  will  find  in  these  letters  abundant  evidence  of 
Warren's  generous  spirit,  with  no  attempt  to  claim  for  him 
self  all  the  glory. 

The  statement  in  Lieutenant  Roebling's  letter  that  Vin 
cent's  brigade  did  not  become  generally  engaged  until  after 
O'Rorke's  regiment  had  made  its  onslaught  on  the  rebels, 
is  a  mistake.  The  attack  on  Vincent's  right  flank  was  not 
made  until  the  troops  which  made  it  had  been  repulsed  sev 
eral  times  in  assaults  on  Vincent's  front  and  left.  Roebling 
was  with  Warren  near  the  signal  station,  and  neither  of 
them  heard  the  noise  of  the  fighting  about  Vincent's  posi 
tion,  for  reasons  which  I  have  stated  elsewhere. 


GKXKRAL   JOSHUA    L.    CITAMr.K RLAIX 


Faciny   Page    S3'2 


VIII 
APPOMATTOX 

IT  seems  fitting  to  close  this  account  of  a  portion  of  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  the  high  tide  of  the  conflict  for  the 
preservation  of  the  Union,  with  a  description  of  the  last 
scene  between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  written  by  one  of  the  regimental  com 
manders  at  Little  Round  Top,  who  served  to  the  end  of  the 
war  and  had  the  honor  of  commanding  the  parade  which 
received  the  formal  surrender  of  Lee's  army. 

This  paper  was  read  by  General  Chamberlain  several 
years  ago  at  a  reunion  of  the  survivors  of  the  old  brigade, 
and  is  published  by  the  kind  permission  of  its  author.  It 
is  entitled, 

THE  THIRD  BRIGADE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

At  two  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  April  9,  1865,  the 
Third  brigade,  after  a  feverish  march  of  twenty-nine  miles, 
came  to  a  halt,  the  rear  brigade  of  the  division  column, 
which  on  such  occasions  has  the  hardest  place  of  all.  Worn 
out,  body  and  spirit,  by  the  vexations  of  a  forced  march 
over  a  course  blocked  every  half  hour  by  the  nondescript 
and  unaccountable  obstacles  of  a  lagging  column  in  the 
road  ahead,  men  made  few  preliminaries  about  "  going 
into  camp."  That  peculiar  ingredient  of  humanity  called 
the  nervous  system  held  an  imperious  precedence,  not  only 
over  mind  and  matter,  but  over  army  regulations  and  disci 
pline.  There  was  no  voice  and  ear  for  roll-calls,  and  even 
the  command  of  empty  stomachs  did  not  avail  with  habit 
or  instinct  to  grope  among  the  jumbled  remnants  of  the 

333 


VIII 
APPOMATTOX 

IT  seems  fitting  to  close  this  account  of  a  portion  of  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  the  high  tide  of  the  conflict  for  the 
preservation  of  the  Union,  with  a  description  of  the  last 
scene  between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  written  by  one  of  the  regimental  com 
manders  at  Little  Round  Top,  who  served  to  the  end  of  the 
war  and  had  the  honor  of  commanding  the  parade  which 
received  the  formal  surrender  of  Lee's  army. 

This  paper  was  read  by  General  Chamberlain  several 
years  ago  at  a  reunion  of  the  survivors  of  the  old  brigade, 
and  is  published  by  the  kind  permission  of  its  author.  It 
is  entitled, 

THE  THIRD  BRIGADE  AT  APPOMATTOX 

At  two  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  April  9,  1865,  the 
Third  brigade,  after  a  feverish  march  of  twenty-nine  miles, 
came  to  a  halt,  the  rear  brigade  of  the  division  column, 
which  on  such  occasions  has  the  hardest  place  of  all.  Worn 
out,  body  and  spirit,  by  the  vexations  of  a  forced  march 
over  a  course  blocked  every  half  hour  by  the  nondescript 
and  unaccountable  obstacles  of  a  lagging  column  in  the 
road  ahead,  men  made  few  preliminaries  about  "  going 
into  camp."  That  peculiar  ingredient  of  humanity  called 
the  nervous  system  held  an  imperious  precedence,  not  only 
over  mind  and  matter,  but  over  army  regulations  and  disci 
pline.  There  was  no  voice  and  ear  for  roll-calls,  and  even 
the  command  of  empty  stomachs  did  not  avail  with  habit 
or  instinct  to  grope  among  the  jumbled  remnants  of  the 

333 


334    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

too  familiar  haversacks.  Officers  and  men  alike  flung 
themselves  right  and  left  along  the  roadside,  whether  it 
were  bank  or  ditch,  in  whatever  order  or  disorder  the  col 
umn  had  halted.  Horses  and  riders  exchanged  positions, 
the  patient  animals,  with  slackened  girths,  dozing  with 
drooping  head  just  over  the  faces  of  their  masters.  In  an 
instant,  as  it  were,  the  struggling,  straggling  hosts  were 
wrapped  in  misty  darkness  and  silence. 

But  suddenly  and  soon  the  bugles  rang  out  "  The  Gen 
eral  !  "  Orders  came  to  march  within  an  hour's  time. 
Word  had  come  from  Sheridan  that  he  was  at  Appomattox 
Station,  and  that  if  we  could  hurry  up  he  could  cut  the 
head  of  Lee's  column,  then  near  Appomattox  Court  House. 
Such  a  summons  itself  gave  something  of  the  strength  it 
demanded.  Spirit  triumphed  over  body,  and  seemed  to  be 
on  the  alert  before  the  latter  could  fully  recover  its  senses. 
The  time  given  was  intended  to  provide  for  a  meal,  but 
that  required  also  material,  which  indeed  was  now  so  simple 
as  to  quality  and  quantity  as  to  make  choice  no  task.  Some 
of  the  younger  regiments  of  the  division  were  seen  light 
ing  dismal  little  fires  to  fry  salt  pork  or  steep  some  musty, 
sodden  coffee.  The  Third  brigade,  made  up  of  veterans, 
spared  their  strength  until  the  last  for  severer  exercises. 
But  this  time  patience  did  not  attain  to  its  perfect  work. 
While  sitting  on  their  heels  munching  crumbs  of  hard  tack 
and  watching  the  coffee  gradually  "  taking  water,"  so  as 
to  produce  a  black  liquid  which  could  be  sipped  from  the 
black  tin  dipper,  word  suddenly  came  that  the  Third  bri 
gade  was  to  take  the  head  of  the  column,  and  must  pull  out 
at  once.  The  glimmering  daybreak  made  still  more  weird 
the  scenes  and  sounds  which  betokened  that  untimely  de 
parture,  and  the  glimmering  breakfasts  must  have  evoked 
similar  wild  sensations  for  the  benighted  stomachs  of  the 
Third  brigade.  But  a  brisk  march  with  a  fight  at  the  end 
was  the  best  medicine  for  such  a  mood. 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       335 

In  three  hours  we  were  at  Appomattox  Station,  and  then 
learned  that  Sheridan,  with  the  cavalry,  had  pushed  on  to 
Appomattox  Court  House,  leaving  word  for  us  to  follow 
with  all  possible  dispatch.  Indeed,  there  was  no  need  of 
orders  to  this  effect,  for  we  now  began  to  hear  the  boom 
of  cannon  ahead,  and  we  knew  that  Sheridan  and  our  glo 
rious  cavalry  had  cut  across  Lee's  last  line  of  retreat. 
Every  heart  beat  high.  No  "  obstacles  "  hindered  that 
march.  The  head  of  the  Fifth  corps  ran  past  the  rear  of 
the  Twenty-fourth,  which  had  had  the  advance  in  the  or 
der  of  march.  It  was  a  triple  column.  The  roads  were 
taken  mostly  by  whatever  was  to  go  on  wheels,  the  men  of 
both  corps  pressing  along  the  fields  on  each  side.  We 
were  evidently  so  near  the  "  front  "  that  General  Bartlett 
thought  it  time  to  throw  forward  a  "  division  "  skirmish 
line,  which  he  and  General  Griffin  followed  with  character 
istic  eagerness.  I  was  following  with  my  own  brigade  and 
the  Second  (Gregory's),  when  there  dashed  out  of  a  farm 
road  on  our  right  an  officer  of  General  Sheridan's  staff, 
who  gave  me  a  hurried  order  to  break  off  from  the  column 
at  once,  without  waiting  for  communication  with  any  im 
mediate  superiors,  and  hasten  to  the  support  of  Sheri 
dan,  who  was  that  moment  forced  to  fall  back  somewhat 
before  the  desperate  onset  of  Gordon's  old  "  Stonewall 
Corps." 

Now  it  was  the  "  double-quick,"  indeed.  This  move 
ment,  of  course,  brought  me  on  the  ground  our  cavalry 
occupied,  and  on  the  enemy's  left  flank,  at  nearly  the  same 
time  at  which  our  skirmish  line  had  struck  them  in  their 
proper  front,  the  direction  of  the  Lynchburg  Pike.  Reach 
ing  the  ground,  I  wheeled  into  double  line  of  battle  and 
gradually  replaced  our  cavalry,  which  galloped  off  to  our 
right,  while  the  Third  brigade  still  poured  in  upon  my  left. 
In  this  way  we  pressed  the  enemy  steadily  back  upon  Ap 
pomattox  Court  House.  There  was  gallant  and  wild  work 


336    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

done  there  by  the  Third  brigade,  as  well  as  by  the  rest  of 
the  division. 

Gordon  had  hoped  to  force  his  way  through  our  cavalry 
before  our  infantry  could  get  up,  and  reach  Lynchburg  with 
the  resolute  remnant  of  his  famous  old  corps.  But  when 
there  burst  upon  his  front  and  flank  these  lines  of  ours  they 
knew  so  well,  that  had  so  unexpectedly  kept  pace  with  the 
cavalry  and  marched  around  his  retreating  front,  desper 
ately  as  he  had  pressed  his  march,  the  veterans  of  Lee's 
army  took  in  the  situation  as  by  instinct.  Their  resist 
ance  was  mechanical  and  by  force  of  habit  or  discipline. 
Their  old  dash  and  daring  were  gone.  When  our  ad 
vance  struck  them  at  close  quarters,  they  fell  back  in  dis 
order  or  rendered  themselves  up  as  prisoners.  As  an  ex 
ample  of  this  feeling,  all  that  was  left  of  an  entire  brigade 
surrendered  to  a  single  staff  officer  of  the  Third  brigade, 
who  dashed  up  to  them  with  the  demand.  It  may  well  be 
believed  that  our  men  also  were  responsive  to  the  logic 
of  the  situation.  The  end  was  now  so  near  they  could  see 
through  to  it,  and  they  were  bound  to  "  be  there  "  them 
selves.  Action  there  was  of  the  most  stirring  kind,  but  of 
passion  nothing.  No  man  wantonly  or  in  excitement  struck 
at  the  life  of  his  antagonist.  It  was  an  example  of  what  is 
so  strangely,  and  for  want  of  an  adequate  word,  called  a 
"  moral  "  effect. 

When  in  the  heat  of  the  onset  the  flag  of  truce  was  seen 
coming  in  on  our  right,  some  deeper,  inner  sense  seemed  to 
stifle  all  the  others.  All  was  moving  with  such  momen 
tum,  that  when  the  order  came  at  length  to  cease  firing  and 
to  halt,  it  was  next  to  impossible  to  stop  the  men.  They 
saw  well  that  we  held  the  rebel  army  at  bay,  and  what  the 
consequence  must  soon  be  they  did  not  need  to  be  told ;  only 
whatever  was  to  be  done,  they  wanted  to  be  there  and  have 
a  hand  in  it.  If  there  was  anything  to  be  seen,  they  had 
earned  the  right  to  front  seats  at  the  spectacle.  But  when 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       337 

at  about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  brief,  thrilling 
message  was  passed  along  the  lines,  "  Lee  surrenders !  " 
there  was  a  tumult  as  of  an  ocean  let  loose.  Men  went 
wild  with  the  sweeping  energies  of  that  assurance,  which 
answered  so  much  of  long-cherished  hope  and  of  long-en 
dured  suffering  that  had  marked  their  loyal  and  brave 
career. 

Now  that  they  were  no  longer  allowed  to  go  forward 
and  did  not  know  how  to  go  backward,  there  was  no  direc 
tion  left  but  to  go  upward,  and  that  way  they  took  —  to  the 
top  of  fences,  haystacks,  roofs,  and  chimneys,  that  they 
might  send  their  hallelujahs  and  toss  their  old  caps  higher 
toward  heaven.  The  rebels  over  across  the  slender  rivulets 
of  the  Appomattox  were  shouting  their  side  of  the  jubila 
tion,  from  whatever  cause,  whether  cheering  Lee  as  he  rode 
over  to  speak  a  last  word  to  them,  or  whether  in  deep  truth 
they  were  heartily  sick  of  the  war  and  felt  that  their  loyal 
spirit  and  manly  energies  were  wasted  in  a  hopeless  and 
perhaps  mistaken  cause.  There  is  reason  to  believe  the  lat 
ter  feeling  was  the  motive  of  their  exuberant  demonstra 
tion,  whose  echoes  rolled  along  the  hillsides  long  after  all 
was  silent  in  our  bivouac.  For  toward  evening  some  of 
the  rations  that  had  been  promised  us  for  distribution  at 
nine  o'clock  that  morning,  and  from  which  we  had  double- 
quicked  away,  had  now  got  up,  and  we  could  finish  our 
breakfasts  before  lying  down  in  peace  at  the  close  of  that 
eventful  day;  and  a  certain  deeper  peace  was  ours,  in  that 
learning  now  of  the  starving  condition  of  our  surrender 
ing  foes,  twenty  thousand  rations  were  sent  over  just  as 
the  day  was  done,  into  that  camp  of  fellow-countrymen 
we  had  restored  to  brotherhood.  Fitting  token  and  em 
blem  of  the  spirit  in  which  that  victory  was  won  and  that 
day  ended !  Here  too  was  possibly  one  reason  for  the 
cheering  that  echoed  in  our  ears  as  we  fell  asleep  on  that 
Palm  Sunday  evening. 


338    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

All  the  next  day,  and  the  day  after,  measures  were  being 
determined  as  to  the  actual  breaking  up  of  Lee's  army,  and 
the  return  of  ours.  Grant  and  Lee  had  not  lingered,  after 
the  main  points  were  settled,  nor  indeed  was  Sheridan  seen 
again  on  the  field.  Generals  Griffin,  Gibbon,  and  Merritt 
were  appointed  commissioners  to  arrange  the  final  details. 

All  this  while  the  visiting  fever  and  the  exchanging  of 
tokens  and  souvenirs  ran  wild  through  both  armies. 
Stringent  measures  had  to  be  taken  to  prevent  utter  con 
fusion  in  both  camps,  especially  in  ours,  as  it  seemed  to  be 
understood  that  we  were  the  hosts,  and  it  was  our  "  at 
home  "  reception.  This  spirit  of  exchange  shortly  passed 
into  the  spirit  of  trade ;  for  our  rations,  after  the  best  was 
done,  were  very  short,  and  for  three  days  afterwards  it  be 
came  necessary  to  forage  the  country  far  and  wide  to  get 
even  raw  corn  enough  for  man  and  beast.  So  the  market 
"  went  up  "  decidedly  on  all  sorts  of  farm  produce.  Hard 
tack  was  a  luxury,  and  coffee  and  sugar  at  a  high  pre 
mium. 

How  or  why  it  came  about,  I  do  not  know,  but  on  the 
evening  of  the  loth  of  April  I  was  summoned  to  headquar 
ters,  and  informed  that  I  was  to  command  the  parade  which 
was  to  receive  the  formal  surrender  of  the  arms  and  colors 
of  the  rebel  army  the  next  morning.  This  was  an  order, 
and  to  be  received  and  obeyed  without  question.  One  re 
quest  only  I  ventured  to  make  of  my  corps  commander.  It 
was  that,  considering  this  occasion,  I  might  resume  com 
mand  of  my  old  brigade,  the  Third,  from  which  I  had  been 
transferred  in  June,  1864,  with  which  I  had  served  up  to 
that  time  since  my  entrance  into  the  service.  My  request 
was  granted,  and  on  that  evening  I  yielded  the  command  of 
my  gallant  First  brigade,  and  went  back  to  my  veterans. 

General  Grant  was  a  magnanimous  man,  great-minded 
and  large-minded.  He  would  have  nothing  done  for  show 
and  no  vain  ceremony.  He  granted  to  officers  the  high 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       339 

privilege  of  retaining  their  swords,  and  all  men  who  owned 
their  horses  were  made  welcome  to  keep  them,  as  they 
would  need  them  to  plow  their  land.  The  rebels  had 
begged  to  be  spared  the  pain  of  actually  laying  down  their 
arms  and  colors  in  the  presence  of  our  troops,  and  to  be 
permitted  to  stack  them  in  front  of  their  own  camps  and 
march  off,  and  let  us  go  and  pick  them  up  after  they  had 
gone.  But  this  would  be  to  err  too  far  on  the  side  of 
mildness.  So  it  was  insisted  that,  while  the  surrendering 
army  should  be  spared  all  that  could  humiliate  their  man 
hood,  yet  the  insignia  of  the  rebellion  and  the  tokens  of  the 
power  and  will  to  hurt,  lifted  against  the  country's  honor 
and  life,  must  be  laid  down  in  due  military  form  in  pres 
ence  of  a  designated  portion  of  our  army. 

This  latter  office  fell  to  our  lot.  It  gave  us,  no  doubt, 
a  grateful  satisfaction  and  permitted  a  modest  pride,  but  it 
was  not  accepted  as  a  token  that  we  surpassed  our  com 
rades  in  merit  of  any  kind. 

We  formed  our  line  of  battle  on  the  southern  margin  of 
the  principal  street  in  Appomattox  Court  House.  Massa 
chusetts  on  the  right  —  her  Thirty-second  regiment,  with 
all  that  was  left  to  us  of  her  Ninth,  Eighteenth,  and 
Twenty-second ;  then  Maine  —  her  Twentieth  regiment, 
with  the  delivered  remnant  of  her  Second  and  her  First 
Sharpshooters;  Michigan  next  —  her  Sixteenth,  with  inter- 
minglings  of  her  First  and  Fourth.  On  the  left  Pennsyl 
vania1 —  her  One  Hundred  and  Fifty-fifth  holding  also 
filaments  which  bound  us  with  the  Sixty-second,  Eighty- 
third,  Ninety-first,  and  One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth,  an 
immortal  band,  which  held  in  it  the  soul  of  the  famous 
"  Light  Brigade,"  and  of  the  stern  old  First  division,  Por 
ter's,  which  was  nucleus  of  the  Fifth  corps,  men  among 
them  who  had  fired  the  first  shot  at  Yorktown,  and  others 
that  had  fired  the  last  at  Appomattox,  and  who  thus  bore 
upon  their  banners  all  the  battles  of  that  army. 


340    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

By  the  courtesy  of  General  Bartlett  the  First  brigade, 
which  I  had  so  long  commanded,  and  the  Second,  which 
had  been  with  me  in  this  last  campaign,  were  sent  to  me 
and  held  part  in  the  parade,  being  formed  on  another  line 
across  the  street  and  facing  us.  These  were,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Ninety-eighth  Pennsyl 
vania,  composed  of  New  York  regiments, —  the  One  Hun 
dred  and  Eighty-fifth,  One  Hundred  and  Eighty-seventh, 
One  Hundred  and  Eighty-eighth,  and  One  Hundred  and 
Eighty-ninth, —  which  in  severe  service  had  made  them 
selves  veterans  worthy  the  fellowship  of  those  sterling  old 
New  York  regiments  that  had  fulfilled  their  time  and  fame. 
Names  and  figures,  all  of  these,  dear  to  every  heart  that 
had  shared  their  eventful  and  glorious  history. 

As  we  stood  there  in  the  morning  mist,  straining  our  eyes 
toward  that  camp  about  to  break  up  for  the  last  march,  a 
feeling  came  over  our  hearts  which  led  us  to  make  some  ap 
propriate  recognition  of  this  great,  last  meeting. 

We  could  not  content  ourselves  with  simply  standing  in 
line  and  witnessing  this  crowning  scene.  So  instructions 
were  sent  to  the  several  commanders  that  at  the  given  sig 
nals,  as  the  head  of  each  division  of  the  surrendering  col 
umn  approached  their  right,  they  should  in  succession  bring 
their  men  to  "  attention  "  and  arms  to  the  "  carry,"  then  re 
suming  the  "  ordered  arms  "  and  the  "  parade  rest."  And 
now  we  see  the  little  shelter  tents  on  the  opposite  slope  melt 
ing  away  and  carefully  folded,  being  things  which  were 
needed  by  men  as  men  and  not  as  tokens  of  rebellion. 
Soon  the  gray  masses  are  in  motion  —  once  more  toward 
us  —  as  in  the  days  that  were  gone.  A  thrilling  sight. 
First,  Gordon,  with  the  "  Stonewall  Corps  " ;  then  their 
First  corps, —  Longstreet's, —  no  less  familiar  to  us  and  to 
fame;  then  Anderson,  with  his  new  Fourth  corps;  and 
lastly,  A.  P.  Hill's  corps,  commanded  now  by  Heth,  since 
Hill  had  fallen  at  one  of  the  river  fights  a  few  days  before, 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       341 

On  they  come  with  careless,  swinging  route  step,  the  col 
umn  thick  with  battle  flags,  disproportionate  to  their  de 
pleted  numbers.  As  they  come  opposite  our  right  our 
bugle  sounds  the  signal,  repeated  along  our  line.  Each 
organization  comes  to  "  attention,"  and  thereupon  takes  up 
successively  the  "  carry."  The  gallant  General  Gordon,  at 
the  head  of  the  marching  column,  outdoes  us  in  courtesy. 
He  was  riding  with  downcast  eyes  and  more  than  pensive 
look;  but  at  this  clatter  of  arms  he  raises  his  eyes  and,  in 
stantly  catching  the  significance,  wheels  his  horse  with  that 
superb  grace  of  which  he  is  master,  drops  the  point  of  his 
sword  to  his  stirrup,  gives  a  command,  at  which  the  great 
Confederate  ensign  following  him  is  dipped,  and  his  deci 
mated  brigades,  as  they  reach  our  right,  respond  to  the 
"  carry."  All  the  while  on  our  part  not  a  sound  of 
trumpet  or  drum,  not  a  cheer,  nor  word  nor  motion  of  man, 
but  awful  stillness,  as  if  it  were  the  passing  of  the  dead. 
Now  and  then  a  gust  of  wind  would  spring  up  from  the 
south  with  strange  greeting;  our  starry  ensigns  stiffen  and 
fly  out  as  if  to  welcome  back  the  returning  brothers.  The 
ensigns  of  rebellion  seem  to  shrink  back  and  strain  away 
from  the  fated  farewell. 

So  a  division  at  a  time  covers  our  front.  They  halt, 
face  inward,  some  ten  paces  from  us ;  carefully  "  dress  " 
their  lines,  each  captain  as  careful  of  his  alignment  as  if  at 
a  dress  parade.  Then  they  fix  bayonets,  stack  arms,  then 
wearily  remove  their  cartridge-boxes  and  hang  them' on  the 
pile;  lastly,  reluctantly,  painfully,  they  furl  their  battle- 
stained  flags  and  lay  them  down ;  some,  unable  to  restrain 
themselves,  rushing  from  the  ranks,  clinging  to  them, 
kneeling  over  them  and  kissing  them  with  burning  tears. 
And  then  the  Flag  of  the  Union  floats  alone  upon  the 
field. 

Then,  stripped  of  every  sign  of  the  rebellion  and  token 
of  its  hate  and  will  to  hurt,  they  march  off  to  give  their 


342    THE  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF 

•word  of  honor  never  to  lift  arms  against  the  old  flag  again, 
and  are  free  to  go  where  they  will  in  the  broad  Republic. 

Thus  division  after  division  passes,  and  it  takes  the  whole 
day  long  to  complete  this  deliverance.  Twenty-seven  thou 
sand  men  paroled,  one  hundred  and  forty  cannon  and  near 
that  number  of  battle  flags  surrendered,  but  only  about 
seventeen  thousand  stand  of  small  arms.  For  sometimes 
a  whole  brigade,  or  what  was  left  of  it,  had  scarcely  a 
score  of  arms  to  surrender,  having  thrown  them  away  by 
roadside  and  riverside  in  weariness  of  flight  or  hopelessness 
of  heart,  or  disdaining  to  carry  them  longer,  only  to  be 
taken  from  them  in  token  of  a  lost  cause.  After  this  it 
remained  only  to  gather  up  what  was  serviceable  of  this 
material  of  war  and  to  destroy  the  rest.  Nothing  was  left 
which  could  be  turned  to  use  against  the  Union  armies. 
The  cartridge-boxes  were  emptied  on  the  ground  for  the 
most  part,  burned,  and  after  the  troops  had  withdrawn, 
at  the  first  dusk  of  evening,  it  was  a  weird  and  almost  sad 
sight  to  see  the  running  flame  with  frequent  bursts  of  lurid 
explosion  along  the  lines  where  the  surrendering  army  had 
stood ;  then  only  bits  of  leather  writhing  in  the  gray  ashes. 

All  was  over.  With  the  dawn  of  morning  the  hillsides 
were  alive  with  men,  in  groups  or  singly,  on  foot  or  horse, 
making  their  way  as  by  the  instinct  of  an  ant,  each  with  his 
own  little  burden,  each  for  his  own  little  harbor  or  home. 

And  we  were  left  alone  and  lonesome!  The  familiar 
forms  that  had  long  so  firmly  held  our  eyes,  until  they  al 
most  demanded  the  sight  of  them  for  their  daily  satisfac 
tion,  had  vanished  like  a  dream.  The  very  reason  of  our 
existence  seemed  to  have  been  taken  away.  And  when  on 
the  morrow  we  took  up  our  march  again,  though  home 
ward,  something  was  lacking  in  the  spring  and  spice  wrhich 
had  enlivened  us  through  even  the  dreariest  times.  To  be 
sure,  the  war  was  not  over  yet,  but  we  felt  that  the  dis 
tinctive  work  of  the  old  Third  brigade  was  over.  We  were 


LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  GETTYSBURG       343 

soon  to  be  mustered  out;  but  never  to  be  again  as  if  the 
Third  brigade  had  not  become  a  part  of  our  lives ;  a  part  of 
our  souls.  There  were  "thoughts  that  ran  before  and 
after,"  memories  of  things  that  cannot  be  told,  and  new 
purposes  of  manly  living  and  hopes  of  useful  service  yet,  in 
visions  of  a  broader  citizenship  and  the  career  of  an  en 
franchised  country. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


\FPOMATTOX-Third    Brigade    at, 

333-343- 

'Army  of  the  Potomac,  History 
of,"  see  Stint. 

^yres,  Brig.-Gen.  Romeyn  B., 
Second  Division,  see,  Re 
ports,  Official. 

BARNES,  Brig.-Gen.  James,  see  Re 
ports,  Official. 

'Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil 
War,"  see  Hunt,  General 
Henry  J. 

Beecham,  Captain  R.  K.,  "Gettys 
burg,  the  Pivotal  Battle 
of  the  Civil  War,"  67-76. 

—commentary  on,  76-77. 

Benning's  Brigade,  see  Reports, 
Official. 

Birney,  General  D.  B.,  official  re 
port  quoted,  43-44. 

Bulger,  Colonel,  surrender  of,  93, 
H3,  149. 

'CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 
POTOMAC,"  see  Swinton. 

Dase,  Lieutenant  A.  P.,  Notes  on 
Taking  and  Holding  Lit 
tle  Round  Top,  296-302. 

—commentary  on,  302. 

—Farley,  Captain  Porter  on,  302- 
304- 

IThamberlain,  Col.  Joshua  L., 
Twentieth  Maine  In 
fantry,  see  Reports,  Offi 
cial. 

—General  Grant's  Appointment  of, 
as  brigadier  general,  273, 
note. 

—on  the  Third  Brigade  at  Ap- 
pomattox,  333,  343. 

—quoted,  91. 

'Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg," 
see  Doubleday,  General 
Abner. 


347 


"Civil  War  in  America,  The,"  see 
Paris,  Comte  de. 

Confederate  Official  Reports,  see 
Reports,  Official. 

Connor,  Lieut-Col.  Freeman, 
Forty-fourth  New  York 
Infantry,  see  Reports, 
Official. 

Crawford,  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  W., 
Third  Division,  see  Re 
ports,  Official. 

DOUBLEDAY,  General  Abner  "Chan 
cellorsville  and  Gettys 
burg,"  20-22. 

— commentary  on,  22-23. 

EIGHTY-THIRD  PENNSYLVANIA  IN 
FANTRY,  see  Woodward, 
Reports,  Official. 

i 

FARLEY,  Captain  Porter,  Letters  of 
Comte  de  Paris  to,  304- 
306. 

— Military  record,  290-291. 

— "Number  Nine,"  125-140. 

— commentary  on,   140. 

Fifteenth  Alabama  Infantry,  see 
Reports,  Official. 

"Fifth  Army  Corps,  The/'  see 
Powell,  Lieutenant  Colo 
nel  William  H. 

Fifth  Texas  Infantry,  see  Reports, 
Official. 

First  Brigade,  see  Tilton,  Reports, 
Official. 

— Texas  Infantry,  see  Reports, 
Official. 

Fisher,  Col.  Joseph  W.,  Third 
Brigade,  see  Reports, 
Official 

Forty-fourth  Alabama  Infantry, 
see  Reports,  Official. 

— New  York  Infantry,  see  Con 
nor,  Reports,  Official. 


348 


INDEX 


Forty-seventh  Alabama  Infantry, 
see  Reports,  Official. 

Forty-eighth  Alabama  Infantry, 
official  report,  141-142. 

Fourth  Alabama  Infantry,  see  Re 
ports,  Official. 

— Texas  Infantry,  see  Reports, 
Official. 

"Four  Years  with  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,"  see  Tro- 
briand,  General  Regis  de. 

GARRARD,  Col.  Kenner,  Third  Bri 
gade,  see  Reports,  Official. 

Geary,  General,  official  report 
quoted,  43. 

"Gettysburg,  the  Pivotal  Battle  of 
the  Civil  War,"  see 
Beecham. 

"Gettysburg  Then  and  Now,"  see 
Vander slice. 

Griffin,  Brig.-Gen.  Charles,  see  Re 
ports,  Official. 

HOOD,       Major-General,       report 

quoted,  80-83. 
Humphreys,  General  A.  A.,  official 

report  quoted,  44. 
Hunt,   General   Henry  J.,   Battles 

and  Leaders  of  the  Civil 

War,"  39-40. 
— commentary  on,  40. 

INTRODUCTION,  n. 

LAW,  General  E.  M.,  "The  Strug 
gle  for  Round  Top," — 
"Battles  and  Leaders  in 
the  Civil  War,"  114-123. 

— commentary  on,  123-125. 

Law's  Brigade,  see  Reports,  Offi 
cial. 

Letters  and  Papers — 

— Mackenzie,  Lieutenant,  to  Gen 
eral  Meade,  292. 

— Notes  on  Taking  and  Holding 
Little  Round  Top,  296-302. 

commentary  on,  302. 

Farley,  Captain  Porter  on,  302. 

— Paris,  Comte  de,  to  Captain 
Porter  Farley,  304-306. 

— Roebling,  Lieutenant  W.  A.,  330. 


Letters  and   Papers — 

— Sykes,  General,  293-295. 

commentary   on,   295-296. 

—Warren,  307-329- 

Little  Round  Top,  Notes  on  Tak 
ing  and  Holding,  296-302. 

— commentary  on,  302-304. 

— Farley,  Captain  Porter  on,  302. 

Longstreet,  General,  quoted,  85, 
102. 

MACKENZIE,  Lieutenant,  letter  of 
to  General  Meade,  292. 

Meade,  General,  Circular  to  Army, 
127-128. 

— letter  of  Lieutenant  Mackenzie 
to,  292. 

NASH,  Captain,  quoted,  89. 
"Number  Nine,"  see  Farley. 

GATES,  Colonel  William  C,  "The 
War  Between  the  Union 
and  the  Confederacy,"  77- 
no. 

— commentary  on,  110-113. 

Official  Reports,  see  Reports,  Offi 
cial. 

O'Rorke,  Colonel  Patrick  H., 
Sketch  of,  288-290. 

— Death,  Warren  letter  on,  321. 

PARIS,  Comte  de,  Letters  of  to 
Captain  Porter  Farley, 
304-306. 

—"The  Civil  War  in  America/' 
23-30. 

commentary  on,  30-38. 

Perry,  Colonel  W.  F.,  quoted,  107- 
110. 

Powell,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wil 
liam  H.,  "The  Fifth  Army 
Corps,"  42-54. 

— commentary  on,  55-57. 

Prince,  Captain  Howard  L., 
quoted,  90. 

REPORTS,  Official,  Confederate— 
— Benning's    Brigade,    167-171. 

Benning,  Brig.-Gen.  Henry  L., 

167-171. 

commentary  on,  180-181. 

— Law's  Brigade,   141-149. 
commentary  on,  171  et  seq. 


INDEX 


349 


REPORTS,  Official,  Confederate — 

Fifteenth  Alabama  Infantry, 

144-146. 

commentary  on,  175. 

— — Fourth  Alabama  Infantry,  142*- 
144. 

commentary  on,  173. 

Forty-fourth  Alabama  Infan 
try,  146-148. 

commentary  on,  175. 

Forty-seventh  Alabama  In 
fantry,  148-149. 

— commentary  on,  176. 

— — Forty-eighth  Alabama  In 
fantry,  141-142. 

— • commentary  on,  172. 

— Robertson's  Brigade,  149-166. 

— — Robertson,    Brig.-Gen.    J.    B., 

149-155. 

commentary  on,  177. 

Fifth  Texas  Infantry,  163-166. 

commentary  on,  179. 

First  Texas  Infantry,  156-161. 

— commentary  on,  178. 

— i — Fourth    Texas    Infantry,    161- 

162. 

commentary  on,  178. 

Third  Arkansas  Infantry,  155- 

156. 

commentary  on,  177-178. 

Reports,   Official,  Union — 

commentary  on,  236. 

— Ayres,    Brig.-Gen.    Romeyn    B., 

Second  Division,  222-223. 

commentary  on,  246. 

Barnes,  Brig.-Gen.  James,  186- 

197- 

commentary  on,  240-241. 

— Chamberlain,     Col.    Joshua    L., 

Twentieth    Maine    Infan 
try,  210-2*18. 

commentary  on,   242. 

— Connor,    Lieut.    Col.    Freeman, 

Forty-fourth    New    York 

Infantry,    220-221. 

commentary   on,    245-246. 

— Crawford,     Brig.-Gen.     Samuel 

W.,  Third  Division,  226-7, 

232. 

commentary  on,  248-249. 

—Fisher,   Col.  Joseph  W.,  Third 

Brigade,  232-234. 


REPORTS,  Official,  Union — 

commentary  on,  249-252. 

— Garrard,     Col.     Kenner,     Third 

Brigade     (Weed's),    223- 

225. 

commentary  on,  247-248. 

—Griffin,   Brig.-Gen.   Charles,   186. 
—Rice,  Col.  James  C,  Third  Bri 
gade,  205-210. 

commentary   on,  242. 

— Stoughton,     Maj.     Homer     R., 

Third    Army    Corps,   234- 

236. 
— Sweitzer,  Col.  Jacob  B.,  Second 

Brigade,   199-205. 

commentary  on,  241. 

— Sykes,    Maj. -Gen.    George,    181- 

186. 

commentary  on,   236. 

— Tilton,    Col.    William    S.,    First 

Brigade,  197-199. 

commentary  on,  241. 

— Weed's  Brigade,  see  Garrard. 
—Welch,    Lieut.-Col.    Norval    K, 

Sixteenth    Michigan,   218- 

220. 

commentary  on,  242". 

— Woodward,    Capt.    Orpheus    S., 

Eighty-third  Pennsylvania 

Infantry,  221-222. 
— — commentary  on,  246. 

RICE,  Col.  James  C,  Third  Bri 
gade,  see  Reports,  Official. 

Robertson,  Brigade,  see  Re 
ports,  Official. 

Roebling,  Lieutenant  W.  A.,  letter 
of,  330. 

Round  Top,  Attack  and  Defense 
of,  253-275. 

—Attack,  the,  253-262. 

— Defense,  the,  262-275. 

"Round  Top,  The  Struggle  for," 
see  Law. 

"SECOND  ARMY  CORPS,  HISTORY 
OF,"  see  Walker,  General 
Francis  A. 

Second  Brigade,  see  Sweitzer,  Re 
ports,  Official. 

Sixteenth  Michigan,  see  Welch, 
Reports,  Official 


350 


INDEX 


Stine,  J.  H.,  "History  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,"  60-65. 

— commentary  on,  65-66. 

Stoughton,  Maj.  Homer  R.,  Third 
Army  Corps,  see  Reports, 
Official. 

Sweitzer,  Col.  James  B.,  Second 
Brigade,  see  Reports, 
Official 

Swinton,  William,  "Campaigns  of 
the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac,"  16-18. 

— commentary  on,  18-20. 

Sykes,  Maj.  Gen.  George,  see  Re 
ports,  Official 

—letter  of,  293-295. 

— commentary  on,  29^-296. 

THIRD  ARMY  BRIGADE,  see  Rice 
and  Stoughton,  Reports, 
Official 

— Arkansas  Infantry,  see  Reports, 
Official 

at  Appomattox,  333-343- 

— Brigade,  see  Garrard,  Reports, 
Official 

Tilton,  Col.  William  S.,  see  Re 
ports,  Official 

Trobriand,  General  Regis  de, 
"Four  years  with  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac," 
41-42. 

— commentary  on,  42. 

Twentieth  Maine  Infantry,  see 
Chamberlain,  Reports,  Of 
ficial. 

UNION  OFFICIAL  REPORTS,  see  Re 
ports,  official. 

VANDERSLICE,   J.    M.,   "Gettysburg 

Then  and  Now,"  57-59. 
— commentary  on,  59-60. 


Vincent,  Brigadier-General  Strong, 
281-285. 

— Letters  concerning,  and  his  Bri 
gade  at  Gettysburg,  285- 
288. 

Butterfield,  Major  General 

Daniel,  286. 

Chamberlain,  Major-General 

Joshua  L.,  286. 

Eliot,  Charles  W.,  Harvard 

University,  287. 

Longstreet,  General  James, 

288. 

Spear,  General  Ellis,  287. 

Vincent's  Brigade,  see  Rice,  Re 
ports,  Official 


WALKER,  General  Francis  A., 
"History  of  the  Second 
Army  Corps,"  38-39. 

— commentary  on,  39. 

"War  Between  the  Union  and  the 
Confederacy,"  see  Oates. 

Warren,  General  Gouverneur 
Kemble,  276-281. 

—letters,  307-329- 

— commentary  on,  331-332. 

— — Farley,  Captain  Porter  on, 
317,  321- 

quoted,   130-132. 

Weed's  Brigade,  see  Garrard,  Re 
ports,  Official 

Welch,  Lieut-Col.  Nprval  E.,  Six 
teenth  Michigan,  see  Re 
ports,  Official 

Wilderness,  Battle  of,  Warren  let 
ter  on,  326. 

Woodward,  Capt.  Orpheus  S., 
Third  Pennsylvania  In 
fantry,  see  Reports,  Offi 
cial 


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